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THE  
REFORMED CHURCH  
REVIEW.

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YE SHALL KNOW THE TRUTH, AND THE TRUTH SHALL MAKE YOU FREE

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# CONTENTS.

ARTICLE	No. 1.	PAGE
I.—The Contribution of the Hebrews to Civilization. By The REV. CALVIN K. STAUDT, Ph.D. . . . .		1
II.—Scientific Study of Religious Revivals. By The REV. H. M. J. KLEIN, Ph.D. . . . .		16
III.—Evangelism in the Reformed Churches. By The REV. HENRY COLLIN MINTON, D.D., LL.D. . . . .		43
IV.—The Preacher's Greatest Problem. By The REV. SCOTT R. WAGNER . . . . .		52
V.—The Greatness of <i>Hamlet</i> as a Work of Dramatic Art. By PROF. C. ERNEST WAGNER, A.M. . . . .		65
VI.—Punishment. By The REV. A. G. GEKELER . . . . .		85
VII.—Contemporary Religious and Theological Thought in Great Britain and America. By The REV. A. S. WEBER, D.D. . . . .		91
VIII.—Editorial Department.		
The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America		107
IX.—Notices of New Books . . . . .		114
<i>Hinke: A New Boundary Stone of Nebuchadrezzar I. from Nippur; Sternberg: Die Ethik des Deuteronomiums; Sheldon: Unbelief in the Nineteenth Century; Richards: Christian Worship: Its Principles and Forms; Mott: The Future Leadership of the Church; Maclaren: Exposition of Holy Scripture; Nösgen: Das Wirken des Heiligen Geistes an den einzelnen Gläubigen und in der Kirche; Goodspeed: The Epistle to the Hebrews; Robertson: A Short Grammar of the Greek New Testament; Adam: The Religious Teachers of Greece; Dykes: The Christian Minister and His Duties; Gilbert: Interpretation of the Bible; Tyrrell: The Programme of Modernism; Matheson: The Representative Women of the Bible; Bloomfield: The Religion of the Veda; Campbell: Paul the Mystic; Braun: Die Bedeutung der Concupiscenz in Luthers Leben und Lehre.</i>		
	No. 2.	
I.—John Calvin, the Man. By The REV. H. M. J. KLEIN, Ph.D. . . . .		145
II.—Calvin as an Interpreter of the Bible. By PROF. IRWIN HOCH DE LONG, D.B., Ph.D. . . . .		165
III.—Calvin's Doctrine of Predestination. By The REV. THEO. F. HERMAN . . . . .		183
IV.—The Doctrine of the Lord's Supper in Calvin's System of Thought. By The REV. A. S. WEBER, D.D. . . . .		209
V.—The Ethics of Calvinism. By JOHN S. STAHR, D.D., LL.D. . . . .		229
VI.—Calvin as a Preacher. By PROF. C. BOWMAN, D.D. . . . .		245
VII.—Calvin and Civil Liberty. By PROF. A. V. HESTER . . . . .		262
VIII.—Calvinism in the Reformed Churches of Germany. By PROF. GEORGE W. RICHARDS, D.D. . . . .		316



ARTICLE	PAGE
IX.—Illustrative Anecdotes from the Life of Calvin. By The REV. VICTOR WILLIAM DIPPELL, Ph.D. . . . .	346
<b>No. 3.</b>	
I.—The Marks of a True Religion. By The REV. GEORGE F. MOORE, D.D. . . . .	353
II.—The Conservation of Our Resources. By NATHAN C. SCHAEFFER, D.D., LL.D. . . . .	363
III.—The Legacy Left Us by Darwin and His Collaborators. By JOHN M. MACFARLANE, Ph.D. . . . .	378
IV.—A New Boundary Stone of Nebuchadrezzar I. from Nippur. By PROF. WM. J. HINKE, Ph.D., D.D. . . . .	402
V.—The Ethics of Suffering. By The REV. JOHN BENJAMIN RUST, Ph.D. . . . .	416
VI.—Is the Best in Burns Typically Scotch? By The REV. E. S. BROMER, D.D. . . . .	435
VII.—Contemporary Sociology. By PROF. A. V. HIESTER . . . .	458
VIII.—Notices of New Books . . . . .	473

*Denney*: Jesus and the Gospels; *Staudt*: The Idea of the Resurrection in the Ante-Nicene Period; *Stalker*: The Atonement; *Palmer*: A Second Lear of Sunday School Lessons for Young Children; *Gladden*: The Church and Modern Life; *Jones*: India, Its Life and Thought; *Schaeffer*: Outline of the Life of Paul; *Vollmer*: John Calvin, Theologian, Preacher, Educator, Statesman.

#### No. 4.

I.—The Religious Significance of Tennyson's "In Memoriam." By W. WILBERFORCE DEATRICK, Sc.D. . . . .	481
II.—The Rights and Limits of Biblical Criticism. By PROF. WILLIAM C. SCHAEFFER, D.D. . . . .	499
III.—Christian Life in its Relation to Christian Cultus. By PROF. JOHN I. SWANDER, Ph.D., D.D. . . . .	514
IV.—The Ethics of the Gospels. By The REV. E. E. KRESGE . . . .	531
V.—The Spiritual Self-culture of the Minister. By C. B. SCHNEDER, D.D. . . . .	549
VI.—Authority in Religion. By A. C. SHUMAN, D.D. . . . .	558
VII.—A New Defense of Theism. By S. S. HEBBERD . . . . .	569
VIII.—Contemporary Religious and Theological Thought in Great Britain and America. By The REV. A. S. WEBER, D.D. . . . .	581
IX.—Contemporary Sociology. By PROF. A. V. HIESTER . . . .	596
X.—Notices of New Books . . . . .	610

*Seipt*: Schwenkfelder Hymnology and the Sources of the First Schwenkfelder Hymn-book Printed in America; *Sihler*: Testimonium Animæ; *King*: The Laws of Friendship, Human and Divine; *Lindsay*: Daniel Boone, Backwoodsman; The Faith and Works of Christian Science; *Hall*: Christ and the Eastern Soul; *King*: The Seeming Unreality of the Spiritual Life; *Balch*: Calvinism and American Independence.

# THE REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW

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No. 1.—JANUARY—1909.

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## I.

### THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE HEBREWS TO CIVILIZATION.

BY THE REV. CALVIN K. STAUDT, PH.D.

The religion which we have inherited from God's chosen people is multiform in its value and significance. It is capable of being approached from different points of view; and in whatever way one approaches it, it always appears to the unbiased heart and mind as a precious gem set in the midst of less attractive jewels. Inherently, it is the same message, being the same yesterday, to-day and forever. But as the *Zeitgeist* varies with the centuries, so shifts the ground from which we view our inherited religion. And, indeed, this shifting of the emphasis has resulted in an ever-increasing valuation of Israel's contribution. Once it was considered primarily as God's way telling us how to get safely to heaven, this contribution of the Hebrews; then, as an elaborate, all-embracing law telling us what to do and what not to do. Once it appeared emphatically as a message of comfort and consolation; then again as a power which suddenly grips the heart and abruptly changes it. Once it was looked upon chiefly as a revelation of divine love effecting the forgiveness of sins; and in these latter days it looms up as an indispensable ele-



ment of culture and civilization—as an element which has helped to make us what we are and what we have; as, in the words of Benjamin Kidd, “the sole secret of our civilization and progress.” This, then, shall be our worthy task, namely, to elucidate how the Hebraic is one of the most potent factors in this teleological process of the ushering in of the perfect man in the perfect society.

As a prerequisite to this study, it is in order to ask what exactly we are to understand by the Hebrew element and how, if at all, it is to be distinguished from the Christian. In spite of elaborate discussions there are still variations of opinion. However, it must always be recognized that Judaism and Christianity are the same movement. Christianity is the flower of which Judaism is the bud. Jesus and the Apostles are genetically related to that which preceded. The Hebrew element is Christian and the Christian is Hebrew. The Old Testament is simply pre-natal to Christianity, being “to the New Testament what the unborn child is to the born.” The appearance of Jesus was not Minerva-like, having no vital and organic relation with historical processes; His appearance was simply one step—the last—in the unfolding of a people with a passion for the true God and a genius for moral excellence. There is a tendency on the part of the latest school of German theologians to “account” for Jesus by endeavoring to show that He and His first interpreters stand merely for a vast receptacle in which the higher life of the world then existing—Greek, Roman, Jewish, Egyptian, Alexandrian—reservoired itself. Whether future scholarship will substantiate this thesis is a question. But the relation between Jesus and the house of Israel is not an hypothesis. There is no chasm between the Old Testament prophet, priest, and sage and the New Testament Christ, apostle, and martyr. For Christianity, the prophetic element worked out truth, righteousness, and peace; the priestly the filthiness of sin, the forgiveness of sin, and vicarious suffering; the wisdom the universality of God and the ethical life pertaining to all men. By the Hebrew in civiliza-



tion we are then to understand that which was revealed, taught, contributed by the Hebrews as a *race* and *nation* to, what Matthew Arnold defines, "the humanization of man in society, and the satisfaction for him, in society, of the true law of human nature."

Hence our purpose shall be to deal with the Hebrews as a nation—Ancient Israel. The ardent Jew of to-day projects into the future a mission of his people; but the mission of the sons of Jacob ended with the missionary activities of Paul. Let us then consider in order, first, the contributory feature of nations, and Israel's place among them; secondly, the nature of Israel's contribution, and the mode of creating it; thirdly, the intrinsic force of Hebraism, and the unequivocal testimony of history.

First, then, the contributory feature of nations, and Israel's place among them. In the economy of human progress every race has its office to fulfill. There is a Pilot of History in whom nations as well as individuals live and move and have their being. The guiding hand of Providence rests over the affairs of a people; and the rise and fall of nations, as well as the onward march of civilization, is due not to mere chance; for all history is a teleological process, tending toward

"That God, which ever lives and loves,  
One God, one law, one element,  
And one far-off divine event,  
To which the whole creation moves."

Penetrating beneath the transient and the temporal to the permanent and eternal, one finds that there are in the onward flow of history order, continuity, progression; in which each generation builds upon the accumulated results of the former generation. The Ancient World has contributed the forces which have entered into the making of European and Modern History; and the nations now existing are grinding out truth for the benefit of generations still unborn. We are the heirs of all the ages. Everything good and true and beautiful, which men have ever thought and felt, is ours to-day to enjoy, to

possess, to utilize. Others have planted and sowed and struggled and suffered and labored and experimented, and we have entered into the fruits of their labors, having bestowed no labor upon our harvest. Humanity is, and always has been, indebted to certain individuals that preceded it; but the richest heritage comes, not from outstanding persons, but rather from outstanding nations. Withal nations have their great men; but great men merely embody in the highest degree the characteristic longings and gropings of the nation. They are outstanding peaks, not of a plain, but of a mountain range.

A knowledge of history is more valuable than a knowledge of biography, in spite of Carlyle's assertion that the history of the world is but the biography of great men. Nations make a vaster contribution to the world's life and thought than individuals. History has a normative value, a lesson, and a moral significance. Alexander Pope says, "The proper study of mankind is man"; but he would have conveyed a greater and more eternal truth should he have said, "The proper study of man is mankind." There is a lesson and a message for us to-day in every idea of the past which became universally and nationally socialized. Socialized ideas and passions and emotions can teach us more of man, of moral evil and of good, than all isolated individual philosophers can. The highest problems of life are worked out, not by the isolated man, but by mankind. Nations have a mission greater than individuals. Just as we teach the divine mission of persons, so we must teach the divine mission of nations.

However, of the many nations which have existed, there are only a few which have been real factors in the world's progress. There are actually nations which have subsisted on such a dead level of monotonous existence that their very names have long ago been forgotten. Of others we know only the name and nothing more, as there is no tangible evidence of their existence. These maintained, for a longer or a shorter period, a mere subsistence; they have added nothing materially or spiritually to the world's wealth. But in the case of others the



very opposite is true. Imbued with a spirit eager to secure that which was higher, driven by an impulse growing out of a desire toward humankind, impelled by a force from without, they gradually lifted themselves up to higher planes of life and thought. It is the history of these nations—and only these—which make up the history of the world. They have led the world in each step of its progress; each has added a quota to the making of modern civilization.

As an illustration of existing nations having a mission and making a contribution there are France, Germany, England, and the United States. France is setting the world agog in fashions and manners; and her life and genius is writ upon, and subsists in, the changing styles of the civilized world. Germany is making her contribution in scientific scholarship; and the whole world is drinking at her pure fountain of knowledge, perennially refreshing itself. England has been the laboratory and experiment station for the working out of democracy and principles of representative government. And upon the shoulders of the United States has fallen the task of working out the problem of applied morality; wherein the great ethical principles long since theoretically held are to become applicable and workable, and whereby humankind is to be infused with a sense of service and helpfulness. As an illustration of the nations of the Ancient World in which the roots of modern civilization are planted deeply, there is Egypt with her passion and preparation for the after-life; Assyria and Babylonia with their desire and creation of material splendor; Phenicia with her craving for commerce and adventure; Israel with her all-controlling motive for the true God and true religion; Greece with her all-absorbing passion for art, literature and philosophy; and Rome with her inclination toward law and order.

But among these the Arbiter of Nations assigned the highest mission to Greece and Israel. Along the mountain range of nations, in which each nation stands out as a distinct peak, the peak of Hellenism and that of Hebraism project most promi-



nently and reach nearest to the sky. These two have been the primary elements in the making of European and modern history. They are the fundamentals upon which the pillars of life and civilization are grounded. They suggest the two streams of influence which have percolated down through history and have made this world a veritable paradise. Or, to change the figure, they have been the warp and woof of two unbroken threads out of which our entire civilization is constructed. Hellenism, derived from Hellas or Greece, stands for the method of culture and makes life broad; Hebraism, derived from Hebrew or Israel, stands for the method of religion, and makes life deep. On the one hand, the world owes its whole conception of the intellectual life—art, literature, philosophy—to a little country known in ancient days as Hellas; and, on the other hand, the world owes its whole conception of the true God and true religion, likewise, to a little country known in the days of the patriarchs as the Promised Land. Similarly, in trying to decide which one of these is superior to the other, we cannot but feel, as we shall readily see, that, after all, out of Israel there has issued forth the greater blessing.

Having seen Israel's place among contributing nations, let us now, in the second place, turn to a consideration of her contribution and to an analysis of the method in which that contribution was created and wrought out. And there is no better way of approaching this truth than by thinking of her as a laboratory—a laboratory in which experiments were performed, results tabulated, and a contribution made to the existing sum of life and thought. A real laboratory exists for the purpose of creating, of adding something to the existing sum of material or spiritual wealth. In a chemical laboratory the result of the interaction of acids, salts, and metals placed in a crucible is a new substance. In a physical laboratory energy and force, heat and light are brought together in such a relation that a new resultant is produced. And, indeed, there is also such a thing as a spiritual laboratory—real and substan-

tial as a physical laboratory—for the purpose of working out truth and spiritual realities.

Now, in the world's greatest spiritual laboratory—Israel, there were the component factors of the land, the people, and the Director, who is God; and in the interaction of these the problem of how to live, which is the greatest problem of life, was solved.

The land was the apparatus of the laboratory. Modern historians and sociologists recognize the influence of soil and climate and the physical features of a country upon the make-up of a people. Palestine typically illustrates this principle. This country comprised in ancient days as now the northern border of the parallelogram of Arabia. In a measure Israel was hemmed in on every side. On the north was a mountain ridge across which her inhabitants never passed; on the east and south a barren desert, which they had learned to dread; on the west an unbroken sea-coast, without a single natural harbor—"nothing to tempt men in nor to tempt men out." How necessary this seclusion was for the working out of moral and religious truth. And yet, while she was secluded she was also in a measure open, being, at least, accessible now and then to the civilizing influences of the nations round about. She was lying between two continents—Asia and Africa; between two primæval homes of men—the valley of the Euphrates and that of the Nile; between two great centers of empire—Western Asia and Egypt. And so she became the bridge and the passageway of the world. No one has expressed the significance of this better than George Adam Smith (to whom we have already been largely indebted for the sentences just indited) when he says, "In this strange mingling of bridge and harbor, of high-road and field, of battleground and sanctuary, of seclusion and opportunity—rendered possible through the striking division of surface into mountain and plain—lies all the secret of Syria's history, under the religion which has lifted her fame to glory."

In this little country there was also every variety of climate



—from the snow-capped Hermon with an alpine climate to the depressions of the Dead Sea with a sub-tropical climate. There was a rainy season lasting from October to May, followed by a season of dryness from May to October. It was a country which the nomads of the desert described as a land flowing with milk and honey, seeing that it was better than the barren desert from which they came; but, as a matter of fact, Palestine was merely an oasis in the great desert of Arabia, and with the exception of the Maritime Plain and the Valley of Esdrælon, which were very seldom occupied by the children of Israel, the products of the land were scant and uncertain. In fact, it was a land given to drought, which often came two years in succession, to famine, to pestilence, to locusts, coming every fifth or sixth year, and to earthquakes, too.

Such was the apparatus of the laboratory which the Pilot of History prepared through His infinite wisdom at the creation of the world, to the end that it might be possible to create the highest religion therein. And we cannot conceive of another country which would have lent itself better to the service of moral and religious ideas than that of Palestine. How different from that of Ancient Greece, where another great problem—the problem of culture—was worked out! This country was entirely different from that of Canaan; and as a matter of fact an idea was worked out which was diametrically opposite to that contributed by the Hebrews. Hellas was surrounded by the sea and had a coast consisting of jutting promontories, secluded harbors, smiling bays and sprinkled isles. Open on every side, she felt the leveling power of commerce and was susceptible to the varied influences of the world. Her rivers were rushing torrents, full of sparkling waterfalls. The land itself was cut up into every variety of independent valleys, mountain glens and romantic dells. And over land and sea was a brilliant sky, the play of light and shade of which was poetically tender and winsomely beautiful. Such is a parallel example of another laboratory, fitted out by Providence for the production of beauty and thought, another civilizing force.

The second component factor entering into the production of true religion was the people. No matter how well equipped the laboratory, the experiments will never be of a high order, neither original nor contributory, unless the experimenter has an aptitude and a genius for his work. The land and the people must go hand in hand; and in accordance with this principle, a people were called—for this already selected country—psychologically and temperamentally fitted for the working out of the religious problem. To this land of promise, this oasis of the desert, many nomadic tribes had come to settle; but, not being the chosen people, they were unable to make proper use of the tools at hand; and instead of developing a monotheistic religion, they fell into the rankest polytheism and the most obscene religious practices. Finally, however, the Arbiter of Nations took out of that great Semitic family a handful of people known as the Hebrews, whose schooling in the desert, where nature is monotonous, silent and illiberal, was long; and led them into this chosen land.

As they were the last to enter Canaan they not only had a long schooling in the desert, but prior to their entrance had been brought in touch with the Babylonian and the Egyptian civilizations. They possessed such characteristics as a yearning for dreamy ease, a strange and ever-present shiftlessness, a spirit of unity which preserves everything in its purest simplicity and an idealism which made religion possible. Their religious genius was already evidenced prior to their entrance into Canaan by their choosing of Yahweh—a God ethically superior to that of any other tribal God. Upon the barren hills of the central plain of Palestine they eked out a bare existence. When annoyed and harrassed by the neighboring tribes they put their trust in the Lord of Hosts, and He came and fought their battles with and for them. When the Bedouin tribes of the desert came up at the time of the harvest and snatched away the meager products of the land, they turned their faces in heartfelt sorrow to the Lord of Harvest, and He gave them comfort and consolation. When a season of drought



came—and these were frequent—they could not, as down in Egypt, refresh a garden by letting in the water of the Nile, but they had to look up to the God of Heaven, who maketh His sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth His rain on the just and the unjust. Again, these people by having been brought in contact with the nations around them absorbed and digested the civilization of each, gave to it a religious significance, and interpreted it from the God-point of view.

Such were the workers, the experimenters, who were chosen to work in God's great spiritual laboratory, to the end that the true God and true religion might be found, and the problem of how to live be solved. Greece, again, is a parallel example of how a peculiar people were chosen for a definite task. To this beautiful Hellas there came also, at first, a people who were not the chosen people. Although they were stimulated to works of art through the charm and intoxication of land and sea, nevertheless they lacked something quite essential to the production of finality in culture. And so the Arbiter of Nations took out of that great Indo-European family a handful of people whose schooling in the forest and the wilderness had developed strength, vigor, accuracy, discrimination, fixity of purpose, and power of dealing with combinations and complexities; and led them into this chosen land. The beauty of mountain and glen, of river and sea made their hearts poetically tender, and the mystery behind nature beckoned their minds into philosophic pursuits. How parallel, indeed, is the divine working among nations, and how an insight in the hand of Providence in one nation helps us to see that same hand in other nations!

The third component factor in this historical process enabling Israel to make a contribution was the direction of the Director Himself; or the Power above the Hebrew nation which was always active and immanent, working toward a definite end and using great men as the instrument of its evolution. At first the Director requested the experimenters to separate themselves sharply from the rest of the world. In this they were

assisted by such men as Moses, Samuel, Elijah, and Elisha. Then they were asked to acquaint themselves very intimately with the Director, in order that they might understand more fully who He is and what methods He would employ. At this time the literary prophets were of the greatest assistance. Then the Director had them transported into another country, through which they learned that the Director of their laboratory was the Director of the whole world. Then, through varied experiences, and by coming in touch with outside influences, they were taught and made to see the awfulness of sin and the universality of truth. And so the Director came nearer and nearer, and their vision became clearer and clearer, until finally the Director of the laboratory came Himself in person. It was Jesus. Many did not recognize Him; a few, however, saw that it was He. His instruction was clear and simple and definite; the ideal life was lived; the problem of how to live was solved; the work for which the laboratory was founded was finished; the thing created was given broadcast to the world; and the national life was destroyed. A record was kept of what was done, and this record is the Old and New Testament. The Bible, therefore, contains, and is, the laboratory record of a people divinely chosen, who experimented in religion under divine guidance until they found the highest. When the misplaced records are chronologically arranged, this book gives us every step of the process of the working out of the problem of how to live through the finding of the true God and true religion.

This, then, is what we are to understand by the contribution of the Hebrews, which has since become a potent factor toward the making of the perfect man in the perfect society. The process, though not the result, is akin to what this same Director did in Hellas, where He guided, directed, and instructed a people, until in God's laboratory of culture the highest reaches were attained; after which the thing created was scattered, the country overrun, and the record preserved in art, literature, and philosophy.



And now, in the third place, let us examine the intrinsic value of this finished product of the Hebrews as a civilizing force as well as the clear witness of history. That it is a civilizing force, in spite of some critics, there can be no question. The dogmatism of Christianity and of the creeds is fearfully arraigned to-day, and the thinking world is not much disturbed; but when there are those—as there are a few—who try to disturb the source and undervalue the pristine and fundamental truth as it sprang from the Hebrew race and nation, either by giving no recognition to Israel's contribution, or by denouncing it as a retarding factor of civilization, then we rise up to show the fallacy of the situation. There are certain mystics, either theologic or poetic, who, disregarding historical processes, find their God, their religion, their ideas, their all in immediate and direct revelation and none particularly in biblical revelation. There are matter-of-fact scientists, such as Haeckel, who, trying to solve the "riddle of the universe" by reason only, disregard revelation as well as an all-pervading design in history. There are certain artistic philosophers, such as Nietzsche, who arraign the teachings of Jesus and "denounce the Christian principle of brotherhood and equality as immoral and dangerous to life itself." There are certain historians, such as Gibbons, who, exalting the Hellenic, depreciate the Hebraic and represent the Christian religion rather as a retarding than a helpful force in the life of the European people.

But what a depreciation of the highest force of civilization and human progress! What a one-sided interpretation of life and history! We cannot but feel the mental, moral, and social uplift of that which was reservoired in Israel for the healing of the nations. Measured by the principle of pragmatism which asks, "How does it work?" who will deny that in this contribution of the Hebrews there are just the very doctrines and ideas which make for the humanization of man in society? First of all, this contribution is a religious contribution, and nothing so pervades all man's activities as the religious. And lo! it is the true religion. In faith in the true God and true

religion there is and always has been the idea to be and the dynamic to become like the object of faith. In a fatherhood of God men are inspired to a brotherhood of man, which ushers in social amelioration and universal progress. In a higher law of righteousness and a regenerated heart accrues a new social order. In short, through the inversion of the primitive values of selfishness into the humanitarian values of altruism there is added the most potent factor to higher evolution.

The testimony of history on this matter is also clear and unmistakable. Such nations which were not touched by the stream of Hebraism have remained barren and unattractive; while those through which this stream flowed have blossomed into civilization and become productive in material and spiritual things. One is often unable to determine the influence of the Hebraic apart from the Hellenic, inasmuch as these two elements went often side by side and even mingled. Modern civilization is a very composite product; it has resulted from the mutual action and reaction upon one another of, at least, these two inherited historical agencies and minor ones besides, especially the Teutonic spirit. Should, however, the Hebrew element not have entered into history, the modern world would be something wholly different from what it is. Upon the ruins of the Roman Empire, which was the great absorbent of the Christian religion as well as Greek culture, arose the Middle Ages. During this period the Hebraic had merely an attenuated influence, in spite of the fact that every thing was summed up in the Roman Church. It was an attenuated influence; first, because the Bible was imperfectly known through imperfect Latin translations, and secondly, because it was considered a "sacred holy horror"—a book to be worshipped rather than studied. Beginning with the Reformation the Hebraic became a fertilizing influence. The Bible and no longer the Church was to be the seat of authority. The rediscovery of the Bible in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries stirred men's minds and awakened them as from a sleep. Greek manuscripts of the New Testament were collected; Erasmus



published his "Novum Instrumentum," and the Scriptures were read in the original tongues and translations made therefrom. The living source was opened, and the result was a revival of religion and a recasting of theology.

Indeed, the Bible has since the Reformation become a most potent factor in history. It has gone to the making, not merely of all ecclesiastical history, but also of a great deal of secular history. That it is closely interwoven with the history of England, Scotland, and America we need not be told. In his address before the Pennsylvania Bible Society, Ambassador Bryce recently said: "This [Bible] is still a tie between your people and ours, still one of those ancient foundations of common thought and knowledge which enables both to retain a unity of intellectual life and to understand one another." It has often been pointed out that the English and the German translations of the Scriptures did more than anything else to form the English and the German languages respectively and give them their present shape. European and English literature has its birth in the commingling of the Hellenic and the Hebraic; and, indeed, the latter is no secondary factor when we take into consideration, as Washington Gladden has pointed out, that there are one hundred times more allusions and references to the Bible in literature than to any other book. Modern art is likewise the product of these two ancestral forces, in which the Hebraic furnished many of the subjects and themes and the ground for the emotions of faith and hope, ecstasy and suffering. And, finally, who can measure all the beneficent influences of the Hebrews as a means of culture and enjoyment, of progress and achievement?

There is, seemingly, also something prophetic in this historical survey. If it is true that in the economy of human progress Israel fulfilled the highest office and all history testifies to the beneficent influences issuing therefrom, then it behooves us to continue to cherish this gift; and that, not imperfectly as we may know it in a second-hand manner, but as it is embodied in the original source. Yea, because of changed

conditions in modern society, and because of our psychological knowledge of the unfolding of human life, and because of our present educational ideals, there is the greatest need for accentuating the importance of a more thorough and universal study of the laboratory records of the Hebrews. If the Hebrew element functioned on life heretofore, it should continue to function; and that with greater effectiveness. Religious education is the slogan of to-day, and in this the Bible must have, in the very nature of things, the foremost place. There is the greatest need in this day and generation for an intelligent propagation of Israel's contribution; for a more faithful and systematic study of the Bible. Few things will do more for the humanization of man in society in the future, for the welfare of the coming generation, than a more vital and thorough study of the pristine laboratory notes of the Hebrews—in the home, in the church, in the school.

MYERSTOWN, PA.



## II.

### SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGIOUS REVIVALS.

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Looking back through history, we find that all nations have been subject at times to great swells of religious feeling. These impetuous outbursts of interest for matters of personal religion have been characterized, in a very broad and loose sense of the term, by the word "revival." In accordance with this comprehensive usage of the word we may say that revival tendencies and phenomena are to be found among all races of men accepting any possible form of religion from North American Indians to Arabian Mohammedans. In this vague sense, too, the Old Testament efforts for the betterment of Israel, the Pentecostal Era of the New Testament, the Crusades of the Middle Ages, the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century, the Puritan Reaction of the seventeenth century, and all great epochal movements which have characterized the development of religion may be designated as revivals.

Strictly speaking, however, revivals are a modern product in so far as they refer to a particular religious method and a particular type of religious experience. In our discussion we shall use the term in its more restricted sense and shall have in mind more specifically the great religious awakenings in England, Ireland, and America during the past two centuries. We shall be compelled to do this because in a scientific discussion we are expected to interpret not generalities but specific phenomena, and the phenomena of the revivals of the past two centuries in England, Ireland, and America are historically recorded and unmistakable.

Our task, then, is two-fold. First, to state briefly the his-

toric facts and factors entering into those social movements known as modern religious revivals. Second, to seek to interpret those facts so far as we are able in the light of natural laws and processes; to show that these social movements, like everything else in nature and life, depend largely upon a combination of factors that can be analyzed and described and conform to laws that are approximately as absolute as are the laws of physical phenomena.

What, then, are the natural elements that have entered into the great revivals of modern history? What were the physical, racial, mental, social, and religious predispositions of the people among whom these revivals took place? What was the nature of the personality of the leaders? What was the method of their work? What was the message they delivered? To what motives did they appeal? Who were the first to respond? What were the physical and psychical phenomena that characterized their converts? What were the temporary and the permanent results of the revivals so far as their value to society was concerned?

A study of modern revival methods must begin with the great awakening in New England under Jonathan Edwards in 1734. The inhabitants of New England in the early part of the eighteenth century can be characterized as dogmatic and yet emotional. The stern solemnity of the Puritan and the deep melancholy sensibilities of the Saxon and the Dane flowed in their veins. They were children of superstition as the uncanny history of witchcraft only too plainly attests. They were fearless of man but fearful of God and the Devil. The wrath of God and the thought of hell made them tremble. Spiritually they were in a state of decline brought on by reaction against the rigid Puritan standards of their fathers. To this people there came as spiritual leader a man of strange personal fascination, a man in whose blood there flowed the practical sense of the Saxon, and a Celtic strain of lofty and sustained imagination, all the richness of sensibility and mysticism



that is found in the Welsh race. His message consisted in an appeal to the fears of his hearers. By his intense earnestness he stirred them to the depths of their souls by picturing "the kind of hell an infinite God would arrange who was infinitely enraged against a human being who had infinitely sinned in rejecting God's infinite love." Anyone who has ever read Edwards's sermons can testify to the imprecatory character of his message. The very titles are significant, "Sinners in the hands of an angry God," "The wrath of God upon the wicked to the uttermost," "The eternity of Hell torments," etc. He contended that deliverance from evil and its consequences was something tragic and that men needed a spiritual convulsion before spiritual growth could follow. His first convert in this revival was a single young woman. From her the contagion spread throughout New England and under Whitefield its territory was bounded by Maine and Georgia. As to the phenomena accompanying this outburst of religious feeling, one is not surprised to learn that there were many manifestations of mental and nervous disorders. While Edwards himself did not regard these bodily affections as the high proof of God's favor (here his Saxon good sense is evident), there followed in his footsteps a number of men less judicious than he, who brought with them a flood of fanaticism and delusion. They taught that the most certain sign of God's grace was found, not in life and conduct, but in enthusiastic emotion. They took their own conversion experiences and made them the normal standard by which to judge all others. Soon physical manifestations, tremblings and faintings, shrieking and weeping, agony and distress, dreams and visions were looked upon as the certain evidence of God's indwelling. An eye-witness records the symptoms as follows: "Many fell on the ground, they lay for a time speechless and motionless, then followed convulsions and terrible shrieking. Numbers in a congregation would be in that condition at the same time. When they did not swoon away they were upbraided for hardness of heart. The effect was often increased by the indirect suggestion of

the speaker as to the result wrought elsewhere. Women by the score became hysterical. When the preacher grew calm they grew calm, when he thundered their violent struggles immediately returned." As to results, we find on the one hand an increase of congregations in New England and a temporary heightening of moral tone in social life; on the other hand we find a speedy reaction, much back sliding, for four years not a single soul added to Edwards's church in Northampton. That the revival had not exercised an enduring influence on the community in general is evident since only a few years after these ecstasies of devotion there was an outbreak of antagonism and Edwards himself was exiled. Pathological history shows a disheartening list of mental and nervous disorders in the New England of this period, and moral history shows that the life of New England at the latter part of the eighteenth century was lower than ever before.

John Wesley, on one of his numerous walks from Oxford to London to visit William Law, author of "The Serious Call," read an account of the New England revival and the English awakening followed. Conditions in England were unique in the middle of the eighteenth century. It was near the close of Walpole's ministry. The nation was prosperous in trade, but most ungodly in life. Laws were severe, discipline was weak, education was neglected, crime flourished and there were great outbreaks of mobs. The Church had sunk into insignificance, the clergy were worldly and indolent. "In the higher circles of society every one laughs," said Montesquieu, "if one talks of religion." The lower classes were ignorant and brutal, neglected and hardened, living for the passion of the hour. Yet at the fall of Walpole new forces and cravings and aims which lay under the crust began to make themselves felt. John Wesley was the man of God sent to awaken the slumbering instincts of a new age. Like Edwards, Wesley combined deep emotion with superb practical sense. He was calm, self-possessed, terribly in earnest. He had a dominating personality, his presence was said to have been hypnotic and to have



created an atmosphere of awe. His searching eye was one of the strongest elements in the man. He had the sound judgment of the Saxon race, and yet a deep strain of superstition. "He lived in a world of wonders and divine interpretations. It was a miracle if the rain stopped and allowed him to set forward on a journey. It was a judgment of Heaven if a hailstorm burst over a town which had been deaf to his preaching. One day, he tells us, when he was tired and his horse fell lame, he thought cannot God heal man or beast by any means or without any, and immediately his headache ceased and his horse's lameness in the same moment. With a still more childish fanaticism he guided his conduct by drawing lots or watching the particular texts at which his Bible opened" (Green). His message differed from that of Edwards's in that he appealed somewhat more to the divine in the human soul, and yet at bottom it was an appeal to the element of fear and to the horrors of hell. The Wesleyan revival was practically kindled at Bristol and Kingswood where dwelt, according to Wesley's own statement, the most primitive, brutal, and ignorant of England's population. Wesley says in his "Journal," Vol. 1, page 170, "that they were but one remove from the beasts that perish, utterly without desire of instruction as well as without the means of it." The suggestibility of these people was so great that under the excitement of Wesley's preaching they would fall down on every side torn with a kind of convulsive motion. Reflex phenomena first appeared in modern times under Wesley. They spread rapidly. Men would be struck down as though by lightning and writhe in agony of soul. Wesley regarded these extravagances as the throes of the new birth. The mental and nervous strain of the revival excitement soon became so great that many were on the verge of insanity. The wildest excesses followed. Others who lacked much of the good sense of Wesley introduced a reign of terror. I quote from Wesley's "Journal," Vol. 2, page 32: "There were agonies and contortions of bodies of many little children, loud breathing of men and women half-strangled and gasping

for life, outcries, bitter anguish, faces turning red and then almost black, convulsions, awful contagion sweeping over the stifled crowd, numbers carried into the parsonage, where they struggled or lay as dead. The breaking of pews and benches, the trance, the demoniac shriek, the uncontrollable laughter, a child of seven years old seeing visions, a woman rolling on the ground and tearing grass with her hands, some dropping in a heap on the road home." All these manifestations you find recorded in Wesley's "Journal." Toward the end of his life Wesley's faith in these outward manifestations was shaken, the fervor of his superstition died down into the calm of age and his common sense discouraged in his followers the fanatical outbursts which marked the opening of the revival.

Within a decade of Wesley's death the great Kentucky revival took place in America. The Scotch-Irish pioneers of Kentucky had in them a deep strain of the emotionalism of the Celt. In this new wild country they lived without restraints of law, custom or religion. Their habit of life in the wilderness developed in them quick response to stimulus and strong motor tendencies. Bacon in his "History of American Christianity" puts the historic conditions thus: "When there was brought to bear upon these Kentucky pioneers the protracted camp meeting and they were suddenly aroused by the most fervid imaginative and reiterative appeal, there resulted as perfect a combination of conditions for the production of mental and nervous infection as the world has ever seen." The revival began in a district in Logan County known as Rogue's Harbor, because the citizenship of the place was made up largely of murderers, horse thieves, and fugitives. James McGready and Peter Cartwright were the leaders of the movement. McGready is said to have arrayed hell before the wicked that they trembled and quaked. McMaster in his "History of the United States" gives a vivid account of the details of this extraordinary religious movement. Two women first became greatly excited and by contagion their fervor spread through the whole community. The floor was covered



with the slain. Nothing could allay the excitement. It spread like prairie fire. Men fitted their wagons with beds and provisions and travelled many miles, and camp meetings began. "Crops were left forgotten, cabins were deserted and in large settlements there did not remain one soul." The falling exercise prevailed especially at night. Nothing was then wanting that could strike terror into minds weak, timid and harassed. The converts exhibited astounding physical manifestations. Many fell, continued for hours breathless and would then rise shouting deliverance. Soon men and women fell in such numbers that it became impossible to move about without trampling them. Some would bound about like a live fish out of water. Many rolled over and over for hours at a time. It happened that an elder came back to his house at Cane Ridge and told what he had seen in Logan County, and immediately the same manifestations appeared as in the south of Kentucky. First two little girls were struck down, then a boisterous emotion followed, a singing ecstasy, and susceptible people on every side were over-wrought. For days there was an aggregated mass of humanity. Every extraordinary nervous condition was attributed to the mysterious and immediate agency of the divine. Three thousand people—one in every six—were struck to the ground at Cane Ridge. As the meetings grew more frequent, the nervous excitement assumed new and more terrible forms. A peculiar nervous and muscular manifestation known as the "jerks" was experienced by the converts. It began in the hand and spread rapidly to the feet. The victim shook in every joint. His head would be thrown from side to side so swiftly that the features would be blotted out and the hair made to snap. Finally the sufferer was dashed to the ground to bounce about like a ball. This nervous affection became a regular epidemic. From the nerves and muscles the disorder passed to the mind. Trances and visions followed such as one reads about in the accounts of Indian ghost dances. Barking at trees and the holy laugh were other phenomena of this religious mania. At last the emotions had so completely

swept away the element of control that gross immorality followed. Students of our national life are debating the question to-day, not without reason, whether the super-emotionalism and the fanaticism of this revival and its consequent weakening of the element of control in large districts of Kentucky is not largely responsible for the highly impassioned outbreaks of various kinds that so frequently take place in these very parts of Kentucky in our day.

Then came the great revival under Charles Finney. It began in the western part of New York State, a section of our country that has given rise to more than one super-emotional movement. It was in this region that Millerism arose, that the spiritual delusion under the Fox sisters had its origin, that gave birth to the Gospel of the Latter Day Saints under Joseph Smith. A large part of the population was of exceedingly primitive character, highly neurotic and suggestible. This was the tinder for the great revival fire under Charles Finney. The spell of Finney's personality was felt by all who met him. He was a man of brilliant parts. His influence was magnetic. He had a hypnotic eye. Men quaked under his gaze. His power of suggestion over men's minds was extraordinary. His manner was dramatic and sensational. He appealed to the fears of men, making their conscience quake by the most searching analysis of the motives of their hearts. He introduced the "anxious bench" and pressed the duty of immediate decision. He describes his preaching by saying, "The Lord let me loose upon them in a wonderful manner." His meetings were accompanied by violent bodily manifestations. His first convert was a young girl who fell from her seat under the power of his preaching, who had to be carried to her home and lay without the power of speech for sixteen hours. The scenes that followed baffle description. Whole communities came forward by the hundreds, pounding the anxious bench with great tumult and confusion. On one occasion so many people fell on the floor, says Finney, that "if I had had a sword in each hand I could not have cut them off their seats



as fast as they fell." His autobiography shows that whole sections of the country were so wrought up over the expectation of his coming that before he spoke a word, when he put in his appearance, they would fall under his sway. As to the result, we have on the one hand thousands of immediate conversions and on the other a state of affairs best described by Dr. Nevin in his "Anxious Bench Tract," when he says in 1843, "Years of faithful pastoral service on the part of a different class of ministers, working in a wholly different style have hardly yet sufficed to restore to something like spiritual fruitfulness and beauty the field in New York State over which Finney and his system passed as a wasting fire in the fulness of its strength."

Then came the Great Revival of 1857. The people of America were well-nigh crazed with financial fear because of commercial disaster. The treasury of the United States was emptied in the crash. The government was not able to pay its officers. The ruin of the country seemed complete. New York City especially seemed paralyzed with fear. Then the emotions generated by speculative excitement and intensified by panic depressions were transferred to religious subjects, and a remarkable revival followed close upon the heels of the panic. This revival was absolutely unique in the fact that it was not dependent on any one great leader and in the further fact that it was a transition from the old type of revival to a newer, quieter, saner type.

This American revival of 1857 spread to northern Ireland, where it had the Celtic temperament as its basis. From the very beginning there were physical manifestations, but these were of a passive nature. Scores of young women in factories were prostrated, and in Belfast particularly the sleeping phenomena occurred, the converts falling into slumber at will, waking a few days afterwards at a time they had set. The trance, the vision, sensory automatisms, sinking of muscular energy, were the prevailing type of manifestation in this revival.

Among recent revival movements in America none is more remarkable than that under Mr. Moody. He emancipated

religious evangelism from the Gospel of fear and preached the love of God with such tenderness and pathos as to magnetize his hearers. The great billows of his soul would break into a spray of tears till men would weep with him. He appealed less to dogmatic bias, and more to the distinctively ethical motives, and consequently little of the extreme forms of emotionality was found in his work. Most remarkable, however, and noteworthy is it that at the very summit of his powers he recognized the limitations of his method, and turned aside from revival work to engage in the systematic instruction and training of those already Christian.

In the Welsh revival of 1904 we have all the factors of a great religious awakening clearly at hand. The Welsh nature is peculiarly rich in sensibilities, exceptionally responsive to religious appeals and to the influence of music. Song often lifts an entire Welsh audience on a wave of feeling. Then, too, they are a secluded people, their horizon is limited. Especially is this the case among the thousands of colliers in south Wales. To this people there came one of the most striking personalities of our time, a young man named Evan Roberts, the son of a Welsh miner. He is a man of quiet, mystical temperament, a seer of visions. "One night he woke from his sleep," he says, "to find himself in the very presence of the Almighty God. For the space of four hours I was privileged to speak with him as a man speaks face to face with a friend. At five o'clock it seemed to me as if I again returned to earth. This continued every morning for four months." His presence is hypnotic. Over and over again we are told he would look fixedly in a certain direction and demand a convert, and every time a convert was discovered at the spot indicated. Each of these strange predictions was preceded by a trembling of the missionary's body and a painful contortion of the facial muscles. The people had been brought into that electrical frame of mind upon which the powerful and pure force of Roberts could play as upon an instrument of music. A young girl at a Christian Endeavor meeting was his first convert.



Forty thousand conversions followed. As to manifestations, many declared that they had seen visions. Thus we are told that a party of young men going along a road saw before them, rising above the hedge, a figure radiating light and transfixed by a shaft coming down from the sky. They knelt on the ground in the middle of the road and prayed, not in fear, but in the full conviction that they were in the presence of a heavenly visitant. This marvellous revival was noted for the irrepressible excitement and almost frenzied enthusiasm of the masses of the people in towns and villages throughout south Wales.

The revivals of recent years have somewhat modified their methods. The anxious bench has been superseded by the even more superficial method of putting all one's batteries to work with a view of getting a convert to rise where he is sitting, to lift his hand, to sign a card, or by some other feeble, unnatural, mechanical movement to indicate his immediate and unreserved surrender, giving what we believe is a totally false and weak idea of what really constitutes enlisting in the service of Christ. To gain this end protracted meetings are held, itinerant evangelists employed, blatant advertising engaged in, and hymns are sung that are but a jumble of pious ideas, one standard of spiritual experience is pressed indiscriminately on all persons alike by the affirmation and reiteration of the evangelist—and the twentieth century man is expected to go “clanging in stoga-boots into the holy of holies.” We say this in full recognition of the earnestness and sincerity of many godly evangelists of our day.

## II.

We have described up to this point the historic facts, factors, and phenomena of the modern religious revivals. How shall we explain or interpret these phenomena? There have been three methods of interpretation: (1) The exclusively supernatural, (2) the exclusively pathological, (3) the scientific.

1. The supernatural interpretation looks upon all revival phenomena, normal and abnormal, as the immediate signs of

the presence and favor of God. It looks upon the passional as the peculiar channel of divine communication. It views the unusual and mysterious as signs of another world—whether that unusual occur in the physical, mental or religious sphere. This is akin to the superstition that burns witches for diseases which medical science has not yet understood. To the superstitious mind all the mysterious manifestations connected with religious experience seem to be the work of demons or of the spirit of God. Physical manifestations are the sure sign of demoniac or divine power. There can be no doubt that much of the power of the old revival rested on this exclusively supernatural interpretation which the popular mind gave to certain physical and mental phenomena, just because they were mysterious and awe-inspiring. This type of mind still regards the revivals of history as the most eminent instance of the immediate divine presence vouchsafed to the world. One would think by hearing these interpreters that not only were revivals out of all course of nature, but that all the ordinary laws of the physical, mental, social universe were suspended in their favor. We are told that all the revival phenomena are the work of the Holy Ghost and therefore it is beyond human power to understand, interpret, produce or control them. Frankly, we believe this theory to be inadequate to explain all the phenomena. This does not mean, as you shall see in a moment, the elimination of the supernatural.

2. At the other extreme is the exclusively pathological theory. It regards all conversion and spiritual experience and revival phenomena as the most remarkable exhibition of morbid emotion or neurotics. It accounts for the whole thing by calling it a disease or a serious functional derangement of the nervous system, a condition, as Nietzsche calls it, of *nervus sympathicus*. This crass view of the medical materialist who refers all things in heaven and on earth to organic disposition, is both unworthy and inadequate.

3. Between these two methods, conserving the element of truth in each, there lies a third that we shall designate the



Scientific. It is only within the past decade that a scientific study of religious phenomena has been seriously attempted under men like James, Clark, Coe, Starbuck, Davenport, Leuba and others. The scientific study by no means excludes the Divine Spirit from religious experience, but it seeks to show that religious phenomena are more largely subject to natural laws and processes than men have dreamed. Certain phenomena which at one time were widely believed to be supernatural reveal information which fix them very definitely in the category of the natural. This does not mean that we would attempt to explain by natural laws all the mysteries of revival phenomena. There is a sense in which all the phenomena of the human mind, thought, feeling, and will, never reveal their secret. Religion is life and life has its eternal secret. But there are many phenomena of religious experience which can easily be taken out of the realm of the mysterious and the capricious and the superstitious and explained by perfectly natural, physical, psychical or social laws.

A religious revival from a scientific standpoint is a social movement. It is an outgrowth of man's social nature. The necessary antecedents of any social movement are, according to Professor Giddings, a consciousness of kind and a certain like-mindedness. By like-mindedness is meant the capacity for like response to the same stimulus. Like-mindedness may be sympathetic, formal or rational. The first is a simple combination of feelings on the part of a social group, the second refers to memories, traditions and habits that are held in common, the third expresses agreement of thought produced by rational reflection and is the highest mode of the social mind. The religious revival is a social movement on the part of individuals who are in a condition of sympathetic like-mindedness. Subjectively they are in a condition of suggestibility, imitativeness, imagination, and emotion. Objectively a social group in such a condition is apt to enter into what is known as impulsive social action. If a sufficient number in the group have strong powers of inhibition and hold themselves in restraint,

we have a deliberative assembly. But one of the characteristics of a group in a condition of sympathetic like-mindedness is that the instinctive nervous tendencies gain control over the rational and volitional, and deeds of hasty impulse rather than of calm judgment result. This is equally true in industrial, political, judicial or religious assemblies. The history of impulsive social action is an interesting and a disastrous one. Professor Giddings has carefully formulated certain laws that enter into all such action. There are three laws of impulsive social action: (1) The law of origin, (2) the law of extent and intensity, (3) the law of restraint. We shall apply these laws to religious revivals looked at as a form of impulsive social action.

1. The law of origin is that "Impulsive social action is commenced by those elements of the population that are least self-controlled." This law is demonstrated in two ways, historically and psychologically. The historical proof can be seen on every side. Men of thought and strong control may lay the plans for social movements, they may apply the stimulus, but the highly impulsive, the impressionable, the most nervously unstable and suggestible are always the first to act. In the long chronicles of history we find many examples of this law. The rise and conduct of the crusades under Peter the Hermit, Walter the Penniless, and Gottschalk, and the Children's Crusade, the events of the Reign of Terror in the French Revolution, the case of John Brown, the reign of the Commune in Paris in '71, many American riots, and the Armenian massacres of '94, all serve to demonstrate this law historically. Now, as to revivals, the facts show that the first victims of the great historic revivals were usually some single girls. Of course, the question that Dr. Kurtz asked of Dr. Nevin may be asked by some one: "Whether hysterical girls have not souls to be saved?" to which Dr. Nevin replied, "After due reflection it seems necessary to answer this searching interrogatory in the *affirmative*."

This law of origin may also be demonstrated psychologically. Who are they that first put into action the suggestion of a



leader in a crowd, who first give way to impulse? They are those whose spinal ganglia and lower brain centers are more highly developed than is the gray matter of the cortex where are found the higher rational and volitional faculties. Every student of psychology knows the simple process of nerve and brain reaction. Whenever a sensation passes along the afferent nerve it is carried to the spinal cord and the impulse to act is given over to the efferent nerve and a reflex which contracts the muscles is experienced. In all this there is no thought process or critical reasoning. But as the higher centers of control or the regulating powers of inhibition are developed the current of sensation is switched off into the thought centers of the brain, the sensation is detained, the whole cortical apparatus of the cerebrum is brought to bear upon the matter, deliberation takes place. Then the whole life of reflective action begins as over against the reflex impulsive action. Those who originate impulsive social action, the first to respond to an appeal for a mob-action, a revolution or a revival experience are they in whom these higher faculties of inhibition are least in control.

The impulsive is the lower and more primitive type of mind. In the evolution of the nervous system from instinctive life to rational life we have first the spinal cord as the supreme regulating center, then the medulla and the cord, then the basal ganglia, then the cerebrum. These regulating centers of control mark the progressive steps in the advance of intelligent life. They mark the gradation of the mind from the pure instinctive life of the animal to the rational life of highest civilization. Any one who studies the question of racial development or observes the several tendencies in mental evolution is driven to the conclusion that the impulsive is the lower type of mind. The difference between the primitive mind and the modern type of mind is the difference between the highly impulsive, emotional man with feeble reasoning power, the creature of suggestion, imitation, imagination, credulity, and the man not without emotion, but with deeper and more robust

emotion, controlled, however, by strong powers of inhibition. The primitive type of mind is indicative of the infancy of humanity. We still find it in the savage, the Indian, the negro, and the super-emotional elements of civilization. In all primitive cults the emotions are predominant. This is also true in varying proportions in the modern revival. Emotion runs the whole gamut from intense religious feeling to wildest frenzy in the revivals under consideration.

Here we have the natural cause of many of the religious phenomena whose mysteriousness used to be looked upon as evidence of the special interposition of the divine hand. Pure, uncontrolled religious emotion includes not only a psychic state but also a somatic state. The emotions profoundly affect the body. The physiological factor is not to be regarded with indifference. Emotions change the circulation, the respiration, the vibration of the whole organism. Its physiological accompaniment contains in varying proportion the two elements, depression and exaltation. Depression is related to fear. When the primitive instinct of fear is aroused, physical weakness follows, pallor, trembling, inability to speak. The extent to which depression grows depends on character, education, temperament, environment, and epoch of life. A more subjective form of fear consists purely in religious melancholia, the person believing himself to be lost or damned. The objective form so frequently found in the days of Edwards and Wesley is the demoniac melancholia, the delusion of possession, hallucination, etc. The terrible appeals to fear in the early revival and the vivid pictures of hell and judgment and doom, are an adequate explanation of the most serious bodily manifestations of early revivals.

Then there is the condition of exaltation which is related to joy. To the manifestation of this sentiment belong the mechanical exaltation produced by the Indian dance, the rhythmical music of primitive tribes, the toxic effects of the wine of the ancient Bacchanals, the exaltation of fakirs and dervishes. These are, of course, the most grossly materialistic



forms of exaltation. The collective excitement of pilgrimages and revivals produced by artificial means are of the same order of exaltation. They are necessary conditions of intense emotion. When they become chronic they enter the region of pathology. Ecstasy follows. When the ecstatic state is attended by unconsciousness it becomes catalepsy and all sensory activity is suspended. The phenomena are not due to divine interpositions. It is not the spirit of God working extraordinarily but the natural laws of emotion that account for physical manifestations of depression and exaltation. These phenomena always affect first the most susceptible, those who are most primitive in their reflexes, the impulsive rather than the deliberative, the lower rather than the higher type of mind.

2. The second great law of impulsive social action is that of its growth, the law of extent and intensity. It is as follows: "Impulsive social action tends to extend and intensify in a geometrical progression." This law follows from the sympathetic character of the movement. Each individual subject to a wave of feeling and impulse is a transmitter of impulse to others, and as to the increase in intensity we have the truth that the emotional reaction of many minds acts upon each individual mind. How this law works becomes clearer if we consider severally the influences at work in the spread of any impulsive social movement. (a) There is the individual influence on individual known as the law of imitation. (b) There is the individual influence on the individual or on the mass known as the law of suggestion. (c) There is the influence of the mass on the individual known as the law of mob-mind. These three principles have entered largely into the growth and the intensity of revivals.

(a) What has imitation to do with the spread of revivals? Let us see. A repetition, conscious or unconscious, by one individual of any act of another individual is imitation. This is a matter so familiar to us as to be given little thought. Yet the great French thinker, Tarde, has declared it to be the primordial social law, the fundamental factor of all social activ-

ity. Whether we concede that or not, we are compelled to grant that the principle of imitation lies at the basis of all spread of feeling or action, that from every individual modes of thought, feeling, and action spread as waves from a center of disturbance. Any act or expression of feeling is a stimulus to the nerve centers that perceive it. Unless this action is inhibited by the will or by counter stimulation it discharges itself in movements that are a close copy of the original. Imitations may be those of custom or they may be those of mode. Fashions, fads, revolutions, and revivals are mode imitations. In the absence of interference they spread in geometrical progression. This accounts for the extreme rapidity with which new words, panics, revolutions, fads, and fashions travel. This is a factor, too, in the spread of revivals. This accounts for the similarity in physical manifestations often seen in revivals. Motor impulses diffuse themselves with great facility. Bodily movements spread rapidly. Feelings spread more rapidly even than ideas. The hope of a "boom" and the terror of a panic are examples. In accounting for the rapid growth and the similarity of manifestations in religious revivals due account must be made of the truth that impulsive social action propagates itself through imitation in a geometrical progression like waves of light or sound.

(b) Again, the law of suggestion enters into the growth of religious revivals, and has much to do with the nature of their phenomena. Baldwin in his "Psychology" defines suggestion as the "abrupt entrance from without into consciousness of an idea or image which tends to produce the muscular and volitional effects which ordinarily follow upon its presence." Stimuli from within we call impulses, those reaching us from without we call suggestions. Suggestions are real forces. The power to withstand them is the will. If they meet no resistance they enact themselves. A person is said to be suggestible when he responds unconsciously to an idea as all people respond automatically in reflex action to a



sensation. Suggestibility predominates in the animal world, especially among monkeys and sheep. So the minds of the lower races of men are like wax. There are no counteracting ideas in the primitive mind; the idea that is there has everything its own way. Suggestibility is at its maximum in young children. The sanguine and melancholic temperament are more suggestible than the choleric; the Celtic race more suggestible than the Saxon. Women are more suggestible than men. Among the Indian ghost dancers young women are usually the first to be affected. The same is true in revivals. Starbuck shows that six times as many women as men are converted in public crowds. Ellis in his scientific study of "Man and Woman" shows that women are more hypnotizable than men; that in women the stirrings of the inferior nervous centers are not so firmly controlled by the supreme center as in man, hence they are more suggestible and emotional.

Now, the power of suggestion has been a great force in the production of revival experiences. There is a very complete correlation between the suggestibility of persons and their religious experience. The striking psychic manifestations of revivals are frequently simply of a hypnotic kind. Take the manifestations of "power" under Wesley, when men and women would cry out and fall unconscious. To modern psychology it is perfectly plain that this "power" was induced, not by divine interposition, but by hypnotic process. Under the influence of excitement a case of hallucination or catalepsy occurred. Those who saw it or heard of it were distressed lest the same mysterious power strike them. Thus fear acted as a suggestion and the susceptible ones soon fell.

Most frequently the suggestion comes from the revivalist himself. Take the modern revival as an example. The expectation of people is wrought up by weeks of elaborate preparation. The attention is fixed on some one subject, hymns that do not call forth any thought are sung and re-sung, an appeal from a leader of undoubted magnetism follows, an appeal filled with vivid imagination and strong feeling, and

the result is that the unstable element is at once in a state of mind favorable to suggestion. Then they are asked to do the very last thing that emotionally inclined persons ought to do, viz., to lay aside their will. Perfect self-surrender is asked for. Then the suggestion is made. "Raise the hand! Rise! Rise!" Repetitious phrases are used. "There's another." "One more saved." "See them coming." Do we realize to what extent this whole method is a hypnotization of weak and recalcitrant wills. There are only too many passive suggestibles in the world with whom any implanted idea leads at once to impulsive fulfilment. This accounts for the large number of lapses among converts, and for the proportionately meager permanent results of revival effort. There are victims of suggestion who are converted and re-converted at every revival. There is much so-called conversion, which is really a hypnotic process that never touches ethical or spiritual life at all. When the temporary stimulation is removed the reaction comes. I wish space would permit me to quote the concrete confessions as given by Starbuck of those who were brought for the time under the sway of the excitement and the hypnotic influence of a revival and afterwards when reaction and reflection came looked back on their experience with shame and repugnance. One of them called it a "gold brick deal." This principle of hypnotic suggestion explains why often men of superficial character and ability have such mysterious influence over the revival crowd. Dr. Buckley wrote a few years ago an account of a noted criminal who by this same method caused almost an entire revival audience to be struck down under the influence of his sermon as though by the power of God, and later confessed himself to have been a mesmeric fraud.

The employment of fear as the supreme motive has largely passed from the modern revival. The hypnotic feature has not passed away. The suggestibility highly wrought upon by the revivalist remains. Now, suggestion and the hypnotic process are not bad in themselves. But they are not in any sense a spiritual power. The phenomena produced by them



are not special evidences of the immediate presence of God. They are functions of the human mind. The hypnotic process is not one of the highest functions of the mind, either. It is primarily an animal means of fascination. Davenport compares it to the power "the feline employs upon the helpless bird, and the Indian medicine man upon the ghost dance votary." To use it upon susceptible women and little children is mentally, morally, and spiritually injurious. Suggestion will bless mankind only as it comes under the calm domination of reason and will.

(c) We have considered the influence of the individual on the individual and on the mass. Let us now look at the influence of the mass on the individual. Durkheim makes the ultimate social phenomenon to consist in the social pressure, the coercive power which many minds make upon any one mind. He calls it the intimidation by the mass, the influence of mere numbers against a helpless individual. Le Bon views this same thought from the standpoint of the psychology of the crowd: "Whoever be the individuals composing it, however like or unlike be their mode of life, their occupations, their character, or their intelligence, the fact that they have been transformed into a crowd puts them in possession of a sort of collective mind which makes them feel, think, and act in a manner quite different from that in which each individual of them would feel, think, and act were he in a state of isolation." The individual in a psychologic crowd is one thing; out of it he is another. Individuals in a crowd are just as cells which constitute a living body and form by their union a new being with characteristics different from those possessed by the individual cells. The acts of a crowd are the outcome of the subconscious stratum of their instincts, passions, and feelings. That which unites the psychologic crowd is not reason, but feeling; for feeling is the broad bond of nature. The crowd is the great driving force of impulsive social action. Individuality is wilted, excitement heightens suggestibility, feeling is intensified, reflection and reason are in abeyance. A psycho-

logic crowd acts more under the influence of the spinal cord than of the brain. It is at the mercy of external exciting causes. Stimulation immediately brings action. The individual possesses the capacity of dominating his reflex actions, the psychologic crowd is void of this capacity. It is credulous. It thinks in images. It is moved by improbable stories. It succumbs to exaggeration, affirmation and repetition. If it reasons at all it does so by analogy and generalizes from particular cases. The power of contagion in a crowd is strong, contagion not only of certain opinions, but especially of certain modes of feeling. Even the unsympathetic may be swept off their feet by this crowd contagion. Thus law-abiding persons have been swept into the unlawful actions of a mob, and men of critical mind have been drawn into the revival maelstrom. A psychologic crowd is not formed in a moment. It takes some time for the contagion to work. The revivalist does not expect much response during his first half hour. But soon the growing pressure of the mass on the individual so contract his consciousness to a single point that it takes less suggestion than usual to start an impulse. The fascinating power of a crowd for the individual is greater than most men suspect. This is the secret of many a revolution, a mob, or a revival.

It is a strange fact that the greatest epidemics of crowd emotion have occurred in rural communities rather than in large cities. The rural community is relatively homogeneous and an exciting event or suggestion that moves one individual is almost certain to move others. A city population is more composite. It is not so likely to respond to like stimuli. This may have something to do with the great revivals in rural communities under Wesley, Finney, Roberts, and others. At best, the psychologic crowd is too ephemeral for permanent influences on ethical life. The crowd pressure does not last long. The bond dissolves, the crowd scatters, the revival breaks up and the converts come to the point where for the first time reflection begins. But in considering the temporary spread and the emotional intensity of any revival due account must



be made of this second law of impulsive social action, the law that refers to growth by geometrical progression through imitation, suggestion, and mob-mind.

3. The law of restraint is that "deliberation as a habit of mind is the only check to impulsive social action." As individuals are trained in the habit of control, subordinating feeling to rational considerations, impulsive social actions are held in restraint. This is the only safety of a democracy. Only as the greatest respect for intellectual activity and for self-control is maintained is the danger of impulse in a democracy prevented from becoming threatening. A nation that gets its political life solely by impulse and that is undermining its powers of rational control is doomed. He who reads Lecky can easily see how the errors of a democracy are caused by the acceptance of the leadership of unrestrained emotion on the part of a nation. The same principle holds in religion. A method of religion that demands of men that they yield without question and thought to impassioned appeals in the crisis of their spiritual life is, we believe, dangerous to the individual, the church, and the nation. The very last thing that an impulsive man needs is a stirring of the emotion. The very first thing that he needs is a religious discipline that will strengthen his will to keep passions in check and to build up piece by piece a new set of moral and spiritual habits. The greatest danger of the whole method is that it does not take the proper function of the will into account. What makes sin and the sinner? What is the crime of the drunkard? It is yielding to impulse rather than to reason. It is lack of inhibition. What he needs is not a sudden and profound upheaval of his soul, but a method that will keep him in the way of a more deliberate and controlled manner of living. He is to be challenged not to an impulsive self-surrender, but to a deliberate devotion of self to a higher life. What is needed by a boy or girl just entering adolescence, a period when the whole physical and mental nature undergoes transformation characterized by stirring emotion, apprehension and sensitiveness, is not the

excitement of a revival, nor the singing of sensuous religious hymns, but a guiding hand, a wise religious leader who through careful instruction and deliberate strengthening of moral and spiritual habits will cause the young soul to unfold and to blossom forth with all the quietness, gentleness, sweetness, and beauty of a rose. What this nation needs, crazed as it is in many quarters by frenzied feeling that ever and anon bursts forth in mob and riot, is certainly not a method of religion that lacks the elements of rational self-restraint. The danger is that a people who get their religion by impulse rather than by rational control will soon degenerate to the point where they will get their political life in the same way.

For these and many other reasons, the conviction is growing among thoughtful men that the typical religious revival has had its day. This conviction has come gradually but surely. The conception of God's immanence, the principle of growth, the fundamental ethical relation of man to God, have all helped to bring about the conviction that God's method with men is that of building up intelligent volition through divine unfolding. They see that it is perilous to the whole cause of the Christian religion to take a relation as intensely practical and personal as religion ought to be and to look upon it in a superficial, mechanical and magical fashion. The modern mind resents the obtrusiveness of the revival method. The relation of a man to his God is so deep, personal, intimate, and sacred a thing that the self-respecting man shrinks from dragging it out into the public gaze. No man of really fine feeling carries his heart upon his coat sleeve or flaunts to the crowd the most sacred things in his own life, nor dare he find it in his heart to press or demand such a public revelation from others. A man who deeply reverences personality will not do that. The more deeply sensitive he is to the eternal significance of the religion of the considerate Jesus, the less will he be inclined to force his way into the secret recesses of another's heart. If there is one thing the man of fine grain dreads in himself and in others, it is this trifling play upon, this ruthless overriding of, the per-



sonality of another. A deepening sense is growing upon thoughtful men of the sacredness of the personal relation between a man and his God. It is not a thing for public gaze. It is not a question solved in a moment by the waving of a handkerchief. It is not a matter of unrestrained emotion or dramatic convulsion. The kingdom of God came not as the Jews expected through some cataclysmic stroke out of the sky. It came as the seed that bore first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear. It grew as all fellowship grows, as all true relationships ripen. See how unobtrusively God works in human hearts! See how unobtrusively Jesus led men into the Kingdom! If we understand the method of Jesus aright it conforms to the truth promulgated by modern psychology that strong character appears normally in the growth of calm and disciplined habits of religion. The secret of the Kingdom lies in the little child and the principle of growth.

With the passing away of the revival will evangelism disappear? By no means. A new type of evangelism will come. It will be the evangelism of Jesus. There will be less effort to gather immense crowds. It will know nothing of emotional stampeding. There will be no overriding of the will and the reason. There will be no obtrusive pressing of the sacred matter of man's relation to God under the spell of excitement or contagion. Its message will appeal not to fear, but to love, a love that is ethical and spiritual and that will inspire men to action. It will be social as well as individual. John Bunyan and the city of destruction will be heard of less, and John Howard and the city of God will be heard of more. The purpose of the message will be to give men moments of insight, times of vision, fresh awakening to the significance of life. There may be no converts as far as the raising of hands is concerned, but that Kingdom of God which cometh not by observation, but which consists in the influence of personal life and character will surely be coming.

This new evangelism will ground itself on the great truth of Christian nurture. It will seek through careful, prayerful

Christian training to conform the whole man more and more to the Christian ideal. It will put a new emphasis on the teaching side in all religious work. It will regard the ideal Christian life as the product of the gradual dawning of a sweet and trustful God consciousness in the minds and hearts of men. To this end it will foster religious culture in sound Christian homes. It will look upon the religious instruction of the Sunday School as worthy of the best pedagogical ideals of the twentieth century. It will see to it that those who instruct the young in Biblical knowledge are at least as well trained as those who instruct them in secular lore. It will emphasize the moral value of the library and the press. It will see to it that the foundations of morality and religion are taught in the common schools. It will not be content to teach a chosen few the answers of a sixteenth century catechism for a few months in a year. Such a method is as superficial and inadequate as the other, not because it is a wrong method, but because it touches life at but one point and one period. The great religious movement of the twentieth century will lie in the direction of renewed fervor in the interests of Christian training. There are signs of the times on every hand. The Bible is studied and taught as never before. Volumes on religious instruction are coming from the press yearly. Teachers are being trained. The Bible is being taught in college and university. Young people, instead of trying to get up revivals, are organizing mission study classes. Revivalistic churches are formulating catechisms. One of the most far-reaching movements of modern times is the Religious Educational Association of America. All these things mark the dawn of a new day in religious evangelism and religious education. James Russell Lowell, speaking of the religion of the American of the future in his poem on "The Cathedral," says that it will be more than

"an ambulance  
To fetch life's wounded and malingerers in,  
Scorned by the strong."



No, the religion of the twentieth century will not be "scorned by the strong." It will be rugged and active. It will minister to strength, to happiness, to character, to absorbing work. It will give rational attention to the great spiritual realities, and will find its peace and its joy in the doing of the will of God.

ALLENTOWN, PA.

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### III.

## EVANGELISM IN THE REFORMED CHURCHES.<sup>1</sup>

BY THE REV. HENRY COLLIN MINTON, D.D., LL.D.

The special committee appointed one year ago to ascertain and report upon the state of the churches represented in this body, as related to evangelistic work, has been embarrassed by the magnitude and many-sidedness of the task assigned to it. We have been impressed with the thought that, in the larger interpretation of our duty, we should have inquired into all the missionary activities of the various churches. Obviously, however, this was not intended. Although missionary work is primarily and preëminently evangelistic work, and although we have found a disposition in some of the churches to lodge the control of evangelistic work in already established boards and agencies, yet the committee interprets its work to be that of inquiring into the means and methods employed in the local churches in reaching the unevangelized with the gospel, and in bringing the unconverted to a saving knowledge of Jesus Christ.

It is clear that in most of the churches there has been in recent years a deepening consciousness of the unrivalled importance of this work, and of the imperfect manner in which it has been performed. This consciousness is largely independent of the question whether or not our faith and polity are well suited for such a work. The chief end of the church cannot be higher or lower or other than that of her Great Head, and He it is who said of Himself that He came to seek and to save the lost. The feeling has taken strong hold upon many in our churches that in a commendable zeal for social reform,

<sup>1</sup> This paper was presented to the Western Section of the Executive Committee of the Pan-Presbyterian Alliance, at its meeting in the Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church, New York City, in February, 1908.



or for civic righteousness, or for purity of doctrine, or for institutional integrity, or for ethical achievement, or for humanitarian interests there is grave peril that the prime motive for the church's existence and maintenance should be lost sight of, namely, the saving of lost men and women from sin through faith in Jesus Christ by the gracious power of the living God. So many are the blessed indirect benefactions of religion, that the central nucleus of them all is sometimes overlooked and, accordingly, it is forgotten that just as the branches derive their life from the stem, so these incidental interests and movements can be healthy and permanent only where there is a deep, strong spiritual life at the core. We do not believe that we over-state the truth in saying that in all the legitimate activities of the Christian church, evangelical, educational, aggressive or eleemosynary, the one worthy motive and enduring inspiration must be always evangelistic.

Few are the communities to-day, either rural or urban, in which there is not a large margin of population unreached by the gospel and practically untouched by the church. If we consider the element, not inconsiderable in many towns and cities, who avowedly announce themselves as hostile to the church; and then if we consider the growing number of those who, although actively interested in noble and perhaps Christian enterprises, still studiously avoid allying themselves with any effort that is under a distinctively church control; and then if we consider again that very large neutral element who either do or do not themselves occasionally attend upon the services of the sanctuary, and who, however amiable and respectable in themselves, yet neither profess nor manifest any personal interest in the saving work for which the church exists, we cannot escape the conviction that the church has not yet achieved the signal success to which it is predestined, and that the infusion of a new impulse if not of a new life must be the condition of the fulfillment of its high hopes and purposes.

Our churches are conservative. They are chary of the bizarre and the sensational. They exalt the stated means of

grace and ordinances of the house of God. They suspect any immediate result that has been achieved at the cost of decorum or at the sacrifice of becoming reverence for the sanctities of religion. This very proper attitude finds expression in the replies of several of the churches; and yet we find at the same time that the leaven of uneasiness has been at work. Disquietude has resulted from the clearly observed fact that extra-ecclesiastical evangelism is entering the field and more and more doing the very work which the church itself was commissioned to do. The Young Men's Christian Association, the Salvation Army, Rescue Missions, and other works of many kinds, while in spirit friendly to the church without whose support indeed they could not exist, are coming to be regarded by many as rivals of the church itself. Meanwhile the church in many places has been making feeble inroads upon the ranks of the unchurched. The average annual increase in the membership of our churches, from their own baptized children, from their Sunday School classes and from all other sources without has, at the very best, not much exceeded six per cent. of their entire membership. Counting deaths and defections, the church in many instances has not been much more than holding her own. Certainly this is not taking the world for Christ.

Moved by all these things, a number of our churches in the last few years have appointed committees especially charged with stimulating and directing evangelistic effort. In the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, this committee, with Mr. John H. Converse as chairman and the Reverend J. Wilbur Chapman, D.D., as corresponding secretary, by distributing literature, holding conferences and conducting great evangelistic meetings, has unquestionably accomplished a great work with far-reaching influence and blessed results. A number of the other churches, notably the United Presbyterian Church and the Reformed (Dutch) Church in America have had similar committees at work. The Presbyterian Church in the United States has a committee in its field



directing its evangelistic work, but this committee is independent of its General Assembly. The Church of Canada expresses itself as not zealously devoted to evangelistic efforts and relies largely upon the old-fashioned custom of special services just preceding the regular communion in which neighboring pastors assist the pastor at home. A systematic canvass of the parish is made periodically by the pastor himself, and it is believed, in avoiding emotional excitement, fewer lapses are recorded later on.

In the Reformed Church (German) in the United States we are told that emphasis is put upon the "catechetical system" to the exclusion of the revivalistic method"; and if there be those who regard this as a mistake, we may well consider whether in some of the churches the other extreme has not been fallen into, namely, that of relying exclusively upon the Sabbath School which, for doctrinal grounding, is wholly inadequate and which is often overshadowed as an educational factor by the undue preponderance of the evangelistic idea and method.

Your committee beg leave to call your attention to the following reflections upon this subject:

1. We are convinced that there is no integral lack in the organized equipment of our churches for the successful prosecution of evangelistic work. The Presbyterian polity is flexible and adjustable to the ever-changing conditions of society. Her doctrine may be only the dead husks of orthodoxy; but, vitalized by the spirit of Him who is Himself the Truth, it has demonstrated again and again in the history of the Reformed churches its vitality and virility in the work of saving men. Ever loyal to the Bible as the inspired Word of God, it calls sin sin and scorns the glossing over of its essential sinfulness; it presents the awful tragedies of death which sin brings to men and points to the Tragedy of Calvary with its divinely atoning sacrifice as the only deliverance from its curse; it honors the Sovereign Spirit who works when and where and how He pleases, as the only author of all re-creating and sanctifying work in men; and it points the way to an open field of opportunity and activity and

service wherein every redeemed child of God may develop his own spiritual life and carry the gospel that saved himself to others who need it as he once needed it, but have not yet felt its changing power. We do not believe that the exigent demands of the twentieth century, with conditions which may indeed entail certain incidental changes upon the conventional means and methods of ordinary church work, call for any radical or constitutional changes in any of the Reformed churches, in order that they may go forward to a larger and more fruitful work of winning lost men to Christ and bringing them into the Kingdom of God.

2. The question emerges whether or not the laity of the churches may not possess certain latent possibilities for evangelistic service heretofore unutilized. Our churches are all at one in holding to the parity of the ministry. This is a cardinal principle of the Reformed polity. The ordained ministry is not more clearly distinguished from the laity than it is homogeneous and of equal rank. And yet, on the one hand, with a marked decline in the number of forthcoming ministers and a dearth upon the churches already not much short of disastrous, and, on the other hand, with the wide dissemination of Biblical training and learning, and with the development in our churches of unordained men who indisputably possess both the graces of speech and the grace of God, it becomes a practical question how far the churches should go in giving official sanction to the public utterances of unordained preachers of the gospel. The Presbyterian Church of the United States of America has a constitutional provision for local evangelists, licensed by the Presbytery for one year subject to renewal, and if renewed for four consecutive years, the experience thus gained may be taken as that of a novitiate for the ministry and, after a satisfactory examination upon the equivalent of a three years' study of theology and kindred subjects, the novitiate may be ordained to the full gospel ministry. The Presbyterian Church of Canada has made a still further concession to the exigencies of frontier work, and by special act of its



Assembly it grants qualified and limited ordination to certain men who are not eligible for a pastorate and who can work only under Presbyterian oversight, associated with the control of the Home Missions Committee.

Your committee refrain from making any recommendations, but we believe that there is a great potential force, resident in our laity, which might well be employed in carrying the gospel to the unchurched. However, we believe, too, that the ordained ministry should always control and direct these efforts. A great interdenominational laymen's evangelistic council has recently been organized in Chicago and we note with gratification that while the laity does much of the work, the ministers are in a position to lead and advise and control. The recent organization of the Presbyterian Brotherhood in the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America contemplates the development of this latent force and has already been applied in some splendid evangelistic activities. We are disposed to believe that the Reformed churches of this country could greatly advance their evangelistic work if they would organize a summer school of theology, under joint auspices and at some suitable place, for the quickening of our pastors in evangelistic spirit and for the study, both by ministers and intelligent laymen, of the great truths of the gospel and of the best methods of Christian work. It is significant that at the last meeting of the General Synod of the Reformed (Dutch) Church of America the faculty of the Synod's Theological Seminary at New Brunswick was authorized to arrange as far as practicable for a special course for lay workers, in preparing for the service of the churches at home and in its missionary field. The people are bound to get ideas concerning Christianity, and it is certainly worth while to see to it that *our* people get true ideas and at the same time cherish a genuine loyalty to what we hold to be Christianity's true meaning and work. Is it not possible for the allied churches of the Western Section to correlate and coördinate their forces in this great common work? It is much to be desired that they should

protect each other against the vagrancies and vagaries of incompetent and unworthy revivalists; that they should combine their forces for aggressive work in certain great centers of our population and that they should foster and further any plans, practicable and approved, which would add to the carrying power of the preacher's voice and the saving power of the church's work.

3. We must never forget that in Christian lands, at least, the key to the work of evangelization is, under God, committed to the hands of the local church and of the settled pastor. We may plan great spectacular campaigns and carry forward magnificent concerted movements, but the tide will never rise and remain higher than the zeal and faith of the church itself. Pastoral evangelism is the aim to be kept in view in all agitation and education upon this subject. There are reasons for the hesitating attitude which many of our congregations assume toward occasional spasms of evangelism. Paripatetic irresponsibles have too often brought into disrepute the high office which was sanctioned in New Testament history and has been greatly blessed in many lands and ages since. We believe that every evangelist should have a definite ecclesiastical status and that his loyalty to the faith and order and authority of his church should never be far to seek. But the hope of the future is in a generation of pastors, filled with evangelistic zeal and backed up by churches who will count many other things but loss if they can only bring men through their efforts into the knowledge and service of Jesus Christ. This requires no *outré* methods, no sensational tricks, no unusual or unwarranted resort to ethics or esthetics or anesthetics; the world is more often than we think rather repelled than attracted by efforts to win it which it knows only too well are a compromise of the church's dignity, a lowering of her sacred standards, and a reproachful proof of her lack of faith in the self-evidencing power of the truth of the gospel, and of the saving power of the Grace of God. But within proper bounds and as far as



is consistent with solemn appeals and kindly approaches to men we believe that the church should avail itself of every consecrated ingenuity and sagacious enterprise in its unremitting efforts either to bring the people to the gospel, or, where this cannot be done, to take the gospel to the people.

4. We profoundly believe that no greater interest confronts the church to-day than that of evangelism. We call it foreign missions or home missions elsewhere, but when it is in our own parish or our own precinct, we call it evangelism. "This ought we to have done and not to leave the other undone." Many a pastor has a heavy heart to-day because he feels his work limited in scope and hampered in results. He longs for the freedom of apostolic conditions. He is vaguely conscious of something wrong, partly in himself and partly in the conditions, and he is not clear as to the proper and effectual remedy. But his heart sinks within him as he sees the few that hear his message and the many that heed it not. It is small comfort to reflect that the fault is theirs, not ours. It is our business, like our Lord's, not only to save, but also to seek the lost. We submit that the churches of this Section have no graver question to consider than this. If we fail here, we fail disastrously. The world laughs; the hesitating turn away; the young men in our colleges will none of it, and the church wonders why candidates for the ministry are so few; and more and more the church itself, drunk with the wine of worldliness and complacent in the memory of greater days of grace and victory in the past, gravitates down lower and yet lower in the scale of lifeless intellectualism, institutional prestige and conventional respectability.

But on the other hand, if we succeed here, we succeed gloriously. The church that saves men from sin to God, the church that goes out widely and wisely, with gracious touch and tender dignity, that gets near to all classes of the masses with the sympathetic sacrificing spirit of her blessed Lord, the church that, while withstanding assaults without and perils within in the midst of all her manifold plans and agencies,

holds true to the one original germinal impulse of the salvation of the lost; that church will find a thousand vexing problems already solved in this and, relying upon neither might nor power but upon the Spirit of the Living God, it may be well assured of this that whatever else it may have or may not have, whatever else it may do or may not do, it is doing the one work that most urgently needs to be done, the one work that lies nearest the heart of Him who cherishes the church as His beloved bride and has "purchased her with His own blood."

TRENTON, N. J.



## IV.

### THE PREACHER'S GREATEST PROBLEM.

BY THE REV. SCOTT R. WAGNER.

The preacher has numerous and various problems to solve. Many problems vary in different ages and different countries. Some problems of the city preacher are different from some problems of the country preacher. Everywhere the minister has the problem of his own self improvement, the continual building of his body, mind, and soul. Every minister has some sort of question in determining his theology and philosophy, but this varies according to the man's tastes and training. All have something to do with the matter of church polity, with forms of worship, government, and discipline. The problem of his own salvation must not be lost sight of. And in these times many ministers would be inclined to put above all other problems the problem of how to live and keep a Christian disposition, while quarreling with the issue of making a dollar do the work of two dollars.

The problem which underlies all problems is not new, but its solution depends upon our understanding of certain conditions. John Fiske, in his book "Through Nature to God," derives three postulates which form fundamental ground. He says all men, everywhere, have a consciousness of Deity; they have also a sense of the soul as undying; and again all mankind believes in the unseen world having an ethical significance for man on this side of the great divide.

The working out of these and adjacent questions, forms, to a large extent, the history of religion. To-day we state our question as follows: (1) Every human soul, in its deepest operations, is not only conscious of, and in need of, but is also craving for fellowship with the Divine Father. (2)

The Divine Father is always ready and willing to come into intimate fellowship with the human soul. (3) The greatest problem of the minister is to establish and foster an intimate, harmonious, and satisfying relation between the human soul and the Divine Father. The normal relation between the soul of man and the Spirit of God is harmony, just as harmony is the normal relation between a man and his wife, or between a father and his child. But all sorts of conditions tend to produce a relation that has varying degrees of inharmonious fellowship. Questions of education, wealth, poverty, sin, misfortune, misinformation, pleasure, and such like, are the conditions.

The most important part of our proposition to-day is to determine the proper attitude of the souls of the race toward the Divine Father, to determine whether or not the souls of men are craving for fellowship with The Eternal. Also to give some attention, more or less indirectly, to the relation of the Father God, as interpreted by Jesus, to the souls of men; and to conclude with reference to the solution of the issue raised. What, then, is the status of the souls of mankind, as they are called up for reflection and study, in the light of the question now before us? The Psalmist, in trying to voice the condition of his age in spiritual matters, said: "This is the generation of them that seek him"; and in trying to make the same conditions appear in a personal form, said: "My soul thirsteth for God, for the living God." In reading over these words we feel that for ourselves these thoughts are often the real expression of our own souls, but when we survey that part of the world with which we are personally familiar and with which we come in frequent contact, what is our answer to the question, Is this a generation of them that seek God? Are there many people who are thirsty for the living God? I answer both these questions in the affirmative. In undertaking to set forth my convictions that this is a God-seeking age, I realize that I have upon me, apparently, the burden of proof. The present age is so often called a godless age, an age of



unrighteousness, a worldly, licentious, materialistic, money-crazed age, an age of doubt, or of socialism, that to say anything to the contrary must seem, to some, like calling good evil and evil good. From all parts of the country come wails on the depletion of our churches and the neglect of church attendance. Church attendance is not what it should be and I agree that it is not what it might be. That the world is growing worse is the opinion of not a few. That the age, for some reason, is so far adrift from the church that every denomination is short in its supply of candidates for the ministry is not a theory but a painful fact. That many young men thinking of the ministry as a profession are diverted therefrom by parents or friends, is common knowledge. That crime is not abating in quantity, that sin is by no means nearing extinction, that doubt and agnosticism are finding new converts every day, that the old time reverence for the Bible is no more to be found, that implicit adherence to our ecclesiastical functions is waning, are all evident and almost beyond dispute. Nevertheless, in the face of all these and many other tendencies, I do not think that we miss the spirit of the times when we contend that people are very hungry for God; that souls faint for God, for the living God.

Looking at the surface of a smoothly flowing stream, especially during a storm, we cannot easily tell which way the water is flowing. Looking at the superficial waves of the ocean of thought we cannot accurately know their direction nor fathom their real depth. *Let us try to interpret the under current.* Why men do not go to church is a theme much more frequently discussed than the theme, why men do go to church. We distinguish between seeking the church and seeking God. Our proposition, as stated above, was not that the present age is a church-going age, but that it is a God-hungry age; and we must bear in mind that not going to church is not always the same as not having any desire to know God. Not being a church member and not being a church-goer may be a sign of being ungodly and unrighteous, but it

is not proof thereof. I believe with all my heart that people cannot do anything better than belong to and attend a church. I believe it is a sign of a hunger and a thirst for God. I believe it is best for the individual and for the community. But when I consider what church-going is; and when I consider how much imperfection there is in both pulpit and pew; when I reflect upon how often the precept and practice of both pulpit and pew are very far apart; when I consider how weak and futile my own efforts seem in trying to present God to a lot of people I see before me; when I consider how unworthy I am to stand between God and man, in some small sense a mediator; and when I consider that all of us are nothing more than men, painfully limited by all that is human; when I consider such thoughts I am absolutely persuaded that we underestimate the number of people whose souls are crying out for the living God.

A few years ago a pastor was preaching a series of sermons on the old question, "Why men do not go to church," and was using considerable space in the daily papers to advertise and report. On the Monday after the delivery of the principal sermon on the general theme it was my duty to call at the office of a prominent non-churchman. The first thing he said to me was: "I have just been reading what this preacher has to say about why men do not go to church." I at once asked him if the reasons given, as reported, were the same as he, a non-church member, would give. The reasons of the preacher and this man did not agree in all points, though they did in some, and after much reflection, I feel that some things the non-churchman said were as near the real cause of certain conditions as were the reasons the preacher gave. Our conversation on the subject was quite lengthy, and we drifted into different phases of the church and God question. While many persons will not admit that a man who never goes to church can have a serious thought about God and the human soul, nevertheless I am convinced, from this and repeated conversations with this same man, and others of a similar type, that in a great



many unsuspected places and in a great many unsuspected persons, there are minds that think seriously and hearts that hunger truthfully for the living God.

After the incident of the interview with the man just referred to, I made it my business to conduct a quiet, but earnest inquiry, into the nature of the thoughts and feelings of the minds and hearts of many people who were to all appearances worldly and ungodly, with the particular aim of finding out if there was any latent desire for God, and what was the reason they did not belong to or attend a church. I shall be unable to go into details in this paper, but will give you only a general idea of the results. I first went to some men, whom I knew quite well, who were active club members. I asked them questions like these: When your fellow club members speak about the church, what is their attitude? When they speak about the preacher, when they speak about God, what is the nature of their speech? Do they often discuss what we might define as sacred things? Among the most profane and intemperate persons with whom you associate or come into contact, do you ever find that they show an attitude of what might be called a hunger for God, and for what his name, when used reverently, signifies?

I carried this same sort of inquiry through big mills and factories, getting evidence from the rank and file of the persons at work. From labor unions and socialist bodies I also collected evidence along the same lines. From every available source I tried to get the root feelings in the hearts of the people whom the church is likely to speak of as "being at enmity with God." I learned this from my investigations: that while men are often profane and women often vulgar; while people often ridicule the church and make ridiculous jibes at the preacher; while many show great indifference to what we call "spiritual matters"; yet underneath all the profanity, real and apparent, and underneath all the apparent disregard for the religion and the church, there is a sense of God and a hunger for God that is not merely superficial. That the

people of whom we are now speaking were doing right in their way of thinking, I do not contend. That I did not wholly excuse in them the things to which I have been referring, goes without saying. That they often thought seriously about God, talked quietly of him, when with their equals and associates even spoke of a desire for more of his life, that they confessed to secretly praying to him, as best they knew how, revealed what I feel perfectly justified in calling a true thirst for God. They were mistaken and misinformed, biased in their views by many things, led astray in thought and habit, victims of many sins, making up that class we call the worldly and profane, yet not without God, not infidels, but rather with parched tongues trying to slake their thirst at the wrong fountain and by wrong methods. For these and many other reasons I stated at the opening of this paper that the human soul was not only conscious of and in need of, but also craved, fellowship with the Divine Father.

Now, I never approach any man but that I have the feeling that if I may properly get into his confidence I am going to find good soil for some of the divine seed. In the days of Jesus on the earth there was a class of people called publicans and sinners and harlots, who, when they saw God as he was in Christ Jesus, almost leaped upon him for joy, in finding that for which their souls hungered and thirsted; and the same hunger is still working in the hearts of many upon whom we are more likely to look as being at enmity with God than as being famished for him.

There are other reasons for believing in the statement that the hearts of men are hungry for the life of God, some of which are here referred to. Take the literature of to-day and analyze it; and how many people are eager to read on subjects that have a religious bearing! In the realm of science and philosophy, where the intellectual alone can travel with ease, the greatest effort has been to find truth, to know the first principle, to know the great power that works for righteousness; in short, to find and know, not only the origin of life or the



origin of species, but to find the eternal power we call God and harmonize the hunger of the soul with that power. The demand for light on sacred things was never so great as it is to-day. The religious presses are kept running almost day and night. No sooner is a good book produced than the edition is exhausted, and so on with a second and a third. Notwithstanding the fact that Bibles are very numerous, yet the sale goes on by hundreds and by thousands. More persons are devoting themselves, with time and money, to the serious study of the Word, and more persons are discussing the Bible and religious literature and more persons are anxious about a great many things pertaining to their faith and soul development, than in any previous age, or than we are ready to believe of this age until we have made some thorough investigation. It is not many years since all discussion of theology was in the hands of the schools, but now the same questions are being worked out by the masses, and by them because they are interested, because they are anxious about some things, and are conscious of certain definite needs for the soul. The result of all their heterogeneous reading and discussion is great confusion of doctrine and of essential faith, but underneath all of it is the human heart and the human heart unsatisfied. This is the same as saying that the human heart is hungry. It has aches and wants that it may often misinterpret; it has cravings which it can neither analyze nor express; feelings that find no better language than a child a year old can find to express itself, and yet with wants, desires, and hungerings none the less real.

When we come to analyze the condition and conduct of many who have never taken any interest in the church, we find, according to their own confessions and testimonies, that what a great many men on their way to worldly indulgence and intemperance want, or wanted when first they became sensual devotees, is not the actual indulgence in intemperate practices, but the effect of them. They are uneasy, discontented, have troubles, both real and imaginary, have no rest or peace of

mind, body or heart, and what they want is a sort of an oblivion, which they think gives them that calm for which there is the intense craving. It is not that they seek to be turned from men into beasts; it is not that they prefer the cold, damp bed of the gutter to the one at home; it is not that they seek poverty and to be castaways, but it is because they have some sense of a great need, an unsatisfied craving, which for the time being seems to find satisfaction in complete intoxication or other absorbing indulgence. What they really need and what they really want, though they may not know it and may resent if you suggest it to them, is peace, content, comfort, and freedom from what now seems like serpents' fangs of torment. Experience shows that when these men are properly brought to the fountain of life and have their hunger and thirst quenched in that life-giving stream, they find what they have long desired and hungered for, and knew it not, was nothing else than God, the living God.

Again, the very fact that numberless people will cling to any new form of faith, rather any new fads or theories, as Christian Science, or Dowieism, or Spiritualism and the like, is not an argument against our proposition, but in favor of it. It is a sign of a hunger not satisfied when people are ready to run to every new method that is reported to have found a better and shorter way into the Holy Place. They go hither and thither with an uncertain knowledge of an inward craving, which seeks the face of God. In the Gospels there is an account of a man who had been possessed of many devils and the devils were cast out; he was likened to a man who went away and walked through dry places, seeking rest and finding none; of course, he found it not; he was hungry, but he took the wrong method of satisfying his hunger. No one finds mental peace in going contrary to the natural laws of the mind. No one finds bodily health in going contrary to the laws that control the body. And no one finds soul peace, or soul health in going contrary to the laws which prevail in its



realm. This man's thirst was led in the wrong direction, and so, as the record says, he came back to his former house and taketh to himself seven other spirits and the last state was worse than the first. He is typical of so many persons who come to the churches a few times, or for a season, and then drop away. It may be that they came to the church seeking rest and finding none they went back to their former habits of sin and indulged in them with a new zeal, but their heart hunger for God was not satisfied, and as long as they live, that spark of celestial fire, of which the poet speaks, will sometimes glow, and if properly approached can usually be fanned into a flame.

That the church does not always meet the needs of men, and does not always succeed in mediating that peace which the world needs, is not always the fault of the church. Yet the greatest question before the church to-day is how to properly feed the bread of life that it may satisfy the hungry world; how to administer God that the souls of men may find peace. The multitudes to-day are like they were in the days of Jesus; they are a great way from home and have no bread. The multitudes being hungry, it is the business of the preacher and the church to feed them and not allow them to go away hungry. The disciples in the days of Jesus said send them away to the villages and let them buy, but Christ said give ye them to eat. I believe, too often, in our age and in previous ages, the church has been willing to allow the hungry multitude to go away and seek its own way of satisfying its deeper heart hungerings. Too often, living souls, hungry for a living God, have come and asked for the bread of life and the church has thrown at them the crusts of old musty theology and church polity. Too often men cry out for the water of life and they are handed a sop, dipped in the vinegar and gall of denominational controversy or history or pride. Too often do eager minds ask for a little guidance and direction and light, on dark subjects, and they are told to swallow wholesale an unreasonable creed or theology or they will be damned. Alas, too often

have those hungry for a personal uplift sought to find help in getting the influence of one supposed to have risen to sterling character through the church, only to find that the lives of that man and many others are not true to their professions. Surely, the world is not to be too harshly condemned for having lost much reverence and respect for things ecclesiastical. So many have come thirsty and gone away more thirsty, and the greatest problem of the day comes to be for the preacher a very serious problem.

How shall the church and the minister meet the needs of the present day? How shall they satisfy the hungry and the thirsty? How can they help men to find what they need? The answers to these questions lead us to the heart of the minister's greatest problem. The greatest question of the age is not socialism or social ethics. It is not the change of a creed or a catechism. It is not evolution or higher criticism. It is not the new theology as over against the old theology. The burning question is the old problem of Jesus, to give the Father to the children, and to give the children to their Father; to bring the prodigal back to the open arms of the ever-loving Father and to keep the elder brother in proper harmony and spiritual growth at home. To this end the first responsibility is placed rightly upon the preacher, though the preacher must not be asked to carry all the responsibility.

The people sometimes say, "Let the pulpit give us great living sermons and we will all, and always, attend church." In this respect the preachers are more honest than able, they cannot always be delivering masterpieces. In order to meet the demand and satisfy the needs and bring about the solution of the question before us, all sorts of superficial plans are propagated. Some ministers say that we must make the church more spectacular. On all sides we hear that what the age needs is a social church, this social element running out into all kinds of suppers and bazaars and lectures and entertainments, lantern slides, and anything that will attract, like the bill-boards for the theater and the barker for the street per-



formance. Some say the sermons must be on the same live topics that fill the daily papers and magazines. Others, again, say the new theology, and again others the old theology, as though if that were changed the heavens would fall. I firmly believe that these and similar methods are just the things the preacher must not use and the church should not support. These things will not satisfy the thirst for God. What this thirsty, God-hungry age wants and needs is not the things of the social and political and material world hashed over in the pulpit, not the affairs and fancies of men worked over and offered as that which will feed the deepest hungerings of human nature, but they want God. God is what and whom they need. God is what they really seek, and giving them God in all his fullness, in all his love, in all his satisfying goodness, is the only thing that will bring entire and permanent peace and content.

The hunger of the world is great. The need of the times to meet this hunger is also great and the problem of the preacher was never so great as now. If the world, the soul-hungry world, says, "Give us God to quench our parched hearts," and the preacher gives them theories about God, it will not do. If sinners are hungry for the companionship of Christ and the preacher holds up before them the theories of the church on the doctrines of the Logos, the atonement, the immaculate conception, etc., as expressed in creeds or other formularies, it will not do. It will be like giving a stone when they ask for bread. If they say, "Lead us into the spirit of his presence," and there is proclaimed simply a doctrine of a third person, it does not and will not satisfy.

When we look into the faces of men and women, what a crying need we see! When the preacher looks out on this hungry sea of soul-needy people, well may he wonder how he is going to scatter even a few crumbs for them. But just three things must be kept in mind: (1) That this God for whom men hunger, and whom men need, is always a Father; (2) that this soul, that is without that for which it hungers, is always

a child of that Father; (3) that the normal, and therefore desirable relation, is one of harmony and union. When a little child gets lost from its parents and is restored tired and sobbing to the family for the loss of which it was in great distress, there is no need for a lecture on how to avoid getting lost when in a crowd, but put the little hand in that of the parent and the sobbing is over for the child and the anxiety for the parent; both understand. When a husband and wife become estranged and after while hunger for the peace which is so much better than discord, there is no need of anything more than the old embrace, and they are both happy and both understand. The great business of the preacher to-day is to take the hand of the erring child and lay it in the hand of God and say, "This is your Father."

But how is this to be done? Some suggestions: The souls of many are pauperized with selfishness and greed, but God is love. The church and minister must say, here, "God is love; be filled with love and you will be enriched, and revived." The mother worn out with fretful children and broken in heart over the infidelity of her husband, and also smarting under the consciousness of her own errors, must be led, not to the church to learn the catechism and creed and the peculiar theology of the denomination, but she must be led to the arms of God's love and there left to rest her weary head on the Father's breast. The sinner stained by impurity, or lost in the whirl of sensual pleasure, needs not instructions in the miracles, or the infallibility of the Bible, or the nature of the Trinity, but just to touch the hem of his garment and be made whole and clean. What does the world suffer from? It suffers in the broadest sense from sin, and God is the antidote for the poisonous effects of sin. The soul of man is weary with the struggle of life—God is a refuge and a rest. The labor of the world is for bread and clothes and possessions and pleasures, but when the world acquires them it is still unsatisfied—God says, "Come unto me all ye that labor and are heavy laden and I will give you rest." God is a father, God is love, God



is peace of mind and soul, God is truth, God is honesty, God is kindness and tender mercy, God is hope, and God is life. The soul of man needs and cries out for its Father. The heart craves for love, pure and true. It craves for the peace which is eternal. It asks for truth and the way thereto. The souls of men and women are famishing for true sympathy and kindness. The care-worn, discouraged heart wants, needs, cries out aloud and in secret for hope, for life, and not death; and for all these God eternally stands.

What the world really wants and what the minister must really give is such service that this crying thirst of the human soul may find its satisfaction in the living God—and to realize this end constitutes the minister's greatest problem.

RIEGLSVILLE, PA.

## V.

### THE GREATNESS OF *HAMLET* AS A WORK OF DRAMATIC ART.<sup>1</sup>

BY PROFESSOR C. ERNEST WAGNER, A.M.

The play of *Hamlet* is, all things considered, Shakspeare's greatest single work. Other plays, to be sure, excel in certain particulars. In delicacy of fancy and sheer poetic beauty, *A Midsummer Night's Dream* easily outranks it. In spirited characterization and the happy blending of comedy with history, the two parts of *King Henry IV* surpass it. In skill of construction and the subtle interweaving of varied elements to produce a harmonious whole, *The Merchant of Venice* exceeds it. In animated action, in brilliant dialogue and the sparkle of witty repartee, both *As You Like It* and *Much Ado About Nothing* outshine it. In the province of tragedy *Macbeth* and *King Lear* are more intense, more dramatically effective. Nevertheless, after all deductions, exceptions, and qualifications have been made, the play of *Hamlet* remains, in a class by itself, Shakspeare's masterpiece—the greatest work of the greatest dramatic genius the world has produced.

When we come to consider the reasons for this preëminence, when we ask the question, "Why has this drama intrenched itself so strongly in the popular heart, retaining even to-day, full three hundred years after it was first produced, its place upon the boards by the side of the most successful modern plays?" an interesting problem is opened up.

The proverbial expression, "Like the play of *Hamlet* with *Hamlet* left out," is sufficiently indicative of the popular feel-

<sup>1</sup> A paper read at a meeting of The Avon Literary Club, of Mercersburg, Pa., held on the evening of December 11, 1908.



ing. To the theatre-going public and to the general reader of this and other days, the character of Hamlet is alone important. In him the interest centres. With his exits and his entrances the real action ceases or begins. All other characters are unimportant, indeed almost negligible.

This fascination of Hamlet, this domination of the scene by him, is not hard to explain. For in his hero, if hero he may be termed, Shakspeare has drawn a figure of irresistible interest and charm. The prince is well-born, young, handsome, intelligent, refined, romantic. Besides all this, he is a lover. He has been abused and wronged. Saddened and disillusioned as he is by the consciousness of infidelity, of treachery, and of foul murder done upon a father whom he loved, and overwhelmed by the task so solemnly put upon him of avenging the hideous crime, he is indeed a figure to enlist at the very outset the warmest sympathy, the devoted loyalty, of beholders and readers alike.

As the action advances and the mesh of destiny is irresistibly woven about him, these feelings are intensified; and when the final and inevitable *denouement* arrives, the heart is stirred to its depths by the tragic havoc that befalls this Hamlet and all who have crossed his path. The appeal, then, of the play to men in every age and generation is essentially the appeal of Hamlet, the ill-starred Dane.

To the serious student, however, Hamlet is by no means the sole source of interest, the single element of strength, in the play. From whatever point of view he contemplates the work, he is overawed by its greatness. Each succeeding study only serves to increase his wonder.

If the subject of consideration be the plot, he will be amazed to find out of what crude and simple materials the master dramatist has erected the mighty framework which succeeding generations have chosen to call the supreme example of his dramatic art. The story, as we know, is very old. It is found first in literary form in the chronicle of Saxo Grammaticus, a Danish historian, who wrote in the closing years of the twelfth

century. It is likely that there was an earlier play on the London stage which treated the Hamlet theme; but every vestige of it has been lost, and it can have been at best a crude and clumsy piece of work. In this material, perchance unpromising enough to the tyro, Shakspeare, the trained craftsman, now in the mature period of his career (about 1602), discovered the elements of a soul-moving tragedy.

It is significant that from 1601 to 1608, the period when his powers were the ripest and his productive energy most active, Shakspeare chose dark and tragic themes. It is during these years that the solemn figures of Brutus, Othello, Lear, and Macbeth people his fancy; that he wrestles with the darkest problems of human destiny; that he portrays with inexorable fidelity the evil that is in men's hearts and the suffering that is in the world through sin. Out of the depths of his profoundest feelings, out of the fulness of his own experience, the dramatist speaks to us in these the mightiest works of his genius.

And tragedy, after all, say what we will, comes nearer to us than comedy ever can. It moves us to the very centre of our being. It reveals to us, with relentless austerity, the inmost secrets of man's nature, its greatness and its littleness, its august virtues, its Titanic vices. It exhibits with unabashed candor the workings of the "essential passions" and the "elemental feelings." Rightly, therefore, the ancient Greeks placed tragedy above comedy, crowning with victor's wreath the successful tragic poet. And rightly are the greenest bays in Shakspeare's chaplet of fame the mighty tragedies of *Othello*, *Lear*, *Macbeth*, and *Hamlet*.

In *Hamlet* most of all (and here is one of its strongest fascinations for the attentive student), we seem to come close to Shakspeare himself, to be taken for the nonce into his confidence, to catch a momentary glimpse of that elusive personality, concerning which we would fain know so much. We like, at least, to believe that Shakspeare put more of himself, as he was about the year 1602, into the character of Hamlet than he put into any other single dramatic creation. Surely, the



world-weariness of Hamlet, as evinced in his marvelous soliloquies, was Shakspeare's own when he conceived the part, during those years of gloom that followed the death of his father, mother, brother, younger daughter, and only son, Hamnet, the execution of Essex, the disgrace and imprisonment of Southampton, and the alienation of the mysterious friend of the sonnets. Surely it is Shakspeare himself who protests against the demoralization of the drama because of the "late innovation"; who deplores the vogue of the children players, the "little eyases that cry out on the top of question, and are most tyrannically clapped for 't"; who defines in immortal terms the true function of the drama, "to hold, as 't were, the mirror up to nature; to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure;" and who, out of the bitterness of his own experience, inveighs against the player who "tears a noble passion to tatters," and the clown who, not content with the lines set down for him by the poet, must needs divert the "groundlings" with local gags and extemporé horse play. Surely, then, in Hamlet's brilliant soliloquies we have the scintillations of Shakspeare's dazzling wit. In Hamlet's mental attitude, in his intellectual processes, Shakspeare has revealed to us, perhaps unintentionally and in spite of himself, the play of his own god-like reason upon matters that concerned him most nearly.

These are but a few of the more obvious elements of interest in a play that, of itself, may fitly serve as the study of a lifetime. So vast is its scope, so exquisite its structure, so far-reaching the import of many of its lines, so complex its delineation and interplay of character, so comprehensive its knowledge of human life, so wide and undying its appeal! In our consideration of the subject we must perforce be limited to a very cursory glance at a few of the more salient features of this stupendous work.

Let us notice, first of all, the dramatic and personal values of the so-called "minor" characters. For the reason noted before,

they do not as a rule receive the attention they deserve. And yet, in the delineation of these varied and interesting types, Shakspeare has shown marvelous skill. Were they not dwarfed by the commanding personality of Hamlet, they would be more fully appreciated.

Take, for example, Claudius, the usurping king. We are prejudiced against him from the start because we look at him through Hamlet's eyes. And yet, when we come to estimate him at his true dramatic or even human worth, we find that he is far from being a mere "Vice of kings," a "king of shreds and patches." Whenever he is presented to us in the evolution of the play, whenever he speaks or acts for himself or in his rôle of king, we find him to be the strong, masterful, courageous, tactful man, fit to rule and equal to every emergency. He is a wise statesman, a tender husband, a finished courtier and diplomat. Whether the problem be Hamlet's strange "transformation," Polonius' violent death, Laertes' insurrection, Ophelia's sad derangement, or the threatened incursion of "young Norway," he is, so far as we can see, "every inch a king," and far more fit for Denmark's throne than Hamlet could ever hope to be. True, he goes down in the general ruin at the end of the play, but only as a victim of Nemesis.

Again, if we permit ourselves to look at Gertrude through Hamlet's eyes, we shall have a distorted picture of her. "Frailty, thy name is woman!" is perhaps the worst that may be said of her. To assume with Hamlet that she was accessory to, or even cognizant of, the foul deed whereby her first husband was removed, is unjust, unwarranted by the facts in evidence. Indeed, the first quarto makes it entirely clear that she was innocent of the murder. Even in the folio text, the present acting version, the horror with which she hears the charge from her own son's lips is natural, not assumed. That she was possessed of sufficient personal charm to win and hold the affection of Claudius, there can be no doubt. Her solicitude for her distracted son, her eagerness to put the best construction upon his wild deeds, and to protect him, if possible,



from their natural consequences, show her to be a woman, not a monster, endowed with true motherly feeling. Beyond this, in extenuation, we may not go. It is hard to think of her as having given birth to Hamlet. He seems not, in mental or spiritual traits, to be his mother's son; unless, inconstancy or fickleness of purpose be a part of the maternal legacy. Neither is he, for that matter, the son of his father—a statesman, a warrior, and a man of action; unless it be in seriousness, in dignity, and mental acumen.

Horatio, the friend of Hamlet, is an interesting personality. He is a student, a scholar, a serious-minded, temperate, self-centred man. Hamlet admires him for these qualities, and in a touching interview speaks to him words of unwonted warmth. He takes him into his confidence, trusts him with his secret, and when he comes to die pleads with him to clear his name and deliver it unstained to posterity. In intellectual pursuits the two have evidently much in common. We feel, however, that Horatio is not tainted with Hamlet's overfondness for speculation, that he is not willing to follow in those flights "beyond the reaches of our souls" which have an irresistible fascination for the vision-seeing prince.

Polonius, the father of Laertes and Ophelia, is admirably drawn. In him, though without his knowledge or consent, the element of comedy supervenes; and while he struts his little hour upon the stage, we are forced by turns to sneer, to smile, and perchance to pity. As a type of the worn-out courtier, smug and consequential, pattering words of wisdom, the full import of which he himself seems not always to understand, Polonius is drawn to the life. His Chesterfieldian precepts to Laertes on the eve of his departure for Paris, his fatherly advice to Ophelia with regard to young Hamlet's "tenders" of affection, reveal most fully the fibre of his moral nature and the standards that go therewith. His diagnosis of Hamlet's malady is exquisite, and his recital of the several stages through which his patient declined before arriving at complete madness, is a delicious bit of unconscious humor. That Hamlet

should hold him in contempt is natural. His shallowness and self-complacency he despises. His meddlesomeness he resents. His underhand and sneaking practices he loathes. On every possible occasion he quizzes him and holds him up to ridicule; and when finally, after the fatal pass through the arras, he discovers that the eavesdropper is this same prying, sneaking Polonius, he serenely washes his hands of the crime and sets his conscience entirely at rest—a characteristic, significant incident.

Given a father like Polonius, and we should expect a son like Laertes and a daughter like Ophelia. Laertes is a type of the “young blood” of the later Elizabethan time and the early days of James I. He is a frank Hedonist, wholly abandoned to the pursuit of pleasure. Like Horatio, he has come home to attend the coronation of the king; but it is not from Wittenberg that he has come. He is no student. He makes no pretence of being one. Life at the Danish court he finds very irksome. Having paid his formal respects, he is eager to be off again. But before he embarks he must needs give his sister some brotherly advice. Tainted and debased himself, he is totally unable to appreciate a nature like Hamlet’s, and therefore misconstrues his motives and breathes innuendoes against his character. Ophelia shrewdly discounts his moral precepts, emanating as they do from one who “himself the primrose path of dalliance treads, and recks not his own rede.” Nevertheless, his suggestive words, reinforced as they are by Polonius’ sneers and commands, sink into her mind and poison it, as base insinuations seem so commonly to do. In the later scenes of the play Laertes is used as an effective foil to Hamlet. In him we are shown the spirited man of action, disinclined to reflect, eager only to do, yielding without hesitation or scruple to the elemental instinct that clamors for revenge.

In Ophelia the influences of heredity and environment are subtly portrayed. She was, we must believe, an attractive and withal an amiable girl. That Hamlet once loved her there can



be no doubt. The tokens he had given her, his spoken and written protestations of affection, and that final surge of passion as he stood by her open grave, all prove this. So far as we are permitted to know Ophelia, she is devoid of any glaring fault. She has in her favor good looks, a sweet temper, and an intellect of no mean calibre. Gertrude, the queen, regarded her with favor, and would gladly have had her for a daughter-in-law. That she was capable in a sense of appreciating Hamlet's worth, is proved by her eloquent eulogium when she beholds the change in him. Her quiet dignity when assailed by his cruel words is admirable, and the very fact that her reason is unhinged by the calamities that befall her father and quondam lover, proves beyond question the strength of her feelings and the genuineness of her womanly instincts. Why is it, then, that Hamlet is estranged, and for his love offers her rude taunts and unfeeling jests? There is a deeper reason for this than his madness, be that real or assumed. Ophelia is, after all, a commonplace, conventional girl, brought up in the atmosphere of the court and dependent for her moral standards and her views of life upon such men as her father and her brother, or, if you like, upon such women as Gertrude. She is thoroughly conventional, and therefore timid and complaisant. Hamlet is the reverse of all this; and therefore when the test comes, when the issue arises between father, brother, and the court, on the one side, and himself on the other, and when Ophelia, too weak to meet the ordeal, fails him, he promptly estimates her at her true worth, and sadly but irrevocably turns away. To me, one of the finest situations in the play is that scene where Hamlet applies the final test. Words are not necessary. He need only gaze unspeaking into her eyes and, seeing mirrored there the cowering, dismayed soul of the woman who could not understand, who would not, if she could, bear with him the burden that had been laid upon him, he departs as he had come, silent but resolved. Hamlet needed for his mate a girl of Juliet's mettle, or, if you will, a

woman like Clara Middleton, a woman stronger than himself, who, by giving herself, might perchance have saved him.

Fortinbras, of Norway, is an engaging figure. Here is a man of heroic mold—strong, capable, courageous, fit to rule and eager for the task. A plain, practical man of affairs, too, unhampered by scruples, undismayed by difficulties, a type that Shakspeare loved to portray. He comes upon the scene at the end of the play, like a creature from another world. Nemesis has done her work upon the sinned against and sinning. With the dying Hamlet we give him our voice for the succession and gladly surrender the reins of government to his strong and unpolluted hands. Fortinbras is another telling foil to Hamlet. We see in him what Hamlet should have been would he have succeeded worthily to his father's place upon the throne of Denmark.

Rosencrantz and Guildenstern have been termed the nonentities of the play. Shift the names and they fit the men as well. And yet they serve their purpose. They draw from Hamlet some interesting observations, and without a twinge of conscience he sends them to their final, and, in his opinion, just reward. Even Osric, the court butterfly, is a type immortalized for us by the dramatist's touch. Only a passing touch, it is true, and yet a touch so deft, so sure, so unerring in its fixing qualities, that men and women with an eye for the ridiculous shall continue through the ages to see the discomfited courtier, after his interview with Hamlet and Horatio, "run away like a lapwing with his shell on his head."

The grave-digging clowns, who furnish, at the opening of the fifth act, the comic relief which Shakspeare seemed to feel so necessary even in his most sombre tragedies, are evidently drawn from the life. They are types of the heavy, ale-sodden rustic, such as the dramatist must frequently have observed in his own native Warwickshire. He never tired of studying the "humours" and exhibiting the mental processes of this class of men.

Having glanced at the several minor characters of the play,



let us turn now to the study of the central figure, whose personality and whose fortunes dominate the action and determine the inevitable *denouement*.

Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, is withal the most solemn and impressive figure in the entire gallery of the master dramatist. From the moment that he comes upon the scene, clad in the habiliments of woe and enshrouded in an atmosphere of mystery, he seizes upon the imagination and enchains the attention of beholder and reader alike. The fascination increases as the play goes on, and he is made by the dramatist's art to reveal himself through the rapidly shifting scenes. To his associates he remains to the very end an enigma; but to us who are permitted to hear his wonderful soliloquies, those communings with his own soul, it is given to know much more, to "pluck," as it were, "the heart of the mystery," to apprehend the real tragedy.

The brooding silence which characterizes Hamlet at the opening of the play is not hard to understand. It is the product of his father's sudden death, his mother's o'erhasty marriage, and the presence of a hated interloper on the throne. The first words he utters, in reply to Claudius' kindly overture, "a little more than kin and less than kind," reveal his bitterness of soul and his uncompromising attitude toward the usurping king. These feelings are intensified as the action progresses.

We must remember the situation at Elsinore. Called from the scholastic quiet of Wittenberg by his father's sudden death, and while still observing the formal period of mourning, Hamlet is horrified by his mother's unseemly marriage. His sensitive nature, already chastened by the loss of a dear father, is unspeakably shocked by the callousness and infidelity of a mother whom, we must believe, he had from boyhood respected and loved. Horribly disillusioned, and now keenly alive to the artificiality and hollowness of life as it confronts him at the Danish court, he is driven in upon himself, the moody, brooding, ironical Hamlet of the opening scene. At this junc-

ture comes the news of the ghostly apparition, seen by the officers of the watch and by his trusted friend, Horatio. "My father's spirit in arms!" he ejaculates. "All is not well; I doubt some foul play." Afterward, in the midnight colloquy on the wind-swept platform beneath the castle walls, when he hears the dread account of his father's taking off, he cries, "O my prophetic soul! my uncle!" Having rightly jumped to this conclusion, he forthwith assumes his mother's complicity and equal guilt, degrading her to the level of "that incestuous, that adulterate beast" who had won her love.

A deal of ink has been spilled in the discussion of Hamlet's madness. Was he really, essentially mad, or was his madness deliberately and consistently assumed for the accomplishment of a definite purpose? That critics of the play have differed so widely in their views is of itself sufficient proof of the dramatist's art in handling this delicate theme.

That the madness of Hamlet is accepted as genuine by Polonius, by Ophelia, by Laertes, by Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, and, up to a certain point at least, by his own mother, Gertrude, there can be no doubt. This, too, according to the grave-digger's statement, is the view prevalent among the people. Claudius, on the other hand, is less easily convinced. He is frankly sceptical; and as for Horatio, Hamlet's bosom friend and confidant, there is not the slightest evidence in anything he says or does to show that he, for one moment, believes Hamlet to be really mad. In short, those who knew least, or who had least opportunity of knowing, believed him to be mad. He who knew more, Claudius, was somewhat in doubt. He who knew most, Horatio, habitually accepted him as a rational man.

To convince ourselves, it seems to me, we need consider only three points. 1. His conversations with Horatio. 2. The well-known scene with his mother, in which he challenges her to bring him to the test. 3. His soliloquies.

1. Hamlet's avowed purpose to assume the "antic disposition" is plainly enough declared in the conversation with



Horatio and Marcellus, which took place immediately after the first communication of the ghost. Excited as he is by the message, he seems at first beside himself. To his friends he speaks "wild and whirling words"; but quickly regaining control of his overwrought nerves, he binds the two sharers of his secret to a solemn compact. From this time forward the "antic disposition" is consistently assumed whenever it will serve his purpose. He succeeds, as I have said before, in fooling the majority of those upon whom it is practiced. Claudius, however, because of his guilty knowledge, is only partially deceived. Horatio, true to his agreement, keeps silence and always understands. In all the scenes that follow, Hamlet presumes upon Horatio's loyalty and his full comprehension. Only once, toward the end of the play, does he express regret to his friend for a previous outbreak, confessing that he had, in this instance, really lost control of himself.

2. In the painful interview with his mother, where he "tents her to the quick," and when, interrupted by the apparition of his father, who pleads with him to "step between her and her frightened soul," the terrified queen, now more than ever convinced that her son's reason is entirely gone, cries, "This bodiless creation ecstasy is very cunning in," Hamlet quickly seizes upon the word "ecstasy" and, in order that his inquisition may not lose its force, chooses now to prove to her his sanity. Hear his remarkable words:

"Ecstasy!

My pulse, as yours, doth temperately keep time,  
And makes as healthful music; it is not madness  
That I have uttered: bring me to the test,  
And I the matter will re-word; which madness  
Would gambol from."

This is admittedly a test well-known to alienists and not uncommonly employed by them in cases of like kind. After this challenge Hamlet's burning words sink into Gertrude's very soul. That she is influenced by them there can be no question; for, in her subsequent report of the interview to the

king, she endeavors to put the best possible construction upon Hamlet's acts, and in her solicitude for him makes a deliberate misstatement concerning his conduct. In the fencing scene between Hamlet and Laertes, she is an interested and innocent spectator; for Claudius, grown desperate, has not taken her into his counsels, but is now acting on his own initiative. She frankly encourages her son and, in her eagerness to show a mother's loyalty, drinks of the poisoned cup which had been prepared for him.

3. Most of all, however, the soliloquies help us to understand the workings of Hamlet's mind, to estimate the quality of his intellect; in short, to pass judgment upon his rationality. It is not only in the swift transitions from madness to sanity, which Hamlet executes at will; it is not only that he is a different man when all others have withdrawn and he is left alone; it is in the amazing play of intellect; it is in the keen perception of moral values, in the mental grasp of the situation, whatever it may be, and the clear, logical reasoning, that the soliloquies incontestably prove Hamlet, when he utters them at least, to be sane. We who are privileged to hear them know more about him than his own mother knew, more than his friend, Horatio, knew.

And yet, the so-called problem of Hamlet's madness we have always with us. Like Banquo's ghost, "it will not down." Herein, as I have before noted, lies the subtlety of Shakspeare's art. In Hamlet he has drawn a man singularly susceptible to emotional exaltation and depression. He need only yield to a natural tendency, and he has crossed the narrow boundary line which separates the sane from the insane. To play the madman is so easy to him that he need only relax his customary hold upon himself and forthwith, to all intents and purposes, he is mad. That this tendency grows upon him in proportion as he yields to it, that the transition becomes easier as the play progresses, a careful study will surely reveal. Perhaps the most interesting illustration may be found in Act V, Scene 1. Interrupted in his last and, in some respects, most ingenious



speculation by the approach of the mourners following Ophelia's body to the grave, he no sooner takes in the situation than he gives way to the most violent fit of raving in which he has yet indulged. He not only outdoes Laertes in extravagant professions of love and exhibitions of grief; he even leaps into the open grave and there, above Ophelia's dead body, engages in a desperate encounter with her now distracted brother. Afterward, and this is the important point, he not only offers a free apology to Laertes for his outrageous conduct, pleading in extenuation his "madness," but, in a conversation with Horatio, he makes this startling statement:

"But I am very sorry, good Horatio,  
That to Laertes I forgot myself;  
For, by the image of my cause, I see  
The portraiture of his: I'll court his favours:  
But sure, the bravery of his grief did put me  
Into a towering passion."

There is no hint here of an "antic disposition" willfully put on; only the sad confession of a dangerous tendency so often indulged that it has now passed, under certain circumstances, beyond all power of restraint. In other words, may we not believe that, if Hamlet's life had been spared, he would have become steadily and inevitably a madman indeed?

In this connection an interesting question has often suggested itself to me. Perhaps I shall be pardoned for venturing to interject it here. On several occasions, while travelling through Sweden and Denmark, I have been impressed by a phenomenon not unlike that presented by Hamlet's case. A man or woman, ordinarily sane or at least accepted as such, would suddenly, and apparently on the slightest provocation, break out into a sort of fit or frenzy, during which he or she would seem utterly irresponsible. No violence, however, would ensue, and after a time normal conditions would be restored. I recall, also, that Bayard Taylor, in one of his books of travel, remarks upon the Berserker-like rage which not uncommonly manifests itself among the inhabitants of northern Sweden.

And, again, it is worth noting that Selma Lagerlöf, the Norwegian novelist, in at least one of her powerful sketches of native life, has depicted this same strange obsession. That the long, dark winters in this northern latitude have something to do with the malady, there can be no doubt. But the question naturally obtrudes itself, "Did Shakspeare, 'the myriad minded,' know of this Scandinavian trait? Was this the reason why he chose Hamlet, the Dane, to illustrate an interesting psychological phenomenon, to present this baffling problem?"

To return to the soliloquies, among the richest of Shaksperian treasure houses. They not only reveal most fully the mind and heart, the marvelous personality of Hamlet; we feel instinctively that, for one reason or another, whether wittingly or not, Shakspeare put into them more of himself than into any other single thing he wrote, the sonnets alone excepted.

In Hamlet we have a man endowed by nature with rare and transcendent gifts. In pure intellectuality he is a giant, head and shoulders above all his fellows. In his relations with Polonius, with Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, even with Claudius, his intellectual pride, resulting from this marked superiority, is very evident. All his interests and pursuits are those of a cultivated man. His mental equipment makes him his own best company. Hence he is most fully himself when alone. Then it is that he may indulge in his favorite pastime, speculation. He it is who, of all men, most fully exemplifies Matthew Arnold's ideal of the serious-minded thinker, the man who lets his consciousness play all about a subject until he has apprehended it in its entirety. For Hamlet is not afraid to see things as they are. He is unflinchingly honest in his thinking, being most severe with himself. He is a keen, impartial critic of things national and racial, having travelled sufficiently to get a surview and a sense of relative values. He is, in short, a philosopher, unfettered by a system, who has sounded the depths of human thought and feeling and probed to its centre the mystery of life.

His intellectual agility, his wit, comes out on all occasions.



In his quizzing of Polonius, in his badgering of Ophelia, in his sparring with Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, in his equivocal with Claudius, in his merciless onslaught upon Gertrude, Hamlet is distinguished by his keen, incisive wit rather than by his sense of humor. Wit is intellectual, humor of the feelings, and in Hamlet the intellect is dominant. And yet, on the emotional side, he is most sensitive. His belief in the supernatural is very real, fitting him to receive the message from the spirit world. He is susceptible to love and friendship and to the fears that beset the soul, whether the intellect approves or no. When groaning under the "fardels" of this weary life, his thoughts turn to death, as to "a consummation devoutly to be wished."

"To die, to sleep;  
To sleep: perchance to dream: ay, there's the rub;  
For in that sleep of death what dreams may come  
When we have shuffled off this mortal coil,  
Must give us pause."

('Tis) "the dread of something after death,  
The undiscover'd country from whose bourn  
No traveller returns, (that) puzzles the will,  
And makes us rather bear those ills we have  
Than fly to others that we know not of."

His courage fails him. He yields to the normal human instinct. He obeys the stern mandate, "Thou shalt live," that actuates the being of us all.

Hamlet is unquestionably a fatalist, and in this he is a true descendant of that ancient German stock from which the Danes, no less than the Saxons and Angles, are sprung. Before the bout with Laertes, when Horatio would dissuade him from the encounter, he declares: "We defy augury: there is a special providence in the fall of a sparrow. If it be now, 'tis not to come; if it be not to come, it will be now; if it be not now, yet it will come; the readiness is all: since no man has aught of what he leaves: what is 't to leave betimes?"

Though Hamlet is, in a sense, beloved of the people, chiefly, perhaps, because he is at odds with fortune, though also, we

may believe, because of his inherent dignity, his native courtesy, the gracious manners that become a prince, he can in no sense be regarded as a popular hero or even a general favorite among his own class. From such distinction he is precluded by temperament, endowments, and tastes. His intellectual superiority, his habits of thought, his moral standards, his views of life, all tend to isolate him, to make of him a man apart from his fellows, aloof and alone. Such a man is often admired, he is frequently feared, he is rarely understood, and seldom loved. Of all his associates at the court of Elsinore, Horatio is the only one who gets near to him, who may be said to appreciate and know him. And yet, he was a man fitted for love and friendship, a man not wholly deaf to the sweet voices of honor, fame, and good report. How pathetic, for example, is that dying request made of Horatio, that wish to have his memory set right with posterity:

“O good Horatio, what a wounded name,  
Things standing thus unknown, shall live behind me;  
If thou didst ever hold me in thy heart,  
Absent thee from felicity a while,  
And in this harsh world draw thy breath in pain  
To tell my story.”

Had his lines, then, fallen in pleasanter places, had his environment been more congenial, we believe that Hamlet might have lived a measurably happy life, following always the path of least resistance and ending his days with honor.

The fatal weakness of his character Hamlet understands far better than anyone—even his best friend—could bring it home to him. It is, as he tells himself and us, in those wonderful soliloquies, his over-fondness for speculation. It is the

“craven scruple  
Of thinking too precisely on the event,  
A thought which, quarter'd, hath but one part wisdom  
And ever three parts coward.”

“And thus the native hue of resolution  
Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought,



And enterprises of great pitch and moment  
 With this regard their currents turn awry,  
 And lose the name of action."

This luxury of thinking, this reflective tendency, he indulges until his will becomes so enfeebled that action is next to impossible. Indeed, we see in Hamlet the curious anomaly of a distinctly reflective man, who, when he acts, does so not as the result of deliberation, but solely on the impulse of the moment. Take, for example, that striking instance in Act III, Scene 3, where, after much deliberation, after he has fully satisfied himself of the king's guilt, confirming the ghostly revelation by the play test, after he has firmly resolved to kill him, the looked-for opportunity presents itself. Claudius, engaged in prayer, is off his guard and unprotected. Hamlet is quick to see his chance. "Now might I do it pat," he cries,

"now he is praying;  
 And now I'll do 't. And so he goes to heaven  
 And so am I revenged. That would be scann'd:"

Having scanned it from all sides, his conclusion is:

No!  
 Up, sword; and know thou a more horrid hent:  
 When he is drunk asleep, or in his rage,  
 Or in the incestuous pleasures of his bed;  
 At gaming, swearing, or about some act  
 That has no relish of salvation in 't;  
 Then trip him, that his heels may kick at heaven,  
 And that his soul may be as damn'd and black  
 As hell, whereto it goes."

The opportunity is missed. From this point onward Hamlet has lost control of the situation and he, with the other creatures of fate, is swept onward to the final catastrophe. It is not, as he feebly tries to persuade himself, the diabolical desire to take the king while he is sinning, that his soul may go straight to hell, that restrains him from striking the fatal blow while Claudius is on his knees. No. It is the innate tendency to reflect, humored until it has become a fixed habit, the disinclination to act, that causes him to hesitate, to procrastinate, and so to miss the psychological moment.

When later, impelled by wild impulse, he drives his rapier through the arras, slaying, instead of Claudius, the old eaves-dropper Polonius, this is the first act in the tragedy of violence and blood which follows. Next comes Ophelia's madness and suicide; after it, Laertes' insurrection. And so, "one woe treads upon another's heel;" "sorrows come not single spies, but in battalions;" until, at last, in the second scene of the fifth act, Nemesis completes her awful work. Gertrude drinks of the poisoned cup; Hamlet, Laertes, and Claudius himself fall at the point of the envenomed sword; news arrives from England of the successful taking off of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. The tragedy of blood is complete. Call it Nemesis, as did the Greeks, or call it Fate, as did our Saxon forebears, the outcome is alike inevitable, the lesson is one and the same. "The doer must dree his wierd." The sinner must pay the penalty of his sin.

Nevertheless, bloody as it is, the play of *Hamlet* is not essentially a tragedy of blood. The real tragedy of this soul-moving drama must be defined in other terms. It is not the shedding of blood that stirs within us so powerfully the emotions of "pity" and "terror," which, according to Aristotle, is the supreme end of tragedy. No. Shudder as we may at the general havoc wrought in the closing scene, it is the fate of Hamlet that wrings our very heart of hearts. And here we enter the region of ethics. The real tragedy in Shakspeare's immortal masterpiece is the downfall of a noble nature, the ruin of a great soul. Strange to say, it was Ophelia who, though with different intent and moved by a wrongly interpreted incident, spoke early in the play the words that form a fitting eulogy over the body of the dead prince:

"O, what a noble mind is here o'erthrown!  
The courtier's, soldier's, scholar's, eye, tongue, sword;  
The expectancy and rose of the fair state,  
The glass of fashion and the mould of form,  
The observed of all observers, quite, quite down!  
And I, of ladies most deject and wretched,  
That suck'd the honey of his music vows,



Now see that noble and most sovereign reason,  
Like sweet bells jangled, out of tune and harsh:  
That unmatch'd form and feature of blown youth  
Blasted with ecstasy."

Here was a man, well-born, the only son indeed of a reigning king, endowed by nature with brilliant parts, skilled in the best learning of the age, blessed in his budding youth with health, wealth, and friends; loving, and so far as we can tell, beloved by, a gentle, amiable girl, fitted like himself to move in the courtly circle; a man, too, of the student habit and cultivated tastes, delighting naturally in the refinements of life; generous, too, and magnanimous, the soul of honor, the pattern of courtesy. But, through a foul and ghastly murder perpetrated upon his innocent father, a circumstance entirely beyond his own control, a burden is put upon him, which, by the accepted code of that age, he is duty-bound to assume, but which he is totally unfit to bear. Suddenly the aspect of life is changed for him. The whole world seems different. Robbed by death of father, he is forced now, by circumstances, to renounce mother, sweetheart, friends, and academic pursuits. In the sickening atmosphere of a hostile court, he is driven back upon himself and, in his bitterness of soul, takes up desperately, but half-heartedly, the task which has been allotted him. That he should fail is inevitable.

Given, then, this situation and these elements, and the play of *Hamlet* becomes, in the master's hands, perhaps the most moving tragedy in all literature. There are in the drama incidents more affecting and catastrophes more harrowing. But in the grip of Hamlet's personality upon our sympathy, and the awful sadness of his blighted life and his early, violent death, there is not, I believe, another tragedy to compare with this one. Hence the enduring quality of *Hamlet*. Hence its so-called "modernity." Hence its appeal to the universal human heart.

## VI.

### PUNISHMENT.

BY THE REV. A. G. GEKELER.

There are two sources of knowledge in divine things, the book of nature and the Sacred Scriptures. Of these, the one is the original and unchanged autograph of God; the other is a sort of palimpsest, in which the divine truth is often blurred or distorted by the prejudices and limitations of the writers. Since these are the only sources of all our religious knowledge, we must turn to them for the truth concerning the divine mode of punishing sin.

Our notion of punishment is taken from the courts of justice and suggests an arbitrary and mechanical procedure. An authorized person, having the power to execute punishment, determines its kind and degree, if any shall follow an infraction of the law. If the judge or executive does not enforce the demands of the law, the crime goes without penalty. If he does enforce those requirements, he may select at his pleasure one or more of a variety of penalties provided for by the law. By an act of pardon the guilty may be spared altogether. Hence there is plainly nothing automatic or necessary or predictable about the punishments imposed by human tribunals. Everything depends on the arbitrium, the decision of some one other than the guilty party. The motives for the punishment also vary. The purpose may be purely vindictive, taking vengeance upon the offender, cooling wrath, as it were, by venting it upon the delinquent; or it may be reformatory, seeking to teach and improve the offender; or it may be a sense of equity and justice as in the retaliatory punishments of the Old Testament; or all these motives may be to a greater or less extent combined.



Such, then, is the nature of punishment as inflicted by men in their various judicatories. It was an easy and an inevitable step to ascribe the same motives and methods to God. Men could not help imagining that God rewarded and punished men in the same arbitrary ways. It was supposed, for example, that all kinds of evil and suffering were brought upon men by God on account of the transgression of His commandments. The penalties were not regarded as provided for in the very constitution of nature, so that they would follow of themselves, but they were considered to be an infliction from without and above upon the sinner. The classical passage, exhibiting this view, is in Leviticus 26. Here the transgressor is threatened with the most dreadful sufferings. It is one of the most terrible passages in all literature, but happily quite untrue to life.

Let us remember that the Mosaic law was only partly moral, while the rest consisted of priestly ordinances referring to ceremonies. It embodied all rules and customs which were to be observed in civil and ecclesiastical life. A neglect to keep one's self ceremonially clean exposed the delinquent to the wrath of God, perhaps no less, in the common opinion, than to break one of the ten commandments. It is as though a zealous minister to-day should declare to his people that, if they failed to observe the customs of Christian people, they would be made to suffer by floods or drought or fire or disease. "If ye neglect to say grace at your meals, or fail to read the Bible or attend prayer meeting or church; if ye fail to contribute to the support of the church or to the cause of missions; then will the Lord visit you with poverty and disgrace, with painful and shameful diseases and in the end with eternal hell fire."

This view is nowhere in the Bible clearly and finally abandoned. Some of the later prophets see the cause of natural occurrences, as drought, the destruction of locusts, the desolation of war, in the disobedience of the people.

"Bring in the tithes," says Malachi, "and there will not be

room in your cellars and granaries to store the products of vineyard, flock, and field."

I believe that Jesus had a different conception of punishment and boldly declared it, as in the case of the man born blind and of the unfortunates whose lives were crushed out by the falling walls of Siloam. Jesus said: "By their fruits ye shall know them," a statement as applicable to acts as to men; and Paul expressed the same view in declaring that a man shall reap what he has sown. Here a causal connection is assumed between the act and its consequences. But the truth was not thought out in all its bearings and to all its legitimate conclusions. For this the Bible closed too soon.

According to the theory we criticize, divine punishment is of the nature of a miracle. It is supposed to come to pass by an extraordinary action of God. Conversion in this sense is not miraculous. While in conversion God is certainly as active as in all the processes of nature, He is not active in an irregular manner. Conversions do take place in many millions of cases and in many instances the divine converting power is suppressed by the act of man. The Gospel in itself acts like a savor of life to believers and a savor of death to the impenitent, but this result is not brought to pass by immediate interference in each case.

The true theory, it seems to me, is that all acts are causes in themselves which effect their own rewards or punishments. Evil deeds necessarily have evil effects. This is not due to special divine interference but to the inherent force of the deed. The blighting, destructive consequences may fitly be regarded as the divine judgment on the acts in question. So far as we are able to judge, they are the penalty of sin and the sole and sufficient penalty. Conduct has its consequences in this life, and it is hard to believe that it will cease to produce effects in the world to come. I think it is in entire accord with the scientific spirit to believe in such punishment now and hereafter.

Take a concrete sin, *e. g.*, the breaking of the seventh com-



mandment. The consequences, in part, are immediately registered in the soul of the sinner: shame uneasiness of mind, some sense of the dissatisfaction, yea, the wrath of God. A sense of being stained, polluted, less pure and beautiful than before; a degradation of the soul and some realization of it; the loosening or destruction of the marriage bond. A stab has been made at the social life and well-being. Society has been grievously injured, and possibly a loathsome disease has been contracted. How keenly the results of wrong-doing are realized by the subject depends upon his character and intelligence, but they are there unmistakably. I believe that in such consequences of wrong-doing, affecting the wicked, and, alas, the innocent also, we are to see the judgment and punishment of God, and we do not know whether there are any further artificial or arbitrary penalties.

The punishment of sin, then, is provided for in the regular course of nature. It does not appear that there is any divine action in addition to that by which the world is constantly upheld and governed. Punishment is inflicted automatically. It is inevitable. If God should fall asleep, were such a thing possible, every act would have its appropriate consequences. God is not to be regarded as the great executioner.

This, I think, is the only view tenable to-day. It is of great importance that men should be instructed that they cannot divorce necessary consequences from their actions. No warning comes with such irresistible force to the conscience as the evidence that wrong-doing is absolutely sure to work injury to the evil-doer and to others. Under no other view are the sinfulness of sin and the majesty of the divine justice so impressive as under the knowledge that wrong works harm with the certainty and force of natural law. It is true, no one is able to point out all the consequences that may spring from an act; they may be more or less direful or advantageous, all depending upon circumstances. But enough of the fruits will sooner or later manifest themselves, to show the quality of the act and the justice of God.

If the Mosaic doctrine referred to were true; if God were wont to punish sin in arbitrary ways—then men never could know why they were suffering certain ills, unless in each case it were divinely taught them. Moses might indeed know why the Egyptians were visited with plagues, but the Egyptians would not. The view requires both that punishment should be brought about miraculously and that there should constantly be divinely illumined men able to tell men for what wrongdoing they were suffering. God would thus, while showing Himself a faithful Father to Israel, prove Himself a step-father indeed to the race at large, and make it forever impossible to establish His Kingdom among men. For who could receive and cherish the Christian view of God as the supremely Good One if he saw that God all along has been dealing with His creatures, not according to certain necessary and beneficent principles, but according to infinite caprice and whim?

Certain conclusions naturally follow from this view. If it is true that an evil act contains within itself, as a seed, its own punishment, then it is impossible to accept the doctrine that all the evils in the race are consequences of Adam's fall. The effects of the fall, then, do not come to pass in accordance with the principles of the divine government, but are entirely anomalous. In fact, the doctrine withdraws itself from the range of intelligent comprehension altogether. I do not suppose it has ever been taught that the forbidden fruit contained within itself a force or poison that causes death and all other suffering. It is usually assumed by those who accept the historicity of the story in Genesis that these results are brought on by a decree of God, and not by any inherent necessity.

There is a fair conclusion, I think, too, in regard to a certain form of the doctrine of the atonement. Some ecclesiastical standards and systematic theologians teach that the sufferings of Jesus consisted in enduring the penal consequences due to the sins of mankind and that herein lies the redeeming virtue of his death. It is vicarious punishment. Of course, if sin is punished not through the order of nature, but miraculously



and arbitrarily, then it might be conceivable that it should be punished in Christ in this way. If God deals with us not according to great principles of justice and wisdom, then there is room for any kind of unreasonable and capricious theories, and then it might be held that Jesus endured the penalty of sin. On the basic assumption that the atonement is beyond the sphere of reason, of course, the human reason and conscience can have nothing to say. In such a court they have no standing. A rational theory, then, could not be constructed and we must accept the doctrine, inexplicable and unverifiable, like a decision of the Pope, on mere authority.

I believe with all my heart that Jesus lived and died for us, and that great benefits accrue to us from His death upon the cross, especially that His influence and example have thereby been perpetuated and the establishment of the Christian Church made possible. But with what justice or upon what grounds moral guilt can be transferred from one to another, from one to all and then again from all to One; and that this One should be made responsible and punished in an unnecessary, arbitrary manner—I think this goes beyond the reach of human thought and imagination.

This difficulty is greatly increased when we see that each one receives a large portion of the natural consequences of his conduct himself. It is not justice, but a travesty of justice, to punish the sinner and his bondsman at the same time.

LIMA, O.

## VII.

# CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS AND THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT IN GREAT BRITAIN AND AMERICA.

BY THE REV. A. S. WEBER, D.D.

### THE PARAMOUNT QUESTION OF CHRISTIANITY.

From the earliest times of our era and without intermission, one question of theology has continued to be of paramount importance and interest to religious thought. It was first put, according to scriptural records, by the earliest followers of our Lord. In a moment of awe they inquired—"Who, then, is this?"—and their inquiry in varying forms has been repeated ever since by each successive generation of Christian people.

Our own is no exception to this rule. Whatever may be said as to the absorbing interest with which we are devoting our time and energy to material and commercial affairs, to historic and scientific research, the question which centers in the Person of Christ, after all, remains supreme. The reëxamination of it has indeed been forced into a new prominence by the subordinate interests we have been cultivating with such marked assiduity. We have mastered more fully the forces and resources of nature. We have acquired a sounder view of the universe. We have achieved a truer conception of sacred Scripture. We have attained a wider and more catholic religious outlook. We have won for ourselves a freedom that refuses to subject itself to traditional conceptions of Christian doctrine, the authoritativeness of dogmatism having lost its commanding power.

In these circumstances, it is plain, two things have become necessary: The fundamental question of the Christian faith must be reëxamined. The validity of the grounds upon which



we rest our confidence in Christ as the incarnate Son of God must be established by a new method of approach and apprehension. These necessities, it is, of course, gratuitous to say, are not as yet universally recognized. One finds, for instance, a distinguished representative of orthodox dogmatism affirming his conviction, that "the great battle of the twentieth century is a struggle between a dogmatic Christianity, on the one hand, and an out-and-out naturalistic philosophy on the other."<sup>1</sup> That means, so far as the doctrine of Christ's Person is concerned, that we must accept the deliverances of the ancient Councils as permanently authoritative, notwithstanding our knowledge of the intimidation, the bribery, the intrigue, and the bloodshed, by which some of the decisions were reached. At Nicea, in 325 A. D., it was decided that Christ was truly God. At Constantinople, in 381, that He was perfectly Man. At Ephesus, in 431, that He was undividedly One. At Chalcedon, in 451, that He was unconfusedly Two. These metaphysical theories may still appeal to a certain type of mental habit, but it is certain that there are at present multitudes of simple, humble, Christian believers whom such subtleties of doctrine repel, rather than attract. These latter believers, instead of accepting the contention of the Princeton theologian, agree rather with an equally distinguished scholar who declares that "in the light of what has been called 'psychological hermeneutics' it must be maintained that Dogmatists reverse the natural order of Christian experience in coming to an intellectual apprehension of Christ's character and Person. Instead of opening, they bar the door of discipleship to many who are trying to find their way to a knowledge and acceptance of Jesus Christ."<sup>2</sup>

Paul, it may be granted, represents the dogmatic habit of mind, and supports the traditional view that the acceptance of

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Patton, in *The Princeton Theological Review*, January, 1904, pp. 135, 136.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Peabody, cf. "Jesus Christ and the Christian Character," pp. 76, 78.

dogma is antecedent to knowledge and obedience. In the teaching of Jesus, on the contrary, obedience as a rule is the path that leads to knowledge. "If any man will do the will of Him that sent me, he shall know." "He that hath my commandments and keepeth them, . . . him will I love, and to him will I manifest myself." Our knowledge of the principle enunciated in such sayings helps us to understand how Jesus could accept as His disciples, many a hearer, uninstructed in dogma and untried in loyalty, and whose possible confession of doctrinal belief would not have been sufficient to admit him to membership in many modern churches. What was required of the early disciples was a willingness to follow Jesus as the way of life. Fellowshiping with Him on terms of personal intimacy, observing how He spoke and acted in their presence, making their own inquiries, receiving their own impressions, drawing their own inferences and conclusions—that was the method by which they came to recognize in the Nazarene an absolutely new and incomparable Figure and character, the incarnate Ideal of righteousness and truth, of goodness and love. It took a long while, and required unmeasured patience and forbearance on the part of their Master to bring His disciples to an adequate realization of the real nature and dignity of His unique Person. Instead, however, of dogmatically overwhelming their understanding by an authoritative formula of the truth and requiring them to accept it, He allowed each one according to personal peculiarities to work his way into the light. In other words, He protected the individual freedom of every man He was training. He forced no one in advance of his personal convictions. He knew that a mere doctrinal or creedal belief in His Divinity did not necessarily carry with it religious result. The vital belief in the same truth, acquired under the method of instruction He pursued, He knew also, is reached only as the result of genuine religious effort and obedient devotion, and that by such effort and devotion the important belief in His Divine-



Human Person may be confidently expected to become a practical personal attainment.

Now the one or the other of these methods must be followed by us in coming to an intellectual apprehension of the truth that resides in the mysterious Person of Jesus Christ. The dogmatic demands the acceptance of doctrinal statements as primarily essential, the vital insists upon a living obedience as the way to religious knowledge. The one emphasizes the dogmas set forth as the result of the extended controversies of the Ecumenical Councils or by the Confessions of the sixteenth century, the other lays stress on the teachings of the New Testament as verified in the experience of an obedient faith. The one is metaphysical, the other is scientifically practical. The one is established by a process of reasoning, the other is realized by a process of living. The one is accepted simply on authority, as a dogma, the other is known by the exertion of conscience, feeling, and will, in the pursuit of goodness and Christ-likeness. Comparatively few of the readers of the REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW, one apprehends, will find much difficulty in determining which of these methods is preferable or required.

Given the new conception of the Church and of the Bible which the results of modern historical criticism of the Scriptures have compelled men to recognize, the vital method seems indeed the only one that is left us to follow. "Criticism," says Professor Gwatkin in his remarkably able and informing study of 'The Knowledge of God,' "has demolished alike the Catholic assumption of an infallible Church and the Protestant assumption of an infallible Book." From this view but few competent scholars can now be found to dissent. "The old dogmatic view which invested the Book with a Divine authority," observes the Rev. Dr. Robert F. Horton, "assumed that every word was written by the Holy Ghost, and therefore established religious doctrines and settled religious questions by a comparison, or even by a quotation, of texts. But no power on earth can carry the mind of to-day back to that posi-

tion. The plainest literary facts, the most unquestioned scientific results, are against it. If a preacher attempts to maintain it, he can do so only by violence and vituperation; he brings the Bible and himself into disrepute. The old view of infallibility or inerrancy, of finality and completeness, has gone."<sup>3</sup> What is true of the Bible is more pronouncedly true of the Creeds and Confessions. Their authority is likewise gone, and gone forever. The popular mind does not find in their dogmatic pronouncements any compelling power. What, in face of these facts, is left us as inquirers after the truth to do in order to assure ourselves, for instance, of the divine character and authority of Jesus Christ? How shall we as public teachers of religion commend Christianity and Him who is not simply its Founder but its Foundation, to the acceptance and practice of our fellow-men?

Before proceeding to suggest that the answer to such questions is to be found in what has above been called the vital method, in distinction from the dogmatic, let mention be made of a few facts which most men, whatever their theological perplexities and doubts, would probably allow us to assume. *First*, the actual existence in the first half of the first century of our era of Jesus Christ as an historical character. Testimony that is unassailable, because it comes from extra-Biblical and disinterested, if not unfriendly, sources—Pliny, Tacitus, and Josephus—makes this minimum of historic confidence in Jesus an unquestionable certainty. *Second*, the most general and superficial acquaintance with history compels this additional acknowledgment, namely, that this historic Figure, in the brief space of three years or less, teaching in a remote corner of the Roman world, produced such an impression that ever since His day, men have turned to Him to worship, and have found in Him the answer and the satisfying fulfilment of all their religious needs. After all these ages He is to-day exercising upon the mind and heart of an ever-increasing section of mankind such a hold that He can be described, as He

<sup>3</sup> See Horton's "My Belief," p. 18.



was described by one of His disciples less than thirty years after His death on the Cross, as "the power of God and the wisdom of God." And *third*, that notwithstanding the changed conception of the nature of the New Testament, brought about by the critical study of it, there remain in the Gospel records indisputable historical data, guaranteed even by the apparently reluctant testimony of those whose critical ingenuity and scholastic ruthlessness in handling the Scriptures must often be deeply deplored if not indignantly condemned.

This last point is the only one of the three that needs confirmation, to show that we are here on firm ground. Sixty years ago we should have found the situation very different. Then, as Harnack tells us: "David Frederick Strauss thought he had almost entirely destroyed the historical credibility not only of the Fourth, but also of the first three Gospels as well. The historical criticism of two generations has succeeded in restoring that credibility in its main outlines, on which account the Synoptic Gospels are weighty, offering us a plain picture of Jesus' teaching in regard both to its main features and its individual application."<sup>4</sup> A similar position is taken by other critics of strong and independent mind. Jülicher, for example, who identifies himself unhesitatingly with the liberal wing of historic critics, makes frankest acknowledgment of the historical value of the Gospels. "The true merit of the Synoptists," he says, "is that in spite of all the poetical touches they employ, they did not repaint, but only handed on, the Christ of history. As a rule, there lies in all the Synoptic Logia a kernel of individual character so inimitable and so fresh that their authenticity is raised above all suspicion."<sup>5</sup> Even Schmiedel, whose notoriously rigorous methods are as thoroughgoing as his conclusions are frequently startling, after pointing out what he regards as having been imported by the Evangelists into their narratives from unauthentic sources, confesses that they contain, in their portraiture of Jesus, a solid stratum of

<sup>4</sup> "What is Christianity?" pp. 20, 31.

<sup>5</sup> "Introduction to the New Testament," p. 371.

historical fact, as the result of close and exact recollection. "All those statements in the Synoptic accounts," he writes, "which affirm something particularly great about Jesus, or put into His mouth sayings of marked significance, *must* be accepted as having the stamp of historicity upon them."<sup>6</sup> Wrede, another so-called destructive scholar, to many of whose contentions one cannot assent, is equally explicit on the point under notice. "Whilst Matthew, Mark, and Luke are often writing out of the depths of simple feeling, instead of the logical understanding," he observes, "they were yet unable to obliterate their fidelity to the historic truth uttered by the creative Personality who was the bearer of the revelation that became the greatest force in the foundation of the Christian community."<sup>7</sup> And Warschauer, to quote one more charged by some with a revolutionary bias in his study of the Gospels, makes this declaration, namely, that "it is a unique teaching and a unique Personality which we discover in the brief (Synoptic) documents—both historic, both authentic, both dynamic, and both together forming the supreme manifestation and instrument of the Most High, the power of God unto salvation." "The teaching of Jesus," he continues, "and the Person of Jesus are not detachable from one another: they are not two but one, mutually interpretative, a matchless amalgam. We see Jesus in these plain records, as truly, simply, lovably human, and as grandly, shiningly, majestically Divine. We see Him as One who had not where to lay His head, subject to hunger and thirst, acquainted with want and pain, with grief and death. We see Him, too, as the Teacher of ageless truth concerning God and man, Himself the Revealer of both, our Friend, our Brother, and our Lord. A more real, a more vivid, a more convincing portrait has never been drawn by supreme literary craftsmanship than that which looks out at us from the artless pages of our three earlier Evangelists."<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Cf. his article in the *En. Bib.*

<sup>7</sup> "The Sources of Our Knowledge of the Life of Jesus," pp. 161, 162.

<sup>8</sup> See "Jesus—Seven Questions," pp. 30, 32.



From these parenthetical observations, justifying the three-fold assumption of the historical reality of Jesus, of the vast effects that have issued from His appearance in human history, and of the historic trustworthiness of what is most essential to the Christian faith in the first three Books of the New Testament canon, we may return now to the questions as to what remains for us to do in our private search after the truth, and in our public advocacy of the religion we profess, if we feel it necessary to decline the acceptance of dogmatic statements as to Christ's Person, and to accord to others the same privilege.

These questions may perhaps be best answered by referring to the concrete example of one who had been stricken with dismay by the religious insecurity which modern science and Biblical criticism seemed to bring upon him, and who, after an intense spiritual struggle in darkness, after awhile by following the vital method we are advocating found his way back into the light and comforts of a living faith in the Incarnate Son of God. He has written the story of his emancipation, and published it in Gothic type under the title, "*Wie Ich ein Moderner Theologe Wurde.*" At the suggestion of a friend to whom he had sadly disclosed his mental distress of doubt and unbelief, due to the new learning, he is led to take up his copy of the Bible anew, without any preoccupations of mind concerning it save those above instanced as valid and unsailable assumptions. He reads it without any theory as to its inspiration, without any belief as to its traditional authoritativeness in doctrinal statement. He recognizes what plainest literary facts and ascertained scientific results have established, and lets the Book as a whole tell upon him precisely as he would any other book he might take up for study. He seeks aids to the proper understanding of the Scriptures just as he would in the case of any other work written long ago, in a foreign language and amid other surroundings. He surrenders himself to the "sweet reasonableness" of its words and ideas. Ere long he is taken captive by the Book. Its interest, its beauty, its variety, its charm, ~~are~~ **are** enthralling to a

degree he had never before realized. Presently it is borne in upon him that he is dealing with God, and that God is dealing with him through its pages. He discovers that from first to last, the Book is an incentive to seek God, to learn His will, to pray, to worship, to obey. He is led, when he comes to apprehend the Gospels, to recognize in the Person of Christ, who is their central theme, a revelation of God. God shows Himself to him in the face of Jesus Christ. By believing in Him, he is reconciled to God, and the Spirit of God speaks in him. The Book, he comes to see, presents Christ in so real and heart-some a way that he is constrained to give himself without reserve to His guidance, and thus he is transformed into a new creature. The Scriptures, their traditional trammels removed, are now more wonderful and authoritative than ever. Like Christ, the Sacred Book vindicates its own authority to him, and without any regret the baseless dogma of infallibility or inerrancy, which candor has obliged him to surrender, is no longer thought of, and the rest of the results established by reverent criticism are frankly accepted, and at the same time Christ acknowledged to be Divine.

This is the course which is recommended also, as its practical outcome by Herrmann's highly valued volume on "The Communion of the Christian with God." Those who have read it will recall how full a hearing it accords to the critics, and that it accepts their principal contentions as frankly as Gwatkin does in the statement that has been quoted. At the same time he is persuaded that the open-minded reader of the Gospels may discover in them and in a life of obedience to their counsels, the loftiest conception of Christ's Person and character. Making every necessary allowance for inaccuracies and discrepancies, for accretions and misinterpretations, the unbiased and obedient student of the New Testament will find this truth, namely, "That God manifests Himself by means of a Fact which enables men to believe in Him, and that that Fact, the only one in the whole world having the power of effecting this, is the historical appearance of Jesus as



handed down to us in the Gospels.” Hence his prescription to read the Bible daily, systematically, religiously, with prayer for light, and with obedience to the truths revealed. On such terms, he feels warranted to assure men, they may be led into communion with God, to a knowledge of God in Christ, and to an inward experience of God in the soul.

If these representations rest upon solid foundations, as one thinks a practical test of them will show they do, the claim made for the vital method of coming to an intellectual apprehension of the mystery of Christ’s Person has been vindicated, and our questions satisfactorily answered. The religious value of a belief in the Divinity of Christ thus attained, must surely be seen to be immeasurably greater than that which attends a belief in the same truth on the authority of a majority vote in a Council, or on any dogmatic statement whatsoever. So men who have passed from a dogmatic to a vital apprehension of it have really found it. Luther is an example. When he repudiated the authority of Rome, he declined to rest his faith in the Divinity of Christ any longer on the statement of the Creeds, and affirmed it to be an art, an attainment, through faith. In other words, by a personal examination of the trustworthy records of the New Testament, he grounded himself in the truth. He arrived at his conception of our Lord, as we may and as the first disciples did, not by taking the abstract idea of Deity, and asserting that Christ is Divine, but by taking Him as shown in the Gospels, and coming through Him to the idea of Deity. No man can first know God and then say that Christ is God. He first must know Christ, and through Him attain to a knowledge of God. “No man knoweth the Father but the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal Him.” One of the writers already quoted has well said that “nothing is more barren than to say we are saved by believing in the Divinity of Christ. We are saved by believing in Christ; the Divinity is an inference from the faith. We find Him Divine because He has brought us to

God.”<sup>9</sup> Our knowledge and experience of God are the priceless heritage which He has bestowed upon us.

Like the first disciples, we, when reading the Gospels, begin with the Man, Jesus—the Person who appears in their spiritual experience. When first brought into touch with Him through the written Word we may have no thought of what category, human or Divine, or both, He belongs to; yet He draws us. We believe in Him, we admire His life, we accept the value of His teachings, we accept His promises, we hearken with awe to His admonitions. The best that is in us responds to the authority with which He commands us. Thus, through this practical belief in Him, we become reconciled to God, become conscious of forgiveness, and have the experience of Holy Spirit in our hearts. In the phrase of the Ritschlians, we are led in this way to the belief that Jesus has for us the value of God, and to a recognition, as the next step of progress in religious life, that God is holy, merciful, forgiving, love. And since no other man has or can have this value for us, we put Jesus in a category apart, and give Him the name that is above every name. We call Him the God-Man, the only Mediator between God and man. Bound to Him, accordingly, by tenderest ties of sympathy and fellowship, trusting Him as He asks that we should, our hearts are “strangely warmed,” and a spiritual transformation wrought within us, under the realization of which as coming from Christ, we cannot long resist the impulse to exclaim with the once incredulous Thomas, “My Lord and my God.”

In addition to these general impressions concerning Christ’s character and office, the faithful pursuit of the method here proposed should yield a knowledge also of certain distinguishing particulars of His person. The first of them, likely to press itself upon one’s attention, is His unparalleled and commanding moral power. In whatever relations or circumstances we are allowed to behold Jesus, this note of forceful, effective, matchless strength challenges attention. It cannot

<sup>9</sup> Dr. Horton, *op. cit.*, p. 96.



escape the notice of any careful reader of the Gospels, that He was evidently Himself conscious of this impressive personal mastership and power. That alone is adequate to explain the quiet confidence, the lofty self-poise, and the undisturbed serenity that are always attending Him. In all the diversity of His relations with men, whether friends or enemies, one invariably hears in His words and sees in His acts the same self-assured security, the same unfaltering tone of authority. How great the difficulties involved in doing this may be in a measure realized by recalling what the accomplishing of His purposes required. "He had to relate His new doctrine," Dr. Forrest has pointed out, "to the beliefs and customs of an established faith, to pronounce judgment on the most sacred traditions, to retain, reject, transform, and to bear home His message to those whose hearts and minds were saturated with the faith which He had come at once to supersede and to complete."<sup>10</sup> But He does all this without any hesitancy or doubt, without leaving upon Himself any haunting regrets or rebuking memories. Immensely positive and unalterably convinced as to the righteousness and truth of His judgment, is Jesus, in everything that He does or says.

That the several writers of the New Testament Books were deeply impressed by this characteristic, is quite as clear as is Jesus' own consciousness of it. Again and again they employ the word "power" in describing their Master's influence. "The multitude glorified God," says Matthew, "who had given such power unto men." "The kingdom of God," says Mark, "comes with power." "His word," says Luke, "was with power." "Thou hast given Him power over all flesh," says John. "God anointed Jesus of Nazareth with power," it is recorded in the Book of Acts. And Paul speaks of "the power of the Lord Jesus Christ." Under their observation of this power of Jesus, inherently native to His Person, these early disciples must have felt, as we, who now read the historic record of their impressions, feel, that "the character of Jesus,"

<sup>10</sup> See "The Christ of History and of Experience," p. 30.

to put it in Horace Bushnell's phrase, "forbids His classification with men." He visualizes and embodies the Divine. His unique nature is radiant with the indwelling presence of God. All who see Him, unless their eyes are "holden" feel in His presence as if they were "walking in hallowed cathedrals"—a feeling to which Charles Lamb gave expression in that saying of his so often referred to: "If Shakespeare or Milton or some other distinguished person should unexpectedly appear in our midst, we should all rise to do him honor; but if Christ were to enter we should all prostrate ourselves in reverent and adoring worship at His feet!"

Another characteristic deserving notice in this connection, similarly exceptional and impressive, is the absolutely sinless and perfectly holy manhood of our Lord. He did not at any point of His progressive experience deflect from the specific ideal which God had set before Him in life. "While Christ speaks as a man to men, and out of a deep sense of common brotherhood," Dr. Forrest says with incisive truthfulness and convincing force, "yet at the same time He does not occupy their standpoint. He addresses Himself to those who are outside the circle of right relations with the Father, but He Himself speaks from within. He moves quietly about among men, mingles with them in all the ease and variety of social relations, yet as one who breathes another atmosphere than they, who dwells in a region of unbroken serenity, at peace with Himself and with God. The holy love of the Father utters no word of forgiveness to His soul, but it utters it through Him to others. His joy is not that of the son who has wandered and been restored, but of the son who has never left the Father's house. This is the mystery of Christ's sinlessness."<sup>11</sup>

It is true, attempts have been made to disprove the perfect holiness of Jesus by challenging His conduct in particular instances. In His boyhood, it has been said, He displayed a want of filial obedience. In driving out the buyers and sellers from the Temple, He exhibited an excess of passion. In the

<sup>11</sup> "The Authority of Christ," pp. 10, 11.



deliverance of the Gadarene demoniac, He unwarrantedly destroyed the property of others. And in His treatment of the Syro-Phœnician woman, He was harsh to the point of contempt. But all such objections are negligible. They largely rest upon an abstract treatment of certain elements in the case, and spring out of an ignorance, as Godet has conclusively shown, "of the precise circumstances which determined Jesus' action."<sup>12</sup> The full and final answer to all such cavillings is that Jesus stood self-vindicated after them all. Not a tremor of regret or self-reproach is discoverable in Him throughout His entire career.

The inference that must necessarily be drawn from this stupendously important and altogether exceptional characteristic of Jesus' life, corresponds with that which His unique power forced upon our attention. Very early in the history of Christian thought, a man of spiritual insight seized his pen and wrote out his inference in words that have carried the approbation of multitudes of Christians, "The Word was God." The problem raised by the fact of Christ's sinless and holy character, is neither fairly nor fully met by describing Jesus, in view of His acknowledged moral perfection, for example, as Keim does in calling Him "a super-human miracle,"<sup>13</sup> or as Channing does in acknowledging Him "to be more than a human being."<sup>14</sup> Such intermediate compromises, attempting to place Christ above men whilst denying His Godhood, are both historically and logically untenable. Such halting, half-and-half theories, fail not only in doing justice to Christ, but also, in deriving from Him genuine and efficient inspirational power and uplift for the moral and religious life. The acceptance of a real Incarnation of God in the Person of His Son, on the other hand, whilst affording a satisfactory solution to the problem of His perfect manhood, at the same time offers an intellectual rest, not otherwise attain-

<sup>12</sup> "Defense of the Faith," pp. 193, 194.

<sup>13</sup> "Geschichte von Jesu von Nazara," English trans., Vol. 3, p. 662.

<sup>14</sup> Channing's "Works," Vol. 4, p. 160.

able by us, when facing the mystery of the world, of the soul, and of God. All through the Christian centuries, therefore, there have been men, a continuous succession of men, who in the light of the accredited historical facts of the Gospel, verified in their own experience, have unhesitatingly and confidently affirmed the One sinless and holy member of our race to be Deity incarnate, God's adorable, true, and only Son.

"Thou art the King of glory, O Christ,  
Thou art the everlasting Son of the Father."

This estimate of Christ, in an age that emphasizes the thought of Divine Immanence and has the spirit of agnosticism as its intellectual background, should appear to be the more readily acceptable and intrinsically credible, on the one hand, and the more eagerly welcomed, on the other hand, as an adequate and successful answer to the naturalistic philosophical theory which holds God to be unknowable. The thoughts here suggested may well occupy us for a moment longer. Agnosticism, as it appears, for instance, in the popular and widely-influential philosophy of Herbert Spencer, has helped mankind to realize, that apart from revelation God is unknown and unknowable. Now, one form of heresy—increasingly prevalent in our day careful observers of the trend of thought declare—has always started from the assumption that a sufficient knowledge of God is possible aside from the revelation of Jesus Christ. Upon this assumption of knowing what God is, it has proceeded to deny that all the fulness of the Godhead dwelt in Christ. In face of the agnostic position, should not the heresy referred to, feel itself compelled to recognize that the God it knows, or thinks it knows, apart from Christ, is after all known to it only in and through the Son who has revealed Him? Gwatkin's great book on "The Knowledge of God," to which earlier reference has been made, has rendered large service to Christian thought in pressing this point upon men's attention. The Unitarian heresy cannot rest its contentions upon theories which look for living power to a purely



human Christ, this writer says, for substance. Its advocates must accept His Deity, interpret God through Him, and worship God in Him, or they must seat Necessity upon the throne of the Almighty and worship that. In other phrase, choice must be made by them between agnosticism, pure and simple, and the assurance of Christ recorded by Matthew (11: 27), namely, that "no man knoweth the Father save the Son and he to whom the Son willeth to reveal Him." Once this is definitely realized, men should have little difficulty in determining what to do with Jesus.

And as an aid to the right decision, the doctrine of the Divine Immanence at this point proffers a service of inestimable value. According to the generally recognized truth of its claims, God is latently present in human personality as such. If this is so, one must feel constrained to acknowledge that the larger, the truer, the purer, the soul of a person is, the clearer, the fuller, and the more certain the indwelling of God must be. Our best knowledge of the Most High must be derived from the best of men. And if there is one man who is the best, a man spotlessly pure and absolutely holy, God will reside in, and reveal Himself through that man as fully and certainly as He can be revealed, and make this revelation for the guidance and salvation of mankind. This man, the Gospels of the New Testament point out to us, in the Person of Jesus Christ. For the first and only time in history, the Immanence of God becomes a perfect and transparent reality in the soul of Him whom Christendom has united in crowning the Lord and Saviour of us all.

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND.

## VIII.

### EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT.

#### THE FEDERAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN AMERICA.

It was an historic assembly, both because it was the consummation of a long preparatory process, and the beginning of a new period of denominational coöperation. Whatever the immediate or distant results may be, the Protestant churches of the United States have entered into new relations toward one another and have shown, in a concrete way, a unity of spirit in reference to the spiritual, moral, and social problems of the age. Such a gathering Archbishop Cranmer longed for when, in 1552, he wrote letters from Lambeth to Calvin, Bullinger, and Melancthon, urging "that learned and godly men, who are eminent for erudition and judgment might meet together in some place of safety, where by taking counsel together and comparing their respective opinions, they might handle all the heads of ecclesiastical doctrine and hand down to posterity under the weight of their authority some work not only upon the subjects themselves but upon the forms of expressing them." The questions then requiring solution were largely doctrinal; now they are ethical and social. Probably the way to doctrinal agreement is not so much by comparison of opinions as by working together in the cause of Christ and humanity. In substance Cranmer's dream has been realized almost four centuries afterwards and in a locality which was then a wilderness.

The personnel of the Council was an interesting study. Four hundred and fifty delegates, representative men of thirty-one denominations numbering eighteen million members, sat



side by side for a week. Baptists and Lutherans, Congregationalists and Episcopalians, Presbyterians and Quakers, Methodists and Reformed, Mennonites and Moravians—all dwelt in unity together in Philadelphia, a name appropriate to the occasion. It may have been a meeting like this of which John Calvin said that “he would not shrink from crossing ten seas, if need be,” to attend. The spirit of Count Zinzendorf must have smiled with approval when he saw this “Congregation of God in the Spirit” in a far more comprehensive form than he ever dreamt of. The members in attendance were men of wide, frequently of world-wide, experience, who had borne the burden and heat of the day, and by word and deed had proved themselves workmen that need not be ashamed. There were bishops, moderators, presidents of synods, stated clerks, secretaries of boards, professors in seminaries and colleges, pastors and elders—serious, devout, intelligent, and aggressive men. They came together not *to become* interested, but because they *were* interested, in the spiritual, moral, and social welfare, not merely of their respective churches, but of their country and of the world. In times past there doubtless were greater theologians and scholars in councils, but they did not have a clearer vision of the scope of Christ’s kingdom, of the essential elements of His gospel, and of the urgent needs of men in all nations. Discussions did not turn around a Greek iota, but hinged on the subjects enumerated by Christ in His reply to John’s question—“the blind receive their sight, and the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, and the dead are raised up, and the poor have good tidings preached to them.”

The Council was authoritatively constituted. It was not a collection of individuals moved by good intentions, but without official warrant, to consider measures for the improvement of church or state. It was “a federation of denominations created by the denominations themselves.” The supreme judicatories accepted the Plan of Federation and chose regular delegates for this, the first, Council. So far as Protestantism at

present can meet in an authoritative way, it did meet in Philadelphia. In this regard a long step in advance has been taken beyond any previous interdenominational or undenominational organization. The Constitution, indeed, clearly limits the scope of the Council, yet within these bounds its acts are representative and, by a later vote of the judicatories of the constituent churches, become authoritative. The subjects which claim attention, as well as the purpose of the Federation, are defined as follows:

“This Federal Council shall have no authority over the constituent bodies adhering to it; but its province shall be limited to the expression of its counsel and the recommending of a course of action in matters of common interest to the Church’s local councils and individual Christians.

“It has no authority to draw up a common creed or form of government or of worship, or in any way to limit the full autonomy of the Christian bodies adhering to it.”

In the limitations of the Council’s authority the rights of denominations are safeguarded and the ills that would necessarily arise from discussions of doctrine, polity, or worship are wisely avoided. The Executive Committee in its report calls special attention to Article 4 of the Plan of Federation:

“We believe that the great Christian bodies in our country should stand together, should lead in the discussion of and give impulse to all great movements that make for righteousness. We believe that questions like those of marriage and divorce, Sabbath desecration, social evils, child labor, the relation of labor to capital, problems that are created by foreign immigration, the bettering of the conditions of the laboring classes, and the moral and religious training of the young—concern Christians in every name, and demand their united and concerted action if the Church is to lead effectively in the conquest of the world for Christ.”

Some one may protest on the ground that the object is too indefinite and vague, that executive power is wanting. We reply that the genius of Protestantism, no less than the divi-



sions in the Church, does not favor coercion by external authority, but depends on "the opinions of men crystallized into common convictions as the source of ultimate power." The strength of the Council must therefore be found in the righteousness and reasonableness of its action and in the voluntary coöperation of its constituents.

What results, under these circumstances, may be reasonably expected? The cynic may sneer and consider it another project of a coterie of ecclesiastical organizers who find their work profitable and gratifying. The enthusiast may at once catch a glimpse of the millennial dawn. Few, if any, of the delegates were either cynics or enthusiasts. All seemed to recognize the limitations of power and a certain problematic element, but at the same time, also, the evident possibilities and the actual work already done. The meetings were not primarily intended for inspiration. Only ten minutes were granted to the speakers on the program to present the substance of their papers and the appended resolutions for consideration and adoption. In the discussion which followed speeches were limited to five minutes. The adopted resolutions will be sent to the supreme judicatories of the several churches for final action. Thus in a regular and legitimate way the Protestant bodies will be kept in close touch with one another, their common consciousness will be more clearly realized, and they will speak in unison on the great questions of the day to the world at large.

The possibilities of federation for efficient service in various directions were indicated by Dr. Sanford in his report entitled, "A Record of Three Years' Work." He cited a number of instances where the churches by united action were influential in remedying political and social evils in communities, states, and even nations. The United Church of Christ of South Dakota, by arousing public sentiment and appealing to legislators, was the principal cause for the removal of an evil that had become a national scandal. The New York State and City Federations played no small part in supporting Governor Hughes in his fight against gambling which was practically

legalized by the Percy Grey law. In 1905 the Inter-Church Conference passed vigorous resolutions in reference to the conditions in the Congo Free State at Washington. A letter, embodying the resolutions and those of the national ecclesiastical assemblies of the country, was sent to every member of Congress. With this message was included a letter signed by fifty missionaries representing the Protestant churches of the Congo Free State. The President and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations were interviewed. "In less than a week after the interviews a resolution was introduced in the Senate and adopted by a non-partisan vote that gave the President power to take such steps as he might deem wise in coöperating with or in aid of any powers signatory of the treaty of Berlin for the amelioration of the condition of the inhabitants of the basin of the Congo if inquiry revealed the truth of alleged cruelty." King Leopold did not wait for further inquiry, but at once opened negotiations that have transferred the care of the Congo to the kingdom of Belgium. While not all that is desired has been obtained for the oppressed and wretched people of the Congo basin, it must be conceded that "the united action of Protestant Christianity in Europe and America has brought partial relief, and selfish greed backed by imperial resources was compelled to recognize a power of righteousness that is the hope of nations and oppressed humanity." How much may be done in the way of moral influence on civic movements, social reform, missionary activity, and charitable work in towns, cities and states by State and Local Federations, will appear from what has been accomplished in the last five years. It cannot well be gainsaid that it is the most practicable and reasonable method for the unification and correlation of the religious forces of the Republic that has yet been proposed.

It is to be hoped that the Council will supersede some of the preceding interdenominational or undenominational associations and render the organization of new ones unnecessary. Their mission is ended because their work will now be accomplished in a far more systematic and comprehensive way. Let



them decrease, and let the Council increase. We have reached a limit in the number of societies, alliances, councils, and leagues. We are in danger of losing sight of the Church on account of the multitude of subsidiary organizations. We, therefore, heartily endorse the resolution that "It is our conviction that the plan of work which this Council will take up will be so comprehensive as to make unnecessary the further increase in the number of undenominational or interdenominational organizations for special work and will thus protect the churches from many appeals for aid which tend to dissipate the energy of the churches and to direct the stream of their benevolence from the regular and recognized channels." Yet about the time this resolution was passed a new organization, The National Lord's Day Alliance, was constituted in Pittsburgh. Its aim is to unite churches to conserve the sanctity of the American Sabbath. A moment's reflection will convince one that no agency can do more in this direction than the churches acting through the Federal Council.

The watchword of the Council was federation, not organic union. This was emphasized in a number of speeches from the first to the last meeting. Denominationalism was recognized as legitimate and necessary. It has its basis not only in past controversies but also in the constitution of human nature. Doubtless there will be and ought to be closer union between members of the same family or type of churches, such as the Lutherans, Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians. The reasons for separation in many instances have disappeared. But Protestantism will always have its divisions, whether along sixteenth or twentieth century lines. There is far more to be feared from uniformity than from diversity. The one is often an indication of low vitality, the other of vigorous individuality. Federation recognizes the legitimacy of divisions, the necessity of tolerance, the importance of coöperation. Bishop Hoss said in an address: "We must not only recognize Christians in other churches, but the churches of other Christians." As American citizens we have inherited the idea of federation

in our political order. In the union of states each maintains its autonomy and is still loyal to the Republic. Indeed the State and the Union find their greatest efficiency in their mutual interdependence. If in the colonial era the Protestant ideals gave form to our political institutions, the debt may now be repaid when the churches accept the principle of federation from the civil government.

That the Federal Council is an earnest effort to obviate the evils of a divided Church and to correlate the Christian forces of the country in the interest of righteousness cannot be denied. That it is a panacea for all ills no one will affirm. It is after all only a *plan of operation*. The efficiency of the plan depends on the spirit of the churches which have adopted it.

If Christian men and women in the towns, cities and states of this country will work together in turning resolutions into action, and only to that extent, the Council will accomplish its purpose. Such coöperation will require common sense, hard work, money, tolerance, sympathy and aggressive local leadership—in brief, a sort of moral heroism which will face popular indifference, bigotry, cowardice, fanaticism, and ridicule with courage that is born of firm faith in the ultimate victory of Christian ideals.

G. W. R.



## IX.

### NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

A NEW BOUNDARY STONE OF NEBUCHADREZZAR I. FROM NIPPUR. With a Concordance of Proper Names and a Glossary of the Kudurru Inscriptions thus far published. By Wm. J. Hinke, Ph.D., D.D., Assistant Professor in the Old Testament Department in Auburn Theological Seminary. With 16 Halftone Illustrations and 35 Drawings. Philadelphia, published by the University of Pennsylvania, 1907.

This book is by a minister of the Reformed Church in the United States, well-known to the ministry and laity of said church as a teacher and as a careful and diligent student of its early historical records. It was handed to us by the editor of the REVIEW with the request that we should write a brief notice of it. The book before us is an outgrowth of a thesis for the Ph.D. degree; "That part of this book which relates directly to the boundary stone of Nebuchadrezzar I. from Nippur was originally presented to the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Pennsylvania, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Ph.D." (first sentence of the author's preface). The part referred to consists of pages 116-187. The boundary stone, of which the author in these 71 pages presents a transliteration of the cuneiform text and an English translation of the same, together with a commentary and an introduction, bears a text of 155 lines. The stone contains also a drawing of the field in question and 20 symbols.

The form of its symbols, Nos. 3, 6 and 9, is comparatively common on the monuments, as is well known. As to the meaning of these symbols there is a divergence of opinion. At times these, like the "spearhead" of No. 1, are regarded as phallic emblems, "simulacra Priapi." Professor Hinke, with others, regards such symbols as Nos. 3, 6 and 9, as "scepters," and, possibly, rightly so. To one who has been among the modern Bedouin and fellahen of Palestine for some time, these "scepters" suggest the quite common weapon of the Arab shepherd. These Arab weapons have the same general appearance as these oft-recurring "scepters" or "phallic symbols" on the monuments. These weapons are oaken clubs, running to a point at one end and ending in a round, heavy knob at the other. The general appearance is that of a large pin, whence the Palestinian Arabs name it *dibbûsy*, "pin." The same weapon in Babylonia is called *mikwâr* by the modern Arabs there. In Babylonia the knob frequently consists of hard-

ened pitch.<sup>1</sup> For the name compare قَار, "liquid pitch," "tar," also "shoemaker's wax." The weapon ordinarily is less than three feet in length and weighs about from two to three pounds. It is carried by the natives on the right forearm in a horizontal position in front of the body, with the right hand upon the pointed end, while the end having the knob rests on the arm, extending somewhat beyond the elbow. As far as our inquiries went with the natives during our connection, as Thayer Fellow, with the American School for Oriental Study and Research in Palestine, we have not been able to learn whether they attribute a phallic signification, or that of a royal scepter, to this weapon. To the natives to-day the *dibbûsy* or *mikwâr* is apparently nothing more than a simple effective weapon to ward off the foe, whether man or beast. Has this any value in interpreting these monumental symbols?

In IV. 10 *nu-gu* is, according to Delitzsch, "Assyrische Grammatik," Sec. 138, 2d ed., from the root נגנ rather than from נגנ; it may be that this is due to the printer. Likewise in the paragraph preceding, page 180 of the commentary, the Hebrew in question is נגנ and not נגנ. On page 176, מפר is certainly due to the printer or proof-reader. There are, it seems to us, too many errors of this kind, not only in the printing or proof-reading of the Hebrew and of the cuneiform transliterations, but also in the printing or proof-reading of the English. There are in the entire work more than three pages of "Additions and Corrections" with an additional slip of "Additional Corrections." There is occasion for a second slip of still further additional corrections. We shall however not enumerate, in this notice, these errors due to careless proof-reading; it is to be regretted in this case, as in every similar case, that a book thus marred should be allowed to appear with such errors uncorrected.

The part of the book under consideration, the thesis presented for the Ph.D. degree, is a scholarly treatment, making an actual contribution to our knowledge of the Babylonian boundary stones and kudurru inscriptions. The rest of the work, (pages 1-115; 188-199), apart from the "concordance" and "glossary," which together take up pages 200-313, is, in the main, nothing more than a partial summing up and registering of previous results of scholars working in this particular field of Assyriology. Or in the words of the author, this part of the work is offered "as a general introduction into this interesting field of Babylonian studies."

<sup>1</sup>The existence of asphalt springs in Babylonia, from which asphalt issues forth in a liquid state, is well known to western scholars. For a picture of one of these asphalt springs near Hît see Clay, "Light on the Old Testament from Babel," p. 94. The picture is a reproduction of a photograph by Haynes.



The work does not include "a discussion of all Babylonian boundary stones discovered up to the present." (So Professor Clay in *Records of the Past*, Jan.-Feb., 1908, page 39.) Professor Hinke himself does not claim to have presented a discussion of all Babylonian boundary stones discovered up to the present. His sub-title and a few sentences from the preface show this: "The attempt seemed . . . warranted to secure, if possible, a complete collection of all the symbols and to present them in the form of an astronomical atlas. This original plan, however, had to be given up, because the Museums of Berlin and London declined to permit the publication of the material in their possession, inasmuch as it had been 'reserved for publication by the Museum.' As a result the author was compelled to restrict himself to a collection of all the material that had been published thus far." On page xxv the author gives a list of "Unpublished Boundary Stones."

Professor Hinke's "Bibliography of the Babylonian Kudurru Inscriptions" consists of about two and a half pages. It is arranged under the following headings: I., "Text editions;" II., "Transliterations, Translations and Discussions;" III., "Description and Discussion of the Symbols."

There are suggestions here and there, which indicate that Professor Hinke has in this book joined, or is on the way of joining, the forces of the Pan-Babylonists of the "Winckler und Genossen" type. This appears for example, in the paragraph closing with the sentence: "As the prototypes of all earthly conditions are to be found in heaven, according to the belief of the Babylonians, so earthly temples had their heavenly models."<sup>2</sup> How far, and to what countries and peoples our author would extend the Babylonian "Lehre," and to what extent he would, for instance, dissolve the civilization and religion of Israel into the elements of this same "Lehre," does not yet appear. In a footnote Professor Hinke tacitly informs the reader that he owes this position to Winckler and his comrades. The foot-note reads: "Cf. Winckler, *Himmels- und Weltenbild der Babylonier*,"<sup>3</sup> p. 12; Winckler,

<sup>2</sup> The contrary principle finds expression in the following: "Himmlische Erscheinungen wirken weniger auf die Phantasie der Wilden als irdische und tägliche, die ihnen ebenso mysteriös sind; das Ferne erklären sie vom Nahen aus, übertragen also irdische Gottheiten auf himmlische Erscheinungen (nicht umgekehrt)."—"Man, I think, grew upwards from the earth to heaven, not like the drop of the banian tree, from heaven to earth. The old root was the first growth, and only after it attained to a considerable maturity did it throw down bright tendrils, fed by the riches of the aerial light, which had imparted to them warmth and moisture."

<sup>3</sup> The full title of this work is characteristic of the extravagant claims of Winckler and his followers, and hence we give it in full, "*Himmels- und Weltenbild der Babylonier als Grundlage der Weltanschauung und Mythologie aller Völker*."

“Die Weltanschauung des alten Orients,” p. 11; A. Jeremias, “Das alte Testament im Lichte des alten Orients,” ed. 1, p. 12.” For an excellent characterization and criticism of the Pan-Babylonian school the reader may be referred to Professor Barton’s articles<sup>4</sup> in the *Biblical World*, May and June, 1908.

To the Christian theologian and student of the Biblical religions there are some interesting practices and customs referred to and described in this book by Professor Hinke. We mention one of these in this connection, viz., the practice of attaching curses to these boundary stones, calculated to keep an individual or individuals from removing, altering, or marring them in any way. The curse on the stone whose inscription was translated by our author reads as follows: “Whoever [removes?] this stone, hides it in the dust, burns it with fire, throws it into the water, shuts it up in an enclosure, causes a fool, a deaf man, a witless man to take it, places it in an invisible place, may the great gods as many as are mentioned by their names on this stone, curse him with an evil curse, tear out his foundation and destroy his seed.”

With these and similar curses Professor Hinke compares the passage in Mašûdi, the Arabic historian: “He who dares to change the sense of this book, to remove one of the foundations upon which it rests, to obscure the clearness of the text or to cast doubt upon a passage by alteration or removal, by extract or résumé, and finally who shall allow it to be attributed to another author, may he be the object of divine wrath and of swift punishment,” etc. (“Kitâb Marûj el Dhahabi,” Paris, 1861-77, pp. 22 f.). Professor Hinke might also have compared the following passage: “I testify unto every man that heareth the words of the prophecy of this book, If any man shall add unto them, God shall add unto him the plagues which are written in this book: and if any man shall take away from the words of the book of this prophecy, God shall take away his part from the tree of life, and out of the holy city, which are written in this book” (Rev. 22: 18, 19). Furthermore, the Eshmunazer inscription in Phœnician might have been compared, as well as others.

A study of Oriental curses on monuments, boundary stones, in books, and in daily life, proves interesting and affords a glimpse into the life of the people. While in Palestine, among other things, we made a list of all Arabic curses that we heard in the land.

On page 179 on *li-tal-lik-šu-ma*, II, 2, pret. of *alâku*, it is remarked that the meaning of the verb cannot be “to go,” because the context demands a stronger verb than *alâku*, “to go.” There

<sup>4</sup> “Recent German Theories of Foreign Influences in the Bible,” pp. 336-347; “The Astro-mythological School of Biblical Interpretation,” pp. 433-444.



are other reasons given. We simply wish to suggest in this connection the Arabic *هَلَكَ*, rather than *حَلَفَ*, which is used both intransitively and transitively meaning "to perish," "to destroy," "to ruin." See also Freytag, *sub voce*.

The work bears an improper and misleading title, since only a comparatively small portion of the book "relates directly to the boundary stone of Nebuchadrezzar I. from Nippur"; the title is "irreführend und wohl nur der Reklame wegen gewählt." Why the book, under these circumstances, bears the title it does, we do not understand. The title in connection with the contents of the book reminds one of the moral essays of De Chantereine, which, being at a loss to entitle, he finally called "The Education of a Prince." In the preface he goes on to say, that, though the essays were not written with a view to this title, nevertheless, the author should not be censured for the title, as the essays partly relate to the education of a prince. A title that would describe Professor Hinke's book more accurately and fittingly is the following: "A General Introduction to Babylonian Boundary Stones." The present sub-title might then be preceded by some statement like the following: "Including a study of a new boundary stone of Nebuchadrezzar I. from Nippur," or the present title with the sub-title, "Including a General Introduction," etc.

While in Egypt, as a member of the American School, the Hathor temple at Denderah was one of the special places of study and observation. This study of the temple *in situ* was later supplemented at Berlin under Erman and at Strassburg under Spiegelberg, under the general subject of Egyptian Art. Naturally we turn to page 99, where there is a representation of "The archer from the Egyptian zodiac of Dendera." We read: "On the square zodiac of Dendera, *e. g.*, which dates from the time of the Emperor Nero, we see the same double-headed centaur drawing a bow, winged and having two tails, the lower of a horse and the upper of a scorpion." Judging, for the moment, from Professor Hinke's reproduction of this centaur-archer, it is not likely that we have here the representation of a horse's tail, for, in the first place, the tail is too long and has not the form and shape of a horse's tail, and, in the second place, the hoofs of the centaur are cloven! If the hoof is that of a horse, then it represents a hitherto unknown stage of development between protohippus and pliohippus! Is it probable that men, living in the time of Nero, would represent a horse as having cloven hoofs? It is to be regretted that Professor Clay, who reproduces Professor Hinke's illustration in his summary of the contents of Professor Hinke's book, in *Records of the Past*, allows himself to repeat the illustration and this statement without testing their accuracy. Professor Clay repeats after Professor Hinke: "In both figures we find a

winged centaur, drawing the bow, with a double head, one human, the other animal, and a double tail, one of a horse, the other of a scorpion" (p. 49).

We have something further to say on Professor Hinke's reproduction of this archer, but, before we continue with this, we call attention to page 177, where the credit of discovering הלכא in the Aramaic indorsements on the documents of the Murashû sons, corresponding to the Babylonian *ilki*, is given to Professor Clay by Professor Hinke: "Professor Clay discovered הלכא in the Aramaic endorsements of the Murashû tablets, corresponding to *ilki gamrutu*, see B.E., X., 78, where ה in the first line of the Aramaic endorsement is written on an erasure of ש." Professor Clay himself, however, does not claim this credit. In his painstaking and scholarly contribution to "Old Testament and Semitic Studies in memory of William Rainey Harper" he writes, page 308 f., on this point: "To Professor Montgomery belongs the credit for suggesting that the letter ה is written upon ש. The scribe doubtless had the word שקל in mind after he had written כסף. This gives us הלכא, which corresponds to the Babylonian *ilki* written in the text." See also Clay on indorsements nos. 35 and 48.

Now to revert to the archer of Denderah. On page 99, fig. 33 is said (on page xii) to have been "drawn from Boll, *Sphæra*, pl. II." This is not correct. If figure 33 was drawn from Boll's plates and not from *Mémoires de l'Institut Royal de France*, it is meant as a reproduction of the archer on plate III. of Boll's work. This, among other indications, is clear from the position of the bow-string in fig. 33; it is at rest as on plate III., while on plate II. of Boll's work the bow-string is drawn back to the bosom of the archer who holds the bow drawn in a strong tension. On plate II. the centaur clearly has only one tail, while on plate III. it may be double-tailed,<sup>5</sup> as fig. 33. Now plate II. and plate III. of Boll's work are, however, reproductions of the same round zodiac in the center of a square relief of the Hathor temple at Denderah. For the sake of comparison Boll presented two reproductions of the same zodiac. The former, plate II., is according to the "drawing" (p. 160, note 2) or to the "print" in the "Description de l'Égypte"; the latter, or plate III., is according to a photograph of a cast in the Louvre.

In connection with this round zodiac two other things are to be noted; its designation and its date. Professor Hinke is confused on these points as well; he contradicts himself on the next to the following page, and apparently does not understand Boll from whom he derives his material. Or is this confusion and contra-

<sup>5</sup> "Auf der Photographie (represented by plate III) ist dies leider nicht deutlich; die Zeichnung in der Description de l'Égypte (represented by plate II) zeigt nur einen Schwanz, die bei Letronne, *Analyse critique des représentations zodiacales de Dendéra et d'Esné*, Taf. I, zwei." (Boll.)



diction due to a lack of proper familiarity with the subject in hand? The zodiac in question is properly designated as the "round" zodiac of Denderah. It is so designated, *i. e.*, "circulaire," in the *Mémoires de l'Institut Royal de France*, XVI., 2 (1846), in the title of an article: "Mémoire sur le zodiaque circulaire de Denderah," pp. 1-101. This zodiac is also designated as the "round" zodiac, on Boll's two plates, II. and III., thus, "Runder Zodiacus von Dendera." On page 160 Boll speaks of it as this "Rundbild"; on page 163, note 3, "das Rundbild von Dendera," so also p. 166, note 1, also p. 169, also p. 177; and on page 161 "der runde Zodiacus." Boll also has this sentence: "Im Innern des Tempels [*i. e.*, der grossen Hathor] aber trägt die Decke eines der Osiriszimmer als Schmuck ein quadratisches Relief, in dessen rundem Hauptstück die 12 Tierkreiszeichen zu sehen sind" (p. 160). Now on page 99 Professor Hinke speaks of "the square zodiac of Dendera," while on the next to the following page he speaks of "the round zodiac of Dendera." The round zodiac and what Professor Hinke calls the square zodiac on page 99 are the same. Furthermore, Professor Hinke says the "square zodiac of Dendera" dates "from the time of the Emperor Nero," while on page 101, where evidently by confusion, though properly, he calls the same zodiac the "round zodiac of Dendera." He says: "Round zodiac of Dendera from the time of the Emperor Augustus."

It is the rectangular zodiac from the same Hathor temple, and not the round zodiac, which dates from the time of Nero, according to Boll (p. 159), and Dümichen, in "Photographische Ergebnisse einer nach Ägypten entsendeten archäologischen Expedition," Berlin, 1871, p. 27. Professor Hinke apparently did not understand Boll. Or does he have reasons, which he did not mention, for placing the round zodiac in the time of Nero? If so, how can he say on the next to the following page that the "round zodiac of Dendera is from the time of Augustus?"

Concerning the date of the round zodiac of Denderah, we quote a sentence from Professor Hinke's source of information: "Dieses Rundbild (*i. e.*, the round zodiac) gehört nach Letronne der Zeit des Augustus, nach Lepsius den letzten Dezennien vor Christus an" (Boll, p. 160).

In the face of the above and similar matters upon which we cannot now enter, our confidence in the scientific accuracy of this "general introduction" is shaken, for, wherever we have tested it, we have too frequently found it inaccurate in statement and in reproduction of monumental representations. We regret that we cannot agree with Professor Clay's judgment, pronounced on this book in *Records of the Past*. We would not like to call it "a most excellent production of American scholarship." Much less



would we like to speak of it as Professor Clay does in the sentence from which we quoted the above: "The work which takes such high rank as a scientific contribution is a most excellent production of American scholarship, in which the author may justly take pride, for the volume will serve as the basis for future studies in this interesting class of inscriptions." In view of the results of our examination of the book and of this great unmerited praise we caution all users and readers of the same not to accept its statements and illustrations without subjecting them to an examination.

IRWIN HOCH DELONG.

DIE ETHIK DES DEUTERONOMIUMS. Von Georg Sternberg, Lic. Theol. Berlin, Trowitzsch & Sohn, 1908. Ladenpreis 2, 60 M. Pages 1-99.

The subject of this brochure, the ethics of Deuteronomy, as well as the more comprehensive subject, the history of Hebrew Ethics, has been given comparatively little attention by modern scholars. The subject was repeatedly urged by the late President Harper upon the attention of the members of his Old Testament seminar in the University of Chicago. Assuming for the time being that the ethical standards in Israel vary, just as the religious ideas of the several Old Testament writers are partially different and vary generally according as the writer lives in this or that period of Israel's history, he used to say again and again that it is just as important and desirable to study Israel's ethics from the historical standpoint as it is to study Israel's religious ideas from this standpoint. Since leaving his seminar (1902), this is the first critical and scholarly monograph on a part of this general theme that has come to my knowledge. Schultze's article, "Die Beweggründe zum sittlichen Handeln in dem vorchristlichen Israel," appeared as early as 1890. Giesebrecht's article in *The American Journal of Theology*, Vol. XI. (1907), pages 31-55, presents a fine sketch of Hebrew ethics from the beginning to the period of late Judaism "immediately before the Christian age." This article is entitled "The Moral Level of the Old Testament Scriptures." It is perhaps not necessary to mention that this subject is generally treated, at least in part, by modern scholars (Marti, Smend, Stade, Duff,<sup>1</sup> and others) in treatises on the history of Israel's religion.

The work in hand is written for scholars and not for the general public. The reading of it presupposes a knowledge of Hebrew. Biblical passages, phrases, and words, are quoted freely in the original languages.

The following outline may serve to give the reader some idea

<sup>1</sup> Duff, in addition to his two volumes on "Old Testament Theology," has a small volume on "The Theology and Ethics of the Hebrews," which is distinctly popular in treatment. It was published by Scribners, New York, 1902, in "The Semitic Series." The price is \$1.25.



of what he may expect in this work. In the first part of the brochure, after an introduction defining the limits and nature of the subject, the author discusses the *theoretical* moments of the ethics of Deuteronomy. Here the following questions are raised and answered. (1) What is the ethical norm applied in Deuteronomy? or what is that in Deuteronomy which fills the sense of duty with a concrete content? (a) What is the ethical norm applied in regulating one's action? (b) In pronouncing judgment upon another's action? (2) On what is the ethical norm in Deuteronomy based or founded? (3) What emotional motives are used in Deuteronomy to incite human action according to the ethical norm of the book? We indicate here the twofold answer: (a) The consideration and employment of emotional impulses of a natural instinctive sort. "Da nun das Dt. nicht am Anfang einer ethischen Entwicklung überhaupt steht, so ist von vornherein zu erwarten, . . . dass in ihm solche menschlichen Gefühlsregungen, welche in früherer Praxis z. T. schon ethisch befruchtet sind, nicht ignoriert, sondern vielfach und gern in den Dienst seines sittlichen Ideals gestellt werden" (p. 42). (b) The employment of impulses that are specifically religious. The first of these is the "fear of God" (Gottesfurcht), and the second "love of God" (Liebe zu Gott).

The second part of the brochure discusses the *practical* ethics of Deuteronomy, or the moral and social life demanded of Israel by the ethical standard of Deuteronomy. In the first place are discussed the *public acts*, the acts of Israel as a community, such as warfare, national religious ceremonies, festivals, etc. Upon this follows a discussion of the acts of the individual Israelite as a member of the community in his *private* life: as a householder; as an owner of slaves; as a neighbor; as a creditor and a debtor; as a harvester and a vintager; as coming in relation with the birds and beasts of the field, with the domestic animals belonging to himself and with those belonging to his fellow Israelite.

On the last page, page 99, the author pronounces a brief judgment upon the ethics of Deuteronomy. The duty of love to one's neighbor, he maintains, is limited by the national particularistic idea. Personal revenge and enmity as a requital for injury received is apparently proper and legitimate. (Die Übung persönlicher Rache und Feindschaft als Vergeltung für erlittene Bosheit erscheint nicht als unberechtigt.) Other demerits of the Deuteronomic ethics are mentioned in this summary, but over against all these deficiencies the author emphasizes, as the chief merit, the fact that in spite of the external hindrances (some of which we have just mentioned), it presents in its time and environment the possibility of a grand ethical advance. Nor is this all that he would say in behalf of the Deuteronomic ethics in this general

summary and judgment. "Noch mehr," the author continues, "sie (die deuteronomische Ethik) hat geradezu messianische Bedeutung: Die Stellung und Bedeutung Jhvh's im Dt als Erzieher und Vorbild für die Seinen hat Jesus Christus übernehmen können, als er den Grund für die Ethik seiner Jünger legte, durch das Wort: Ἐντολὴν καινὴν δίδωμι ὑμῖν ἵνα ἀγαπᾶτε ἀλλήλους, καθὼς ἠγάπησα ὑμᾶς ἵνα καὶ ὑμεῖς ἀγαπᾶτε ἀλλήλους."

We have already characterized the treatment of the subject as critical and scholarly. Those who mean to make a serious study of the subject treated in this brochure will surely give attention to this treatise. The substance is attractive, even though not all positions taken by the author commend themselves as able to stand the test. Here, to be silent about others, we mention the author's presupposition underlying his treatment that Deuteronomy was written some time during the Solomonic reign (in der "Regierungszeit Salomos nach dem Tempelbau," p. 7). On the other hand, the form in some respects is wearisome and annoying. In a short monograph of 99 pages there is no excuse for the employment of such an extensive system of abbreviations of titles and words, such as the author makes use of both in the text and in the foot-notes. The trifling amount of space and printer's ink saved by this device, it seems to me, does not justify an author of a work of this kind to inflict upon his readers the inconvenience of constantly consulting a list or indeed lists of abbreviations.

IRWIN HOCH DELONG.

UNBELIEF IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. A CRITICAL HISTORY. By Henry C. Sheldon, Professor in Boston University. New York, Eaton & Maines. Pages 399. Price \$2.00.

The author of this volume has written extensively on church history and systematic theology. He thus prepared himself to discuss so difficult a subject as the diverse forms of unbelief of the various schools of religious thought in the nineteenth century. It is a period of revolution, reaction, restoration, mediation, and reconstruction. It is needless to say that the current tendencies in theology and philosophy cannot be understood without a study of these movements in church and state. A number of monographs on this subject has appeared in Germany and England. The general church histories also treat the period briefly. There is room, however, for a treatise of this kind in America. The plan and method of the author will be most readily understood by a study of the table of contents. He divides the subject into three parts, with chapters, as follows:

Part 1: Philosophical Theories. Chapter 1, Radical Idealism; Chapter 2, Radical Sensationalism and Materialism; Chapter 3, Positivism; Chapter 4, Agnosticism and Anti-theistic Evolutionism; Chapter 5, Pessimism.



Part 2: Quasi-Scientific Theological and Ethical Theories. Chapter 1, The Challenging of the Supernatural; Chapter 2, The Denial of the Finality of Christianity; Chapter 3, Denial of the Transcendent Sonship of Jesus Christ; Chapter 4, Utilitarian and Naturalistic Ethics.

Part 3: Critical Theories. Chapter 1, Criticism of the Gospel History by Strauss; Chapter 2, Criticism of the New Testament by Baur; Chapter 3, Critical Reconstruction of the Life of Jesus by Renan and others; Chapter 4, Elements of Radicalism in the Recent Criticism of the Old Testament; Chapter 5, Elements of Radicalism in the Recent Criticism of the New Testament.

The material is appropriately and suggestively grouped under three heads—the philosophical, ethical, and critical. The topics of the sub-divisions are clearly stated. The tenets of the leading representatives of each system or school are defined and criticized. The author has evidently read widely and has thought profoundly. His conclusions are determined largely by his standard of judgment. In the Introduction he recognizes the difficulty of treating his theme in an objective manner and of testing the various schools with an absolute standard. He realizes that the personal convictions, preferences, and prejudices of an author will in a measure affect his judgment. He proposes to write from the Christian standpoint, and accepts what he calls the essential content of the Christian system as his standard. By this he means whatever can “be derived from the Scriptures by a fair exegesis” and for which also a clear support is provided in the general consensus of Christian scholarship. He accepts the theistic view of the universe. He regards personality as the highest category and knows nothing of a supra-personal God. Jesus Christ is a transcendent personality and came into the world to fulfill an extraordinary mediatorial office. Man is a free personality dowered with essential aptitudes for morality and religion. Any theory which makes man simply a part of a cosmic mechanism, a mere link in a chain of causes operating according to a law of mechanical necessity, abolishes the subject which Christianity contemplates. Finally, Christianity is conceived as not simply a name for a purely speculative system or body of ideal truth, but as an historical religion resting upon a basis of ascertained facts. Keeping this standard in mind the author tests the different systems by studying their fundamental ideas and then showing the truth and error in them. He also relates them genetically to those which precede and follow. The reviewer was especially gratified by the opening chapter in which he traces the history of speculative thought in Germany from Kant to Hegel. One will rarely find so clear an exposition in the space of forty pages.

The third book on “Critical Theories” will naturally attract

attention at present. In his criticism of the Old and New Testament critics, he follows the mediational or straddling method. He believes in the legitimacy of criticism, recognizes the valuable work done in this field, but constantly warns the reader against the results of criticism. He attempts to separate the wheat from the chaff. He takes up in order the work of Keunen, Wellhausen, Smend, and Winckler. All of them he considers radical, though he concedes that they represent various degrees of radicalism.

There are doubtless conservative and radical critics, but it seems to the writer that the time has come when in works like this not only the radical positions should be stated but the conservative and reliable results should be defined. It is not enough to praise the critic in vague generalities, and then to denounce his conclusions. The general reader has heard so much of that, that he is beginning to long for a clear statement of definite work accomplished.

In a brief concluding chapter the author takes an optimistic view of the final outcome of the nineteenth century scholarship. Christianity has doubtless undergone some changes. "A living religion, deep enough and real enough to meet the needs and to command the loyalty of an advancing race, ought to be able to secure and improve the position of one or another point in its content through such an intellectual engagement as that of the nineteenth century." While the conception of God, as supreme ethical person, has been brought into competition with pantheism, materialism, evolutionism, positivism, and pessimism, it has maintained itself and no permanent harm has been done to Christian theism. With all the critical and destructive work on Jesus and the New Testament, "the unique preëminence and lordship of Christ and the conception of Christ as central to the redemptive process in the world," are more firmly held than ever. The trend of exegesis has been in the direction of establishing the transcendent Sonship and the redemptive office of Christ as deeply imbedded in the New Testament. The primacy of the Bible, in the world's ethical and religious literature, stands out more clearly than ever in the light of a comparative study of the sacred books of the East. In the concluding sentences he says: "The Christian believer, at the opening of the twentieth century, should exercise his prerogative to go forward with illumined countenance and joyful spirit. No real barrier has been placed in the way of his faith. The outlook is inspiring. Never in fact, since the time when the revelator was entranced by the vision of the New Jerusalem, descending out of heaven, has the prospect for Christianity been better than it is at present."

A mere statement of its contents and general characteristics will commend this volume to the thoughtful American student.

GEORGE W. RICHARDS.



CHRISTIAN WORSHIP: ITS PRINCIPLES AND FORMS. By Rev. J. W. Richard, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Homiletics and Ecclesiastical Theology in the Theological Seminary at Gettysburg, and Rev. F. V. N. Painter, D.D., Professor of Modern Languages and Literature in Roanoke College. Second edition, revised. Philadelphia, Pa., Lutheran Publication Society. Pages 368.

The first edition of this work appeared in 1892. It well deserves a second edition, for it not only supplies a need in the theological literature of this country, but it is a most satisfactory treatment of the history and the principles of worship. The authors acknowledge their indebtedness to the leading German authorities, many of whom are quoted in the text. The book, however, is by no means a mere translation or paraphrase. It has the marks of a thorough mastery of the material and of no small amount of original research. In the Introduction the nature of worship in general and its fundamental principles as laid down in the New Testament, are discussed. "The first five chapters are devoted to the era before the Reformation. They treat of worship in the apostolic church and in post-apostolic and mediæval times. The influences that corrupted worship and introduced an imposing externalism are clearly pointed out."

In the next six chapters the principles and forms of worship in the Lutheran Church are described. Chapter 7 contains valuable abstracts from Luther's liturgical writings. Especially noteworthy is the translation of the tract, "Of The Order of Divine Worship in the Congregation," dated 1523. Of this work Kliefoth said: "In this first word which was uttered by the Lutheran Church on matters of divine worship, lie its principles in full."

Worship in the Reformed Churches is treated in two chapters from an impartial standpoint. The difference between the cultus of the two great Reformation Churches is clearly indicated. The points of agreement are also stated. In the last two chapters, contributed by the Rev. M. Valentine, formerly Professor of Didactic Theology in the Theological Seminary at Gettysburg, the following subjects are treated: "The Word in Relation to the Other Means of Grace," and "The Ministry in Relation to Worship."

There are many admirable qualities in this production. The material is presented in a clear, logical, and attractive form. Unnecessary details are carefully eliminated. There is little, if any, evidence of partisanship. The facts of history are presented without any effort to interpret them according to a pet theory. The value of the work is increased by the number of typical liturgies which are reproduced to illustrate the leading characteristics of worship in the several ages and churches. Among these are the liturgy of St. Chrysostom, used in the Eastern Church, the Roman mass, used in the Western Church, and the more important



forms of worship of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches. The reader is able, in this way, to make a comparative study of liturgies and form his own conclusions. The quotations from German writers are aptly chosen and add strength to the argument.

One does not like to pick flaws in a book as satisfactory as this; but it may be well to notice what appears to the writer a departure from the customary historical and unbiased spirit and method of the authors. In the Introduction, pages 25 and 26, the following statement is made: "But without condemning the use of fixed forms, we find that they are of exceptional character, springing not from the essential nature of prayer, but from the needs of particular persons or from a spirit of formalism." The authors make no distinction between public and private worship. Written forms may indeed be more appropriate in the one than in the other. In our experience we have found that the free prayer "springs from the needs of particular persons" far more than the liturgical prayer. The latter usually contains petitions which are appropriate for the whole assembly, while the former frequently is composed of personal effusions of the preacher and is defective both in form and content. The sweeping statement which follows, namely, that "the world will never be converted by fixed forms of prayer nor by the men that habitually use them," does not, to say the least, improve the argument which in other respects is so judiciously presented. The reader might reply in the same spirit and say, "that the world will never be converted by most of the free prayers which are offered at the present time."

A singular omission is found in the chapter on "Recent Liturgical Movements and Tendencies." Reference is made to the new forms of worship which have been published in Germany, notably the Prussian liturgy; and to the "Common Service Book for all English-speaking Lutherans." A comparatively late liturgical production, "The Book of Common Worship," of the Presbyterian Church, is mentioned as an indication of the growth of liturgical sentiment in Reformed Churches. Not a word, however, is said of the forms of worship that have been prepared in The Reformed Church in the United States. It seems hardly possible that the authors are not acquainted with "The Order of Worship" and "The Directory of Worship" of this denomination. These have been prepared after a generation of careful study and serious controversy. They bear favorable comparison with any of the liturgies produced in America. If a third edition of this work is ever published, we suggest that a page be added to the fourteenth chapter, on the "Liturgies of the Reformed Church in the United States."

This book is especially valuable for preachers who desire to study the subject of worship. It is doubtless the most satisfac-



tory hand-book in English. It will also serve well as a text-book for theological students. The arrangement of the material will enable the teacher to use it effectively in the class-room. We cannot tell how widely it has circulated, but we feel convinced that, on account of its merits, the book should reach far beyond the limits of the Lutheran Church. It ought to be found not only in theological, but also in public libraries generally.

GEORGE W. RICHARDS.

**THE FUTURE LEADERSHIP OF THE CHURCH.** By John R. Mott, M.A. Student Department, Young Men's Christian Association. New York, 1908. Pages ix + 208.

This volume is a comprehensive yet concise discussion of the various phases of the problem of procuring more men for the ministry. The author is prepared in a special way to write on this subject. He is a virile, courageous, devout, masterly, and sympathetic fellow himself. He has lived in close touch with young men, Christian leaders, educational institutions and men of affairs for the last twenty years. For the past six years he has made special investigation in all parts of the world on the dearth of able candidates for the ministry. His sources of information are primarily the leading men in every sphere of religious work—ministers, theological professors, editors of religious periodicals, officers of denominational societies, in different parts of North America, Europe, Australasia, South Africa, and all the principal foreign missionary fields. He has met students in conventions, ministers in small gatherings, and held free discussions "with selected groups of young men planning to devote their lives to teaching, law, medicine, literature, engineering and other lay pursuits." The information gathered in this way has been supplemented by material drawn from the proceedings of the ecclesiastical gatherings, the year books and the periodicals of all the leading denominations of the United States and Canada, as well as from the reports of societies dealing with questions bearing on candidates for the ministry, covering a period of one, and in some cases, two or three generations. As a result of this wide experience and thorough acquaintance with the conditions in the churches everywhere, the author speaks with authority, does not present theories but facts, and suggests remedies that are practicable, sane, and tried. His generalizations are carefully and sparingly drawn, well-balanced and convincing. The tone of the book is encouraging, hope-inspiring, optimistic, and energizing, in spite of the fact that the shortcomings of the Church and the sins of the world are in no way concealed.

The contents are divided into five chapters: The Problem; the Urgency; the Obstacles; The Favoring Influences; the Propa-



ganda. The plea, not only for more men, but "more men of the highest qualifications," is constantly made. What is meant by men of ability is described in a classic passage on page eleven. That there is an actual decline in the number of candidates for the sacred office, he clearly shows by recently gathered statistics. That the same conditions confront the Church in a greater or lesser degree in all lands, adds seriousness to the situation. The only exception is the Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa, which for many years has had a remarkable record. "In no part of the world," says Mr. Mott, "in fact not even in Scotland, have I found a church which in recent years has succeeded in attracting to the ministry so many of the finest type of its young men."

The pressing need for men of leadership is due to the complexity, intensity, and variety of the life of this age. It is this that made Philips Brooks, shortly before his death, say: "I want to live. The next twenty years offer greater opportunity for the Christian minister than any other like period in history." The prevalence of industrialism, the theological transition, the social unrest, the home and foreign missionary work, the overcrowded city, the depleted country, the immigrant, and the new settlements in the West—these all concern the preacher and in his hands is the power for the successful mastery and control of the new forces and conditions. The influence of his life and work will extend into every sphere of individual and social activity. The student of history will recall the work done by the Puritan ministers, including scores of graduates of Oxford and Cambridge, at the formative stage of New England, or by the itinerant preachers of early Methodism, in the civilization of the frontier settlements. Bishop Asbury and other travelling ministers of his day, inculcated respect for law and held up high ideals of Christian citizenship in the new States which they visited. "What does not Ohio owe to the fact that in its plastic period men like Lyman Beecher, Charles G. Finney, and James Hoge identified themselves with its life. Think of the influence wielded by the band of eleven Yale men who in 1829 went out to plant civilization in northern and central Illinois; and of the impress of the Andover Band of nine men on the Commonwealth of Iowa in its early history."

The obstacles which keep men from the ministry are enumerated in order. The materialistic spirit, the lack of family training, preferences for other callings in which to serve God, courses of study in colleges which automatically lead men from the ministry, the fear of sacrificing individual freedom and freedom of expression, the shortcomings of ministers, the granting of aid to poor students, the dead line and the lack of proper support—all have a deterrent influence. In the judgment of the author, however, the greatest obstacle of all is the lack of proper effort to lead men into the ministry.



Can these difficulties be overcome? The author says where an actual quest has been made for men the result has been far from being "helpless and pitiful." Professor Craig, of McCormick Theological Seminary, calls attention to the fact that during the past forty years he had known two periods of marked decline in the ministerial supply of the Presbyterian Church; that each time the general assembly grappled with the matter thoroughly and appealed to the entire ministry to coöperate in meeting the need; and as a result the difficulty in each case yielded to treatment. As one of the favoring influences emphasis is put on the necessity of the minister magnifying his calling. Professor Austin Phelps thus speaks of the impression made upon him by his father: "He honestly believed that the pastoral office has no superior . . . To be a preacher of the gospel was a loftier honor than to be a prince of the blood royal. So pervasive was this conviction in the atmosphere of his household, that I distinctly remember my resolve, before I was four years old, that I would become a minister. Not so much because the ministry was my father's guild as because he had taught me nothing above that to which ambition could aspire."

The volume closes with a strong appeal to the heroic in men. Experience shows that the most difficult fields are most easily filled. Prospective tasks and hardships evidently do not keep men out of the ministry. A member of the Reformed Church Mission Board not long since stated that they were able to get more recruits for Arabia, their most difficult field, than for any other mission. In England the ablest men offer themselves for work in Central Africa, and that field was never undermanned. The call to heroism meets with heroic response. Make the gospel hard and you make it triumphant. If it is a choice between self-sacrifice and self-interest, the former will draw the stronger men. The highest call that has come to young men, as Mazzini has said, is "Come and suffer." There is a vicarious element in strong young men which needs to be called out and exercised. There is a deep truth in the words of Illingworth: "The pleasures of each generation evaporate in air. It is their pains that increase the spiritual momentum of the world."

In this volume the material and arguments that have been presented in periodicals, addresses, and sermons of the last decade are summarized. But it is more than a summary. Facts and figures are the crude material into which the author breathes the breath of life, stamps upon them his personality, and makes a powerful appeal to the Christian Church to marshal all its forces for the successful solution of one of its most urgent problems. Ministers, elders, teachers, parents, and students ought to read this book. To circulate it in academies and colleges would be a

positive inspiration to young men to devote themselves to the supreme calling of God for service among men.

GEORGE W. RICHARDS.

EXPOSITION OF HOLY SCRIPTURE. A Commentary on the Entire Bible, to be Completed in Thirty Volumes. By Alexander Maclaren, D.D., Litt.D. Third Series, Six Volumes. Sold only in series. 3 and 5 W. 18th St., New York, A. C. Armstrong & Son. Price \$7.50 net.

This series contains expositions of the following books of the Bible: Acts, Vol. 2; St. John, Vols. 1, 2, 3; Second Book of Kings, from Chap. 7; Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes. In previous numbers of the REVIEW notices of the first two series of this publication have appeared. Reference was then made to the excellence of binding, paper, and printing. The fame of Dr. Maclaren's attainments as an exegete as well as of his lucidity, vigor, and elegance as a writer of English prose is vindicated by these volumes. The deep spiritual insight of the author, his power of delineating the inner life, and his ability of coördinating the deeper notes that are struck throughout the sacred writings are especially manifested in his expositions of John's Gospel. They will remain for a long time a matchless commentary of its kind on this greatest of New Testament books. The almost infinite variety of ideas and the constant freshness of thought are in evidence in each volume. The table of contents abounds with topics felicitously phrased and formulated so as to start new lines of thought in the reader's mind.

While the scope of the work is comprehensive, a high standard of excellence is maintained in both the Old and New Testament expositions. The student is usually satisfied. Even if he differs from the author's views, he cannot fail to respect him for his thorough scholarship and his firm grasp of the essential verities of the higher life. The text is not always treated extensively, but with rare facility he presents the central truths of a chapter and applies them to the life of the present age. Questions are raised and suggestions made which lead one to further meditation or research.

After having examined with some care the three series thus far published (18 volumes) our estimate of the value of these expositions has increased and we await with anticipations of profit and pleasure the appearance of the remaining series. The work ought to be in the home, the school, and the public library. It is adapted to the parent, teacher and preacher. It can be profitably used for devotional reading. The preacher will find it a rich treasury of material for sermons and addresses."



We wish to call the attention of the readers of the REVIEW to the fact that these volumes are sold by the Reformed Church Publication Board, Philadelphia, Pa.

GEORGE W. RICHARDS.

DAS WIRKEN DES HEILIGEN GEISTES AN DEN EINZELNEN GLÄUBIGEN UND IN DER KIRCHE. Erörtert von K. F. Nösgen. 302 S. Berlin, Trowitzsch und Sohn, 1907. Price M. 6.50.

This is the second of the two parts of "Das Wesen und Wirken des Heiligen Geistes." The other part received notice in this REVIEW last year (p. 275).

As is indicated by the title the author first discusses the activity of the Holy Spirit with reference to the individual. He here observes strictly the divisions of the traditional orthodox *ordo salutis*. The remaining half of the book is devoted to the activity of the Holy Spirit in the Church, as manifested in the charisms, the most important of which is the gift of prophecy. Inspiration, the counterpart of revelation, is the chief theme of the latter part of the book.

In the Introduction the author undertakes a vigorous rebuttal of some criticisms evoked by the appearance of the first part of the work. He notices particularly the suggestion that the order of the two parts should have been reversed, because the nature of the Holy Spirit is best ascertained inductively from the facts of Christian experience. He insists that such a method delivers theology over to subjectivism, quoting with approval the saying of Wundt "that the position of one who attempts to observe his own consciousness is like that of a Münchhausen who would lift himself out of a morass by his own cue." This shows how little sympathy he has for the live theology of the present day.

He finds it necessary also to answer the question why it would not be better in the present volume to deal with the Church first and then with the individual. He fears to do this, being jealous to guard the absolutely supernatural character of the Spirit's work. The Church is too historical, too human; he could not think of it as mediating God to the soul of the believer. Here again his tendency is quite at variance with modern thought. Professor Nösgen is ultra-Protestant and crypto-Calvinistic.

It is odd that a Protestant theologian, discussing the work of the Holy Spirit, should treat the Sacraments in one book and the Word in another. Are not these two in the Augsburg Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism so joined together that we cannot well sunder them in reflection?

Yet we would not withhold a just tribute of praise. However widely points of view may differ, one cannot but admire the author's scholarship. His notes particularly evince exegetical acumen and mastery of all pertinent German theological literature.

C. NOSS.

THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS. By Edgar J. Goodspeed, Assistant Professor of Biblical and Patristic Greek in the University of Chicago. The Macmillan Company. Price \$.50 net.

This is one of a series of volumes to be issued under the general editorship of Shailer Mathews, of the University of Chicago, under the title "The Bible for Home and School." Of the series Professor Mathews says, "The Bible for Home and School is intended to place the results of the best modern Biblical scholarship at the disposal of the general reader. It does not seek to duplicate other commentaries to which the student must turn. Its chief characteristics are (a) its rigid exclusion of all *processes*, both critical and exegetical, from its notes; (b) its presupposition and its use of the assured results of historical investigation and criticism wherever such results throw light on the Biblical text; (c) its running analysis both in text and comment; (d) its brief explanatory notes adapted to the rapid reader; (e) its thorough but brief Introductions; (f) its use of the Revised Version of 1881, supplemented with all important renderings of other versions."

In the volume before us, Professor Goodspeed makes good the claims thus put forth for the series. The work is well done. The Introduction is excellent and scholarly, yet sufficiently clear and popular for an ordinary reader of the New Testament, who does not have any technical knowledge of New Testament science, to grasp. It gives just such information of the times and circumstances under which the epistle was written, of its occasion and purpose, as the reader needs to understand its contents. The analysis is good, and given in such a way that the reader will follow it without effort. The comments are concise, yet illuminating, such as the rapid reader will appreciate.

The volume is of the same size and scope as the Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges. If the series keeps up with the standard of excellence here attained, it promises to take the place for the general reader which that was intended to fill for the student. We commend the book especially to parents and Sunday-school teachers who do not have access to the more elaborate commentaries.

WM. C. SCHAEFFER.

A SHORT GRAMMAR OF THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT, for students familiar with the elements of Greek. By A. T. ROBERTSON, A.M., D.D., Professor of New Testament Interpretation, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Louisville, Ky. New York, A. C. Armstrong & Son. Price \$1.50.

This is an excellent hand-book for the student of the Greek New Testament. It is not as elementary as Green or Harper and Weidner, nor yet so minute and exhaustive as Winer, Blass, or Moulton. As indicated in the title, it is intended for students



who are familiar with the elements of Greek. Hence much that is usually found in Greek grammars is omitted. There are no paradigms. The usual matter on inflection, euphonic changes, and formation of words is wanting. Instead of it we find a discussion of the differences between New Testament and Classic Greek, and of special forms in the declensions and conjugations. The discussions on prepositions and on modes and tenses is especially good. The author has given us, what has hitherto been wanting in nearly all New Testament grammars, a statement of the relation of New Testament Greek to the Classic Greek on the one hand, and to modern Greek on the other. He has utilized the new light, which has been shed on the subject by the recent discoveries of the papyri in Egypt. "The Greek of the New Testament that was used with practical uniformity over most of the Roman world is called the Common Greek or *κοινή*." "The New Testament in general contains books composed freely in the vernacular *κοινή*." The significance of this fact seems to be kept constantly in view throughout the volume. We heartily commend the work to all who desire a convenient hand-book on the Greek of the New Testament.

WM. C. SCHAEFFER.

THE RELIGIOUS TEACHERS OF GREECE. By Professor James Adam, Litt.D. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1908. Octavo, cloth, 470 pages. Price \$4.00 net.

This book, its readers are informed by the preface, represents the substance of the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion delivered by the author in the University of Aberdeen. While the book was passing through the press, Professor Adam died at the early age of forty-seven. One reading these lectures, every paragraph of which abounds in evidences of wide and painstaking research in the literature of Greece and of thorough acquaintance with its underlying philosophy and religion, feels amazed at what was accomplished by the author during the comparatively brief years of his life. Not only had he made himself master of that ancient literature; he was equally well informed with reference to what others have written concerning it and the interesting questions that are raised by Greek life and history. He was keenly alive to the vast influence that Hellenic thought has wielded in the subsequent history of religion and philosophy in general, and of modern civilization and Christianity in particular. He was an enthusiastic student in all their phases of the problems which he discusses, and the thrill of his enthusiasm is conveyed to his readers by his manifest love of the truth, his range of scholarship, his direct and simple style, his clearness of thought, and his felicity of language.

The initial lecture on the place of poetry and philosophy in the development of religious thought among the Greeks, presents a general survey of the ground covered in detail by the lectures that follow. Students interested in questions of Comparative Religion will find in these opening pages a great wealth of learning and suggestion, the permanent usefulness of which they will recognize at once and greatly prize. The poets and philosophers of Greece were seers who laid hold of whatever was divine and imperishable in the religious faith of their nation, and they consecrated it for all time in those incomparable masterpieces of literature which embody the national genius at its best. By pointing out the relation of those ancient facts of faith and religion to the religious conceptions of subsequent centuries, and showing their value and significance for Christian doctrine, Doctor Adam has rendered a service to contemporary scholarship which should command its hearty acknowledgements and abiding gratitude.

The large expectations aroused by the illuminating and inspiring character of the first lecture, will be found fully sustained and confirmed by the course of inquiry pursued in those that follow. He begins by considering first the *poetical* development of religious thought from Homer to Sophocles, and afterwards takes up in order the *philosophical* development from Thales to Anaxagoras — both these lengthy and discriminating studies arousing thought and imparting information. Following these inquiries, the teachings of the Sophists are taken up and investigated, whilst the concluding lectures are devoted to the consideration of Socrates and Plato. To the latter's views as the exponent of the archetypal world of ideas, theory of knowledge, principles of ethics, and doctrine of immortality, much space is rightly given, and the value of his contribution to the progress of religious thought appraised, thus making it more readily available to the ordinary student of Plato's philosophy.

From this bare and altogether too imperfect outline of the area covered by this great book, the breadth and importance of its scope may in a measure be inferred. The purpose of this notice of the volume and the space to which it must be limited combine to forbid one to attempt accompanying the author into the delineation of his thoughts, observations, and conclusions. Suffice it to say that those who will do so by giving these lectures an attentive reading will find them a liberal and rewarding education. Ministers of the Gospel especially cannot afford to remain ignorant of their stimulating and informing suggestiveness and instruction.

A. S. WEBER.



THE CHRISTIAN MINISTER AND HIS DUTIES. By the Rev. Principal J. OSWALD DYKES, D.D. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1908. Octavo, cloth, 375 pages. Price \$2.25 net.

To the department of Practical Theology, no more important contribution than this has been made in the present generation. Principal Dykes brings to the discussion a rare equipment for the successful treatment of it in its various practical bearings. He has had a wide and lengthy personal experience both as pastor and theological teacher. He has a competent knowledge of the history of Christianity, and a profound insight into present-day conditions and of ministerial needs and duties. He has the literary qualifications that are requisite to set forth attractively and persuasively every phase of duty likely to be met with by the minister in the discharge of his office as the leader of public worship, the preacher of the Gospel, the administrator of congregational affairs, the pastor of Christ's people, and the ordained representative of the great Head of the Church. All these ripe qualifications are laid under tribute in these pages, and if any of the younger or older ministers of the Church can read them without being made the better and more useful servants of Christ and His Kingdom by so doing, it is difficult to see what could contribute to their betterment and usefulness in this regard.

As a non-conformist minister, Dr. Dykes has no sympathy, it need hardly be said, with the "priestly airs" that ministers sometimes affect, while at the same time he insists that it is their duty to maintain the dignity which should always attend their office. Quoting Vinet he says, "it is desirable that he should be recognized as a minister, or at least that one should not be surprised to learn that he is a minister." The becoming demeanor lies between extremes. "At the one extreme there is a peculiar clerical or semi-priestly air—be it hauteur, or primness, or an unctuous affectation of sanctity, or professional stand-offishness—which produces a painful impression on the spectator. Whatever he is, let the minister be a man, simple and unaffected. On the other hand, there is an opposite extreme; when the minister of Christ affects the layman, permits himself such an abandon of manner, eccentricity of gait, unclerical attire, loud bold speech, effusive demonstrativeness, unseasonable or excessive jocosity, and the like, as to betray him, if not into forgetfulness of his calling, at least indifference to its sacredness."

When speaking of the minister as a preacher, our author points out most forcibly what is necessary to give efficiency if not distinction to one's pulpit career. He is emphatic in his warnings against reliance upon homiletical magazines, ready-made "skeletons," and preachers' commentaries. "To make practice of this," he declares, "is to write oneself down as a commonplace, second-



rate preacher for life." Equally important is his insistence upon the minister's duty to make himself a correct and agreeable public speaker. "Is it unreasonable," he inquires, "to ask of an order of men whose main mission in life it is to deliver religious addresses in public, that they shall at least understand the rules of voice production, pronounce the English language with purity, enunciate their message in distinct tones, avoid grotesque gestures, and know how to face an audience with dignity and self-command?" With similar frankness Professor Dykes discusses also the requirements which a minister has to face in the delicate situations of the sick-room and the bed-side of the dying, his counsels concerning which we cannot stay to quote or comment on. He treats with fulness and enforces with effective quotations from other writings, the nature and meaning of public worship and indicates what in his judgment are the best methods for its proper and edifying conduct. Indeed it is difficult to think of any feature of ministerial life, public or private, that has not received due attention in this remarkably able and interesting volume. The author has tried to keep in mind, we are told in his foreword to the body of his treatise, "the actual requirements of candidates for the sacred office and of the junior clergy, and aimed less at formal completeness than at practical utility." And while keeping this aim steadily in view he has drawn his guiding principles from the New Testament and derived his illustrations largely from the past in the history of the Christian centuries.

To students and ministers, who in seminary years are devoting or have devoted the bulk of their time to theological disciplines other than that which is dealt with in this volume, this work on the "practicalities" of the ministerial office should be able to render a service of unspeakably great importance. It blazes the way for them to greater ministerial efficiency, and its wise counsels and helpful suggestions should appeal, therefore, to multitudes of young men desirous of making the best of themselves and their ministry. To the sympathetic and studious attention of all such, Dr. Dykes' rich and timely book is cordially commended.

A. S. WEBER.

INTERPRETATION OF THE BIBLE, A SHORT HISTORY. By George Holley Gilbert, Ph.D., D.D., Author of "The Student's Life of Jesus," "The Revelation of Jesus," "The First Interpreters of Jesus," "The Student's Life of Paul," etc. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1908. Pages 309. Price \$1.25.

The history of biblical interpretation is a large field. It deals with the principles and methods that have been used during twenty centuries of Scriptural study. Its importance is self-evident. For if, as we believe, biblical interpretation is the cen-



tral department of all biblical study, then the history of that interpretation is a matter of great importance to the modern student of the Bible. What can be more helpful in the way of bringing him to a realizing sense of the real value of our modern methods of biblical study than a knowledge of the entire process which has reached its culmination in our present-day critical, historical, and scientific method of interpretation? To write such a history is no easy task. For the strifes and struggles of the centuries have been fought with almost endless confusion around this question: "By what method and on what principles shall we interpret the Sacred writings of the Old and the New Testament?" Dr. Farrar's "History of Interpretation" has been practically the only book in the English language devoted exclusively to this interesting and, as Dr. Gilbert characterizes it, "neglected field."

In ten brief yet comprehensive chapters the author lays down the principles of interpretation that have prevailed from the days of Ezra to the days of modern criticism. He illustrates the methods of exposition in each period by many well-chosen passages. The book is not fragmentary, for through the whole volume there runs the idea that Scriptural interpretation, like all other phases of thought, was subject through the ages to the laws of gradual development.

The author shows that the Literature of the Classic Jewish Interpretation of the Old Testament was pervaded by a deadly literalism; yet in spite of its pathetic misinterpretation it gave to the world many rabbis gifted with deep spiritual insight. He shows how Philo's exegesis was colored by his philosophical conceptions, and characterizes him as "the master of all who have read into the Bible what they have brought from elsewhere." Perhaps the most interesting part of the volume is the section devoted to "The Interpretation of the Old Testament by Jesus." Dr. Gilbert claims that Jesus inaugurated a new period in the interpretation of the ancient writings of his nation. He did this by rejecting the oral traditions, and appealing to the Old Testament itself, going right to the sources; by interpreting the written law in a remarkably broad spirit; by "supporting his interpretations with appeals to the reason, the experience and the moral instincts of man"; and by viewing the Messianic element of the Old Testament as a foreshadowing of his life and work, but not as a specific prediction. The author takes particular pains to establish the contention that Jesus' interpretation of the Messianic element in the Old Testament was not based in an outward, mechanical way on a historical knowledge unlike that of his day and superior to it, but was based on his spiritual vision, his perfect comprehension of the scope of the entire Old Testament and

his unerring judgment of moral values. The author shows further how the New Testament writers departed from their Master in their view of the Messianic element of the Old Testament. From Clement of Rome to Irenæus the predictive element continued to be identified with the heart of the Old Testament. Then came the Alexandrians with their allegorizing methods and their philosophic prepossessions. The Syrian School made some advance toward a scientific method of exegesis, and seriously attempted to find out what the sacred authors really meant. With the eighth century all independence in the treatment of Scripture disappeared. In the Middle Ages the Bible ceased to be a living book and was read, so far as it was read at all, through the eyes of the Fathers. With the Reformation came a profound spiritual reaction. Humanism, with its grammars and lexicons, introduced a new force. Still there remained the subjection of Scripture to the authority of dogma. The philosophy of the seventeenth century brought a reaction against the tyranny of dogma. Then came the eighteenth century with its work for a purer text of the New Testament and the beginnings of a scientific, historical criticism. Now we have the modern era of biblical study characterized by new freedom of research and the new viewpoints of natural science and comparative religion. The new method of interpretation, called Historical Criticism, has "as its sole aim to get at the facts and to learn their meaning." This has given us a new conception of the origin and character of the Bible, a conception rich in spirituality, for it looks upon inspiration as belonging not to material writings but to human minds and hearts, and looks upon revelations as identified, not with letters, but with the *lives* of men. Under this conception the Bible again becomes warm and instinct with human interest. The prophets glow with a new fervor as spiritual leaders of their respective ages. The character and work of Jesus becomes "the most conspicuous aspect of Christian thought." "The divinity of Jesus remains, but it is the divinity of character." What is needed now is the wide and fruitful application of these principles to the interpretation of all Scripture.

Dr. Gilbert's books are always lucid and simple in style. His language is free from technicality. He writes as a historian rather than as an advocate. He has the rare faculty of presenting the essentials of a religious truth without going far afield for irrelevant matter. This book is helpful and stimulating, a valuable addition to the many noteworthy publications of the author and we heartily commend it.

H. M. J. KLEIN.



**THE PROGRAMME OF MODERNISM: A Reply to the Encyclical of Pius X., Pascendi Dominici Gregis, with the Text of the Encyclical in an English Version.** Translated from the Italian by Rev. Father George Tyrrell, with an introduction by A. Leslie Lilley, Vicar of St. Mary's, Paddington Green, London. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons. Price \$1.50 net.

This book is published anonymously for obvious reasons. It was written by certain Italian priests in reply to the Pope, or to the authors of the Pope's Encyclical, whoever they may be. An English translation of this celebrated papal pronunciamento is printed in this volume. One should read first this voluminous Encyclical, steeped in medievalism, and then the calm, frank, objective "Programme" in rebuttal.

It will be remembered that "Modernism" is the name which the Pope gave to that movement within the Roman Catholic Church which, in its last analysis, is the rebellion of the historical sense, incarnate in loyal Catholics, against the absolutism of the official scholastic theology of the Roman Hierarchy.

There is a striking analogy between the initial efforts of the Reformers of the sixteenth century against the paganism in the Roman Catholic Church of their age and between the modern revolt from scholasticism. Then, as now, the protestants nourished the fond hope of accomplishing their aim peacefully, within the bosom of the Church. We know that in the sixteenth century their hopes proved delusive. It remains to be seen whether there is heart-room in the Vatican, and house-room in the vast Roman Catholic Church of the twentieth century for these valiant pioneers in the enfranchisement of the life of religion from the scholastic shackles of the "angelic doctor," Thomas Aquinas. Judging from the tone of the Encyclical and from the repressive measures instituted by it, one fears that, like Galileo, whose reputed "E pur si muove" adorns the cover of this volume, these earnest, pious, truth-seekers must pass through much tribulation before reaching their goal.

Meanwhile this book, though written by Catholics for Catholics, should have a wide circulation. It deals justly with scholasticism, it speaks with amazing frankness to the Pope, and it sets forth its own position in a comprehensive and lucid fashion. We wish it well in its appeal from the denunciatory Encyclical of a badly informed Pope to the judgment of history.

THEO. F. HERMAN.

**THE REPRESENTATIVE WOMEN OF THE BIBLE.** By George Matheson, D.D., LL.D., F.R.S.E. New York, A. C. Armstrong and Son. Pages 269. Price \$1.50 net.

This book, by the author of "The Representative Men of the Bible," was published after Dr. Matheson's death, from manuscript well in hand, but not ready for the press. It was prepared

for publication by the author's secretary, Mr. William Smith, and the work is done in such a way as to present with the utmost fidelity what the author himself had wrought out for the purpose.

The character sketches are not intended to be critical studies. The author says he imagined himself standing in a gallery studying the portraits of female forms just as they have been delineated, without inquiring either into their date or the names of the artist. With keen, discriminating insight, from this point of view, he discerns the salient features of the different personages under review, and with masterly skill he describes their characteristics in the most delightful and edifying way. Rarely do we find sketches of equal interest and suggestiveness, and the book will prove a source of instruction and inspiration both to the minister of the gospel and the ordinary reader.

In the introduction the author contrasts the Hebrew woman with woman as she appears in the pagan world, and shows that here, in the Judaic Gallery, she is pictured as the empress of the home. The most striking pictures are in the hall of entrance and the hall of exit; the two are different in execution and unlike in their expressions; but in each the idea is the same—the enfranchisement of the feminine soul. Then he proceeds to show the process and significance of the development along the whole line of characters whose portraits are held up to our view.

The titles of the different chapters suggest in a measure the mode of treatment, and show how, to the author's mind, a single characteristic gives the key to the whole life of an individual. For instance the second chapter is on "Eve the Unfolded," the next on "Sarah the Steadfast"; then we have "Rebekah the Far-Seeing," "Rachel the Placid," "Miriam the Gifted," etc. One of the most thoughtful and suggestive chapters is that on "Mary the Guiding," in which the author lays stress on the fact that it was the especial mission of Mary, the mother of Jesus, to guide the earthly development of her son in such a way that the spiritual should not outrun the physical, and that his human experience should be normal and healthy. In other chapters, too, there are striking, sometimes startling, observations with which one may not always agree, but which afford abundant food for profound thought and reflection.

JOHN S. STAHR.

**THE RELIGION OF THE VEDA.** The Ancient Religion of India (from Rig-Veda to Upanishads). By Maurice Bloomfield, Ph.D., LL.D., Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology in Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1908. Pages xv + 300. Price \$1.50 net.

This is the seventh volume of the American Lectures on the History of Religions, the previous volumes having been devoted



to Primitive Religions, Religions of the Ancient Egyptians, Religion of Israel (two), Buddhism and Religion in Japan. The author of this last is the compiler of the great Vedic Concordance that appeared recently in the Harvard Oriental Series and has published a great deal of material pertaining to his specialty, particularly the Atharva-Veda.

The book before us consists of popular lectures delivered at various theological seminaries and other institutions. The author's long endeavors to make ancient Indian classics intelligible to modern Americans have developed in him a disposition to disregard conventionalities of speech. For instance: "In order to accomplish the slaughter of the arch-dragon Vṛitra he (Indra) drank on one occasion three lakes of that delightful beverage, so that decidedly he had a jag on, which, it has been noted, rhymes well with dragon." "Indra performs in his professional capacity of Hercules a large assortment of other 'stunts.'" Such expressions are calculated to captivate an audience of students, but do not look well in print. Yet these very extravagances of expression indicate the luminous and interesting style of the book as a whole.

Dr. Bloomfield's critical views are characterized by a moderation that commends them to the inexpert. In the Vedic poems he recognizes the combination of genuine religious inspirations on the one hand and mercenary heathenish motives on the other. He resists both the ethnological explanations of Oldenberg and the fanciful interpretations of Max Müller. He confesses ignorance of the chronology of the Vedas, excepting the fact that the Vedic period came to an end about 700 B. C.

The doctrine that is characteristic of the newest stratum, the Upanishads, has two main features. Its monism, which finds the ground of all things in the absolute Brahma-Atman, is foreshadowed in poems which, we have reason to believe, belong to the oldest stratum. The other feature—pessimism, metempsychosis, karma, etc.—is new. The author finds the cause of this peculiar pessimistic turn of thought in the effect of the climate of India on the Aryan invaders. "Hypochondria, melancholia, dyspepsia—call it what we may—conquered the conquering Aryan, whose stock was no doubt the product of a more northerly and invigorating climate."

For a beginner the book is a boon. Difficult names and concepts are explained in a very satisfactory manner, and the effect of the whole discussion is to arouse a desire for more intimate acquaintance with the subject. The Vedas have determined the dominant tone of the religious life of the Orient. In them lie the roots of the highest religious culture of India, China and

Japan. He who makes us better acquainted with them does us a great service.

C. Noss.

PAUL THE MYSTIC, A Study in Apostolic Experience. By James M. Campbell, D.D. New York and London, G. P. Putnam's Sons. Pp. 285. \$1.50 net.

Mysticism, to many minds, suggests the absence of clear and definite ideas, and is, therefore, to say the least, a synonym for vagueness and confusion of thought. Dr. Moberly, on the other hand, declares that the word mysticism has had a noble history, and, although it has been used to express a disproportion, he holds that "the spirit of mysticism is the true and essential Christianity. . . . It is the realization of human personality as characterized by and communicated in the indwelling reality of the Spirit of Christ, which is God." It is quite legitimate, therefore, to assume that there are mystics and mystics, and that, when a man is called a mystic, it is important to inquire in what sense the term may be properly applied to him.

St. Paul may not inappropriately be called the logician of the New Testament. His writings abound in clear statement and keen reasoning. Nowhere else do we find the doctrinal aspect of Christianity set forth in more striking form and clearer outline or a stronger presentation of the rationality of Christian doctrine. And yet, at the same time there is abundant evidence in all his writings of the fact that he recognizes in Christianity an element which transcends human thought and human language, that the revelation of God in Christ Jesus is a mystery which reaches far beyond the limitations of the human reason, and that in his own personal experience there are facts and factors which he cannot explain even to himself, much less to others. It is not without reason, therefore, that Dr. Campbell calls him a mystic—"not a pure mystic, for he was many things besides." "As a mystic Paul was one who dwelt upon the inner side of spiritual things; one who pushed on where logic limped and lagged, seeking the sunlit heights of direct vision, conscious union, and direct communion" (p. 5).

This description of Paul's mysticism at once shows, in a general way, the nature of it and the sphere of its manifestation. It is not philosophical or speculative, but religious and practical, necessarily involved in the subject-matter with which he deals. Dr. Campbell accordingly, in successive chapters treats of him as a Religious Mystic, a Christian Mystic, an Evangelical Mystic, a Rational Mystic, and a Practical Mystic, and finally discusses the Message of Paul the Mystic to the Church of To-day.

This book may, without hesitation, be recommended both to the



theologian and to the general reader. A careful study of it will not only be most helpful to the mastery of St. Paul's doctrinal system, but it will also serve to throw a strong light upon the nature of Christianity itself. The historical method of the study of the New Testament needs to be complemented by the recognition of a living Christ, and the working of His Spirit in our hearts; and this volume will serve an excellent purpose in emphasizing this factor of our common human experience.

JOHN S. STAHR.

**DIE BEDEUTUNG DER CONUPISCENZ IN LUTHERS LEBEN UND LEHRE.** Von Wilhelm Brann, Lic. Theol. Berlin, Trowitsch & Sohn. Pp. 312. 4./5.

This treatise, which gives evidence on almost every page of patient research and real German thoroughness, is on a subject which, at first sight, might seem to be of little interest to the theologian of the present day. But if Christian doctrine is based on Christian experience, an inquiry, such as this, into the details of Luther's life and experience in the cloister and before he came to formulate the doctrine of God's free grace and salvation by faith alone without the works of the law, must be of profound significance.

In the first place the author makes a thorough investigation of Luther's relation to the scholastic doctrine of original sin, and his experience in the confessional where he frequently confessed sins, in the form of sinful thoughts and desires, which to his confessors did not seem to be sins at all. He found himself unable to accept the doctrine that baptism was sufficient to remove original sin, because the evil tendencies of nature and the desire for things forbidden persisted after baptism and caused intense pain to his tender conscience. At the same time the author warmly defends Luther against the attacks made by Roman Catholic writers upon his private life, from Cochleus to Janssen and Denifle, and refers with approbation to W. Walther's work: "For Luther against Rome" (1906). In the next place he shows how Luther, on the ground of his personal experience and the insufficiency of the means offered by the Roman church to give him peace of mind, was led to the conception of man's total depravity, and his absolute dependence upon the free grace of God.

Lic. Brann's work commends itself as an example of careful study, thorough scholarship, a vindication of Luther's private character, and a helpful contribution to the history of dogma in the time of the protestant reformation.

JOHN S. STAHR.

# THE REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW

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## I.

### JOHN CALVIN, THE MAN.

BY REV. H. M. J. KLEIN, PH.D.

The mighty movement of religious and civil liberty which spread over Europe in the sixteenth century and which came to be known as the Reformation was remarkable among other things for the great personal quality of its leaders. To look upon the Reformation as but the lengthening shadow of any one man is to misread its significance. Among a number of men of light and leading, three names tower above all others. They are Luther, Zwingli and Calvin. Each differs from the other in nationality, education, talent, temperament and field of labor. Yet they were joined in a common purpose and labored for the same end. Calvin never saw either of the other two. He was the child of a later stage in the development of the Reformation. He belonged to the reconstruction period rather than to the first generation of Reformers. The whole complex movement, however, revolved in large part around the personality of these three remarkable men; Luther, the man of love, great of heart, original, forceful, genial pioneer; Zwingli, the man of light, broad of mind, classic, illuminating patriot; Calvin, the man of law, logical, systematic, constructive genius, brilliant in intellect and unbending in conviction.

Of these three John Calvin has been looked upon as the least



attractive historical figure. Few great men have been so little known as this really unusual and remarkable man. It has been predicted for the past generation that the fourth centenary of the birth of Calvin in 1909 would not elicit the enthusiasm accorded to that of Luther in 1883 or Zwingli in 1884. Men have alas too often dismissed Calvin with a reference to the tragedy of Servetus and the *decretum horribile*. It is a strange fact that the life and character of men who have personified a doctrine before the world have been esteemed in direct proportion to the world's valuation of the one tenet with which their names seem destined to be connected. Unhappy Polonius is shorn of much of his real worth by the satirical stab of Hamlet. The beautiful culture of Francis Xavier and his holy zeal for souls seem forever to be veiled by the term Jesuitism. John Calvin, the man, has often been looked upon as only a "dry intolerant theologian," identified with all that has gone, for better or for worse, by the name of Calvinism. There is an evolution of feeling taking place in reference to the merits of this man and the services he rendered to the cause of Christ. Few historical figures grow in a more interesting manner under the influence of honest research, freed from the shades of prejudice, loosened from the vicissitudes of the system of thought with which his name is connected, than does the figure of John Calvin. It is the man then, in all his human qualities, that we shall seek to understand and weigh according to his merits, recalling necessarily the outer events of his life, but only in so far as these shall throw real light on the sources, motives and aims of his inner life and character.

In the preface to his "Commentary on the Psalms," deeply conscious of the greatness of his mission, seeing as in a mirror the picture of his own life imaged in that of the Psalmist, Calvin writes: "As David was raised from the sheepfold to the highest dignity of government, so God has dignified me, derived from an obscure and humble origin, with the high and honorable office of Minister and Preacher of the Gospel." The French Reformer like the German and the Swiss sprang

not from the nobles but from the more lowly classes. His grandfather had followed the trade of a cooper in the little village of Pont-l'Évêque. The father had through industry and thrift brought himself to some position in life, becoming secretary to the bishop and registrar of the government in the little mediæval town of Noyon in Picardy, some fifty miles northeast of Paris. Here John Calvin, the second of four sons, was born on July 10, 1509. Concerning his youth we have rather sparse information. His mother died early. The father found little time for the nurture of his children, nor did he understand how to win their affection. Young Calvin got most of his training outside of his father's house. In the home of the noble family of de Montmor he received his early education and that acquaintance with the ways of polite society for which he was distinguished in so characteristic a fashion above the other Reformers. Calvin was grateful through his whole life for the benefits he had received in the home of his noble patron. In the introduction to his first work, dedicated to one of the sons of this family, the Abbot of Saint-Eloi at Noyon, Calvin writes: "To you I owe all that I have and am, and with grateful heart I recall the time when as a boy in your house, I was permitted to engage in the same studies with you and to receive from you and your worthy family the first leading to right knowledge and life." The recollection of this family seems to be the only real pleasant memory that remained out of the days of his early boyhood.

"From the time that I was a child, my father had intended me for theology," he says. To this end he was sent at the age of thirteen to Paris, the great gathering place of the world in those days for the study of divinity. In the College de la Marche he came under the influence of Mathurin Cordier and received from him an enduring love for humanistic studies. He advanced rapidly and was transferred to the College de Montague, the same school at which later Ignatius Loyola laid the foundations for his culture. He proved to be a brilliant student, speedily outstripping all his competitors in grammati-



cal studies, and by his skill in dialectics giving fruitful promise of that excellence as a reasoner which he afterwards displayed. He was not altogether liked by his fellow students, as many incidents show. His timid character yet abrupt manner, his constant criticism of the habits and morals of his companions caused frequent discord. The young Picardian was called, because of his censoriousness, the "Accusative." Nevertheless he formed many close friendships in those early student days. A brilliant future seemed to lie before him in the clerical office. Through the influence of his father he obtained an appointment as chaplain at the altar of La Gèsine in the Cathedral of Noyon. A few years later this benefice was exchanged for others, the living of Marteville and the curacy of Pont-l'Évêque. These promotions seem to have pleased him. He received the tonsure. Though he was not ordained to the priesthood, he preached several sermons to the people.

Suddenly the whole plan for Calvin's career was changed. It was decided that he should study law instead of theology. Whether this decision was reached because as Calvin intimates, his father "observing how extensively the science of law enriched those who follow it withdrew him from the study of philosophy to that of jurisprudence," or because of difficulties which the father had at the time with the ecclesiastical authorities of Noyon, difficulties which eventually ended with his excommunication, in any case John Calvin was recalled from Paris and sent to the great law schools at Orleans and Bourges. He threw himself with characteristic ardor into the new studies as he had done into the old. So great was his desire for knowledge that he shortened the time for nightly rest. Bezè writes that Calvin was accustomed at this period of his life after taking a very frugal supper to pursue his lucubrations until midnight and employ his morning hours in bed reviewing the studies of the preceding night. Teachers and students soon marvelled at his logical mind, his strong memory, the ease with which he grappled fundamental truths, the astonishing rapidity with which he wrote out the lectures and disputations

of his instructors in the most eloquent and accurate language. It was at this time that he lost much of his shy nature. He became more social and mingled more freely with a congenial circle of ambitious young men. He associated much with Francois Daniel, a talented young jurist of Orleans. Still he tells us: "I have always loved quiet and tranquillity, being by nature somewhat shy and timid." He seemed to regret everything that kept him from his study. Even the interruption which the serious illness of his father caused, he found hard to bear. In a letter written practically at the deathbed of his father his thoughts are upon his books and his friends.

The death of Calvin's father in 1531 brought another change to the plans of the young student. It appears he had studied law to please parental ambition rather than to gratify his own wishes. Immediately after his father's death he returned to Paris and threw himself into the study of the new learning, as Humanism was then called, with the result that in a short time he issued his commentary on Seneca's "De Clementia." He was barely twenty-three years of age when the volume was published. It showed extensive research, rare maturity of judgment and a high sense of moral values. It was seen that no ordinary literary critic had entered upon his career. He gave monarchs to see that not armies and treasuries but true friends and love of subjects won by clemency and justice were the safest weapons of state. So he aimed to make a name in the world of humanities, Reuchlin, Erasmus and Le Fevre became his ideals. Yet the time was not far distant in which the Reformer was to gain the victory over the Humanist. The commentary, "De Clementia" remained Calvin's only philological work. It appears that through this first attempt there came to him the conviction that his true calling lay in another sphere.

At some time in his twenty-second or twenty-third year a profound religious transformation took place in Calvin's life. Quite in contrast to the German Reformer, Calvin remained



silent about his transition from the Catholic Church. He speaks as though he had always been the same. Only twice, once in a letter to Cardinal Sadoletto, and again in the preface to the "commentary on the Psalms"—does he refer to his conversion, and then only in a few words. "By a sudden conversion God subdued and reduced my heart to docility." This he wrote a quarter of a century later than the experience it describes. He leaves us entirely in the dark as to the circumstances under which the conversion occurred. No name, neither that of Olivetan, Volmar or Le Fevre, is mentioned in connection with it. There is no reference as to where and how the first real doubts rose in his soul, or how finally they conquered. A plausible explanation of the experience seems to be that there were at Paris, Orleans and Bourges men and women with whom Calvin was intimate, who had broken with churchly traditions, and whose life and courage Calvin greatly admired. His conscience would not permit him any longer to have his own conduct differ so widely from his convictions. During the pest he was obliged to take part in the service at Noyon, and was made to see as never before the inconsistency of his situation. The inner questionings which followed doubtless brought to a climax that which he terms his "sudden conversion." His turning was a complete one. He resigned all his ecclesiastical benefices. He grasped the new ideas with the full earnestness of one who was inwardly convinced that the whole force of his character was dependent upon them. Willingly he broke with a brilliant future which lay before him in the field of humanism. He was ready to make any sacrifice for the sake of being a missionary of his new religious convictions. Only religious interests now lay on his heart. The humanist became theologian. The Bible and the Church Fathers displaced the classics. The little evangelical congregation of Paris soon recognized what an important addition it had received in the new convert. Calvin took the most active interest in all their sessions. Before a year had passed the learned expositor of Seneca, in spite of his youth, had become

the central figure of the evangelical cause in Paris. "Now I was greatly astonished that, before a year passed, all those who had some desire for pure doctrine betook themselves to me in order to learn, although I myself had done little more than begin."

Calvin's zeal was not long confined within the congregation at Paris. His conversion came at a time most favorable to the Evangelical party. Not only at the University of Paris had the liberal tendency gained ground, but in court circles also a change had taken place favorable to the Reformation. Francis I., wavering between two tendencies, was determined at this time to cease his former rigor against those who accepted the new faith. His sister, Margaret of Navarre, had become the influential and cultured protectress of the Evangelical party. Nicholas Cop, Calvin's friend, had been elected rector of the university. In an address by Cop, which it was charged Calvin had inspired and written, sentiments of an undoubted evangelical character drawn from the New Testament, Erasmus and Luther were freely expressed. The wrath of the Sorbonne fell upon the young heretics. Cop and Calvin were compelled to flee from Paris.

Calvin found a home open for him at Angoulême, through the kindness of his friend du Tillet, a man of congenial tastes, whose splendid library was of great service to the young theologian. For his own safety it was deemed advisable for him to leave France entirely, so we find him in 1534 in Basel under an assumed name. Here he lived very quietly and made many important friendships, among whom were Viret, Bullinger, Farel and others. His influence for Protestantism here consisted not in public preaching but rather in the way of private influence and effective writing. His chief work in Basel was the completion and publication of the "Institutes of the Christian Religion," in the Latin language in 1536. It was but a skeleton of what it afterwards became. But it proved to be "the strongest weapon Protestantism had yet forged against the Papacy." It began with an exposition of the Decalogue,



the Apostle's Creed and the Lord's Prayer, and continued with a treatment of the sacraments, Christian liberty and the relation of church and state. There was prefixed to it the famous dedication to Francis I., "a bold proclamation solemnly made by a young man of six-and-twenty who assumed the command of Protestantism against its enemies, caluminators and persecutors." Again he became a wanderer on the face of the earth seeking rest and finding none. We find him in Italy at the Court of Ferrara, then back in Basel, in Paris once more, then on his way to Strassburg, when in the most unexpected way the whole plan of his life was changed.

Between the Jura Mountains and the Alps on the southern borders of beautiful Lake Lemman lies the ancient, picturesque city of Geneva, one of the oldest culture cities of western Europe, one of the most happily situated cities in the world, for centuries the place where French, German and Italian elements have been constantly mixed as in a crucible. Originally a free city, subject to its bishop, it had fallen under the dominating influence of the House of Savoy, which it shook off only after many struggles. When John Calvin entered Geneva that night in 1536 it was a decisive hour for him, for the city and for the Reformation. He found Geneva a "tottering republic"; he made it a city of God after his own pattern, and a fortress for Protestantism. "I had intended to pass quickly by Geneva, without staying longer than a single night in that city," he writes. "A person who knew me made my presence known to others. Upon this Farel, who burned with an extraordinary zeal to advance the Gospel, immediately strained every nerve to detain me. After having learned that my heart was set upon devoting myself to private studies, for which I wished to keep myself free from other pursuits, and finding that he gained nothing by entreaties, he proceeded to utter an imprecation, that God would curse my retirement and the tranquillity of the studies which I sought, if I should withdraw and refuse assistance when the necessity was so urgent. By this imprecation I was so stricken with terror that I

desisted from the journey which I had undertaken." It was the crucial hour of his life when Calvin accepted the call to the ministry of the Evangelical Church of Geneva. He was young, full of high ideals, inexperienced, unacquainted with men, yet determined to do his duty. He saw that Geneva with its mixed population, with its southern blood, with its turbulent, quarrelsome life, needed a reformation of morals. In company with Farel he entered into a life and death struggle for the realization of the reign of God in that city. He set to work to organize the church and to reform the mind and manners of the community by positive enactments. He formulated a confession of faith and a catechism which was accepted and approved by the councils, and sworn to be maintained by the inhabitants of the city. He presented to the councils a form of order and discipline for the Church of Geneva in which it was demanded that the Lord's Supper be celebrated frequently, that psalms be sung, that the youth be regularly instructed, that papal marriage laws be abolished, that public order be maintained and unworthy communicants be excluded. The excommunication from the privileges of communion was insisted upon to protect the purity of the church. Calvin wanted to restore Apostolic conditions. To this end he insisted on strict discipline. The magistrates were only too willing to help in its maintenance. Gamblers were pilloried; women were imprisoned for exaggerated head dress; to wear clothes of a forbidden stuff was a crime; to give a feast to too many guests was a crime, to dance at a wedding was a crime. No sick man might lie in bed three days without sending for the minister of the parish. Prosecutions were plentiful. The people submitted for a time, but it became impossible to enforce the laws, and the council was brought into contempt. The patriots or libertines as they were called rose in rebellion against these drastic proposals and stormy scenes followed. In the election of 1538 the anti-clerical party won. But the preachers persisted in their demands for reform. They were warned not to interfere in the politics of the city. In their



reply they attacked the council from the pulpit, Calvin denouncing it as the "Devil's Council." On Easter Sunday, before large congregations, they declared that they could not administer communion to the people of this rebellious city, lest the sacraments be desecrated. They further declared that they would not use the ceremonies of Bern in the communion at Geneva as the council had commanded them to do. During the next few days both the Little Council and the Council of Two Hundred met, deposed Farel and Calvin, and ordered them to leave the city. "Very well," said Calvin, "it is better to serve God than man. If we had tried to please men, we should have been badly rewarded, but we serve a higher master, who will not withhold from us his reward."

As five years before Angoulême had taken up the exile from Paris, so now in a similar way Strassburg was to heal the wounds made by Geneva. At the earnest solicitation of Bucer, the chief Reformer of that city, Calvin found a refuge in free, imperial Strassburg, on the Upper Rhine. Here he spent three of the most useful and agreeable years of his life. He found faithful, sympathetic friends in Bucer, Capito and Herdio. On every side he was treated with a respect that he had not experienced before. The presence of a large number of French refugees made him feel as though he had not left the land of his own speech. He felt so much at home that during the very next summer he became a citizen of Strassburg. Not the least point of attraction was that here he was to start a home of his own. In the marriage of Idellette de Bure, widow of one of Calvin's Anabaptist converts who had died some time before of the plague, Calvin found a wife who was indeed the faithful helper of his ministry and with whom he lived on terms of cordial affection until the day of her death, nine years later. Calvin's sojourn in Strassburg was a blessing to him in many respects. It broadened his horizon, it deepened his thought, it enriched his experience, it was like a new school. These three years were necessary in order to

make of him the powerful reformer and lawgiver who was to return to Geneva in the autumn of 1541.

His duties in Strassburg were countless. He was first of all preacher and pastor of the French refugee church. He preached four times every week. He found great joy in the pastoral care of his flock. He had free scope to form a model French church whose ordinances were to be an ideal for all the congregations of his native country. He again laid great stress on church discipline. In every letter written from Strassburg to Farel he deals with this question. He carefully guarded the Lord's Table against the unworthy. There was opposition, but Calvin remained firm, and finally built up a prosperous, well-organized congregation that became the wonder and admiration of the community. With the activity of pastor, Calvin combined the position of teacher of theology at the university. "Against my own will Capito has forced me to it. Now I preach and lecture every day." Of more importance however than his preaching or his lectures, his disputations or his conversion of Anabaptists was his literary work. For this tireless worker found time for the exercise of extensive literary activity in the midst of all his many duties in Strassburg. During the Genevan experience his literary talent had lain dormant. His catechism was the only product of those troublous years. But now he took up the thread again. First he revised and enlarged the "Institutes"; then published "The Exposition on Romans," one of the most important of his exegetical works; of a more popular nature, written in the language of his own people, was the "Little Tract on the Lord's Supper"; then followed his "Liturgy," and the famous "Letter to Sadolet." Not without significance is the fact that in Strassburg, too, Calvin got a glimpse of the German world, and was thrown into close relationship with Melancthon, joining him in several colloquies for the healing of the divisions caused by the Reformation. It was at the Colloquy of Worms that Calvin became known by his strong disputation as "The Theologian."



During Calvin's absence of three years, disorder and irreligion had wrought havoc in Geneva. Cardinal Sadoletto taking advantage of the disturbed condition of the city sent an appeal to the Genevese asking them to return to the Roman Church and to restore papal supremacy in the city. But Calvin, still watchful over his ungrateful flock, frustrated this design by writing such a reply to Sadoletto as made him desist from all further efforts. Then the united voice of the councils, the ministers, and the people of Geneva pled for Calvin's return. The invitation signed by the authorities of the city reads: "On behalf of our Little, Great and General Councils (all of which have strongly urged us to take this step) we pray you very affectionately that you will be pleased to come over to us, and to return to your former post and ministry, and we hope that by God's help this course will be a great advantage for the furtherance of the holy Gospel, seeing that our people very much desire you, and we will so deal with you that you shall have reason to be satisfied." Bucer and the people of Strassburg expressed their unwillingness to part with Calvin. He himself shrank from the abyss, as he called it. "There is no place in the world," he wrote, "which I fear more, not because I hate it, but because I feel unequal to the difficulties which await me there." "It were far better for me to go to the cross and die at once than to drag out my life in that place of martyrdom." "But when I remember," he wrote to Farel, "that in this matter I am not my own master, I present my heart as a sacrifice and offer it up to the Lord." On September 13, 1541, he returned to the city from which he had been banished three years before, and henceforth Calvin belonged to Geneva and Geneva to him.

He felt that God had called him back to Geneva to make of it a model Christian community. To this end, he at once asked the Little Council to appoint a committee to prepare a constitution for the Church. The result was the famous Ecclesiastical Ordinances of Geneva. The duties of the four officers of the Church, pastor, teacher, elder and deacon, were

fully described. Especially was emphasis laid on the eldership as the chief disciplining office of the Church. The consistory composed of elders and ministers was the heart of the system. Yet its functions were independent of those of the civil government. Complete separation of church and state was maintained. The consistory could only admonish and warn; the council alone could sentence. Still the consistory, chosen by the smaller council on the advice of the ministers was hardly more than a committee of the councils themselves. So that the separation of civil and ecclesiastical functions was more apparent than real. There is no denying the fact that the exercise of discipline was often petty and unnecessarily severe, that it savored of austerity and belonged to the Levitical code rather than to the Gospel of Jesus. The worse than Draconian severity of the punishments inflicted caused for a time a holy reign of terror in Geneva. The official documents of the councils of 1541-1559 show an enormous list of censures, fines, imprisonments and executions. For ten long years Calvin struggled to establish his system of discipline. He held no civil office but he was the real ruler. The Libertines, in whom the old spirit of Genevese freedom was not quite dead, constantly opposed him, and many a one paid for his opposition at the price of his life.

As to the condition of regenerated Geneva, opinions differ. Some tell us that the rigid and minute discipline of the consistory simply drove sin beneath the surface, and again excited it to bravado; that "at no period was immorality more deep seated than when it was covered over with the thickest varnish of religious observance." Others contend that Geneva to external appearances at least was not a poor and mechanical imitation of the city of God, but a regenerate city indeed, distinguished above all Christian communities of the sixteenth century for moral and religious prosperity. Even the material welfare of the city was not neglected. Sanitary conditions were improved; great cleanliness promoted; new industries started; schools reorganized; daily sermons instituted in



each church of the city. John Knox wrote to his friend Locke from Geneva: "This is the most perfect school of Christ that ever was in the earth since the days of the Apostles. In other places I confess Christ to be preached; but manners and religion so seriously reformed, I have not yet seen in any place besides."

Among the many controversies which entered into Calvin's life during his second sojourn in Geneva, including conflicts with Pighius, Bolsec, Castellio and others, the most memorable one was that connected with the brilliant Spanish doctor, Servetus. This man had spoken in terms needlessly offensive on the doctrine of the Trinity. At his trial Calvin appeared as the accuser. After a long, keen, bitter contention, Servetus was condemned to be burnt to death, and the sentence was executed near Geneva, October 27, 1553. Calvin has been severely condemned for bringing about, or, at least, for not trying to avoid the execution of this sentence. He has been accused of a desire to give the world at large and the Papacy in particular an assurance of the fact that heresy was no more to be tolerated in Geneva than in Rome. That in the light of our twentieth century spirit of toleration Calvin was in error, will admit of no gainsaying. He did, however, use his influence to have the sentence that had been pronounced against Servetus mitigated, by having death by the sword substituted for that of burning. What can be justly charged against him is that he took the initiative in the trial, that he prosecuted it with undue severity and that he approved the sentence that condemned Servetus to death. Toleration was an obscure virtue in the sixteenth century. Even Melancthon and the Swiss churches approved the sentence of Servetus. Coleridge suggests that the tragedy of Servetus was so in accord with the spirit of the age that it was not Calvin's guilt especially but "the common opprobrium of all European Christendom."

By 1555 Calvin had gained complete control of Geneva. The last public enemy that he overcame were the Perrinists.

It appears that Geneva was fast becoming the city of refuge for the oppressed Protestants of Europe. The Perrinists represented the old Genevan citizenship and began to object to the augmenting force of the refugees in the community. A street brawl was magnified by the authorities into a conspiracy; the Perrinist leaders were brought to trial; some escaped, others were thrown into prison and cruelly tortured, still others were executed. This gave Calvin supreme control of the city. The last serious opposition to his rule had been destroyed. The work which he had set about to perform in 1541 was accomplished. For nine years longer he lived to enjoy in peace the fruits of his victory. Much of this time he spent in adding religious education to his work of preaching and disciplining. In 1559 he founded a college and later added an academy, now the University of Geneva. Its first rector was Théodore de Bèze. From its walls there went forth as students men like Olevianus, Chrestien, Thomas Bodley and John Knox. On February 2, 1564, he lectured for the last time in the academy, and on May 27 of that same year he died, being not yet fifty-five years of age. Though a monument bearing the initials J. C. has been placed in the cemetery of Plain-Palais, the place of his burial remains to this day unknown.

Bèze tells us that Calvin was of middle size; his complexion dark and pale; his eyes brilliant even in death. In a famous picture, the last work of Ary Scheffer, Calvin is seen sitting at his desk in his customary attitude, pen in hand, book open before him. His forehead is not high but of the mould that betokens an iron will. His thin long, black beard reaches down to his breast. Sitting there in his long black robe on which there is not a speck of dust, for he was scrupulously tidy, he makes the impression of personified earnestness, determination, order and power. His body was said to have been pure nerve and bone, fitting outward expression of his inner life, whose chief lack was flesh and blood. But he had the bone, nerve and sinew not only of body, but also of mental,



moral and spiritual life. While he lacked the artistic imagination and the richness of heart of Luther, everything in him suggested the logician who avoids the superfluous and carries ideas directly to ultimate conclusion even though that conclusion be a *decretum horribile*. He had an acute and penetrating intellect, a wonderful faculty for assimilating ideas. As a lecturer he was brilliant. There was not much time for preparation. He never brought anything to his desk but the simple text of Holy Scripture. He did not dictate but spoke freely according to the needs of the moment, yet his discourse was always clear and well ordered so that there seemed to be little difference between the style of the speaker and the writer.

He was a living conviction. The logic of his thought was only the formal side of his life. The far richer and deeper side was the logic of his conscience and of his will. This is the keynote of his comparatively simple character. His life is all of a piece. As soon as one sees the foundations, the rest follows. For him to know was to will and to do. It was impossible for him to compromise, to trim or to go half-way in any measure. By nature shy, introspective, fearful of conflict, when convinced that the will of God demanded a course of action, no further argument was needed. To know and to bring about God's will in himself and in others was the inner motive of his far-reaching work, the secret of his iron power and of his ceaseless activity. The main thing for him was the Majesty of God and the omnipotence of the Divine decree fixing the unalterable succession of events, and rigidly determining the eternal fate of men. In connection with this he had the intense assurance of his own election unto life in God. He was impressed with the significance of his own person and work, constantly comparing himself to King David, believing that he was the chosen instrument of God, that God's presence never left him for a moment, and that every insult to him affected God. This conviction gave a certain majesty to Calvin's character. The council

of Geneva spoke of "his character of great majesty, a majesty, which God had impressed upon him." Calvin's Old Testament conception of God was his strength and at the same time his weakness. In all his prayers he never addresses a Heavenly Father, always the Almighty King. If as Henry suggests "the world needed a new Sinai, a second Moses and a second Elias," Geneva certainly found one in the Lawgiver Calvin.

In his daily life however he was also a disciple of Jesus. His life was not all violence. He was humble, devout and pure. Never was a man more willing to serve his fellow men. He would leave the leading of congregations and empires to look after the needs of his friends. His home was the asylum for needy pilgrims. Frequently from ten to fifteen refugees were quartered under his roof for weeks at a time. He was always poor in spite of a good income, using his means for church purposes and especially for church emigrants. He once wrote to the Queen of Navarre that he had not a penny left to buy bread for himself. He could be tender as well as stern. His letters are filled with evidences of sympathy. In his iron breast he carried a warm heart. The tender qualities of his nature are seen at their best in his home life, in his relation to his friends, and in the letters he wrote on the death of his wife and his only child.

His labors were incessant. He was like a bow that is always bent. "There is never any season throughout the year," he writes, "in which I have not my work cut out for me, and more indeed than I could well get through, even although I were a tolerable tailor." He speaks of the "forest of material" awaiting arrangement. His correspondence was enormous. He sent letters in every direction in Europe, to kings, princes, reformers, theologians, humanists, burdened souls, poor women and religious prisoners. Councils and diets, leagues and alliances made demands upon his time.

Collodan wrote: "It is doubtful if any man of our time has to hear more, answer for more, and write more, and that of the



most important things than Calvin." The sum of his expositions and lectures is amazing. He wearied his amanuenses with his ceaseless dictation. He drove with a high hand religion, ethics, politics, literature, teaching, preaching and the writing of extensive theological works. He gave character and direction to every phase of church activity. His study was the center of the most important political counsels. Like Hildebrand he combined the zeal of an Old Testament Prophet with the sharp insight and spirit of a statesman. His state papers naturally signed by the syndics and the councils are masterpieces. He stood related to all the ecclesiastical or political parties of Europe either personally or by correspondence. All phases of life in Church and State were before him at every moment. He had risen to the height of a commanding figure in Europe. After the death of Luther, it was Calvin who represented the Reformation in the eyes of Pope, Emperor and people. So he bent upon his tasks, with his frail debilitated body, living to work and working only to establish the Kingdom of God upon the earth.

Of his moral courage there has never been any question. He wrote to the Queen of Navarre: "A dog barks and stands at bay if he sees any one assault his master. I should be indeed remiss if, the truth of God thus attacked, I should remain dumb, without giving one note of warning." "I have been in derision saluted of an evening with forty arquebuse shots before my door. How think you that must have astonished a poor scholar, timid as I have ever been?" Yet, "I exhorted them," he says elsewhere, "if they designed to shed blood, to begin with me." He was not afraid to speak fearlessly to Pope or Emperor. Yet his temper was irenic, for it was through Calvin that the "Reformed Church became less antithetical to the Lutheran, and the Lutheran leaders better understood among the Reformed."

He was not only an important religious, moral, and political influence, but his work counted for much in French Literature. His influence upon the French language was perhaps

less than that of Luther upon the German, it was certainly more than that of Tyndale upon the English. He gave French prose a character of precision and simplicity that it has never lost. As much as any one man of his race, he has helped to make the French tongue a literary medium for profound philosophical and religious discussion. He showed that the French tongue was capable of gravity as well as of levity. Frenchman though he was, he was also the only one of the great Reformers who can justly be called international. His work carried with it a universal character. His influence was felt in every country in Europe.

He was the supreme constructive genius of the Reformation. He not only gave to Protestantism a system of thought as logical as the Roman Church had in the system of Aquinas, but also an order of church polity which combined the scattering forces of the Reformation and fortified them against the powerful organization of the Roman hierarchy on the one hand and the destructive tendencies of sectarianism on the other. Which of these two things is it that has given him a chief title in the history of religion and civilization, is it the system of thought called Calvinism or the Church that he organized? We believe it is the latter. His system of thought is certainly less original and the ideas in it more derivative than his form of Church organization. For the master problem before Calvin was how to make a whole society not only Reformed in faith but also reformed in character. How to "secure the expression of changed faith in a changed life;" or rather how the Church could be made "not simply an institution for the worship of God, but an agency for the making of men fit to worship Him." While his solution had its defects in so far as it forgot that all healthy moral action must be spontaneous, nevertheless he made an heroic effort at the solution of the greatest human problem and deserves the gratitude of modern religion and civilization.

Few men have been so misunderstood, so maligned, so hated as Calvin. He has been called the best-hated man in history.



An old proverb ran: "Better be in hell with Bèze than in heaven with Calvin." Yet he is also one of the most admired men of history. The tributes paid to him by men of every nation and every profession are simply astounding. Bèze says of him: "I have been a witness of Calvin's life for sixteen years and I think I am fully entitled to say that in this man there was exhibited to all a most beautiful example of the life and death of the Christian which it will be as easy to calumniate as it will be difficult to emulate." Scaliger, the greatest scholar of his age, said: "Calvin stands alone as a theologian." Montesquieu wrote: "The Genevese should bless the birthday of Calvin." Kampschulte, the Catholic historian, calls him "the Aristotle of the Reformation," and Renan says of him that "he was the most Christian man of his century." Bancroft assures us that in a high sense Calvin is indeed the father of the French Huguenots, English Puritans, Scotch Covenanters, and the New England Pilgrims who not only sacrificed the world for the liberty of conscience, but who brought across the seas "the doctrines of civil liberty, which sheltered their infancy in the wilderness and within the short space of two centuries infused themselves into the life-blood of every rising state from Labrador to Chili." The Calvin who through religious zeal committed constant violence against the rights of conscience and of liberty was yet beyond a question one of the chief agencies in bringing about the establishment of the free institutions of modern civilization.

Reformer, theologian, legislator, humanist, organizing genius, master of men, majestic in character, great in the fear of God, exponent of law and liberty, faithful servant of his day and generation, John Calvin was one of the supreme forces of the sixteenth century and, through the sixteenth century, of modern times. In the day when men shall be ranked, not according to their defects, but according to their fidelity to God and to the right as God gave them to see the right, few there will be standing higher than he. What Luther wrote of Melancthon is even more true of John Calvin, "the whole Christian world is his debtor."

## II.

### CALVIN AS AN INTERPRETER OF THE BIBLE.

BY PROF. IRWIN HOCH DE LONG, D.B., PH.D.

This paper simply aims to bring before the reader some representative judgments pronounced on Calvin as an interpreter of the Bible, to indicate the extent of Calvin's work as a Biblical interpreter, to state his theory of interpretation, and to note some general characteristics of his work in this department of theology.

It has been said that if Luther was the king of translators, Calvin was the king of commentators. As an interpreter of the Bible Calvin is quite generally praised by historians of Biblical interpretation,<sup>1</sup> and by others who have written about him as an interpreter. There are however those among recent writers, not to speak of earlier writers, who, viewing Calvin's interpretation according to present day standards, speak of Calvin, by implication, as "surely disqualified for the high business of interpretation." He is charged with intolerance,<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The works on the history of interpretation of the Bible are soon enumerated. They are these: Richard Simon, "Histoire Critique du Vieux Testament" (I have the "nouvelle edition, et qui est la premiere imprimée sur la Copie de Paris, augmentée d'une Apologie generale et de plusieurs Remarques Critiques," bearing the date 1685); Gottlob Wilhelm Meyer, "Geschichte der Schrifterklärung seit der Wiederherstellung der Wissenschaften," 1802-1809; F. W. Farrar, "History of Interpretation," 1886; and George H. Gilbert, "Interpretation of the Bible, A Short History," 1908. Gilbert's work is distinctly popular, while Farrar's work is addressed to a narrower circle; Gilbert's work is a book suitable to place in the hands of interested laymen, while Farrar's work is for the technically trained theologian.

<sup>2</sup> "On l'insulte lui-même; on l'outrage quand on élève la voix contre la sienne; et ce qu'il respecte le moins dans ses adversaires, c'est précisément cette liberté de penser qu'il revendique pour lui-même ou plutôt,—car j'ai tort de parler de liberté de penser, ce sont les droits de 'la conscience errante,' puisqu'il est toujours, lui, Calvin, en possession de la vérité." *Revue des Deux Mondes*, October, 1900, in an article "L'œuvre Littéraire de Calvin," p. 906.



with sophistry,<sup>3</sup> with "a mechanical view of inspiration, a subordination of Scripture to the doctrines of the Church, and a failure to give preëminence to the revelation of God in Jesus,"<sup>4</sup> and with "a serious lack of historical insight."<sup>5</sup> "When an honest man, after a careful study of the first three evangelists, declares that they write 'with the most perfect agreement,' it is obvious," says Gilbert in speaking of Calvin, p. 212, "that he does not understand that whereof he speaks."

Reuss, one of the foremost editors of Calvin's works in the "*Corpus Reformatorum*" and himself an epoch-making Biblical scholar, says of Calvin that he was "ohne alle Frage der grösste Exeget des sechszehnten Jahrhunderts."<sup>6</sup> Farrar in his "*History of Interpretation*" which continues to be the most satisfactory work in English on the history of Biblical interpretation, says: "But the greatest exegete and theologian of the Reformation was undoubtedly Calvin." In an article on "Calvin as an Expositor,"<sup>7</sup> written before the publication of his "*History*," Farrar writes as follows: "In modern times he (Calvin) has been generally and justly regarded as the greatest exegete of the age of the Reformation. His commentaries are at the present day far more frequently consulted, and are indeed better worth consulting, than those of Melancthon, Zwingli, or even Luther. They still live, while those of Musculus, Chytræus, Brentius, Bugenhagen, Baldwin, Bullinger, Beza, Mercer, Camerarius, and a host of other Reformation Expositors, are for all practical purposes dead." In the same article, concluding the paragraph from which the above quotation is taken, Farrar says: "But the fact remains that he (Calvin) was beyond all question the greatest exegete

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 910. "C'est ainsi que Calvin, tantôt en brouillant habilement les termes, et tantôt en s'arrogeant sur ses adversaires la supériorité de l'insulte, excelle, non seulement à déplacer les questions, mais vraiment à en dénaturer le sens; et aussi, comme on le voit, les questions, après comme avant son argumentation, demeurent-elles entières."

<sup>4</sup> Gilbert, "*Biblical World*," vol. 27, p. 347.

<sup>5</sup> Gilbert, "*Interpretation of the Bible*," p. 211.

<sup>6</sup> "Unquestionably the greatest exegete of the sixteenth century."

<sup>7</sup> "*The Expositor*," 1884, pp. 426-444.

of the Reformation Age, which produced greater exegetes than all the long preceding centuries." Bayle in his "Dictionnaire Historique et Critique" (1697), a valuable work for information among other things on Old Testament Science, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, says of Calvin: C'étoit un homme à qui Dieu avoit conféré de grans talens, beaucoup d'esprit, un jugement exquis, une fidelle memoire, une plume solide, éloquente, infatigable, un grand savoir, un grand zèle pour la verité,<sup>8</sup>—the exact qualities necessary to make a good interpreter of the Bible. "Joseph Scaliger, qui," so continues Bayle, "ne trouvoit presque personne digne de ses loüanges ne se lassoit point de l'admirer. Il le loüoit entre autres choses de n'avoir pas commenté l'Apocalypse."<sup>9</sup> In note N Bayle then continues: "Il (Scaliger) le reconnoissoit neanmoins pour celui de tous les Commentateurs qui avoit le mieux attrapé le sens des Prophetes. *O quam Calvinus bene assequitur mentem Prophetarum! nemo melius.* Puis donc qu'il ajoûte, *Sapit quod in Apocalypsim non scripsit*, c'est-à-dire il a eu ben nez de n'avoir pas entrepris l'Apocalypse; il falloit qu'il crût qu'il n'y avoit rien à faire sur ce livre."<sup>10</sup> Schaff, himself a Biblical interpreter of renown, in an article on *Calvin as a Commentator*<sup>11</sup> praises him as follows: "Calvin was an exegetical genius of the first order. His commentaries are unsurpassed for originality,

<sup>8</sup> "He was a man upon whom God had conferred great talents, a high degree of intelligence, an exquisite judgment, a faithful memory, a pen instructive, eloquent, unwearied, great knowledge, and a great zeal for the truth."

<sup>9</sup> "Joseph Scaliger, who scarcely finds any one worthy of his praise does not grow tired of admiring Calvin. He praises him among other things for not having written a commentary on the Apocalypse."

<sup>10</sup> "Scaliger acknowledges that Calvin of all commentators had best seized the meaning of the prophets. How excellently Calvin has laid hold of the meaning of the prophets! No one more so than he. Then he adds, He was wise for not writing a commentary on the Apocalypse, *i. e.*, he was sagacious enough not to undertake the Apocalypse; he must have felt that he could not do anything with this book."

<sup>11</sup> *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, July, 1892, pp. 462-469. This article is a reprint, omitting the foot-notes, of § 111, "Calvin's Commentaries," in Vol. VII., "History of the Christian Church."



depth, perspicuity, soundness, and permanent value." A little later on in the same article Schaff, as Scaliger before him, praises Calvin for not commenting on the Apocalypse by saying that he wisely left it alone. "Few exegetical works," says Schaff, in the same article, "outlive their generation; those of Calvin are not likely to be superseded, any more than Chrysostom's "Homilies" for patristic eloquence, or Bengel's "Gnomon" for pregnant and stimulating hints, or Matthew Henry's "Exposition" for devotional purposes and epigrammatic suggestions to preachers."

Diestel in his standard work, "Geschichte des Alten Testaments" (1869), writes concerning Calvin as an interpreter of the Bible: "Johannes Calvin ragt ebensowohl durch den Umfang seiner exegetischen Arbeiten wie durch eine seltene Genialität in der Auslegung hervor; unübertroffen in seinem Jahrhundert, bieten seine Exegesen für alle folgenden Zeiten noch bis heute einen reichen Stoff der Schrifterkenntnis dar. Am werthvollsten sind seine eigentlichen Commentare über den Pentateuch, Jesaja und Psalmen, der letztere sein Meisterwerk; practisch bedeutsam sind seine nachgeschriebenen Vorlesungen über die kleinen Propheten, Daniel, Jeremia, Ezechiel, und seine Homilien über das Buch Hiob und I. Samuel." Not only does Calvin tower above all other interpreters of his time, but according to the same writer he is "der Schöpfer der ächten Exegese." Merx, a prominent Oriental and Biblical scholar, literally echoes Diestel's judgment, in his classical study on "Die Prophetie des Joel und Ihre Ausleger von den ältesten Zeiten bis zu den Reformatoren:" "Calvin ist der grösste Exeget seiner Zeit, aber nicht die entfaltete Gelehrsamkeit—denn in diesem Punkte ist er weislich haushälterisch—macht ihn zum Schöpfer der ächten Exegese 'sondern der tiefe Blick in das alleinige Ziel und die richtige Aufgabe aller Schrifterklärung, sowie die Thatsache, dass er derselben in seinen Arbeiten so bedeutend nahe gekommen ist, dass er sich von seinen Vorgängern specifisch unterscheidet.' Diestel S. 267." Winer in the first two editions of his commentary on

Galatians, did not even mention Calvin, while in the third he lauds him as follows: "Calvinus miram in pervidenda apostoli mente subtilitatem, in exponenda perspicuitatem probavit."<sup>12</sup> Others, like Poole in the preface to his *Synopsis*, excuse themselves for not more frequently referring to Calvin's interpretations on the ground that others have drawn on him so largely that to quote them is in reality to quote him! Tholuck, a prominent Lutheran theologian of the last century, mentions in his admirable essay on "Die Verdienste Calvin's als Ausleger der heiligen Schrift" ("Vermischte Schriften," Part II., pp. 330-360), these two qualities as giving value to Calvin's interpretation of the Old Testament, doctrinal impartiality, and a vital religious feeling which his commentaries everywhere breathe and most beautifully in the Psalms.

Tholuck's interest lay mainly in the New Testament and hence the greater part of his excellent essay deals with Calvin's "New Testament Commentaries." According to Tholuck the New Testament commentaries are characterized by the same marks as the commentaries on the Old Testament. In speaking of the New Testament commentaries he especially commends Calvin's exegetical tact; the various learning upon which his interpretation rests, though not apparent on the surface; his deep Christian feeling whereby he apprehends the fundamental New Testament ideas and interprets the Scriptures with a psychology resting upon Christian experience.

Meyer, who knows how to value a knowledge of the original languages and thorough historical science says of Calvin in his "Geschichte der Exegese"<sup>13</sup> (1802-1809): "Calvin, too, as well as Zwingli, and even still more than he, would have the best founded claims upon our special estimation, even though he were less known by some particular interpretations which he first gave to various controverted passages, and which have served as models for his followers. Of this we may be

<sup>12</sup> "Calvin has displayed remarkable acuteness in perceiving, and in expounding the meaning of the apostle."

<sup>13</sup> Vol. II., p. 450 f.



convinced, especially from his interpretations of the Old Testament, which commends itself to us in a very unusual degree, not only by its great copiousness, and its extent over most of the Old Testament Scriptures, but still more by its very instructive contents. By the natural, and, for the most part successful, elucidation which he has given of the grammatical sense in general, by the valuable philological remarks which he has occasionally interspersed, and by the many peculiar explanations which he has suggested, he has sufficiently proved his capacity to apprehend the sense of the sacred records, and fully justifies us in ascribing to him a better acquaintance with the Hebrew language than R. Simon is inclined to allow him. And his further investigations respecting the sense, after it had been thus grammatically explained, whether in the historic, the poetic, or the prophetic parts, show us everywhere a man who, not satisfied with the traditional meaning, seeks out the historical relations of his author, and endeavors to penetrate more deeply into his spirit; so far, indeed, as his habits of thinking in theology, and his many doctrinal prepossessions, would allow him to do this."

Following these judgments on Calvin's Biblical interpretation, which were selected almost at random, and brought together without giving heed to any order, whether chronological or other, we indicate the extent of Calvin's work in this department. This can be done by enumerating his commentaries as they appear in English in the edition of the "Calvin Translation Society." They are as follows: "Commentary on Genesis," 2 vols.; "Harmony of the last Four Books of the Pentateuch," 4 vols.; "Commentary on Joshua," 1 vol.; "Commentary on the Psalms," 5 vols.; "Commentary on Isaiah," 4 vols.; "Commentary on Jeremiah and Lamentations," 5 vols.; "Commentary on Ezekiel," 2 vols.; "Commentary on Daniel," 2 vols.; "Commentary on Hosea," 1 vol.; "Commentary on Joel, Amos, and Obadiah," 1 vol.; "Commentary on Jonah, Micah, and Nahum," 1 vol.; "Commentary on Habakkuk, Zephaniah, and Haggai," 1 vol.;

“Commentary on Zechariah and Malachi,” 1 vol.; “Harmony of the Synoptical Evangelists,” 3 vols.; “Commentary on John’s Gospel,” 2 vols.; “Commentary on Acts of the Apostles,” 2 vols.; “Commentary on Romans,” 1 vol.; “Commentary on Corinthians,” 2 vols.; “Commentary on Galatians and Ephesians,” 1 vol.; “Commentary on Timothy, Titus, and Philemon,” 1 vol.; “Commentary on Hebrews,” 1 vol.; “Commentary on Peter, John, James, and Jude,” 1 vol.

The above 44 volumes do not contain his many sermons, “qui,” according to Brunetière,<sup>14</sup> “ne sont qu’un commentaire perpétuel de l’Écriture sainte,—des leçons, à vrai dire, plutôt que des sermons.” A similar judgment is pronounced on his sermons by Baumgartner: “On rencontre très fréquemment ce dernier (*i. e.*, the commentator) sous la robe du prédicateur.”<sup>15</sup> Of his sermons, which as a collection are thus characterized as exegetical lectures, there are said to be now in the library of Geneva 2025 in MS.<sup>16</sup> His most famous sermons are those on the book of Job, numbering 159. Admiral Coligny valued these sermons on Job so highly that he read one of them every morning and evening, and because he derived such great benefit from them he called them his “panchrestum medicamentum,”—a healing and soothing balm in all the vicissitudes of life. The sermons on the book of Samuel number 107. These sermons on Job and Samuel are printed in Latin in the nine volume Amsterdam edition of Calvin’s

<sup>14</sup> P. 905, in the article, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, cited above. Calvin’s sermons are “only a *commentarius perpetuus* on Holy Scripture, lectures, to speak truth, rather than sermons.”

<sup>15</sup> *Calvin Hebräisant*, 1889, p. 48. In the case of Calvin the commentator is very frequently met “under the robe of the preacher.” Calvin quotes Hebrew in his sermons. Though the quoting of Hebrew in his sermons seems to be rare, yet it is real. See, for instance, the 70th sermon on the book of Job; also the 149th; the 150th; the 155th; the 156th; the 157th, etc.

<sup>16</sup> Compare, however, the following statement: “Ausserdem besitzt die Genfer Bibliothek 2023 grösstentheils ungedruckte Predigen vom Jahre 1549–60.” Henry, p. xx. The statement in the text is derived from the article “Calvin,” p. 40, in the “Cyclopedia of Biblical, Theological, and Ecclesiastical Literature,” by McClintock and Strong.



works, under the general title "Calvini opera," by Schepfer. Apart from the sermons on the books of Job and Samuel, there are, of course, many others on other books and parts of the Bible. Let this suffice to indicate the amazing extent of Calvin's exegetical labors, covering almost the entire Bible, a task which hardly any Old Testament or New Testament scholar in America, England or on the continent of Europe, would be willing to undertake in our day.

In this connection it should be mentioned that the commentaries on Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel and the Twelve Minor Prophets are the result of *prælectiones* or *cours* delivered by Calvin to his students, and were "recueillis de sa bouche," like his sermons. Afterwards his students published them from their notebooks. This statement takes away some of the grandeur of the remarkable exhibition of the extent of Calvin's exegetical work. It also suggests the fact of the unequal character and value of the exegetical writings published under Calvin's name.

Calvin's theory of interpretation may be learned very readily, for he himself has given us his conception of the duty of an interpreter, or at any rate so expressed himself that his views may be readily inferred, in the preface to Romans, addressed to his friend Grynæus, written at Strassburg, October 18, 1539, and in a letter to Viret, also written at Strassburg, May 19, 1540. In the former he says: "I remember that when three years ago we had a friendly converse as to the best mode of expounding Scripture, the plan which especially pleased you, seemed also to me the most entitled to approbation; we both thought that the chief excellency of an expounder consists in lucid brevity. And, indeed, since it is almost his only work to lay open the mind of the writer whom he undertakes to explain, the degree in which he leads away his readers from it, in that degree he goes astray from his purpose, and in a manner wanders from his own boundaries. Hence we expressed a hope, that from the number of those who strive at this day to advance the interest of theology by

this kind of labour, some one would be found, who would study plainness, and endeavour to avoid the evil of tiring his readers with prolixity. I know at the same time that this view is not taken by all, and that those who judge otherwise have their reasons; but still I cannot be drawn away from the love of what is compendious. But as there is such a variety, found in the minds of men, that different things please different persons, let every one in this case follow his own judgment, provided that no one attempts to force others to adopt his own rules. Thus it will be, that we who approve of brevity, will not reject nor despise the labours of those who are more copious and diffused in their explanations of Scripture, and that they also in their turn will bear with us, though they may think us too compressed and concise.

“I indeed could not have restrained myself from attempting something to benefit the Church of God in this way. I am, however, by no means confident that I have attained what at that time seemed best to us; nor did I hope to attain it when I began; but I have endeavoured so to regulate my style, that I might appear to aim at that model. How far I have succeeded, as it is not my part to determine, I leave to be decided by you and by such as you are.”

Later on there follow some characteristic words on the sacredness of Biblical interpretation, and on the interpreter's necessary freedom from prejudice or any prepossession whatever. “And if it be deemed a great wickedness to contaminate any thing that is dedicated to God, he surely cannot be endured, who, with impure, or even with unprepared hands, will handle that very thing, which of all things is the most sacred on earth. It is therefore an audacity, closely allied to a sacrilege, rashly to turn Scripture in any way we please, and to indulge our fancies as in sport; which has been done by many in former times. . . . Since then what would otherwise be very desirable cannot be expected in this life, that is, universal consent among us in the interpretation of all parts of Scripture, we must endeavor, that, when we depart from



the sentiments of our predecessors, we may not be stimulated by any humour for novelty, nor impelled by any lust for defaming others, nor instigated by hatred, nor tickled by any ambition, but constrained by necessity alone, and by the motive of seeking to do good; and then, when this is done in interpreting Scripture, less liberty will be taken in the principles of religion, in which God would have the minds of his people to be especially unanimous."

In the letter to Viret Calvin pronounces judgment upon other Biblical interpreters in such a manner that his views concerning the duties of an interpreter may likewise readily be inferred. "Capito, in his lectures has some things which may be of much use to you in the illustration of Isaiah. But as he does not dictate any part to his hearers, and has not yet reached beyond the fourteenth chapter, his assistance cannot at present much help you. Zwingli, although he is not wanting in a fit and ready exposition, yet, because he takes too much liberty, often wanders far from the meaning of the prophet. Luther is not so particular as to propriety of expression or the historical accuracy; he is satisfied when he can draw from it some fruitful doctrine. No one, as I think, has hitherto more diligently applied himself to this pursuit than Æcolampadius, who has not always, however, reached the full scope or meaning."

One word characterizes Calvin's theory of interpretation. It is the somewhat awkward word *grammatico-historical*. This theory, of which he is called "the founder," is now quite generally acknowledged as the only valid theory of interpretation of the Bible or of any piece of literature. There is no occasion it seems to me, for shifting the emphasis and designating the theory *historico-grammatical*, as some in these latter days are inclined to do. The logical order of procedure is best expressed by the former term *grammatico-historical*. An undue emphasis upon the historical, to the neglect of the grammatical or linguistic side, is apt in these days of the comparative study of all things, religion and re-

ligious documents not excluded, to lead to imposition rather than to exposition, to eisegesis rather than to exegesis, to *Einlegung* rather than to *Auslegung*. The imposition into Scripture of comparative historical material is no more to be condoned scientifically than the imposition into Scripture of later dogmatic developments. The one method is doing as much violence to Scripture as the other. The historian must be held to a thorough knowledge of the sources; a second-hand knowledge of these can never answer for a firsthand knowledge. Therefore the contention is Hebrew, Aramaic and Greek first, as long as men, or the Church, want to know what the actual message of these men of God is.

Now from Calvin's theory of interpretation we pass and linger briefly with his practice of interpretation. Does his practice square with his theory? Or do we here have one of those not uncommon cases where the prolegomena promise one thing, while the body of the work brings almost anything but what was promised?

First as to brevity. In theory, lucid brevity is according to Calvin the chief excellency of an interpreter. According to Stähelin Calvin has accomplished the aim which he set for interpreters in this respect. Can we, however, rightly, from our standpoint, ascribe brevity to a commentator who writes five large octavo volumes, from four to almost six or seven hundred pages each, on Jeremiah and Lamentations, five volumes on the Psalms, four volumes on Isaiah, etc.? It seems that in interpretation we must, from our standpoint, even if not from the standpoint of his age, deny brevity to Calvin, though in general we are ready to acknowledge that his interpretation is lucid. This lucidity in part is due to his acknowledged neatness and precision in form and in language, both in Latin and in French. Even opponents of Calvin acknowledge the force of his style in both languages. In the history of the French language Calvin holds a position corresponding to that of Luther in the history of the German language. It would be interesting to know the judgment of his friend



Grynæus to whom, "and such as he was," Calvin referred this matter of brevity for decision.

The second point that we note in Calvin's theory of interpretation is contained in the following sentence, already quoted above: "And, indeed, since it is almost his (the interpreter's) only duty to lay open the mind of the writer whom he undertakes to explain, the degree in which he leads his readers from it, in that degree he goes astray from his purpose, and in a manner wanders from his own boundaries." How does his practice square with his theory in this respect? Calvin makes the impression of having honestly striven after this. He is methodical, giving attention to the context of a given passage. His aim is to explain each part by its relation to the whole. His theory is not to pick out passages from a given context and interpret these in their isolation. His theory as an interpreter is not that Scripture is a conglomerate incoherent mass of passages, that can be interpreted apart from the context. His practice is to explain the parts in relation to the whole, and the whole or entire context with reference to all its constituent parts.<sup>17</sup> In doing this he gives attention to syntactical construction, rhetorical figures, and verbal usages of his author; he had a good knowledge of Hebrew,<sup>18</sup> including a knowledge of Aramaic as also of Greek. Only after this is done is he prepared to give the meaning of the passage as a whole. This of course excludes the principle of allegory, of

<sup>17</sup> I am fully aware of the fact that Calvin frequently in his exegetical practice falls in with the proof-text principle of interpretation, in both the Old and New Testaments. His estimate of the Bible is largely that current in his time. The writers of the Bible are "scribes" of the Holy Spirit. Consequently the Bible is of a uniform character in doctrine. That there is a development in doctrinal conceptions or a progressive revelation, in the Bible, as the Christian church now quite generally admits, is not Calvin's view of Scripture.

<sup>18</sup> Richard Simon, p. 435, made a statement concerning Calvin's knowledge of Hebrew which is to-day on all sides rejected as untrue and some have rightly called it ridiculous ("geradezu lächerlich"). The statement is that Calvin scarcely knew the characters of the Hebrew alphabet—"qui n'en (*i. e.*, of the Hebrew language) connoissoit gueres que les characters." Simon's criticism on Calvin's interpretation of the Hebrew word ברא is however favored by modern comparative Semitic etymology.

a double, triple or quadruple sense of Scripture. His final conclusion often is valid even in this our own day, in spite of the fact that so much additional light from different quarters has been shed upon the Scriptures in our age. His theory is correct, though as applied by a properly equipped twentieth century interpreter the results obtained are often strikingly different from those of the sixteenth century co-laborer. The reason for this lies partly in his totally different conception of Scripture, and partly in the fact that he did not have at hand the present means of interpreting Scripture. Calvin did not have the advantages that the heir of his scientific principles enjoys to-day, and then too, like all the Reformers he had very strong dogmatic prepossessions which gave character, whether consciously or unconsciously, to his interpretation. What Calvin learned at Paris and subsequently from Augustine, from whom he professes in his Institutes<sup>19</sup> to be only a "faithful borrower," gave strong color to his interpretation of Scripture. In those days it was extremely difficult to be free from dogmatic prepossessions, just as in these days when the historical rather than the dogmatic spirit is dominant, it is difficult for many to be free from prepossessions of a comparative historical character.

Another feature that commends itself in Calvin's practice as an interpreter of the Bible is his independence. This indeed is apparent already in his theory, but the point here is that he was manly enough to practice his theory, after he was convinced of its soundness, even though in his hands it produced results that were not in accord even with his own conception or with his cause. Calvin abhorred the idea of "lying for God."

Consequently we are not surprised when we learn that Calvin acknowledges to a certain extent, at least, that the language of the Old Testament attributes to God human traits and passions. "And he (Moses) introduces God as speaking after the manner of men, by a figure which ascribes human

<sup>19</sup> Bk. III., chap. XXIII., § 13.



affections to God" (Gen. 6: 5). "*And the Lord shut him in.* This is not added in vain, nor ought it to be lightly passed over. That door must have been large, which could admit an elephant. And truly, no pitch would be sufficiently firm and tenacious, and no joining sufficiently solid, to prevent the immense force of the water from penetrating through its many seams, especially in an irruption so violent, and in a shock so severe. Therefore, Moses, to cut off occasion for the vain speculations which our own curiosity would suggest, declares, in one word, that the ark was made secure from the deluge, not by human artifice but by divine miracle" (Gen. 7: 16). "Moses here, in a homely style, declares that the Lord had undertaken the labour of making garments of skins for Adam and his wife" (Gen. 3: 21).

The Vulgate translation of Joel 1: 1 begins: "*Verbum Dei quod factum est ad Joel.*" Jerome and other patristic and medieval interpreters brought this idiom forward as an intimation of the Incarnation, as though it were synonymous with the statement "the Word was made flesh!" "For he (Jerome) feared lest Christ should be said to be made, as he is the word of the Lord." Calvin regards such comments as a discreditable play upon words and rejects the comment with the contemptuous word *nugæ*; sunt nugæ magis quam pueriles.

Calvin believed in the persecution, even execution of Unitarians or anti-Trinitarians. No one, not even his friends, would to-day release Calvin from his share in the "tragedy and crime" of executing the anti-Trinitarian Servetus. In 1903 (November 1) the Protestants of France and Switzerland erected an "expiatory monument" to the Unitarian Servetus. In an inscription on the monument these Protestants acknowledge their debt to the great Reformer, Calvin, but at the same time condemn his error as an error of his age. For the inscription on the monument see Lindsay, page 131, and for a picture of the monument, reproduced from a photograph, see Walker, opposite page 342. It was well to call this incident to mind to appreciate more fully Calvin's independence

as an interpreter of the Bible. He rejects a number of "dicta probantia" ("proof texts") that had traditionally been used against Arians, Socinians and others. Calvin regards it immoral to defend any particular "proof-text," because it is polemically useful. He saw no proof of the Trinity in the plural *Elohim* (Gen. 1: 1), nor in Abraham's three visitors (Gen. 18: 2), nor in the Trisagion (Is. 6: 3), nor of the divinity of the Holy Spirit (Ps. 33: 6). In John 10: 30, "I and the Father are one," he sees no ontological or homoousian oneness, but the oneness of will between Christ and the Father, an ethical oneness.<sup>20</sup> Compare also the remark on I. John 5: 7, "When it is said that three are one, reference is had, not so much to essence (*essentia*), as to consent (*consensus*)."<sup>21</sup> Now I take it there were few in his age that held so firmly and tenaciously to the belief of the homoousian oneness of the Son with the Father,<sup>21</sup> and yet Calvin yields this traditional "dictum probans," which might have been of service to his cause. In Matthew 11: 11, ο μικρότερος "he that is but little in the Kingdom of heaven," was by the majority of Reformation writers referred to Christ; Calvin applies it to all Christians. Another important Reformation text, Mt. 16: 18, is referred to Peter as the rock, not in his own person, but as the representative of all believers, rather than to Christ (δεικτικῶς), as Luther does. According to Calvin's position it would be the index finger of Luther or of the polemic inter-

<sup>20</sup> This is hardly a correct "laying open of the mind of the writer" of this Gospel. This writer teaches more than an ethical oneness between Christ and the Father. He teaches more than the Lordship of Jesus, he also teaches the Godship of Jesus. "My Lord and my God." Here the oneness between Father and Son is not simply an ethical oneness, but a oneness of essence, as modern, so-called advanced interpreters admit. Compare "Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments," under the general editorship of Johannes Weiss, on the fourth Gospel in general and on this passage in particular.

<sup>21</sup> I am not unmindful of the Arian charges brought against Calvin by Caroli. In controversy with Caroli Calvin refused to join him in assent to the three ancient symbols of the Church, by answering: "We swear in the faith of the one God, not of Athanasius, whose creed no true Church would ever have approved." Nevertheless, that Caroli's charges of Arianism are baseless is not doubted.



preters that points to Christ and not that of Christ Himself. The same virile independence characterizes also Calvin's interpretation of the Messianic prophecies in the Old Testament, and such as are quoted in the New Testament. If space would allow it we might begin with Genesis 3: 15, and follow him through the entire list. Indeed Calvin was charged with expounding "oracles about the Trinity and the Messiah in accordance with Jewish and Socinian views."

Thus far we have noted Calvin's independence in reference to the interpretation of individual passages. Much more might be brought forward, but enough has been given to show this characteristic of Calvin. Now his independence is apparent not only in reference to the interpretation of individual passages, but also in reference to that of entire books. This may briefly be illustrated by his attitude towards the question of authorship of individual books. Of the Epistle to the Hebrews he says: "I cannot be induced to acknowledge Paul as the author." Such judgments were not based on subjective grounds after the fashion of Luther, but on objective facts, on critical and philological data. The Second Epistle of Peter does not contain "the genuine phraseology of Peter."

Certain passages in the Bible he declares not genuine, he speaks of another as a gloss, admits the possibility of oversights or trivial errors in the Biblical writers. Such admissions are not in accord with the theory of verbal dictation or "a mechanical view of inspiration," unless they are regarded as oversights and errors in the course of transmission of the text.

The judgment pronounced upon the Biblical interpretation of Calvin naturally varies according to the viewpoint of him who judges. He who judges Calvin's interpretation from the standpoint of Calvin's age, and environment, remembering the character of what had been done in Biblical interpretation prior to Calvin's time, being not unmindful of the comparatively meagre helps available at the time in Hebrew Grammar and in Hebrew lexicography, will marvel, not only because

of its bulk and extent, but also because of its advance over previous work along this line, and because of its spirit, character, and high quality. It must ever be borne in mind that Calvin lived and wrote before the days of modern comparative Semitic grammar and lexicography, before the days of modern excavations in the Orient, in Egypt, in Babylonia and Assyria, in Palestine and northern Syria, in Asia Minor, and on the island of Cyprus, and before the days when the historical-religious spirit held the dominant sway in the realm of Biblical interpretation. Again, he who judges Calvin's interpretation in accordance with present day standards, "looking at it in the light of the present, for the benefit of the present, and not for the condemnation of the past," will keenly note its shortcomings, its almost total disregard of text critical matters, its lack of comparative Semitic grammar and lexicology, of literary criticism as we now know it, of comparative religion, and of archæology, and its prevailing dogmatic rather than historical character. Nevertheless, after all is said, Calvin, by the almost universal consent of Protestants and Catholics alike, remains *the* Biblical interpreter of his century, a position which he also continues to hold as a theologian.

Calvin's interpretation in general is then a marked advance upon what had been done prior to his time, though it is of a strong dogmatic character which runs into the polemic as of course into the practical. For us, however, to go back to Calvin's commentaries on the Old Testament from the *Expositor's Bible*, edited by Nicoll, from the "*International Critical Commentary*," edited by Briggs, Driver and Plummer, from Marti's "*Kurzer Hand-Commentar zum Alten Testament*," from the "*Handkommentar zum Alten Testament*," edited by Nowack, from the "*Kurzgefasster Kommentar*," edited by Strack and Zöckler, from the "*Westminster Commentaries*," edited by Walter Lock, and from "*The New Century Bible*," edited by Adeney, is like going to another world. Calvin's commentaries have great value, and there seems to be a considerable demand for them in our



day, but there is no gainsaying the fact that they have been left far behind in the rapid progress of Biblical science. Calvin's principle of interpretation will however abide and is valid for all time. It is the only principle of interpretation that commends itself to a scientific interpreter, because it is grammatico-historical. Likewise does Calvin's didactic and religious fervor commend itself to the reader of such modern commentaries that professedly "are not intended to be homiletic or devotional."

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### III.

## CALVIN'S DOCTRINE OF PREDESTINATION.

BY REV. THEO. F. HERMAN.

The theological doctrine of predestination is a particular statement of the general conception of determinism. There are three aspects of this wider problem which confront and perplex the student of human thought, the metaphysical, the physical and the theological.

Metaphysical determinism proceeds from the axiomatic truth that every event must have a cause. That is its major premise, and from this law of causality it infers logically a scheme of absolute necessity in human action. The name applied to this metaphysical world view is Necessitarianism.

The second aspect under which the problem of determinism has been studied is the physical. Metaphysical determinism reasons deductively; it proceeds from the general to the particular; synthetically it lays down the universal law for the intelligent interpretation of life. Physical determinism is inductive. It lays claim to no oracular knowledge of the plan and purpose of a divine architect. It follows the Ariadne thread of scientific investigation as the only sure guide out of the labyrinth of speculation into the realm of knowledge. And reasoning thus, inductively, it ends where the first begins, viz., with determinism. It speaks in the vernacular, it translates metaphysics into physics, speculation into biology, mind into terms of matter, infinite cause into terms of cosmic force; your gray matter, the form of your chin and the formation of your forehead, these things, in the choice of which you have neither voice nor vote, determine your life. As you are made, it says, so you will act. Your moral disposition is the result of your organic structure.



And if in past eons a grain of sand somewhere, had changed its position somehow, you would not be what you are, nor do what you do. The proper name for this scientific evolutionary determinism is fatalism or positivism. It is the apotheosis of impersonal force, shaping the cosmic process without an intelligent purpose, and without an intelligible aim.

The metaphysical determinist and the scientific positivist agree in the facts of the case. Both represent mankind as acting of necessity, whether for good or evil, in distinction to acting freely, by an original motion of the will. But the metaphysician goes to synthetic philosophy for the reason of this binding necessity, while the positivist finds the sufficient explanation of the fatalistic determinism of the universe in the data of the analytical sciences.

The third aspect of the problem is theological predestinarianism. It is, of course, near kin to both metaphysical necessitarianism and scientific positivism. All three agree that history and human life is a nexus of cause and effect, and that the efficient cause is other than man. The verdict of all is that man is the actor but not the agent. But there is a profound difference between the two former and the latter. The predestinarian does not find the efficient cause of things in philosophy nor in science, but in revelation. His argument for necessity is built upon a particular fact, or facts, of which he has been informed by competent authority; not upon ratiocination nor upon scientific investigation.

Let it be clearly understood, therefore, that the problem of determinism is by no means exclusively or peculiarly a theological problem. Often, in the din of debate and in the clash of spirits, it has been tacitly assumed that predestinarianism is simply one of the many odious hallucinations of theologians. And the odium attaching in the popular mind to the general conception of determinism has been lavished quite exclusively upon the champions of its theological aspect. Swedenborg, for example, rejected the epistles of Paul. He says of them that, in the heavenly life, they have no internal sense. The

reason for his antipathy for Paul was that Swedenborg believed his epistles to be the source of Calvinistic predestination, which to Swedenborg was very odious. Calvin himself, and his adherents to the execrable doctrine of predestination, Swedenborg describes as living in a cave where the delight of their lives is to do each other harm. These calumniators of Calvin ignore the fact that the deterministic problem has engaged the critical acumen of the best minds of the world, and that, from the time of Heraclitus to Schleiermacher, Schopenhauer and John Fiske, many of the noblest thinkers have asserted that determinism, in one of its forms, is the only possible solution of the antimony that lies in necessity and free will.

Furthermore, just as determinism in its wider sense is not a theological dogma but one of the great riddles of the universe, yea its prize puzzle par excellence, so, in its narrower theological sense, predestinarianism is not confined to Calvinism. It may be said, I think, that, while most of the great preachers of the world were indeterministic in their theology, the majority of the great theologians have been determinists. The preacher addresses the conscience of mankind, and the conscience rebels against determinism. But the theologian seeks and finds the final unifying cause of all phenomena in an omniscient and omnipotent God, the author, ruler and finisher of all things. And such a God would seem to preclude the reality and scope of free will in man. Hence all the great redemptive religions of the world have a doctrine of necessity, some kind of predestinarianism. And who shall say that the final redemptive religion will be without it? Meanwhile simple justice to Calvin demands mention of the fact that all the great reformers of the Sixteenth Century held the doctrine of predestination as tenaciously, taught it as unequivocally and defended it as vigorously as he did.

And since the doctrine of predestination was held by all the great reformers it is reasonable to seek the cause of its simultaneous emergence, if not equal prominence, in Lutheran,



Zwinglian, Melancthonian and Calvinistic theology, not primarily in the subjective factor, the men who framed the system, but rather in the objective religious motives which overarched, and in the essential principles which underlay the reformation itself. These fundamental principles were, first, a deep sense of the total depravity of mankind and its consequent inability to choose and do the good; secondly, the assertion of the free grace of God in Christ over against the Roman doctrine of the meritoriousness of good works; and, finally, the recognition of a dictated and formally infallible Bible as the sole repository and teacher of divine truth.

Obviously, a system of theology built upon an anthropology that regards mankind as a *massa perditionis*, upon a soteriology which centers in the sovereignty of God, and upon a mechanical conception of the Bible must logically and inevitably issue in predestinarianism. For if it be granted that man is totally depraved, and so inert in sinful corruption that he is unable even to seize or appropriate the proffered salvation, then his salvation must needs be effected by an absolute intervention of the sovereign will of God, who converts, sanctifies and saves man in spite of himself and without his coöperation. Again, since experience teaches that the operation of this irresistible divine grace among men is *selective*, it follows necessarily that it must be *elective*. For evidently not all men are saved by the sovereign act of grace, and the reason for this particularism cannot be found in man, since all men are alike incapable of coöperation. Hence it must exist in God. The selective process in time must originate in the will of God, that is in his eternal election. Furthermore, if you postulate the free will of man you detract from the glory of God; and according to the scriptures the supreme end of creation is the manifestation of the glory of God. And if it revolts the natural mind and heart of man to acknowledge that God elects some to salvation and others to reprobation, then let man remember that only thus God can manifest the glory of his mercy and justice. This double

decree is inscrutable and inexplicable, but its operation is visible in history and experience, and its revelation is clear in the scriptures.

Such then were the speculative antecedents of reformation predestinarianism. Jointly the reformers were driven to it by their controlling sense of man's total depravity and his consequent inability to be saved except by the intervention of the sovereign grace of God; together they found it in Paul as interpreted by Augustine, and in Christ as interpreted by Paul. Granting their premises, the predestinarian conclusion follows with syllogistic inevitableness. The reformation doctrine of predestination may be false, but it is not fallacious. It is splendid reasoning, though it may be poor theology. The fault, if fault there be, lies not in its logic but in its premises.

And this historical explanation of the predestinarianism of the reformers suggests its historical justification and vindication. It is a doctrine than which none other lends itself so readily to mischievous caricature and malicious misrepresentation. To the modern mind the defects of its virtues are so palpable, and the whole system is so paradoxical that a superficial knowledge of it engenders perplexity and surprise that pious and thoughtful men should have conceived and maintained it. And yet, in its day, it was not only needed to counteract the Pelagianism, which was the official Roman theology, but it was also better than its theological antithesis. To overthrow the one-sided Pelagian theory of the efficient and sufficient agency of free will in the salvation of mankind, predestinarianism, with its extreme and exclusive emphasis on the divine factor in salvation, had its historical justification. The world moves in contrasts. The pendulum of thought swings from one extreme to the other. In the Sixteenth Century it swung from Pelagianism to Calvinism, and the *raison d'être* of extreme predestinarianism was the scholastic doctrine of the *liberum arbitrium* and *meritum*. And that explains the universal acceptance of the doctrine of predestination by the pious and earnest men of those days. It made its



appeal from a discredited church to a God, whom Calvinism made most real to the intellect and most authoritative to the conscience. Let us be very sure that Calvinism, which helped to make so many men just and strong, had its profound message from God in spite of its defects.

But while Calvin was not the only champion of the doctrine of predestination, it received, at his hands, its most systematic treatment. Zwingli held the doctrine of predestination in the abstract. In his theological system it remained a speculative thought without normative effect and without constitutive authority. Luther held the same doctrine with the inconsistency of genius, now surpassing Calvin himself in the severity of his views, and in the harshness of their statement, and now contradicting himself by asserting the universal efficacy of the atoning death of Christ. Luther's doctrine of salvation was based upon his religious experience. Faith was not an act of man, as the medieval theology taught, which God supported and aided by acts of grace and by the means and methods of salvation, but it was rather the immediate experience of an act of God by sinful man. In his *de servo arbitrio*, where Luther endeavors to justify and explain his religious experience dialectically, he rushes deeply into a deterministic supralapsarian doctrine of predestination. In language stronger than even Calvin ever used he asserts the unconditional predestination of all men to salvation or damnation. And then he seeks to evade the practical conclusions of this doctrine by introducing a dualism into the divine will, by distinguishing between the *deus absconditus* and the *deus revelatus*, *i. e.*, the revealed will of God for the salvation of all men, and the concealed will which disposes of the salvation or condemnation of each individual. As late as 1537, twelve years after its first appearance, Luther expressly endorsed this essay of his, which has always been a stumbling block for his descendants.

Melanchthon wrote his *Loci Communes* in a sharply predestinarian spirit, even venturing boldly to answer affirmatively the

crucial question: *utrum deus mala faciat?* This was in 1521. But in 1527, when he wrote his commentary to the epistle to the Colossians, he had abandoned the paths of deterministic predestinarianism, and henceforth he interpreted the efficacy of divine grace ethically, emphasizing the cooperant activity of man.

Calvin was constitutionally unable to hold this great doctrine abstractly like Zwingli, or intermittently like Luther; nor was he mentally capable of imitating Melanchthon's feat of theological legerdemain, viz., of modifying his predestinarian conclusions without a corresponding change of the anthropological and soteriological premises. When Melanchthon moderated the rigor of his earlier predestinarianism without modifying the foundations upon which it was built, he thereby demonstrated the fact that in him, the heart, and not the head, made the theologian. Love triumphed over logic. Though unable conscientiously to change his premises, he refused to find in metaphysics the ultimate explanation of his religious experience. But in Calvin logic was paramount. Not simply the formal logic of the mind. That he possessed indeed in rare measure. And his juristic studies had not only strengthened the natural vigor of his mind, but they had also given him what might be called the juridico-dogmatic bent, viz., the idea of law became his norm for the interpretation of the abstract notions of theology. Calvin's logic, however, was more than intellectual vigor and sincerity. Intimately related to this was his moral integrity, the logic of conduct, the logic of the human will under the compulsive power of a tender conscience. His conscience energized his thought, and his thought informed his conscience. His conscience filled him with moral enthusiasm and his mind dug the channel for its operation.

Thus constituted, a man of clear intellect, severe conscience and imperious will, it was mentally and morally impossible for Calvin to accept the doctrine of predestination as scriptural, and yet to hold it in abeyance. What his vigorous intellect held to be the central truth of revelation his conscience com-



pelled him to make the determining principle of his religious life and of his theological system. And this, accordingly, is what Calvin did. With inexorable logic he proceeds from the terminus a quo to the terminus ad quem, from the ante-historical and pre-mundane act of predestination, through the fall, total depravity, absolute human inability, irresistible grace and perseverance of saints to the final dualistic denouement. Compared with other predestinarian systems, the superlative excellence of Calvinism lies in its logical consistency. His mind lays hold of the doctrine of predestination in its colossal nakedness, and, though his heart shrinks from the awful consequences, he unfolds the decretal system with inexorable and inerrant logic.

The chief, though by no means the only, source for a scientific study of Calvin's doctrine of predestination is his Institutes. Besides this fontal source, there are his polemical treatises in defence of predestination, his correspondence, the Consensus Genevensis and his first Genevan catechism, published in 1537. This catechism, intended for the instruction of the young, was an epitome of the doctrines accepted and demanded at Geneva. Here the doctrine of predestination was expressed more definitely and less discursively than in the Institutes. But one naturally seeks the authentic formulation of the doctrine of predestination not in controversial writings, nor in fragmentary letters, nor in consensus compromises but in his Institutes. In this marvelous manifesto of faith, the ablest systematic statement of doctrines produced during the age of the reformation, Calvin unfolds the cosmic program of God. With burning logic, his reason aflame with religious fervor, he sketches the movement of God through history, intent upon establishing His glory.

And in the Institutes it is especially the third book which contains Calvin's doctrine of predestination. It treats of soteriology, and under this general head Calvin devotes four chapters (Book 3: 21-24) to the statement, proof, defense and development of the doctrine of predestination. They are

marked by lucidity of style and fecundity of argument, drawn from scriptural and patristic sources, and wrought into a consistent and coherent system.

The first edition of the Institutes appeared in 1537. It contained only six chapters. Compared with the final edition of 1559, which contained 80 chapters, the first edition was merely a condensed and concise program of religious and moral reforms; while the last edition is a systematic representation and a keen interpretation of the Christian religion. And yet, germinally, Calvin's theology lay completely within the brief compass of the first edition. Beza's statement, that in doctrine Calvin made scarcely any change after the publication of the first edition of his Institutes, has occasioned much fulsome praise of Calvin's precocious genius, and much foolish condemnation of his premature dogmatism. Both the hostile scoffer and the servile worshipper of Calvin should realize that fixity in principle and finality in system are two distinct and separate things. Consistency from first to last does not preclude but rather demand progressive development. Calvin's theory of the Christian religion in principle was complete at the very beginning of his reformatory career. And the first edition of his Institutes contains Calvinism in embryo. But in subsequent editions, by expansion, assimilation and adjustment, the seed developed normally and reached its efflorescence in the final classical edition of 1559.

Thus it is doubtless true that Calvin's doctrine of predestination is found in the very first edition of the Institutes, and that in the last edition it is not changed materially. And yet while at first the doctrine of predestination is stated coordinately with other great doctrines, in 1539, in the second edition of the Institutes, this doctrine is not only set forth more fully, and defended more elaborately, but, by a change of emphasis, it is elevated into the center of things and becomes the pulsing heart of the system. Henceforth predestination is the constitutive and determinative principle of Calvin's theological speculation. The progressive development from



beginning to end was purely formal not material. It was neither a deepening of the doctrine nor a relaxation of its inherent rigor, but, on the one hand a widening of its implications, and, on the other, its elevation to the very center of a system.

And it is more than a mere coincidence, that, almost simultaneously with his second edition of the Institutes, Calvin published his commentary on Romans. This interesting fact permits us to glimpse at the inner processes of Calvin's development and to trace the spiritual pedigree of that mature doctrine of predestination which thence became the pivot and pillar of his theology.

From Paul's great epistle Calvin derived the impetus to make predestination the regulative principle of theology. Authoritatively and unmistakably Paul seemed to teach it in Romans. It formed the backbone of the greatest epistle of the great Apostle. God had spoken, and before the voice of God the heart and head of man must bow in acquiescent adoration.

What then is Calvin's specific doctrine of predestination as found in the Institutes? If space permitted, the best way to state it would be to use Calvin's own words. But in the Institutes the doctrine, in its fullness, is nowhere stated succinctly. Its treatment runs discursively through four chapters. Therefore, it is impossible to reproduce it here in its analytical fullness, and in its logical clearness and consistency. We must be content with a summary statement. And a fair epitome of Calvin's predestinarianism, as taught in the Institutes, must include the following points:

1. The glory of God is the highest and the ultimate aim and end of all things.
2. For the realization of that end God purposed the creation of the universe, and the whole plan of providence and redemption.
3. This eternal purpose of God includes the fall of man.
4. The fall of Adam involves the whole race of mankind in total depravity and in just condemnation.

5. From the massa perditionis God, by an unalterable decree, has elected a definite number to eternal life, for the manifestation of the glory of his grace.

6. From this massa perditionis God, by an unalterable decree, has elected a definite number to eternal condemnation for the manifestation of the glory of his justice.

7. The ground of this election to life, and the sole reason for this election to condemnation is not the foresight of good or bad character in man, but the good pleasure of God.


8. For the salvation of those predestinated to eternal life God gave his Son, to make full satisfaction for their sins; and in him the elect have the absolute assurance of their ultimate salvation.

9. Those whom God has predestinated to eternal death he causes to reach their appointed end, sometimes depriving them of the opportunity of hearing the word, sometimes, by the preaching of it, increasing their blindness.

10. The Holy Spirit is present with every man, so long as he lives, restraining evil and exciting good. But his saving power is exercised only in behalf of the elect.

11. All those whom God has chosen to life shall certainly be brought to the knowledge of the truth, to the exercise of faith, and to perseverance in holy living unto the end.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>In his "Summa totius Christianismi" Theodore Beza sets forth the Calvinistic dogma of predestination very clearly in the form of a genealogical tree, the beginning of which is as follows:





Such, in bare outline, is the great scheme of Calvinistic predestinarianism. Even its author, while he defended its mysteries and exulted in the glorious comfort of the decree of salvation, was moved to say of the decree of reprobation: "Decretum quidem horribile fateor."

Anyone who has even a slight measure of insight into the metaphysical difficulties of reconciling the fact of sin with the wisdom, the power, and the holiness of God, and of harmonizing the demands of logic and of conscience, will view with the profoundest respect Calvin's attempted solution of the apparent conflict between divine sovereignty and human responsibility. Three distinct voices mingle their cries in Calvin's theodicy, the voices of conscience, of logic, and of the heart. Conscience strikes the keynote. Calvin's whole interest in predestination was practical and not speculative. In the Catholic theology the gift of salvation was conveyed to each member through its traditional organs and ordinances. But in Calvin's experience salvation had been mediated not historically and organically by the church, but it had been thrust upon him, as it were, by the absolute unmediated will of God. Gratuitous, irresistible grace had converted him, and, in the interest of the certainty of his salvation, Calvin seeks a scriptural and logical explanation of his experience. Hence his conscience presses his intellect into service. And his intellect, beginning with God, constructs a philosophy of salvation and of history which assures the individual believer of the fixed and unalterable certainty of his election. But with keen anguish Calvin contemplates the negative corollary of predestinated bliss. He does not shrink from discussing and defending reprobation, but he derives no satisfaction from its awful character, as did some ultra Calvinists in later days.

Calvin's doctrine of predestination aroused violent opposition. It involved him in controversies with Pighius, Bolsec and Castellio, against whose attacks Calvin defended predestination with great skill. And the opposition to Calvinistic predestinarianism has never ceased. The conflict of opinion

centers on three controverted points. They are first, whether Calvin is to be classed as a Supralapsarian, or as a Sublapsarian; secondly, whether the Divine Will in the decretal system is ethical or physical and unethical; and thirdly, whether predestinarianism involves the denial of human freedom and responsibility. Let us briefly consider them.

As regards the first controverted question, *i. e.*, whether Calvin's doctrine of predestination is Supralapsarian or Sublapsarian, it must be remembered that these distinct types of predestinarianism did not emerge until after Calvin's death. The terms were not in vogue in his own time, nor was the difference between the two schools a debated question. Amongst predestinarians Calvin is claimed by both schools, with the preponderance of authority leaning towards the view that he taught the milder Sublapsarian predestination. Non-Calvinists usually class Calvin as a rigid Supralapsarian. It will be remembered that the difference between these two schools of predestinarianism hinges on the relation of the decrees to the fall. The unconditional decree of God may include the fall, or may exclude it. Supralapsarianism taught that the decree was antecedent to the fall, and that, therefore, man fell according to the eternal purpose of God. Sublapsarianism maintained that man's apostacy is not referable to the operation of a divine decree, but to man's willful transgression. To which side does Calvin belong?

Judging Calvin by the evidence furnished in his *Institutes* there can be no doubt that he was a rigid Supralapsarian. From other sources certain statements may be quoted which seem to prove that Calvin vacillated between Supralapsarianism and Sublapsarianism. Especially in the *Consensus Genevensis* he does not go beyond Augustinian Sublapsarianism. But it must be remembered that Calvin published the last edition of his *Institutes* in 1559, near the end of his life. It is a fair presumption, therefore, that his mature views are found here rather than in occasional writings that owed their origin to special, defensive and offensive, causes. And in the



Institutes, at least, Calvin's predestinarianism is Supralapsarian. Here his keen mind resolutely brushed aside all Sublapsarian ethical evasions and logical artifices and plunged boldly into the Supralapsarian abyss. He stopped short of the last crucial step, that God is the author of sin. There, even Calvin's logic was confounded. But, barring that illogical concession to his religious feeling, Calvin moves with inexorable logic down the aisles of history, tracing the fall not to a permissive decree, but to the Divine Will and asserting that not foreknowledge but foreordination is antecedent.

It must be confessed of course that, of the two forms of predestinarianism, Supralapsarianism is most revolting to the ethical consciousness of mankind. It does indeed furnish a key to history, with all its anomalies of good and evil, solve all the mysteries of speculation, and eliminate all chance from the universe, but the solution which it offers confuses all moral values. It construes the universe in the terms of sovereignty. Its strength lies in its logic and its weakness in its ethics. And if Sublapsarianism is less severe, its superior mildness is due to its inferior logic. For if sovereignty is the ultimate fact of the universe, if the sovereign will is the ultimate causality, and the glorious manifestation of sovereign justice and grace the ultimate teleological reality, postulates held in common by all Calvinists of both schools, then the data of experience and the facts of history alike demand rigid Supralapsarianism as the only consistent world view. And since sin is a conspicuous factor in this universe, in which God has unalterably foreordained all that comes to pass, it would seem to follow logically, either, that God is the author of sin, or that sin is a delusion of mortal mind and unreal to the divine mind.

The second disputed point in Calvinism is the nature of the Divine Will. It may be stated thus: is the decretal system right because God wills it, or does God will it because it is right? Does right ethicise the might of God, or does his might make right? Evidently this is the crux of predestinarianism.

It has already been stated that, in some sense, all redemptive religions are predestinarian. On the whole, it would seem, predestinarianism commends itself to the religious consciousness of mankind as the most consistent theistic world view. Granted, that God is the author of all things, the efficient cause of their being and the sufficient ground of their existence, then it must follow that there must be unity and stability in the universe. Thus made and controlled the world cannot be a plaything of chance and caprice but must obey law and fixed order. The very idea of monotheism implies that God is the sovereign ruler of the universe who is accomplishing an eternal plan in human history. Let it be borne in mind that this general assertion of the logical satisfactoriness, and perhaps necessity, of a deterministic *Weltanschauung* does not imply the truth of any existing theological, metaphysical or physical system of determinism. It simply signifies that the transcendent God, conceived as intelligent and omnipotent, is immanent in the world process; and that the unfolding processes of nature and history are the realization of the divine idea.

Now Calvin has given us a detailed program of this divine plan and of the means which God uses for its accomplishment. But who or what is Calvin's God? Is he a good, a reasonable being, whose actions are determined not by caprice, but by his character of absolute goodness and love? Is he the God whom Jesus taught us to know and to love, the Father of little children who can claim His love and render in return their filial service?

There can be no doubt that personally Calvin possessed the profoundest and sincerest conception of the absolute moral perfection of God. His soul thrilled and his whole being throbbed with a pure passionate love of the infinite and awful beauty of his maker. And it was this sublime thought of the perfect majesty of God that controlled and shaped his wonderful life. Modern Calvinistic writers contend that Calvin placed this perfect God, who ruled in his heart, in the center of his system; that he subordinated the doctrine of the divine



sovereignty to an ethical conception of God. And that, consequently, the decrees were not the work of absolute power, but rather the inevitable expression of absolute goodness; that God exercised His sovereignty not with the caprice of a tyrant but in full accordance with His ethical character.

If this is Calvin's starting point few men will find fault with him. There can be no objection to divine sovereignty if the vitalizing thought is that the one absolute sovereign of the universe is the God and father of our Lord Jesus Christ, whose will ultimately shall be regnant and triumphant on earth and in heaven. Then predestination according to His good pleasure means predestination according to His pleasure in the good. It is ethical and comprehensible.

But that is evidently not the view of God underlying the predestinarianism of the Institutes.<sup>2</sup> "The will of God," Calvin said, "is the highest rule of justice." Not His perfect nature but His sovereign will is the ground of His actions. Hence, when objection is made to Calvin's doctrine of predestination on the ground that it would be unjust for God to punish creatures for the commission of sins which they were by himself foreordained to commit, Calvin replied, "how could any injustice be committed by him who is the judge of the world?" That means His will is the supreme law, and right and wrong are volitional distinctions of the omnipotent being. The whole decretal system of the Institutes presupposes precisely such a monarchical God. He extends, or withholds mercy as He pleases, for the glory of His sovereign power. According to the unsearchable counsel of His own will He elects some to eternal life and ordains others to dishonor and wrath. It is true that the Institutes does ascribe ethical qualities to God. It speaks freely and frequently of His holiness, justice and mercy. But the qualities denoted by these terms do not constitute the very essence of God. They are peripheral, while the will is central. The deepest thing in God, the *causa immanens*, is pure abstract will that is

<sup>2</sup> See "Institutes," Bk. III., Chapter 23: 11.

determined by nothing whatever but absolute caprice. Theoretically Calvin maintained that the divine will is conditioned by the divine nature, and that the most essential attributes of God are justice and grace. But practically His nature does not condition His will; on the contrary, His will capriciously rules his character. God's most necessary function is sovereignty, not justice nor grace. The sovereign is described as exercising His sovereignty justly and graciously under the double decree; justly predestinating some to eternal reprobation and graciously predestinating others to eternal salvation. This is expressed tersely and clearly in the Institutes, in the second paragraph of the 23 chapter. Calvin says, "Yet we espouse not the notion of the Romish theologians concerning the absolute and arbitrary power of God, which, on account of its profaneness, deserves our detestation. We represent not God as lawless, who is a law unto himself." And in the same paragraph Calvin completely neutralizes this quasi-ethical conception of God's sovereignty by asserting, "it is impious to suppose that there is something antecedent to the will of God, on which it depends. The will of God is the highest rule of justice; so that what He wills must be considered just, for this very reason, because He wills it."

Calvin himself calls this predestinarian scheme "just and irreprehensible, but incomprehensible." To our moral sense it seems perfectly comprehensible, but also absolutely reprehensible and unjust. If the God who is the supreme ruler of the universe is exalted above all ethical distinctions because He is God, then might makes right. Like an oriental tyrant He can do what He pleases. He is the absolute ruler of a kingdom where His will is law. Given such a God and the decretal system is comprehensible as the caprice of a tyrant. But according to human ethical standards His decrees are unjust and reprehensible.

And when non-Calvinists criticise as unjust and reprehensible the condemnation of infants on account of imputed sin, and the reprobation of adults because of the conveyed corruption



of a remote ancestor they are told that such reasoning is purely subjective and derives all its force from our human limitations. It assumes, they say, that we are competent to sit in judgment on God's government of the universe, that we can judge the end which He has in view, and also the justice and wisdom of the means adopted for its accomplishment. And this, they contend, is clearly a preposterous assumption. What is man that he should contend with God, or presume that his interests rather than God's glory should be made the final end? We are shut up to facts, the facts of providence, of the Bible, and of experience. We have no right to say that the goodness of God forbids the permission of sin and the punishment of sinful creatures. We have no right to say that His justice requires that all rational creatures should be treated alike. But, we reply, granting, that God is infinitely superior to man in character and being, yet, His morality cannot differ in kind from our morality. Justice cannot be blind and grace dare not be partial. Not will and force, but reason and freedom must be the terms in which the relations of an ethical God to His universe are expressed. The ethical instinct of mankind recoils from the partialistic justice of Calvin's predestinarianism as subversive of divine goodness and righteousness. And if this divinest instinct of mankind is not trustworthy then there remains no standard of ethical judgment on earth.

The third controverted point of Calvinistic predestinarianism is its alleged denial of human freedom and, consequently, responsibility. Belief in human freedom is as essential to our moral life as, within its own sphere, is the belief in the general uniformity of nature. It will be granted by all rational beings that the denial of freedom must logically result in denying all proper responsibility, all merit and demerit. If our life is simply the resultant of antecedent forces, unalterably the effect of an eternal cause, then the sin of the sinner and the sanctification of the saint must alike be regarded as necessary. Under a reign of law, that is destructive of

freedom, the universe would be a parallelogram of forces but not the arena of free and responsible action.

Calvinism has been generally accused of reducing man to a mere automaton, the puppet in the hands of absolute will; but it has always strenuously denied the impeachment, and has resorted to marvelous dialectical hair-splitting in order to refute it. The sense of responsibility inherent in man has given predestinarianism the utmost embarrassment. And a formal and explicit denial of human freedom would be so great an affront to the moral consciousness of mankind that one cannot expect it even from that system of thought which is based upon the absolute and unconditional sovereignty of the Divine Will, and which, by every implication of logic, reduces man to helpless clay in the hands of an omnipotent potter. Calvinistic predestinarianism has from the beginning been in the hapless plight of being compelled, by the ineradicable sense of human freedom and responsibility, to deny with specious logic what its fundamental principles assert with bold assurance. Sometimes predestinarians have rested their case on the contention that foreknowledge antecedes and conditions foreordination. The double predestination, they have maintained, was determined by the divine prescience, according to which God foresaw the moral disposition of men. But Calvin, with characteristic logic, said, "Predestination is involved in many cavils, especially by those who make foreknowledge the cause of it. We maintain, that both belong to God, but it is preposterous to represent one as dependent on the other." Other Calvinists with much mental acumen have constructed a theory of the will which will square with the facts of the decretal system. And such is the ambiguity of language and the confusion of thought on this difficult matter, that their philosophical defense is not without plausibility. It amounts briefly to this, that liberty and ability are not identical and must not be confused, and that certainty is perfectly consistent with liberty. They maintain that a free act may be inevitably certain as to its occurrence, and



yet perfectly free as to its performance. That is to say, the will is determined by an eternal decree, but the act is free, because it is not the result of external force, but the fruit of internal character. Now common sense would seem to require, that, in order to render man justly responsible for his character, which determines his will, it must be self acquired. But predestinarian philosophy announces with ex-cathedra assurance that this is confounding things which are distinct. God by His eternal decree determines the character of each individual. Man has no inherent ability to change from depravity to holiness, any more than he can thrust himself from the pinnacles of redemption into the abyss of reprobation; yet he is free and responsible. Man falls, says Calvin, God's providence so ordains it; yet he falls by his own guilt.

Surely, ethical reason stands abashed before such unmoral logic, and agrees humbly with Calvin, "that there is a learned ignorance of things which it is neither permitted nor lawful to know, and avidity of knowledge is a species of madness." If this is divine logic, then man must either immolate reason upon the shrine of blind and abject faith, or, by the canons of human logic and morality, he must reject the decretum horribile as violating the essential goodness of God.

Whence did Calvin derive his doctrine of predestination? Mention has already been made of certain dogmatic postulates of predestination which were shared by all the reformers. In a sense, the doctrines grew inevitably out of the biblical, anthropological and soteriological convictions of Calvin. At the same time it has a very definite literary pedigree. It was derived from Calvin's patristic and scriptural studies; specifically from St. Augustine and from St. Paul.

In the history of human thought and achievement Calvinism stands for much more than predestinarianism. The whole modern world owes a vast spiritual, religious and social debt to Calvin. And yet, by the irony of history, his own most original contribution to religious thought and to the life of the world is undervalued by many, who esteem most highly his

theology, which is the most vulnerable and the least original part of Calvin's labors.

Historically Calvinistic predestinarianism reaches back to Augustine. The Saint of Hippo is Calvin's spiritual Father, and Calvin is his lineal heir. Augustinian and Calvinistic predestination are by no means identical. But without the former, the latter is historically inexplicable; and without the latter, the former is logically inchoate. Space forbids a detailed discussion of their mutual relation and agreement. The points of difference between them are chiefly two. Augustine developed the doctrine of predestination controversially, in a fierce theological conflict with Pelagius; while Calvin was led to its adoption logically, by the calm and critical processes of study and reflection. Hence, while in matter Augustine's predestinarianism is milder than Calvin's, sublapsarian instead of supralapsarian, yet, in his manner, Augustine often excels Calvin in harshness of statement and in the complacent breadth with which he depicts the fate of the reprobate. The second difference between the two arises from the fact that in Augustine the doctrine of predestination lies imbedded in a sacramental and sacerdotal conception of the church. According to it God made the decree, but the church manipulates it, and administers the divine will through priestly operations. The church and its sacrosanct ordinances stand between guilty mankind and the sovereign God. Theologically Augustine conceived of salvation as absolutely and eternally decreed by the will of God; but ecclesiastically he described it as conditionally bestowed through the sacraments of the church. Either principle applied rigorously neutralizes the other. Calvin, while accepting Augustine's predestinarianism, swept aside his priestly conception of the church. In Calvinism no sacerdotal order, no sacrosanct ordinances intervene between God and man. Calvin asserted the twin principles of religious individualism and of the spiritual catholicity of the church; in the invisible church man stood face to face with God. Thus, Augustine, the bishop of Hippo, excludes from heaven



all unbaptized children dying in infancy, while Calvin, expressly teaches the salvation of all elect infants, whether baptized or not.

But Calvin claimed more than patristic authority for his central doctrine. He derived it from the Bible, and especially from the teaching of St. Paul, as interpreted by him. Calvin was the ablest exegete of the reformation, and his commentaries, written with rare spiritual insight into scriptural truth, will never become obsolete. But he accepted the mechanical theory of inspiration and that vitiated his interpretation of scripture. To Calvin the Bible was the revelation of the sovereign will of God, dictated by the Holy Spirit to the writers, whom he calls, "Sure and authentic amanuenses." To him it was not the disclosure, by inspired men, of the heart and character of the Father, but the publication of the will and law of the Sovereign of the universe, by means of an inspired book. Hence, of course, the Bible was equally inspired, and equally valuable for instruction, in all its parts. The proof text method of dogmatics is the complement of the mechanical theory of inspiration. And if we approach the Bible in that spirit we can prove anything, according to our dominant dogmatic prepossession.

It is not surprising therefore that Calvin found the Old Testament full of predestinarian proof text.<sup>3</sup> For the Old Testament is imbued with the thought of the all-pervasive presence of the eternal creative will, and everything, the evil as well as the good, is brought directly under the control of God. With naïve, anthropomorphic, unmediated directness the divine sovereignty is conceived to be so absolute that it may without question harden the heart of the sinner, destine a man to perdition, or choose and exalt whom it will to honor and everlasting felicity. If the expressions of an immature moral development in the consciousness of Israel are on a par

<sup>3</sup> Vide Ex. 7: 3; I. Kings 22-22; Jer. 13: 13-14; Isaiah 45: 7; 6: 9-10; Amos 3: 6.

with the Gospel of Jesus Christ, then predestinarianism rests secure on abundant scriptural testimonies; then Calvin's doctrine of predestination is not only strictly logical but also soundly scriptural. And the only difference between the Old Testament and the Institutes is, that what in the former is simply oracularly declared, in the latter is theoretically and systematically explained.

And in this latter respect Paul was a forerunner of Calvin. His Hebrew consciousness brought all history, including evil as well as good, completely under the sway of the divine sovereignty. But his Hellenic mind must needs find a reason for the faith that was in him. As a Jew he believed in the sovereign providence of God; as a Greek he explained it by his philosophy of history.

This Pauline theodicy receives its largest expression in his great letter to the Romans. And since this epistle is the arsenal and the armory of Calvinistic predestinarianism it behooves us to inquire: what is Pauline predestination?

The disturbing element in Paul's thoroughly Hebrew conviction of God's absolute guidance of history was the paradox of sin. Paul squarely faces the paradox and in Romans he solves it, much like Calvin, by asserting that sin is not only a fact of human experience, but also, that, as a part of the whole providential history of the human race, it was intended to be so by the irresistible decree of God. That this is the plain exegetical sense of Romans 9: 6-29 cannot be denied. Its strict literal interpretation buttresses extreme supralapsarianism. But the same method of exegesis applied to Romans 11: 32-36 yields a Pauline doctrine of universalism. There he teaches, not that some will be saved, but that under the divine sovereignty of the eternal love all shall be saved. In this passage of his moral philosophy of human history Paul seems to lift his vision to the last daring height of speculation. He sees the ultimate reason why "God has shut up all under disobedience," viz., "that he might have mercy upon all."



Therefore, if predestinarianism has Pauline proof-texts, so has universalism.<sup>4</sup>

But no exegesis does justice to Paul that detaches a verse, or a chapter from the body of his teaching, and in the interests of a dogmatic presupposition applies a passage referring to a historical situation, to a metaphysical argument. In Romans 9 Paul affirms the unconditional sovereignty of God; in Chapter 10 he asserts human responsibility and in the 11th Chapter he suggests the future ultimate explanation of the paradox of sin. Calvinistic predestinarianism, then, cannot claim the authority of the great Apostle for its scheme of salvation. Pauline predestination is temporal particularism in order to an ultimate (conditional or unconditional?) universalism of grace.

But, whatever is Pauline predestination, in conclusion we say with Calvin himself, "Now, let the supreme Master and Judge decide the whole matter." Is there any warrant for Calvinistic predestinarianism in the mind of the Master? My conviction is that Calvin's decretal system of theology and Jesus' conception of God are so disparate, that, if the one is true, the other must be false.

Jesus, too, teaches the sovereignty of God. But in the teaching of Jesus sovereignty is the kingship exercised by the Father in heaven over the intelligent and responsible creatures of his hand, not the pre-mundane decretal caprice of absolute power; exercised, moreover, in full accordance with His fatherliness, for their salvation, and not for the manifestation of His abstract glory.

And Jesus believes in sin. We find in his teaching no abstract definition of sin, and no speculative theory of its origin. He simply recognizes the fact of sin. The malady was universal and its seat was in the heart of man, *i. e.*, in the sphere of human motive and will. Ideally, all men were the children of the Father, and while actually sin had

<sup>4</sup> Vide John 12: 32; I. Cor. 15: 22; I. Cor. 15: 28; Ephes. 1: 10; Col. 1: 20; Phil. 2: 10-11; I. Tim. 4: 10; Titus 2: 11.

estranged men from God, yet they were loved and missed in the Father's house. Mankind was not a *massa perditionis*; but, in all their unfilial disobedience, men were still the sons of God, capable of returning to their Father.

And Jesus also offers salvation. As the malady of sin is universal so the remedy for sin which Jesus offers is likewise universal. Salvation is not grounded in a pre-temporal election of the absolute sovereign, but in the eternal love of the Father. And man is not its passive recipient, but he must seek it earnestly, and receive it with humble gratitude.

And Jesus teaches that there may ultimately be an irremediable depravity in man. But, far from being the result of an unalterable divine decree, it is caused, in direct opposition to the will of God, by a man's persistent and malignant hatred of goodness.

Thus contrasted Calvinistic predestinarianism and Christ's conception of God are absolutely incongruous, and one must either renounce Calvinism, or abandon Christ's teaching, as a valid conception of the ultimate reality. There are other defective systems of theology which do not make Christ's God-consciousness consistently regulative and normative. Yes, one may go further, and declare, that the God-consciousness of Jesus Christ has been used fully in no system of speculative theology. But among all defective system Calvinism is facile princeps. To Melancthon Calvinism appeared as a revival of Stoicism. And to the christological consciousness of our own day Calvinistic predestinarianism is structurally and metaphysically more nearly akin to some primitive law religion than to christianity. Its conception of the divine government of the universe is derived from a court of justice, oriental justice at that, and not from the family relation. From that primitive notion of the deity as a judge, or sovereign, enforcing his arbitrary decrees, we must rise to the christian thought of a loving Father bent on the education and salvation of the human race.

And to this higher christological standpoint the moral and



religious consciousness of our age is steadily advancing. The day will come when a new Calvin shall arise in the theological world, a man in whom the elements of head, heart and will are mixed as nobly as they were in the great reformer of the Sixteenth Century. But, reversing the order of Calvin, he will interpret Augustine and St. Paul in the light of Christ's Message of the Eternal. He will satisfy our christian consciousness with a theology whose regulative principle lies in these words of Jesus: "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father."

ALLENTOWN, PA.

#### IV.

### THE DOCTRINE OF THE LORD'S SUPPER IN CALVIN'S SYSTEM OF THOUGHT.

A STUDY OF THE SUBJECT IN THE LIGHT OF TO-DAY.

BY THE REV. A. S. WEBER, D.D.

John Morley in beginning his "Life of Gladstone" calls the undertaking a stroke of temerity. A similar characterization might perhaps with not inconsiderable truthfulness be applied to an attempt to discuss, within the limits editorially prescribed for this article, Calvin's doctrinal theory of the Lord's Supper. The difficulties in the present instance arise, however, less from the necessity of bringing a great mass of material on the subject within the scope of a reasonable brevity, than from the fact that the subject, large as it is in itself, cannot be separated from the rest of Calvin's system of doctrine and given independent consideration.

From a closely articulated system of thought, such as Calvin's is known to be, no important doctrine can be taken out of its relations to other doctrines without rendering it largely unintelligible. It may seem somewhat paradoxical, but it is none the less true, to say that no doctrine can be adequately set forth or fully understood, until all the other doctrines have been stated and apprehended. The very word "system" implies that the doctrinal parts making up its content, hang together in a mutually inter-dependent relationship that is vitally significant and important, and that a knowledge of the whole conditions that of its several parts.

In the space here available, it is plainly impossible to enter upon the study of the subject, even in bare outline, in the comprehensive manner thus seen to be required for its fully satis-



factory elucidation. The best way remaining open for our approach to the subject must therefore be taken. We must inquire, in a preliminary way, what is the general philosophical and theological basis upon which Calvin's system of doctrine rests. What are the assumed presuppositions underlying his conceptions as to the nature of man and his needs, as to Christ and Christianity in their adaptation to those needs, as to the Church and its ordinances, in logical consistency with which are formulated the theories of the Sacraments in general and that of the Lord's Supper in particular. Such an inquiry will show that the essential features of these general philosophical and theological assumptions were not new to the age of the Reformation. They were not the intellectual product of the sixteenth century. Calvin and his Protestant co-laborers, whilst insisting upon slight and not unimportant changes of detail here and there in doctrinal statement, retained the fundamental "scheme" which the Church of Rome had handed down to them, and which, so far as its essentials are concerned, can be traced back not only to Augustine and earlier fathers, but to Paul's exposition of the Christian religion as found in his contributions to the New Testament Scriptures.

The correctness of this view of the attitude of the Reformers toward the earlier doctrines of the Church, may be verified and confirmed by instancing several particulars. The traditional "orthodoxy" of historic Christianity, Roman and Protestant alike, from the days of Paul on to the middle of the last century, has been based on several outstanding and coördinated assumptions. (1) The fallen and corrupt nature of man. (2) The necessity of a regeneration that can be wrought only by Divine intervention and super-human power. (3) A view of Christ's person and office answerable to man's need of a new birth. (4) A conception of the Church and the Sacraments as divinely ordained to mediate Christ's saving power to the believing members of our lost and ruined race. That in their *essence*, these age-old conceptions of the truth

were accepted, without qualification in their unaltered form, is fully established by a comparison between the teachings on these points of the Heidelberg Catechism, the Westminster Confession, and the Thirty Nine Articles, on the one hand, and of the Decrees of the Council of Trent, the statements of Augustine, Athenasius, and Irenæus, and the writings of the Apostle Paul, on the other hand. All of them are essentially at one on the broad general assumptions under notice. Those who in the sixteenth century withdrew from the Roman communion, it is evident, therefore, were constrained to do so on grounds other than those covered by those assumptions.

So far as men in our day have broken with one or more or all of these traditional conceptions of religious truth, causes other than those residing in the principles of Protestantism must be sought to account for their changed attitude toward those conceptions. Men in both the Roman and Protestant fellowship have broken with at least some of them, and have done so for substantially the same reasons. These reasons may be summarized under two heads. (1) The accredited achievements of modern science. (2) The results attained by the critical study of Jesus' teachings as recorded in the Synoptic Gospels. So largely determinative of its trend are these factors of present-day thought, and so directly have they to do with the transformation of religious doctrines, that we may properly pause for a moment in passing to give them the attention they deserve.

As everybody, acquainted with the intellectual life of our age, knows, the scientific theory of Evolution during the last half century has been winning a steadily increasing number of thinking Christians to a conviction of the validity of its principal claims. Multitudes of Christians, in pulpits and pews the world over, accept the statement recently made by a distinguished university president, that "the chief and essential contention of Darwin is absolutely beyond question from those competent to form an opinion."<sup>1</sup> This compels not

<sup>1</sup> David Starr Jordan, in *The Independent*, February 11, 1909, p. 323.



simply a re-statement or modification, but a surrender of the ancient theory of the "fall of man," together with those doctrines immediately connected with or related to that theory. Similarly, the historico-critical investigation of the New Testament Scriptures has been succeeding in multiplying the number of its convinced followers. Men, in whose character sound learning and true Christian devotion are combined, and whom it is a libel to charge with being disloyal to the truth and unfaithful to Christ, are giving the most earnest and painstaking attention to this investigation, and frankly accepting the results it is establishing. Among these results, there are some in the light of which open-minded searchers after the truth are forced to give up traditional formulas, particularly such as are loaded with metaphysical distinctions or veiled in mysterious obscurity, and to replace them by those simpler and understandable conceptions of Christian truth in support of which the sayings of Jesus himself, rather than those of any of his earlier or later interpreters, can be confidently quoted from the records of Matthew, Mark and Luke.

This confidence in the simpler sayings of Jesus, rather than in the more complex and abstract statements of others, does not rest on an arbitrary preference merely of what is simple and easily understood. It is prompted and sustained by the discoveries which critical scholarship has made in the pursuit of its comparative study of the New Testament documents. Among those discoveries, one has established the existence of marked—and some would add, irreconcilable—differences in fundamentally important conceptions of religion, between the historic records of the Synoptists on the one side and the interpretative and apologetic writings of Paul and John, for instance, on the other side. Some of these differences have been recently pointed out, by a learned professor in one of the leading "orthodox" theological seminaries of our country, in a notable contribution to the *American Journal of Theology*.<sup>2</sup> So pertinent to the present discussion are certain of

<sup>2</sup> See the first article by Professor McGiffert, in January, 1909, issue.

its contentions, that in venturing to transfer them for the purpose of illustrating a point for which they were not originally designed, one feels certain they lose nothing of their persuasiveness and force.

The author of the paper referred to holds that there is "a great and consistent body of teaching," in the writings of Paul and of John, which "is wanting altogether in the Synoptic Gospels." That which makes such a statement the more significant is the fact that to that "body of teaching," which cannot be traced back to Jesus and in support of which no sayings of the Master can be adduced, "is due the larger and perhaps controlling part of the Christianity of all the centuries." This does not deny that, side by side with its dominant elements, there run through Christianity influences of a different and higher order which must be ascribed to Jesus. It only affirms that these influences have not yet had their day, and suggests the problem of deciding whether prior authority does or does not belong to the Synoptists. No such problem arises, Dr. McGiffert reminds us, from a comparative study of Paul and John. Between them, it is perfectly clear, the connection and agreement are very close. "Many of the essential features of Paul's system," it is asserted, "re-appear in the Gospel according to John: the necessity of regeneration changing a man from a fleshly to a spiritual being, union with Christ, the deity of Christ, the sacramental view of baptism and the Lord's Supper,—all these are found in the teaching of the Johannine Christ. But all the more striking by contrast is the lack of all these elements in the teaching of the Jesus of the Synoptists. In the latter nothing is said of the essentially fleshly and evil nature of man, nothing of a consequent need of regeneration, nothing of mystical union with Christ, nothing of the deity of Christ, and not a trace of sacramentalism appears in connection with its references to baptism and the Lord's Supper."

In a subsequent paragraph of the article from which we are quoting the author returns to give added emphasis to these



discovered differences. "In Jesus' teaching," he there says, "there is no hint of the radical badness and utter helplessness of human nature, of which Paul made so much, and no hint of a consequent necessity of the transformation of man's nature by supernatural agency. It is not simply that Paul threw the matter into theological or philosophical form, but that his view of man and his need was totally at variance with Christ's. And if this is true of the fundamental elements of Paul's system, it is true also of their corollaries—the doctrine of salvation, of the person and work of Christ, of the Church and the sacraments. All these had their origin ultimately in the experience of Paul, and not in the teaching of Jesus."

Conclusions such as these in the realm of criticism, even more so than the results of evolution in the realm of science, carry into the theological world, not merely suggestions that may be momentarily perplexing and disconcerting, but forces that must be permanently effective and revolutionizing. "The new philosophy, the new criticism, the new science," an ultra-conservative theologian said the other day, "are compelling a re-statement of the Christian faith."<sup>3</sup> It can hardly be allowed, however, that his word 're-statement' meets the requirements of the situation. No revision, however drastic, could suffice to make traditional systems of theology and ancient confessional standards, acceptable to the modern mind. What is needed in the circumstances of to-day, is a reconstruction of doctrinal and confessional theology in its entirety, and upon foundations that are at once true to Jesus' conceptions of God and man, and in harmony with the sanctions of an enlightened Christian conscience.

When we turn, now—after these somewhat lengthy but not unimportant parenthetical observations on the results of science and criticism in their relations to Christian doctrine in general—to give attention in the light of those results to Calvin's system in particular, we may, even in advance, anticipate finding certain normative doctrines of his so thoroughly at

<sup>3</sup> The Rev. W. Robertson Nicoll, D.D., editor of *The British Weekly*.

variance with current conceptions of the truth, as to preclude the possibility of our acquiescing in them. This will be seen at once when we begin our examination, as we naturally should, by an inquiry as to his fundamental ideas concerning God and man. These were far more the metaphysical notions of Deity and of the corrupt and hopelessly depraved nature of man, as taught by Paul, than the conceptions of Jesus, so vividly realized and impressively taught by him, of God as Father, and of man as God's imperfect, upward-struggling child. One reading Calvin's "Institutes" can hardly fail to realize that his mind was steeped, not so much in the teachings of the early Gospels, as in the mysticism and philosophy of Paul and of John. The great bulk of the scriptural citations with which he undertakes to fortify his views are taken, not from the Synoptists, but from other books of the New Testament. In this regard Calvin resembles the distinguished British theologian whose Chicago lectures, afterwards published under the title of "Studies in Theology," failed to give anything but the most meager attention to the words of Jesus. It is not at all surprising, therefore, that to Calvin, as to Paul, God should be so largely an arbitrary Sovereign, "electing some members of the race that has been ruined by Adam's 'fall' to the hope of life, and adjudging others to eternal death."<sup>4</sup> It is even less surprising that to him, man should be by heredity and practice a lost and ruined being doomed to death. "All men are totally ruined," he affirms, "not only by corrupt habits but by depravity of nature. They are overwhelmed with an inevitable calamity from which they can never emerge unless extricated by Divine inter-position. So completely is the mind of man alienated from the righteousness of God, that it conceives desires and undertakes everything that is impious, perverse, base and impure; so thoroughly is the heart of man infected by the poison of sin that it cannot produce anything but what is corrupt."<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Cf. "The Institutes," Book 3, Chap. 21, Sec. 5.

<sup>5</sup> "Institutes," Book 3, Chap. 3.



Now, as compared to such Calvinistic views, it may be confidently affirmed, the nobler vision of God in his fatherly relationship and disposition toward man and the changed conception of man, prevailing to-day as the result of spiritual growth under scientific and critical methods of acquiring a knowledge of the truth, afford an immeasurably stronger and more uplifting appeal. They inspire a love for and trust in the Father who pities our frailties and assures us of forgiveness, who woos us into communion with himself by his Spirit and grace, and who guides and supports our feeble and faltering efforts toward the achievement of spiritual ideals in life and character. They dispel a craven religious temper and encourage at once a bolder, more trustful, and hopeful attitude of mind and heart. They change the quality of fear in religion from mere dread of punishment and pain in the world to come, to the nobler moral dread of degradation and corruption of soul and character in the present world. They help men to realize that a "lost soul" does not mean a soul that is to be endlessly tortured hereafter in physical perdition, but a soul that has missed its true life, is shivelled, maimed and polluted, now. The fear of such an issue is a reasonable and worthy element in religion, and reflects the mind that was in Christ.

Passing on in our examination of Calvin's views, from those of God and man, to those which involve his conception of the "redemptive scheme," we find him construing the person and work of Christ, with logical nicety and precision, according to the requirements of his earlier pre-suppositions. In the mystery of the incarnate person of the Son of God, he, as the second Adam, "recapitulates" the race and provides, through its union with him, for man's new start toward salvation. "Through union with and participation in Christ," he says, "man is made a partaker of the resurrection, he is raised to newness of life, and the Divine image which through sin had been defaced and almost obliterated, is restored within him. This is the regeneration which God has provided for man in

his only-begotten Son.”<sup>6</sup> To become available, this provision made in Christ requires not alone a faithful obedience to the commandments of God and such a hearty trust in Christ as he has asked us to repose in him; there are needed, in addition, the Church, an ordained ministry, and the sacraments, for its transmission to and the nourishment of the individual believer. “Owing to our ignorance and slothfulness, and, I may add, the vanity of our minds”; Calvin asserts, “external aids are appointed of God in order that through faith the Gospel of Christ may become ours. First among these external aids appointed of God to be instrumental to our salvation is the Holy Church. The Church is the mother of all that have God for their Father. There is no other way of entrance into life except to be conceived by her, born of her, nourished at her breast, and continually preserved under her care and government. Chosen and separated from the world by Christ, the Church is his spouse, his body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all. Union with Christ being conditioned by union with his Church, it follows that the latter is essential to salvation. It follows, moreover, that a departure from the Church is a renunciation of God and of Christ, a more atrocious crime and sacrilegious perfidy than which cannot be imagined, because it involves the violation of the conjugal relation which the only-begotten Son of God has condescended to form with us—a violation which makes those guilty of it deserving to be crushed with the most powerful thunders of his wrath.”<sup>7</sup>

There is no need of tarrying at this point to indicate by quotations, the conception of the ministry which corresponds to this idea of the Church. It will be sufficient to say that to Calvin's mind, the functions of the holy office are the logical outcome of the notion, for which there is not a suggestion of support to be found in any authentic word of Jesus, that the Church is not a fabric reared by men, but a mystically ap-

<sup>6</sup> “Institutes,” Book 3, Chaps. 13 and 14.

<sup>7</sup> “Institutes,” Book 4, Chap. 1.



pointed channel of salvation, an indispensable element in the relation between the soul of man and his Creator. This superhumanly "high" conception of the Church has not yet entirely lost its hold in certain regions even of Protestantism. Happily, however, its influence in that branch of the Church with which most of the readers of *THE REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW* are identified, has been a dwindling power during the last few decades. Vague, inherited feelings and customs will, no doubt for some time longer, lend some sort of support to the supposition that membership in the Church involves something incommensurably more than union with other Christian associations, that it makes one an inward partaker of ineffable and mysterious graces to which, apart from the Church, there is no access; but conscious Christianity, in its thought of communion and fellowship with God, no longer reckons with Church mediation any more than it does with priestly mediation.

A theological reactionary of the day, a few weeks since in writing upon the subject of "Criticising the Church," said it was astonishing to see how many "powerful minds had taken and were continuing to take" an attitude of this kind toward the Church. He cites with evident regret and strong disapprobation Professor Harnack's counsel that "he who has a denomination should be as though he had it not. That is, the Church's end is not in itself, and one should sit loose to it except as an instrument for achieving ends apart from which it is of no value." This view of the Church is of course wholly foreign to the Calvinistic conception, but it is only another way of saying what the opponents of the "high-church" party affirmed fifty or sixty years ago during the Anglican controversies abroad and the corresponding controversies in our own country. To those opponents the Church, whilst founded and maintained in history by a directing Providence, was nevertheless a human corporation devised to strengthen men in their struggle after goodness and holiness by the association and mutual help of fellow-believers. It was

a corporation of Christians, voluntarily associated with a view of becoming more effective in their efforts to accomplish certain definite purposes: The commemoration of Gospel events was to minister to their own development and strength in the spiritual life, but at the same time send them forth in the spirit of their Master to minister unto others. The linking of Gospel truth to well-ordered living was to end, not with themselves, but result in carrying blessing to fellowmen. Through them the diffusion of a knowledge of the truth as it is in Jesus, was to be brought about, and God's Kingdom extended into every relation and circumstance of life, no less than into every nation, kindred and tribe of the earth. In a scientific age like ours, when the Church, conceived of as "constitutionally sacramental" often repels rather than attracts, may it not be the finger of Providence that is wisely pointing us to the importance of returning through such speculative mysteries as those that have too long enveloped men's conceptions of the Church, back to the simplicity that is in Jesus and his "Gospel of the Kingdom"?

The transition from the foregoing considerations of certain general aspects of Calvin's system of thought, to the notice of the sacramental theories which are an essential and constituent part of that system, as already intimated, can now be made with a sense of at least a partial preparedness for properly appraising their soundness. To the extent to which we have succeeded in showing that the "system" and its ruling ideas are not immune from the possibility of serious objection, to that extent, it must be manifest, such a quarry of thought cannot be expected to furnish the stones needed for an enduring and satisfying structure embodying the nature and meaning of Baptism and the Lord's Supper. Against Calvin's carefully guarded statements concerning the initial Sacrament, it may not be necessary for a modern mind to register special protest. Instead of regarding it as the divinely ordained method by which God conveys his grace of regeneration, he declares himself "by no means able to admit that baptism is



essential to salvation. That is an ill-stated notion, mischievous in its consequences and an insult to God.”<sup>8</sup> As a sign, he insists, it is declarative, not communicative, of the fact that “it is the Lord who forgives and cleanses us, who obliterates the remembrance of our sins, who makes us partakers of his death, who weakens the power of our corrupt propensities, and who makes us one with himself. By baptism believers are certified of God’s blessings, but the blessings are not bound or inclosed in the Sacrament which has not the power of imparting them to us. It is only a sign by which the Lord testifies that he is determined to give us all these things.”<sup>9</sup> His language on these points, in the passages cited, it will be observed, does not contain even the remotest suggestion of the theory that the vital germ of immortality is communicated to the believer and his child in and through this sacramental act. In fact, it explicitly pronounces against it. And if the Reformed ecclesiastics had been content with Calvin’s statements of the doctrine, and refrained from importing into our theology and into the “Office for Baptism” the so-called baptismal-regeneration theories of the Romanists or of the high-church party in the Anglican communion in which Hurrell Froude and John Henry Newman, Keble and Pusey, figured so conspicuously, how much unnecessary and harmful controversy in our branch of the Church would have been avoided.

The language in which Calvin’s views of the doctrine of the Lord’s Supper are set forth, is far less of an approximation, however, to the present-day conceptions of the ordinance, than is that just cited with reference to baptism. The intellectual storm-center of his age was the nature and significance of this particular doctrine, and those reading what he has written on the subject are made to feel that he found it peculiarly difficult to formulate the conclusions to which his inquiries had brought him. Thoroughly persuaded that ubiquity cannot be ascribed to Christ’s glorified humanity, that his body is

<sup>8</sup> “Institutes,” Book 4, Chap. 15, p. 491.

<sup>9</sup> “Institutes,” Book 4, Chap. 14, p. 486.

locally present in heaven only and in no conceivable sense included (as Romanists in one form and Lutherans in another, taught that it was), in the consecrated elements of bread and wine, and that it can be apprehended and received by faith only and not at all by communicants' hands and mouths—thoroughly persuaded concerning all this, he nevertheless found himself unable to agree with the theologian, who according to the late A. V. G. Allen was four centuries ahead of his contemporaries, that the Lord's Supper was a commemorative act only. "Whilst there are some who define, in a word, that to eat the flesh of Christ and to drink his blood, is no other than to believe in Christ," he writes, "I conceive that in that remarkable discourse in which Christ recommends us to feed upon his body, he intended to instruct us that we are quickened by a real participation of him which he designates eating and drinking,—instruction which implies the actual transfusion of Christ's life into us through the sacrament he has appointed. At the same time we confess that there is no other eating than by faith, as it is impossible to imagine any other. But the difference between me and those whose opinion I now oppose is this: They consider eating to be the same thing as believing, while I say that in believing we eat the flesh of Christ, and that this eating is the fruit and effect of faith."<sup>10</sup> Significantly he adds: "The difference is small in words"—and it must be left to those that have perceptive powers sufficiently keen to do so, to follow him as he continues—"but in the thing itself the difference is considerable."

The specific ends, which to Calvin's mind, the ordinance is designed to subserve, are definitely considered and stated in other sections of the lengthy chapter devoted in the "Institutes" to this subject. "Our souls are fed by the flesh and blood of Christ," he thinks, "just as our corporal life is preserved and sustained by bread and wine. Though it appears incredible for the flesh of Christ from such an immense local

<sup>10</sup> "Institutes," Book 4, Chap. 17, Sec. 5.



distance to reach us, so as to become our food, we should remember how much the secret power of the Holy Spirit transcends all our senses, and what folly it is to apply any measure of ours to his immensity. Let our faith, therefore, receive what our understanding is unable to comprehend, that the Spirit really unites things which are separated by local distance. The holy participation in his flesh and blood, by which Christ communicates his life unto us and refreshes us, is the method by which the thing signified to us in the sacred banquet, is offered unto us, and by which his promises are accomplished. Thus, if it be true that the visible sign is given us to seal the donation of the invisible substance, we ought to entertain a confident assurance, that in receiving the symbol of his body, we at the same time receive the body itself to the nourishment of our being unto immortality.”<sup>11</sup>

Unbiased minds reading such statements of the doctrine, one suspects, must feel that the Calvinistic ideas, however refined, are really materialistic—little, if at all, better in this regard, than the transubstantiation or consubstantiation theories respectively of Rome and Luther. To insist that Divine grace is something that can be sacramentally transfused gives to the observance of the supper a sense too literal for spiritual safety. Does it not open the way for men to believe in an infusion of grace that incorporates itself with our nature in a subconscious region independent of any intelligent or intelligible activity on their part? If so, then its mysticism becomes magic, under the power of which, men are transmuted without being converted, consecrated without being sanctified, given a formal outward mark of godliness while utterly lacking of its inward spiritual power. True, Calvin exhausts his resources of language in endeavoring to make clear what he means by the objective spiritual presence, in distinction from the Roman and Lutheran hypotheses, but it would be rash to say that he succeeded in his undertaking. Some of his contemporary critics called his views on this particular phase of

<sup>11</sup> “Institutes,” Book 4, Chap. 17, Sec. 8.

the subject "absurd and self-contradictory," whilst others since then, seizing different statements of his, have come to most divergent conclusions as to what he really did teach. Thus Maurice, for instance, who is one of his most searching antagonists, observes that the author of the "Institutes," by affirming that the purposes of the Holy Communion are accomplished "by the ascent of the soul to the glorified Christ in heaven, rather than by the descent of Christ's nature into the elements on the altar," denies that "there is any object present in the Sacrament of the Supper except that which under the creative power of faith is put there by the believing communicant."<sup>12</sup> The late Dr. Nevin, on the contrary, insists that Calvin "clearly taught an objective presence of Christ," but adds that "it is in the sacramental *transaction* as such," rather than in the elements of bread and wine, that the presence is to be discerned.<sup>13</sup> Without presuming to decide which of these learned theologians is correct in his interpretation of the Calvinistic teaching, we may content ourselves by saying that, aside from the more serious objection to that teaching which arises from its underlying assumptions, it is too vague to commend itself to one's approval, too metaphysical to be of genuine religious service to the present age, and too closely allied with priestly and sacrificial notions of religion to be accepted as a valid representation of Jesus' design in instituting the Lord's Supper.

These observations upon Calvin's dogmas on the Holy Communion, apply of course, with equal force to those also of the Roman Church and of all the Reformers—with one notable exception. The theory of the Ordinance as expounded by the great scholar and preacher of Zurich, has great advantage over others of the sixteenth century, on the score of being clear and easily understood, of freedom from mystical and metaphysical entanglements, and of rejecting entirely every form of a supposed outward transmission of Divine grace

<sup>12</sup> Cf. "The Kingdom of Christ," pp. 326-327.

<sup>13</sup> See "The Mystical Presence," p. 74.



through the priestly "administration" of the consecrated elements. Zwingli's doctrine, over against that of the system-builder of Geneva, the most influential and unfettered German theologian of the last century said of it, "is very clear and easily understood." And it is not a little significant that the school of thought, represented by Robertson, Stanley, and Farrar, in England, by Horace Bushnell and Phillips Brooks, in America—all of whom through Coleridge fell heir to Schleiermacher's conceptions, should have been inclined to accept with certain enriching modifications, the Zwinglian, rather than the Calvinistic, form of doctrine on this subject. To their views, duly qualified here and there in points of detail, the present writer should be willing to give unhesitating preference over that of Calvin, were it necessary to choose between the respective theories for which those names stand. From what has been said earlier in this discussion, it should be perfectly plain, however, that we have been fortunately carried far beyond such limitations of choice, by the progress that has attended comparatively recent scientific investigations and biblical studies.

This modern progress in knowledge, as already indicated, has been subversive of the foundation principles and presuppositions upon which so much of all the theologies of the past was built. In the light of to-day, it is neither allowable to attempt, nor possible to construct a sound edifice of religious doctrine, upon the antiquated and superseded assumptions of earlier systems. Among the foundation pillars that must carry the theological superstructure of the future, are the indisputable facts of science, and the historically established teachings of the Prophet of Nazareth. Room must be made, no matter what the cost, for these to stand in their sovereign majesty and strength. The conceptions of God and man, as originally taught by Jesus, must receive due recognition, in any doctrinal scheme that can be allowed to claim for itself the Christian name, and established facts must be frankly owned by those erecting such a scheme if it is to have a com-

manding authority and power among thoughtful men. This means, that instead of regarding man as having been plunged by an original "fall" into a hopelessly lost and forlorn condition of moral turpitude and spiritual ruin, in which he is left without God and without hope in the world, the view of him which Jesus' teaching inspires must be accepted, namely, that he is the frail, the imperfect, the pitied, and the loved, child of the Father in heaven, who is day by day mercifully ministering to his needs for spiritual growth, and leading him step by step toward the ultimate realization of the ideal manhood revealed in Christ Jesus. It means, that instead of interpreting the work of the incarnate Son of God as providing a fund of meritoriousness, which in an unmoral, substitutory, way can be set to the credit of the sinner for his salvation, his perfectly sinless and absolutely holy life and character affords us a vision, which makes its own inspiring and uplifting, its reconciling and saving, moral appeal to those whose humanity he shared—an appeal which, in accordance to the faithful and obedient response to Jesus' instructions and example, it elicits, brings men into an ever-increasing fulness of communion with the Father. It means, that instead of regarding the Church—mentioned in only two Synoptic passages, one of which is of more than doubtful authenticity, and the other applicable only to an individual congregation—as the incarnate projection and continuation of Christ himself in human history, and, therefore, a living divine-human constitution and organism in the world, through membership in which alone, piety is practicable and salvation possible, this great and important institution should be looked upon as the body of Christian believers united by a common faith in and devotion to, the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, and associated together for the purposes of enlarged efficiency in social service, of bringing in and maintaining the Kingdom of God in the world.

Preoccupied by changed conceptions of God and man, of the person and office of Christ, of the nature and function of



the Church, such as those just now too imperfectly outlined, the present-day religious mind must proceed to formulate its theory of the Lord's Supper. The informing and controlling principles for this work, which as yet has not been adequately performed by constructive modern thought, are involved in such changed conceptions of fundamental truths. Sufficient work has been done, however, to enable one with some confidence to suggest certain directions that constructive thinking will and will not take, and certain characteristics of the resultant doctrine. It will surrender wholly and without regret what, for want of a more convenient and equally well understood and comprehensive term, may be called the "high-church" position. But it will not require us to accept in its stead the extreme opposite view which regards the Ordinance as nothing more than a bare memorial or commemorative service. The truth of the matter here, as is so generally the case, will be found to lie between extremes. The Holy Communion of the Lord's Supper—a designation of the service greatly to be preferred to the unscriptural word "Sacrament"—when ever and wherever observed, will be celebrated in obedience, of course, to the word of him who said: "This do in remembrance of me." This will be interpreted as meaning more than "to show forth his death till he come," more than to represent to us the sacrificial and atoning nature of Christ's death on the cross. The observance of the Supper "in remembrance" of Christ will by its symbols recall to us the reality of Jesus as an historic figure, whose perfect character is to us a sure pledge of the possibility of our achieving a satisfying likeness to himself. Thus, it is a symbolical representation of the "glorious Gospel of the blessed God" in its entirety, as taught and illustrated by Jesus in his intercourse with men. By solemn outward and visible sign, it conveys to us the message of Divine love and free forgiveness, and reminds us that to place ourselves in right relations with the Father and to achieve our appointed destiny, we must follow the way, embrace the truth, and live the life, of him who

sealed his confidence in the guidance of the Holy Spirit in his own blood. Just as Jesus, under constraint of his filial devotion to God, to righteousness, and to truth, and under the influence of his love for his brethren, to whom he desired to bequeath an unerring ideal of conduct, was willing to suffer and to die, rather than violate even the least of the Father's commandments, so the symbols of the Supper, tell us we should "follow in his steps," relying as the Master did for the vindication of our course of life, for our daily strength and constant support in this world, and for our assured bliss in the world to come, upon the unfailing mercy and grace of the Most High. As surely as bread and wine are given for the bodily needs, so surely shall "bread from heaven" be bestowed for the spiritual needs of those that are faithful.

Such a visible exhibition and solemn assurance of God's loving and forgiving, supporting and rewarding, goodness toward his children, does not by any means exhaust even the Godward significance that attaches to the celebration of the Holy Supper. But besides the Godward, there is also a manward side to the Ordinance. The thoughts suggested by the latter need corresponding recognition if the "communion" idea of its celebration is to be realized. As an act on man's part, it means for every individual participating with a congregation in the celebration of the Holy Communion, the public acceptance of God's proffered pardon, the humble reception of his strengthening and supporting grace, the devout acknowledgement of the authority and Lordship of Christ, the promise of loyalty to his Spirit and the instructions of his word, the unreserved consecration of self to the service of the Father and of his children. For the Congregation, the Holy Communion is the common and united act of owning and confessing Christ, their joint public declaration of trust in, and devotion to, him and to each other, and thus a spiritually significant bond of union and communion between themselves and their glorified Lord. For both the individual and the congregation, therefore, the celebration of the Holy Com-



munion is, and must always remain, an inestimably precious "means of grace," and that, as such, Christ Jesus our Lord, will honor and bless those observing it with its own "spiritual real presence" only those can doubt who do not believe that he is with his people "always even unto the end of the world."

BALTIMORE, MD.

## V.

### THE ETHICS OF CALVINISM.

BY JOHN S. STAHR, D.D., LL.D.

John Calvin was preëminently a theologian rather than a philosopher, and the manifold results which have flowed from his teaching in social and political life had their origin primarily in his theological views. Religion was with him fundamental, and what he taught and accomplished in the way of social organization and development, flowing directly from his theological principles, gave impulse to and determined the nature of all that stands for Calvinism in its historical development in church and state. In the nature of the case these principles in their concrete manifestation became social forces of great significance, and if, in the beginning, they were religious, they became ethical in their application to human conduct both in its individual and its social aspect. The ethics of Calvinism, accordingly, becomes profoundly interesting both from an historical and a practical point of view, inasmuch as Calvinism dominated so large a part of the theology of the churches of the Reformation, and a still larger part of the social and political development of the modern world.

1. The first thing that strikes the mind of any one conversant with the trend of modern philosophical and religious thought is the extreme rigor of Calvin's doctrine of original sin. Human nature is so totally depraved that it is incapable of the first step towards good works, and morality apart from regeneration by the Spirit of God is absolutely impossible. Although he concedes that there are traces of man's original nature still to be found, as in the sense of right and the voice of conscience, he has little sympathy with philosophical speculation and a positive abhorrence of both Cynicism and Stoi-



cism. Aristotle as the advocate of the *liberum arbitrium* falls under his condemnation; only Pato is recognized as having a dim perception in the distance of the Highest Good, but as he lacked the firm foundation of faith his wisdom which is not based on true piety nor the revelation of God in Christ, is nothing else than "appearance and smoke." And what is true of his wisdom is also true of his virtue.<sup>1</sup>

It follows, accordingly, that Calvin, who as a matter of course developed no formal system of ethics, has no room for or appreciation of philosophical ethics, and that the ethical principles which are involved in his system of thought and doctrine come under the head of Christian ethics. In their development the principal stress is laid on virtue and duty while the good is kept in the background, and the idea of freedom, the glorious liberty of the children of God, as will presently appear, is only imperfectly apprehended. This one-sided view of human life led to a conception of the state and of social development in which the influence of the church was still paramount, and which failed to recognize the fact that the state had a problem of its own to solve independent of formal control by or union with the church, a point that was reached only after a long course of development and the interaction of forces which it is not our province here to discuss. But Christian ethics has nothing to lose and much to gain by a candid recognition of the fact that religion and morality, although closely related, are not identical, nor do they stand in the relation of cause and effect. Morality has its own basis in the nature and constitution of man, and, in a sense, its own independent development, however much this development may be affected by religion. As a man's physical strength or his intellectual acumen is not increased by his becoming religious whilst yet he is physically and intellectually a better man because of his religion, so also his sense of moral obligation does not necessarily increase *pari passu* with the strength of his religious feeling whilst yet it must be freely conceded that

<sup>1</sup> Lobstein, "Die Ethik Calvins," p. 7.

religion fosters and inspires moral development, and that without it, in the long run, virtue will deteriorate and morality decline. The failure to recognize moral forces at work in society independently of religion or formal Christianity as such, marks Calvin, not as a reactionary, but as still different in spirit from present-day tendencies.

2. Man, totally depraved and ruined in the fall, is not only incapable of salvation by his own efforts, but, in addition, his salvation rests wholly on the will of God, who, in his eternal decree, has elected or predestinated some unto life and others unto death. Without such an election of grace neither repentance nor regeneration nor spiritual life is possible; and when by the grace of God, mediated through the gift of his only Son our Lord Jesus Christ, a new life is begotten in man it is to be attributed not to human volition but to the effective working of the grace of God. If it is objected that the condemnation of men unto death is unjust, the answer is that God in his sovereign majesty, for good and wise reasons, does as it pleases him, and that the love and favor extended towards those who are redeemed are all the greater. If it is said that such an election of men unto life irrespective of any merits of their own is unethical in that it leaves the way open for gross sin and immorality on the part of the elect, and makes no room for training and admonition, Calvin answers sharply that such an inference is profane, inasmuch as those who are chosen unto life are chosen unto good works, and that the preaching of the gospel, admonition and training are the means in God's hands by which his purpose is realized.<sup>2</sup> This harsh doctrine is often singled out as the distinctive feature of Calvinism and is often designated by that name. But the fact is that it was by no means peculiar to Calvin. Luther held it just as firmly (although it is not emphasized to the same extent in Lutheran theology); and both Luther and Calvin derived it, as well as the doctrine of total depravity, from St. Augustine. It involves a theory of the human will which is

<sup>2</sup> "Institutes," III., 23, 12.



by no means obsolete at the present day, the theory of determinism. Indeed it may safely be said that it has the trend of present day psychological thought (though from a different point of view) largely in its favor. There is scarcely any one at this time who holds the theory of absolute indifferentism. A man's character, his training and antecedents all enter into his volitions, and, as Jonathan Edwards so stoutly maintains, the will is governed by *motives*. There are, as is well known, three forms of determinism. First that of blind fate, a power that arbitrarily rules the destinies of men (from Ædipus to Amos Judd); secondly, that of divine providence or predestination, according to which God in his sovereign power or for a wise and glorious purpose orders all the events of human life; thirdly, that of the evolutionary school who teach that every act is the effect of an efficient cause, the resultant of all the forces in and around the man so that only one outcome is possible. Freedom in this way resolves itself into the ability to do that to which one's own nature prompts in response to the challenges of the environment appealing both to native and acquired tendencies. "His (man's) will is free in the sense that at any moment what he will attend to and cherish depends upon *him*, upon his attitude toward the situation he confronts. Whether it is free in the further sense that this attitude would be unpredictable even by a perfect intelligence that knew his inborn nature and entire previous experience, is a question unanswered by science and disputed by philosophers."<sup>3</sup> Determinists say no, and it is conceivable that all the events which bear upon any human life are so ordered and disposed that a man freely chooses the very thing which necessity imposes upon him. This seems to be Calvin's way of solving the problem of human responsibility in view of the divine decree and fore-ordination. *Sic e Dei praedestinatione pendet dominum perditio, et causa et materia in ipsis reperiatur; cadit homo Dei providentia sic ordinante, sed vitio suo cadit.*<sup>4</sup> Thus

<sup>3</sup> Thorndike's "Elements of Psychology," p. 281.

<sup>4</sup> "Institutes," III., 23, 6-9.

he holds man responsible for his own misdeeds and gives God the praise for his salvation. But even if we grant that this saves human responsibility, it does not save the ethical character of God unless upon the assumption that for some wise reason unknown to us, for the accomplishment of a greater good, such fore-ordination were necessary. It has been said that for the glory of God a man ought to be willing to suffer eternal damnation; but surely man's moral consciousness has developed beyond the point at which any man's damnation, abstractly considered, should be regarded as a necessity, or as contributing to the glory of God. Much better is the conception of God as a loving Father who desireth not the death of the sinner, of a kind and gracious Father

“Dem allemal das Herze bricht,  
Wir kommen oder kommen nicht.”

3. The new life is the gift of God, but it is not indiscriminately bestowed. It comes in a concrete form, mediated by faith, in the fellowship of believers who constitute the church, the body of Christ, and are made partakers of the merits of the life and death of their Living Head. The ground of good works, of the ethical or spiritual life of the believer, is thus said to be faith; and the fruits of faith are good works. But closer investigation shows, that, after all, faith is not the real source or ground of good works, but only the means by which Christ in the fulness of His saving power is apprehended and appropriated, and He works in us to will and to do according to His good pleasure at the same time that we work out our own salvation with fear and trembling. The church, the services of the sanctuary, the preaching of the word, and the sacraments, are means and channels through which this appropriation by faith is facilitated and made real; and they are therefore, to be considered as grace-bearing ordinances. It is to be observed, however, that their efficacy is not magical but dependent upon the faith of the recipient. Dr. T. C. Hall<sup>5</sup> denounces Calvin's view of the church, the ministry, and the

<sup>5</sup> *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1907.



sacraments, as being in theory Roman Catholic rather than Protestant, and looks with much favor upon Luther's system notwithstanding its thoroughgoing sacramentalism. "In Luther's system sacramentalism was an unfortunate and illogical intrusion upon his fundamental thought . . . In spite of Luther's unfortunate realism in his interpretation of *Hoc est corpus meum*, he remains substantially unaffected in his ethics (though not wholly) by the element of sacramental magic. For Calvin the imparted grace of the sacrament is an ethical element of first importance." That is to say that the theory of a substantial presence in the sacrament for believers and unbelievers alike, working salvation in the former and damnation or judgment in the latter is of little ethical significance; but the conception of a real spiritual presence mediated and appropriated by the faith of the believing recipient is an ethical element of the first importance and involves sacramental magic! But surely Dr. Hall's view of salvation eliminates the idea of *grace* altogether, and makes the whole process purely human except so far as men are influenced by the teaching of our Lord, or inspired by His lofty example. One feels disposed to call this a very bald kind of rationalism.

4. Faith, leading to good works and delivering the sinner from guilt and unrighteousness, necessarily produces in man a joyful sense of freedom. Calvin's conception of freedom, however, it must be confessed, is, in this connection, negative rather than positive. It is freedom from the slavery of sin and from the curse which rests upon the sinner. The heavy burden of guilt is removed, and the consciousness of a divine sonship, of peace and love springs up in the heart because the sinner is justified and made acceptable to God. His works also, although they may be imperfect, since they are the fruit of the spirit, become acceptable, and they abound more and more unto sanctification. In addition to this Calvin urges the importance of limiting the exercise of Christian freedom wherever such exercise would give offence to the faith and con-

science of weak brethren,<sup>6</sup> and he combats with equal earnestness the narrowing of Christian liberty by the Catholics and the abuse of it by the Libertines. There is, however, in Calvin's whole treatment of the subject no such enthusiastic glorification of liberty as is found for instance, in Luther's "*Die Freiheit des Christenmenschen*." The difference between the two reformers in this respect, is no doubt, largely a matter of temperament and of individual experience. But it is very evident that the joyous note of absolute freedom is restrained in Calvin by the ever-present voice of conscience imperatively demanding the observance of the moral law. This legalism is one of the chief points of attack on the part of the present day critics of Calvinism and Puritanism and there is, perhaps, a partial justification for such criticism; but the full discussion of the question must be deferred until we have advanced another step in our discussion.

5. Faith leads to good works; but good works are not such as proceed merely from the natural inclinations and impulses of a regenerate man. They are good only as they conform to the standard of the moral law, the keeping of which, as found especially in the decalogue, is obligatory upon the Christian. Stress is laid, therefore, upon the exact fulfillment of the law's demands, not indeed of the demands of the ceremonial law, but of all that can fairly be construed as belonging to the spiritual essence of the law. Two consequences are likely to follow from this principle, and it will hardly be claimed that Calvinism has wholly escaped either of them. In the first place there is danger of unnecessary rigor, and the magnification of small things because the law is apprehended in a more or less mechanical way. This appears in the form of Sabbath observance, and in the minute regulations of the details of family life and social intercourse which have from time to time become manifest in Puritanism. The ridiculous accounts we get of the so-called Blue Laws are no doubt greatly exaggerated, for such laws prevailed only locally, in com-

<sup>6</sup> "Institutes," III., 19, 10-12.



munities where eccentric and fanatical minds were in authority. But it is not difficult to discover a plenty of instances where unnecessary severity prevailed, and austerity of life and conduct were regarded as the best evidence of a saintly character. In the second place the stress laid upon small things, the tithing of "mint, anise and cummin," may easily lead to hypocrisy, the putting on of a fair outside to hide the corruption that is within. It is well known with what contempt the cavaliers spoke of the Roundheads as "ranting hypocrites;" and it is but natural that among the followers of Calvin and in the development of Puritanism there should have been found those who deserved the title. But what is the fair verdict of history? Was there ever an army the general morality of which, whether in service in the field, or whether disbanded and absorbed in the avocations of private life, was as high, and the members of which, individually and collectively, notwithstanding their lack of æsthetic culture, and the ruthlessness with which they destroyed churches, and cathedrals, were as free from the vices of camp life as that of Cromwell? Were there ever communities the average morality of which, notwithstanding the oddities and excrescences of which we hear so much, was higher than in the colonies and states in which Calvinism has been the ruling force? And its dominant note was not all gloom and severity. It is doubtful whether family affection, tender love, and friendship ever abounded more fully than under these very conditions, if, at least, one may trust the evidence afforded by family traditions, history, and literature. The aspersions cast upon Calvinism from this point of view, must, as will presently appear, be taken with a large grain of allowance. It is true that the spirit of legalism, the painful sense of duty, the omnipresent voice of conscience with its "thou shalt," and "thou shalt not," is not the highest plane of duty. That is found in the spirit of love and a joyous sense of freedom. But it is love of the right; it is freedom in the ability to enter into duty with hearty spontaneity. It means, not less, but more, of the law, because the law now

becomes enthroned within, and the spirit cries out: "Oh, how I love thy law," "It is my meat and drink to do the will of God." Let him who has reached that stage look down upon Calvinism and criticise it. But let not the plea of liberty excuse men from the discharge of duty, or the fact that the observance of the ten commandments is irksome serve as an excuse for breaking them! Is it not better to stand up manfully to the discharge of duty, even if it costs self-denial and hardship, than, on the plea that love is higher than law, to do the right thing when one feels like it, and fail to respond to the call of duty when there is no inclination towards it, and wait for a "more convenient season"?

6. If the moral law as set forth in the decalogue is the standard by which the Christian's conduct is to be regulated, it is not difficult to determine what is for him the line of duty in the various concrete relations of life. Duties to self, social duties, duties to church and state, are all based upon the nature and significance of these various interests, and enforced by the demands of the divine law. For the Christian, therefore, the law is not a means only for teaching him his own sinfulness, but it is also a means of growth in holiness, in harmony with its original beneficent purpose, in that it requires of man the very things which are essential to the perfection of his life. The resultant system is, therefore, in accord with what is generally called Duty Ethics which finds the highest good in the fulfillment of the moral law as grounded in the will of God.

The system of religious and ethical doctrine which we have tried to present in brief outline is naturally subjected to criticism by the adherents of other schools; and the sternness of the Calvinistic discipline may easily be made to appear unfriendly if not positively hostile to the spirit of the modern world. If this were all, it would only be necessary to appeal to history to secure for the system its own vindication as one of the great working forces of the Reformation, the fruitfulness of which, notwithstanding the limitations to which it is



necessarily subject, is apparent along the whole line of progress in morality and religion, and especially in the development of civil and religious liberty. But, following the lead of their master, the Ritschlian school of theologians have endeavored to show that Calvin, far from being a leader in Protestant thought, was really a reactionary, and that his theory of church and state, and the ethical principles of his system are in form and spirit Roman Catholic. "In so far as the ideal of Calvinism is anti-Catholic, this is due to the instigation of Luther; in so far as it departs from Luther, it goes back to the ideal of the Franciscans—of the Franciscans and Anabaptists."<sup>7</sup> The cry, started by Ritschl, was taken up by Loofs, Schulze, and Troeltsch, and it has recently been reëchoed in this country by Dr. T. C. Hall as mentioned on page 233. On the other hand, the *Princeton Review*, January, 1909, contains the translation of a masterly article by E. Doumergue in which the incorrectness and injustice of these charges are set forth with unusual vigor and clearness. We are not concerned here with the political aspect of the question raised by these writers; nor do we propose to enter upon its dogmatic aspect. But our subject makes it incumbent upon us to inquire first whether Calvin can in any sense be said to stand ethically on the same plane with the Franciscans and the monastic system of the Roman Catholic church; and secondly whether there is anything distinctive in his system that leads to the modern Protestant conception of life in general from the ethical point of view. The answer to these inquiries will bring to view Calvin's real position as a reformer, and show in what particulars the Reformed Church has been so large a factor in developing the conscience of the individual, not only in determining his duty to the church and the state, but also in the regulation of his private life in his daily walk and conversation.

The charge that the ethical system of Calvin is in spirit essentially Roman Catholic rests upon two assumptions. First,

<sup>7</sup> Albrecht Ritschl, "Geschichte des Pietismus," 1880, I., p. 76.

that it tests all actions by an absolute norm which finds expression in some form of outward authority instead of being based upon the inward compulsion of conscience (T. C. Hall). Secondly, that it looks upon the world as primarily evil, and the present life as tolerable only in the degree that it renounces the world and makes itself gradually free from its contamination by the practice of the most rigid abstemiousness and self-denial. In other words it is in essence a system of aceticism.

So far as the first is concerned, it is sufficient to say that the statement is not in accordance with the facts. Calvin recognizes no infallible authority in church or state except as it is in harmony with the Scriptures, and there is no infallible interpretation of the latter except as they authenticate themselves to the conscience through the Holy Spirit. There is no infallible authority in the church, neither pope nor council. While the government is not congregational or democratic, it is presbyterial or representative. Elders and deacons are ordained by the ministry, but they are elected by the congregation, and the people thus have a voice in their government, a form not inaptly called "democracy tempered by aristocracy." There is, therefore, no closed system as in the Catholic Church, and the spirit in which actions are to be tested is both different in principle from the beginning, and it has developed on a different plane in the later history of Protestantism.

As regards the charge of aceticism it must be said first of all that Calvin certainly did not teach or approve of Roman Catholic asceticism. If asceticism means the renunciation of social life and comfort for solitude, self-mortification, and religious devotion; if it means the renunciation of the world and worldly occupation to lead the life of a hermit, or to take refuge from the interests, trials and temptations of secular life in a monastery, there is not a trace of it to be found in Calvinism. If, however, it means excessive austerity and self-denial, practiced in daily life in the midst of the busy



activities of the world, it is not Roman Catholic asceticism. Weber, who, according to Doumergue, accords to Calvin a much higher social influence than to Lutheranism, calls it intra-mundane Asceticism, a word in which he sums up the moral, practical and social tendency of Protestantism, while he sums up modern culture in the word Capitalism.<sup>8</sup> He mean, of course, the strictness in morals which is a characteristic feature of the Calvinistic system. But the use of the word asceticism in this sense is unfortunate, because it is so easily misunderstood. Calvin is strict in morals and he emphasizes the importance of self-denial. But he is not alone in this. St. Paul did the same thing when he spoke of mortifying the members which are upon the earth, and our Lord, when he made cross-bearing a condition of discipleship. It is true that in this connection Calvin uses strong terms and speaks sometimes with great vehemence when he characterizes the corruption of the flesh and the sinful tendencies of the world. But St. Paul, too, knows of a law in his members which is at variance with the law in his mind; he speaks of a vile body that is finally to be transformed into a glorious body; and he prays to be delivered from the body of this death. Our Lord, too, puts in sharp contrast the spiritual life and the natural life, when He says: "He that findeth his life shall lose it, and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it." It is unscientific and unfair to bring forward the strong expressions used by Calvin when he wishes to enforce the necessity of self-denial and the overcoming of the world, and to pass by the entire body of his teaching as regards the right use of the world and the enjoyment of life.

Calvin not only does not encourage a retreat from the world, but he insists on the conquest of the world; he not only allows the use of the world as a matter of necessity to maintain life in a prison from which men ought to desire to make their escape as soon as possible, but he also sees the beauty of the

<sup>8</sup> Max Weber, "Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Capitalismus."

world and the pleasures of life in the varied interests to be held and enjoyed in the furtherance of a rational human development. "Speaking of the right use of earthly blessings, he declares we do not have to abstain from this world's goods, not even from those which seem more conducive to pleasure than to our necessities. We are to use them for our needs as for our delectation." "Some good men among the 'saints' have permitted man to use this world's goods only in so far as necessity demanded. Undoubtedly, these saints were well intentioned; but they were none the less mistaken; 'they practiced a too great rigor'; they were more 'strict' than God's word. And this overstrictness is 'very dangerous.'"<sup>9</sup> Again: "If we consider for what purpose God created food, we shall find that He wished to provide not only for our necessity, but also for our pleasure and recreation. So as to raiment, besides necessity, He has regard to that which is proper and becoming. As to herbs, trees, and fruits, besides their various useful qualities, He has enhanced them by their beauty, and gives us added pleasure in their perfume. If this were not so, the prophet would not have numbered among the divine blessings, the wine that rejoiceth man's heart and oil that maketh his face to shine. . . . The good qualities that all things have by nature show us how we ought to enjoy them. . . . Do we think that, our Lord having given such beauty to the flowers which present themselves to the sight, it not lawful to be touched with pleasure in seeing them? Do we think that He has given them so sweet an odor, and does not wish that man should delight to smell them. . . . Have done, then with that inhuman philosophy, which . . . not only maliciously deprives us of the lawful fruit of the divine beneficence, but also cannot be realized without depriving man of all sentiment, and making him a block of wood."<sup>10</sup>

Again referring to the chapter on Christian Liberty,

<sup>9</sup> Doumergue, in *Princeton Review*, quoting "Institutes," III., 10, 1.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, "Institutes," III., 10, 2-3.



Doumergue says: "At the outset he [Calvin] denies all monastic asceticism, as if God took pleasure in the material sacrifices. He shows that the ground is slippery; and that once the foot is on the slope, one must go to the end. The history of certain saints proves it. With virile good sense he writes: "When once the conscience is bridled and held in check, it enters an infinite labyrinth and a deep abyss, whence it is not easy to escape. If one begins to doubt whether it is lawful for him to use linen sheets, shirts, handkerchiefs, and napkins, he will not long be sure about using hemp, and at last he will vacillate as to the use of tow. For he will wonder if he might not eat without a napkin and do without handkerchiefs.' Should he deem daintier food unlawful, he will at last not dare to eat either bread or common viands with an assured conscience before God, since it will always occur to him that he might sustain life with still meaner food. If he scruples to drink good wine, he will afterward not dare to drink the worst with a good conscience, or water that is unusually sweet and pure; in fine, it will come to this, that he will hold it a great sin to trample on a straw in his path" ("Inst.," III., 19, 7). And again: "Why are the rich cursed, who have now received their consolation, who are full, who laugh, who sleep on beds of ivory, who add possession to possession, at whose feasts are harps, lutes, tambourines and wine. Surely the ivory and gold and riches are good creatures (*i. e.*, things created by God) permitted and even appointed for the use of men, and nowhere is laughing forbidden, or being full (*saturari*), or the acquiring of new possessions, or delight in musical instruments, or drinking wine, etc." ("Inst.," III., 19, 9). How does this harmonize with what Ritchie wrote in 1880: "As Calvin personally did not need any recreation, he saw only pressing temptations to sin in the social forms of recreation and in the luxury that followed them. . . . For this reason he combated everything that pertained to the gay and free joyousness of life and luxury." The quotations speak for themselves.

Let this suffice so far as concerns the charge of being Roman Catholic in spirit rather than Protestant. And now, is there anything distinctive in the Calvinistic system that leads to the modern Protestant conception of life from the ethical point of view? Max Weber, in the articles already referred to says yes; it is found in what he designates Capitalism. Here again the word is unfortunate because it is now often used with a sinister meaning. It would be better to say Industrialism, or still better Vocational Consciousness. Weber means to say that the Roman Catholic ideal of life lay apart from and above secular occupations in the line of trades or commerce. The Latin peoples have no word for a vocation of this kind; but the Germanic *Beruf* found its real meaning and application with the advent of Protestantism. Luther recognized the fact that labor at the anvil or behind the plow, in the house and in the kitchen, if conscientiously performed is just as acceptable to God as any other form of conscientious service. But the development of this idea is preëminently one of the merits of Calvin's system, and it has gone forward *pari passu* with the development of civil liberty with great rapidity and splendid results in Calvinistic countries and peoples. Weber says: "Without doubt already in the Middle Ages certain attempts at appraising daily toil in this way are found. But what is entirely new is this: the esteeming the accomplishment of duty in the earthly vocation as the ideal of personal morality. This it is that has logically produced the opinion of the religious importance of the daily task in this world and which has given birth to the idea of vocation. Thus that which finds expression in this idea of vocation, is the central dogma of all the old Protestant denominations, which rejects the distinction between the precepts and the counsels of Christian ethics, which indicates, as the only means of leading a life agreeable to God, not the excelling of worldly morality by monastic aceticism, but the being content solely with the fulfillment of one's duties in the world, as the situation of each requires, that is to say, fulfilling his vocation."



Here, then, are two social forces of far-reaching importance: A strict morality that is yet free from the gloom of asceticism, and the consciousness of a service well-pleasing to God in the discharge of the duties which arise in one's earthly vocation. These have entered into the life of the modern world most fully and have produced the most beneficent results among and through Calvinistic people. The world will not soon forget what the Huguenots were to France, and how much that country lost and other countries gained, morally and industrially, when after the revocation of the edict of Nantes they were driven from her borders. And where are there to be found nobler examples of heroism, love of liberty, devotion to duty, cleanliness, and purity of life than in Scotland, Holland, and the United States. Indeed the Calvinistic peoples have stood forth in the world as champions of liberty, exponents of morality and religion, and leaders in the development of industry and social progress. And such is the case not despite but by virtue of the fundamental principles of the Protestant reformation in the shaping of which Calvin bore so large and honorable a part.

LANCASTER, PA.

## VI.

### CALVIN AS A PREACHER.

BY PROF. JOHN C. BOWMAN, D.D.

The religious world knows comparatively little of the merits of Calvin as a preacher, because of his overshadowing fame as a theologian, commentator, and ecclesiastical organizer. The biographers of Calvin, from Theodore Beza, the earliest, down to the latest, make but scant reference to Calvin as a preacher. But fame is not always limited by or dependent upon facts recorded by the historian. The influence of a great moral personality can never be fully measured by what has been written. Although little has been written of Calvin, eulogistic of his power and his style as a preacher, he is, notwithstanding, placed in the list of the world's great preachers; and the judgment of history is justified. Calvin was called of God to be a preacher of righteousness. Like St. Paul, he believed that he was directly commissioned by Christ to be a minister of truth. "The ministry which I received from Christ I am bound, if need be, to maintain with my blood."<sup>1</sup> As he felt the touch of God's hand upon him, that was sufficient to supply the lack of formal ordination through the hands of either Roman Catholic or Protestant priest. He neither asked nor cared for any stronger credential. Nor are we asked to reconcile the irregularity with the ecclesiastical rule which Calvin himself, as disciplinarian, so rigidly enforced upon others. More than one Melchizedek has appeared in history, to whom has been ascribed the divine right to officiate at the altar and from the pulpit.

The beginnings of Calvin's career as a preacher are traceable

<sup>1</sup> Reply to Cardinal Sadolet.



to the period of his academic and juristic training in France, while a student under the patronage of the Church at Noyon. His religious spirit and moral earnestness increased with his advance in learning. But strict and diligent as he had been in his religious observances, they failed to give rest to his soul or peace to his conscience. By day and by night the thought of God pursued him, filling him with anxiety and dread. By means of a sudden conversion he was subdued by God and made willing to know and follow the truth.<sup>2</sup> The "sudden conversion" does not signify, as according to present popular usage, the beginning of conscious religious experience, but rather a changed and fixed attitude toward the great religious movement of the age. This crisis in his early life led Calvin to combine with his study of law a more earnest study of the Bible; "being," as he says, "inflamed with an intense desire to make progress in the knowledge of true godliness."<sup>3</sup> "Although I myself was as yet but a mere novice and tyro, I was quite surprised to find that all who had any desire after purer doctrine were continuously coming to me to learn."<sup>4</sup>

After his father's death he returned to Paris and devoted himself exclusively to theology. As the reformation-movement was making itself felt in France, Calvin preached frequently in the meetings of the evangelical party, closing commonly with the words: "If God be for us, who can be against us?" His forceful reasoning and courageous spirit drew around him the friends of the Reformation, who welcomed him to their councils as an influential adviser. While later on he was destined to become in Geneva and Strassburg the conspicuous leader of men in public affairs, his natural inclination and personal desires were averse to the excitement of public life. He longed for quietness that he might apply himself to his favorite studies. His mind was set on literary work. Upon his visit to Geneva (1536) he was constrained,

<sup>2</sup> Preface to "Commentary on the Psalms."

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

almost coerced, by Farel, to become his helper and coadjutor. No plea in behalf of his own inclinations and plans were allowed to prevail. "Master William Farel," he wrote in the preface to his "*Comentary on the Psalms*," "retained me in Geneva, not so much by his counsel and exhortation, as by means of a fearful adjuration which caused me to feel as if God Himself had laid his hand upon me to hold me fast. When he saw that he effected nothing by entreaties, he threw his address into the form of an imprecation, praying God to curse the leisure and rest I sought for study, if I refused to lend help in such great need. This word had such a terrifying effect upon me that I gave up my journey, though, from a sense of diffidence, I still refused to bind myself to any particular charge." In Geneva he began his work with the public exposition of the Scriptures in St. Peter's Church. It is related that after his first sermon people flocked in crowds to his residence to testify their delight, and he was obliged to promise those who had not been able to hear him on this occasion to preach again on the following day. Owing to the favorable impression made by his preaching and the desire expressed by many for the continuance of his services, he consented to assist Farel in his pastoral work.

Upon his enforced withdrawal from Geneva to Strassburg, Calvin again resolved to follow his personal inclination by devoting himself without distraction to the pursuit of his favorite studies; but, yielding to the entreaties of Bucer, contrary to his desire and inclination, his services were again enlisted in pastoral activity, and as an Academy lecturer. His return to Geneva in 1541, to resume command as leading theologian, ecclesiastical organizer and chief pastor, was only through surrender, after repeated refusal, to the pressure of the irresistible persuasion of Farel, Bucer, and others of compelling influence. To a friend he wrote: "There is no place in the world which I fear so much as Geneva." Yet he yielded to the request for his return, with tears in his eyes, saying: "I offer to God my slain heart in sacrifice; and force my



bound spirit to obedience.” There is something pathetically admirable in such a surrender of a strong martyr-spirit to the challenge of duty, as an inviolable call of God. By the previous calls to the ministry, and especially by this final call, Calvin experienced his ordained right and power to preach the Gospel without the imposition of ecclesiastical hands through the formal act of ordination.

The few foregoing instances in the life of Calvin are given with a view to aid in arriving at a fair and just estimate of the character of Calvin as a preacher. It was the thought of God, the consciousness of God, that had supreme mastery over the mind, the will, and the affections of Calvin; God, the omniscient, omnipresent, all-glorious ruler in the heavens and over the earth. “The will of God must have the mastery.”<sup>5</sup> Service must be rendered unto Him at all hazard and at whatever cost. Whatever is thought, or said, or suffered, must be done unto “the glory of God.” This phrase, “the glory of God,” which so frequently appears in the writings and preaching of Calvin, expressed the dominant and controlling motive of his life and ministry. It is a glory which, while it brightens the heavens, overshadows all things earthly; while it exalts the majesty and sovereignty of God, obscures, belittles, and almost deadens the nature of man. Calvin’s mind was so filled with the thought of God as transcendent in the heavens, of God who reveals his glory through the exercise of his sovereign will, that little, if any room was given to the thought of God as immanent in his world; of God who reveals his glory in the sunshine, the beauty, and the joy of our earthly life. It is the fear of God rather than the love of God, that is voiced through the theology and teaching of Calvin; God as the Ruler and Judge of the world rather than God as the Father of all, is the object of his reverence. It was to the glory of God, as thus apprehended, that Calvin offered his “slain heart in sacrifice.” And as he thus subjected himself to the sovereign will of God, so, consistently,

<sup>5</sup> Sermon on the theme “Enduring Persecution for Christ.”

did he require of all men that they should conform to the same exalted standard. Sparing not himself, he would not spare others. He was both the champion and victim of the theological system which he propounded. But it should be no matter of surprise that Calvin failed to compass more completely the nature of God. The greatest minds, at best, can discern but a segment of the infinite circle of deity. The theologian of later ages, even of our own advanced age, may not count himself to have fully apprehended.

But incomplete and defective as was Calvin's conception of God, no man was ever more intensely devoted to his God, or to his conception of God, than was Calvin. His God-idea gave increased strength to his powerful intellect; it made effective his ecclesiastical discipline, and made possible the almost world-wide sway of his great personality. Such a champion of God, of His sovereignty and glory,, must needs be an acknowledged leader of men, and, sooner or later, come to hold high rank in the list of the world's great preachers.

Attention has been directed to Calvin's view of God, and to his immovable conviction of the correctness of his doctrine, as constituting the basic element of his preaching. Whatever else may be gathered from various sources, referring to the content and style of Calvin's preaching, however interesting such additional material may be, it is but incidental and of secondary value. Calvin always preached with the "accent of conviction," as one having authority; for, as an expounder of the Word of God, he ever strove to be true to the Word as he apprehended it. Supplementing this primary element of strength, namely, devotion to God, and to the Scriptures as the supreme rule of faith and life, Calvin as a preacher was reinforced by the rare qualities of his character, and the acquisitions of a broad and profound culture, which placed him in the front rank of the thinkers and scholars of his age. Intellect and will were the prominent properties of his personality. His intellect was of the highest order; it was acute, penetrating, profound and comprehensive. His own high



intellectuality stimulated his zeal for an intelligent faith. Intelligence, to Calvin, was the mother of piety. His system of religion admits of no separation between the spiritual and the intellectual. As it appeals primarily to the intellect, it is the foe of all shallow, emotional, or sentimental views of Christian truth. In his day, as at later times, it exercised a powerful influence on the thoughtful and educated. Calvin was a dialectician who sought to persuade his hearers by reasoned conviction. He was not an orator who allures and wins his hearers by the excitement of the emotions. He was unlike Luther who aroused sentiment and emotion, and drew men by their hearts. Calvin bound his hearers fast in the "serried links of his iron logic." Powerful in intellect, Calvin was no less strong in will. He was firm as a rock. His purpose, once fixed, had an inflexibility which no opposition could overcome. Like all masterful spirits he trusted in himself as well as in God. Notwithstanding his advocacy of theocratic rule, he was an autocrat. Although he held no political office, he ruled Geneva with an iron hand. His acts and his words were invested with the command of law. He preached with the authority of a prophet: "Thus saith the Lord." The denial of his authority as an interpreter of the Word of God was an insult to the "honor of Christ." So closely did he identify his own cause with that of God. This, in part, explains his severity, intolerance, and what many have regarded as spiritual tyranny. He held and declared that the honor of God and the salvation of the world depended upon the doctrines which he proclaimed, and that they who opposed them assailed God. There was warrant for the title which in derision was applied to Calvin—"the Pope of Protestantism." It was a tribute to his eminent superiority as a leader and establisher of the Protestant cause. To this he attained by an intellectual, spiritual, and moral strength, despite the defects which appear in his character and public ministry, and which tend to detract from his fame.

To the sterner qualities which have been noted, must be

added the more attractive gifts and graces which Calvin employed in the service of preaching. A theologian with a lawyer's training, a logician of critical acumen, a student of history and Christian antiquity, he was at the same time a master of literary style, unsurpassed since the day of Tertullian. At the age of twenty-two, before he began to preach, he was, according to Scalinger, the most learned man in Europe. Archbishop of Cashel, who dissented from his theological opinions, thus testifies to his superior ability: "He was inferior to none of his contemporaries in general ability, and superior to almost all in the art, as well as elegance, of composition; in the perspicuity and arrangement of ideas, and in the structure of his periods." His style was admirably fitted to his thought, simple and accurate, direct and forceful, and marked by that transparent clearness which is the distinguishing feature of the best French oratory. He thought and wrote clearly in short, intelligible sentences. He rarely indulged in long periods. Beza, who was his personal friend and a spectator of his conduct for sixteen years, and who professes to have given a faithful account both of his life and of his death, says: "Calvin despised fine speaking, and was rather abrupt in his language, but he wrote admirably, and no theologian of his time expressed himself so clearly, so impressively and accurately as he. Proper and dignified expression never failed him, whether he was writing or speaking." Again, comparing Calvin with his contemporaries, Farel and Viret, he says of him: "Tot verba tot pondera," and describes him as "a despiser of great eloquence and sparing in words; so good a writer that no one at his time had written with more dignity, with greater purity or acuteness." In very similar terms does the Roman Catholic Audin express appreciation of the purity and the exactness of Calvin's style: "Never does the proper word fail him; he calls it, and it comes." In defense of himself against the charge of Westphal that he was a "mere babbling, fanciful haranguer," he said: "All the world knows my writings and my



speaking are characterized by cautious brevity, and that I invariably keep to the point which I have undertaken to discuss." His discourses, generally, commence with a proposition on which the entire structure of the sermon is made to rest. With uniform solidity of learning, and clear, cogent reasoning, he constructs his argument, and enforces it with frequent citations from the Scriptures. Like the preachers of the Reformation period generally, his primary purpose was to set forth the doctrinal and moral teaching of the Word of God. The words of the preacher like the words of the Lord must be spirit and life. "True preaching," said Calvin, "must not be dead, but living and effective; no parade of rhetoric, but the Spirit of God must resound in the voice in order to operate with power." While he doubtless attained to a greater or less degree of rhetorical art, he never cultivated it. Display of oratory he condemned as the expression of ambition and vanity; and he decried all purposed effort to give lustre to speech by the studied use of method and arrangement.

It was his invariable custom to preach extemporaneously. Even in his expository lectures he took nothing to his desk but the Scriptural text. It is nowhere mentioned that he ever wrote a sermon. In a letter referring to the twenty-two sermons on the Eighth Psalm, he says: "They have been printed simply as they could be gathered from my mouth in the church. You there see our style and ordinary mode of teaching." He frequently declared that the power of God could only pour itself forth in extemporaneous speech. In his letter to the Duke of Somerset, he expressed himself very distinctly against the writing of sermons, which was the invariable rule in the Church of England. "I say this to your Highness because there is little of living preaching in your kingdom, sermons there being mostly read or recited." Calvin spoke slowly, and could therefore be easily followed by those who took notes. To the note-taker we are indebted for all the sermons which have been preserved. Much of his work, also,

as a commentator, owes its preservation to the zeal of his auditors who wrote from his oral delivery what he afterwards prepared for the press. Scalinger, who had heard Calvin, says: "Calvin, being asthmatical, speaking very deliberately, it is easy to write down all that he says." Often he would make long pauses, giving his hearers time to fix his thoughts in their minds. At times he would divert from the line of powerful argument, and make satirical applications, intended to render disbelievers ridiculous in their own eyes. And when the honor of God was in question, or when he contended with the enemies of order and of the church, his anger poured forth with vehemence in intemperate displeasure. Hard, intolerant, and relentless was his attitude towards his enemies; for he regarded them as the enemies of God. The most effective club he could find for their resistance and defeat was the Word of God. And so, approvingly, and with the characteristic spirit of his times, does Beza describe his hero in conflict with his enemies: "Calvin was a kind of Christian Hercules who subdued many ministers by the mightiest of all clubs, the Word of God. As many adversaries as Satan stirred up against him, so many trophies did the Lord bestow upon his servant." Ordinarily the manner of Calvin was calm, refined, dignified, impressive, indicative of the high and solemn regard which he cherished for the sacred office whose specific purpose he believed to be the reformation of individual character, and the implanting of a holy, evangelical life in the community.

The discourses of Calvin usually were of moderate length. His practical expositions of the twelve minor prophets, and his sermons on the Pauline epistles, occupied rather less than a half hour than more. Likewise his one hundred and fifty sermons on the Book of Job, which were delivered without any studied preparation, are with few exceptions brief. These sermons are regarded as among his most excellent pulpit productions. Beza, in a preface to this work, says that the sermons were attended with such a blessing in the whole of



France, that they were daily recited, especially where there was a want of preachers, both in the churches and families. Calvin experienced peculiar pleasure in the interpretation of this portion of Scripture, because he regarded it as especially applicable to his own time and to his personal experiences. For the beautiful poetic spirit and structure of the Book of Job, and for its dramatic features which charm the critical and analytical scholars of our day, Calvin had no concern, no sympathy. To his mind the book was simply a theodicy and a compendium of practical religious philosophy. "As we are in the hand of God we ought to submit ourselves entirely to his will; we should continually glorify him even when his hand is heavy upon us, and we understand not the cause of the infliction." So, every phase of the teaching of the book justifies and glorifies God, while at the same time it ministers instruction both to sinner and saint.

The amount of Calvin's preaching is amazing, especially when considered in connection with his other labors. While he held no other official post than that of an interpreter of the Word of God as pastor and teacher, yet was he practically ruler of Geneva. He devoted much time to the governing bodies and to matters of discipline. Virtually he was at the head of the Reformed party in Switzerland, France, the Netherlands, England and Scotland, and by voluminous correspondence gave counsel and direction to the leading representatives of the church and state. His commentaries, which cover almost the entire collection of the Old Testament and New Testament, while largely the outgrowth of his lectures and sermons, consumed many hours of dictational work, day by day, continuously, for many years. In addition to these abundant labors, Calvin devoted a considerable portion of his time to preaching. On Sunday a discourse was given at day-break; at noon the youth were instructed in the catechism prepared for the purpose by Calvin; and service with a sermon was conducted at three o'clock. On Monday, Wednesday and Friday there was further preaching. And before Calvin's

death, a daily sermon had been instituted in each church of the city. It was Calvin's purpose, by such ministrations to make of Geneva a model Christian community. He endeavored to put into operation an effective discipline whereby the church might fulfil its chief duty, namely, the initiation of its members into, and their maintenance in, right doctrine and right living. To this end Calvin ceased not to comfort and exhort; also to preach and deliver his lectures on theology. His two hundred sermons on Deuteronomy were all delivered on week days in little more than a year; and, as shown by the dates attached, they sometimes followed one another on four or five days in succession. His frequent severe headaches did not prevent him from meeting his appointment at the preaching hour. His naturally frail body was almost continuously subjected to disease and suffering. One biographer names no less than nine ailments which "troubled him more or less separately for years, and which seemed to descend upon him during his last year with almost their whole united force." It was with difficulty that his friends dissuaded him to desist from preaching while his spare body was being consumed by the quartan fever. Near the close of his life, when no longer able to walk, he was carried to the familiar pulpit in a chair. Beza reckoned Calvin's sermons at two hundred and eighty-six annually, and his lectures on theology as only one hundred less in number. Besides his public works there are now in the library of Geneva two thousand and twenty-five sermons in manuscript.

His sermons and lectures always commanded a crowded congregation. As many as a thousand hearers attended his lectures and preaching. The liberal extension of the rights of citizenship opened the way for the settlement in Geneva of large bodies of immigrants from foreign countries, from Holland, England, Italy, Spain, and especially from France. They were attracted by the fame and influence of Calvin, eager to hear his messages and to obtain his religious counsel. No man of his time attracted so large a circle of noble and dis-



tinguished names as appeared in the community of foreigners in Geneva in 1553, who were known as devoted adherents of Calvin. Geneva came to be regarded as the normal school of Christian life. "There," it was said, doubtless with exaggerated appreciation, "a pure gospel is preached in every temple and house; there the singing of psalms never ceases; there hands are folded and hearts are raised to the living God day and night; for the greater part of the people are inflamed with the spirit of religion and piety." Farel wrote: "I would rather be last in Geneva than first in other places." John Knox was so impressed by the preaching and teaching of Calvin that he regarded his religious system as "the most perfect school of Christ that ever was on earth since the days of the Apostles."

It has been repeatedly observed that Calvin's speech was without eloquence, as that art is usually known and praised; but this judgment cannot be accepted unqualifiedly in the light of the strong testimony to his irresistible influence as a preacher and public debater. Surely it must be something closely akin to eloquence that enables a speaker to attract and hold hundreds of auditors day after day; to sway and convince the minds of men, even though they be unfavorable to the cause which he pleads. In a disputation on the subject of the Lord's Supper, before an assembly in Lausanne, it is recorded that Calvin argued so convincingly that an opposing friar was converted on the spot. Before the Great Council in Geneva were witnessed some of the most notable achievements of Calvin in public disputation. It was here that he found the most frequent incitements to persuasive oratory, and where he exhibited masterly power as he extemporized with irresistible force. As one of many incidents, his triumph over Perrin may be cited. The majority of the Council of Two Hundred had strongly expressed their sympathy in favor of Calvin's antagonist; but they were constrained to reverse their decision by the convincing arguments and fiery ardor of Calvin. Later on when the conflict with Perrin was renewed, at the peril of

his life, and against protest, warning and threat, Calvin appeared before the Two Hundred, and by the courage of his personal presence and the skill and force of his arguments, wrested what seemed to be foregone defeat into triumph.

For a brief season there was a revulsion in the tide of popular favor, and Calvin was banished from the city of Geneva. But even in his defeat and banishment his leadership was acknowledged. His expulsion was regarded by many as a calamity which was followed by divine judgment; nor could the marshals or the people be satisfied until, by most urgent and persistent pleading, his return from Strassburg was secured. Every voice of the Great Council of Geneva was raised in his favor. "Calvin," they exclaimed, "that righteous and learned man, it is he whom we would have as the minister of the Lord." "Come," was their plea, 'thou worthy father in Christ; thou art ours. God has given thee to us. All sigh for thee. Thou must be the watchman of the House of Israel for us.' The influence of Calvin's searching and austere mind, wielded by his preaching as well as by his writings, remained impressed upon the manners and habits of the Genevans for ages after his death; and, it is claimed that the stamp is not yet altogether obliterated.

It is eminently fitting that the fame of Calvin as a preacher, should have recognition, and find a suitable place in the series of tributes presented in the present number of the REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW. But however high or kind may be one's appreciation of Calvin as a preacher, fairness and honesty cannot deny or conceal the defects which weighed so heavily in the balance in his own age, and which have not been lightened by the lapse of centuries. Faults may be explained and extenuated; but as facts they should not be ignored nor excused. Like other men Calvin was subject to human infirmities. It does not explain them away to ascribe them to physical frailty, to temperament, or to the convenient scapegoat,—the "spirit of the times." Like other strong and commanding personalities, Calvin had the "defects of his



qualities"; but it strains the mantle of charity when it is made to cover those defects with such a lenient apology as was expressed by John von Müller in the statement: "His faults were only the excess of the great virtues that qualified him for his peculiar work." Such exaggerated laudation reflects no credit upon Calvin, and still less upon his eulogist. However Calvin may have come by his faults, he had them; and the shadows which they cast, remain. Dr. Paul Henry in his valuable work, "The Life and Times of John Calvin," says regretfully: "Even to the present day, wherever an inclination exists to honor Calvin, Servetus appears as a pale spectre to snatch the crown of honor from his head." That "pale spectre," represents more than an unfortunate incident in the life of Calvin; it discloses traits of character which made possible the Servetus horror.

With his towering intellect, indomitable will, and pre-eminent scholarship; with his many moral and personal qualities which entitle him to respect and admiration, Calvin was fitted above all others of his age for the leadership of men and of nations; but while he was the most influential man of his time, he was the most hated of men of his own and succeeding ages. Not only did he evoke the wrathful opposition of Roman Catholics, but no less was he decried by the Lutherans, as if he were little better than a child of Satan. Within his own church storms of virulent opposition were allayed only for a short period, and continually broke out anew with increased violence. The explanation of the turbulence of which Calvin was the storm-center, is to be found in the temper of the man as well as in the temper of the times. And the qualities of the man which appear so conspicuously in Calvin as a theologian and ecclesiastical disciplinarian, were no less influential in Calvin as a preacher. He knew no other standpoint of doctrine than his own. Strong with the might of conviction, he was intolerant and unbending toward dissenting opinion. With the office of preacher he combined that of the censor of morals, with a sternness and severity which showed

little respect for the principle of individual freedom. Even to his intimate friends he would often express himself with acerbity, while to his enemies he was vindictive and unrelenting. While he was not without intimate friendships, his lack of geniality and good fellowship appears in the fact that "Master Calvin" was the fitting title given to him. Luther had many friends who called him "Brother Martin." He combined with his devout spirit a genial humor which Calvin lacked. He could laugh as well as preach. Bossuet characterized Calvin as "*un génie triste*," which may not be entirely just, for he had his brighter hours and his cheerful moments. As a preacher Calvin failed to move the emotions of the heart, for the reason that his thoughts were forged by his intellect, and were addressed primarily to the intellect. He was well qualified to enact laws as a spiritual legislator and to enforce discipline; he even framed a liturgy in the interests of churchly order, but he could not write a hymn.

Here again the contrast with the great German Reformer may be noted. Calvin has been designated "the intellectual complement of Luther," for the reason that he supplied the regulative and reflective principle to the Reformation which it needed, and that he made up Luther's marked defects. It is true that he outranked all the reformers as a systematizer and organizer, and was by preëminence the people's spiritual ruler and guide; but with all his commanding power he was not the people's preacher, as were Luther and Zwingli. He lacked the sympathy and humanity which they so largely shared and expressed.

Lacking the emotional, even to a greater degree he lacked the artistic. Though his style was classically pure, consistent and exact, it was totally bare of ornament, and unillumined by any ray of imagination. Nor had he any poetic sympathy with nature. The countless scenic attractions which environ lake Geneva, with Mt. Blanc far remote, yet so near, raising aloft its crown of majestic splendor, seem to have evoked no response from the heart of the great preacher and teacher.



It is difficult to understand how anyone confronted daily for many years by the varied beauties of nature which constitute the charm of Geneva, should fail to give any evidence of their appreciation. It is still less comprehensible that a Frenchman should be so destitute of his national characteristic—the love of the beautiful. It was a profound want in the man, whether viewed as theologian or preacher, which no eulogist can conceal.

Still another note rings dolefully from the voice of the preacher; it is the note that disparages and unduly condemns the nature of man. This is bad enough, but it is not all bad. The sin-cloud has cast a very dark shadow upon man's soul, but it is not all darkness; some light yet remains. So intent was the mind of Calvin upon the evil and the gloom which envelope man as a child of wrath, that he could not recognize any claim of his human nature to the favor of the heavenly Father. The sermon of Calvin, chosen as a model specimen for the recent collection of "*The World's Great Sermons*,"<sup>6</sup> does not fail to sound the note of man's vileness and of God's wrathfulness: "Poor worms of the earth, creatures full of vanity, full of lies. Were God to deal with us according to our deserts, would he not have just cause to chastise us daily in a thousand ways? Nay more, a hundred thousand deaths would not suffice for a small portion of our misdeeds." These are but a few of the echoes from the Genevan pulpit which remind one of the awful thunders of Sinai, in contrast with the more inviting and more cheerful message of that "better covenant" into which we have come in our day. They are referred to in this connection, not for the purpose of raising the controversial question as to the merits or defects of Calvin's theology, but rather to show that his lack of sympathy with human nature and its infirmities, together with a too frequent representation of God as a Judge who uses the rod of chastisement, is a phase of the preaching of Calvin more open to censure than to praise.

<sup>6</sup> Funk & Wagnalls Company.

An unprejudiced spirit has yielded to a sense of fairness and honesty in the brief reference that has been made to the defects which inhered in the character of Calvin, and which undeniably detract from his greatness and fame as a preacher. But whatever may have been the defects of Calvin's theology, or of his personality, yet his commanding power as a preacher may not be questioned. If the greatness of a preacher is to be measured by the extent of his influence upon his own age, and the impress of his thought upon succeeding generations, few names, if any, in the entire history of preaching, can find a place superior to that of John Calvin.

LANCASTER, PA.



## VII.

### CALVIN AND CIVIL LIBERTY.

BY PROF. A. V. HIESTER.

While the Reformation was primarily a theological movement, it influenced most profoundly every department of human thought and action, the social as well as the personal, the political and economic no less than the religious, the moral and the intellectual. Concerned at first only with man's relation to God, it was not until they found their doctrines denied and condemned by the Roman hierarchy that the reformers began to challenge the right of the Church to decide questions of doctrine for the individual; and this in turn led them to a critical examination of the nature and constitution of the Christian Church. The consequences of this examination were: first, the definitive repudiation of the authority of both the Roman See and the general councils of the Church to give final decisions on matters of faith and worship; and, secondly, the setting up of the doctrine that the individual conscience interpreting the Word of God in the Scriptures is the sole rule of Christian faith and practice. Both parties acknowledged the Bible as the supreme source of religious authority. But in the one case it was the Bible as interpreted by each individual for himself; in the other, the Bible as interpreted for the individual by the Church speaking through tradition, the opinions of its teachers, the decrees of its popes and the deliverances of its councils. The result of the Roman principle was that in the course of time the Bible came to be buried under layer after layer of accumulated authoritative interpretation. By the sixteenth century it had become practically a sealed book to the laity requiring a priestly hierarchy to unlock its truths. All this was thoroughly obnoxious to the reformers, and what they did in the final analysis was to set aside this

oppressive system of spiritual middlemen, which had interjected itself, with its traditions and authoritative interpretations, between the Divine Spirit and the human soul; and to assert the right of immediate access of every believing soul to God and its capacity to comprehend the divine message.

But in their efforts to escape from one form of oppression the early reformers only succeeded in subjecting themselves to another. To wage a successful war against Rome they needed, or thought they needed, the active support of the civil authorities; and as early as 1520 Luther was calling upon the Emperor and the nobility to establish the Reformation by means of the temporal power. But the German princes as a rule had little interest in the doctrinal controversies precipitated by the Saxon reformer. They were interested much more in his efforts to overthrow the authority of the Pope, for that promised to enhance their own power and dignity. Their purposes were worldly, not spiritual; and in most cases it was only through the prospect of political and material advantage that their support was enlisted. Wherever the Reformation became an accomplished fact through their assistance they promptly confiscated all the property of the Roman Church situated within their territories. The greater part of such property they usually appropriated to their own use, leaving only an insignificant remnant to be applied under their direction to the support of the new ecclesiastical organizations. And then these new organizations, by virtue of their enforced dependence on the secular governments for their pecuniary support, became more or less dependent in everything. In thus acquiring control over the ecclesiastical organizations the secular governments reversed almost at a blow the relation which had subsisted for more than a thousand years between church and state. Instead of the church ruling the state, as in the medieval period, the state now ruled the church in Protestant lands.

This general tendency in the direction of the complete control of the church by the state was materially strengthened by



another set of circumstances. In setting up the doctrine that the Bible as interpreted by the individual is the sole criterion of Christian faith and practice the reformers wielded a two-edged sword. It cut both ways, as they were soon made to realize. From the very beginning of the Reformation there were those who professed to find in the Bible, in the exercise of the unlimited right of private judgment, doctrines that were subversive of every principle of social order. Against these radicals, who were collectively known as Anabaptists, the reformers felt themselves under the necessity of waging a relentless warfare. They believed that their failure to dissociate themselves from these revolutionary and fanatical elements would not only have the effect of discrediting the Reformation in the eyes of the secular governments, but that it would also open the door to every sort of error and excess, and utterly demoralize the masses. In the interest, therefore, of truth and social order, as well as in the interest of the active support of the secular governments, the reformers were obliged early in their struggle with Rome to set some limit to their most cherished principle of the right of individual judgment, and to repudiate the dangerous beliefs and practices flowing from its abuse at the hands of the Anabaptists. And when repudiation and denunciation failed to accomplish the desired end the reformers appealed to the civil power to suppress all revolutionary opinions and practices by force. The princes were only too ready to undertake such a commission, for their interests were identical with those of the reformers. The inevitable consequence of this, again, was to magnify the power and dignity of the secular rulers. Nothing, indeed, could have been more conducive to a growing control of the ecclesiastical organizations by the secular governments than this constant interference in matters of religion by the princes at the urgent solicitation of the reformers themselves.

Still another condition favoring the growing authority of the secular governments in religious and ecclesiastical affairs was the rise of national states. During the medieval period



the glamour of the Roman principle of universal rule, in church and state, held the whole of Europe as under a spell. With the breaking of this spell and the beginnings of national states the world entered upon the modern period of its history. At first these national states were weak and both Pope and Emperor succeeded for a time in maintaining their supremacy over them. But the spirit of nationalism gradually developed strong national states, the effect of which was to magnify the royal power at the expense both of Pope and Emperor above and of feudal institutions below. At the beginning of the sixteenth century the royal power had increased most rapidly in England, France and Spain; and during the next two centuries it succeeded in attaining unchecked supremacy everywhere except in England. The general imitation of the more important civil rulers by the lesser ones made absolutism almost the universal rule in secular government. While this growth in political absolutism was unquestionably harmful in some ways, it is altogether probable that owing to the ignorance of the masses the creation of strong national states, the distinctive contribution of modern times to political progress, and, indeed, the only form of state compatible with individual liberty, would have been impossible, in the first place, without the sacrifice of the principle of self-government.

A fourth condition conducive to the subjection of the church to the state was the substitution of the civil law for canon law in the sixteenth century. The true text of the old Roman Civil Code, discovered by the scholarship of the Renaissance, had taught the lawyers and statesmen of Europe a conception of the relation of church and state that differed widely from the medieval principle. Instead of subjecting the state to the church, as Hildebrand's doctrine did, these old Roman codes made the church merely a department of the state; and one consequence of this substitution of the civil law for canon law was that the secular governments were able to oppose all claims for the independence of the church on legal and philosophic grounds.



Several conditions of minor importance need only be named. The early reformers, both German and Swiss, were too much engrossed in the doctrinal issues of the Reformation to concern themselves with questions of organization and discipline. They also lacked talent for organization and were quite willing to surrender the task into more experienced and capable hands. Finally, they regarded the masses as too rough and turbulent for self-government in ecclesiastical affairs.

The joint effect of these several conditions was that the ecclesiastical organizations in the first years of the Reformation were everywhere remodeled and absolutely controlled by the civil authority. The early reformers hoped that this state of affairs, to which they had been forced by the logic of events, would prove only temporary. But in this they were mistaken, for a state-controlled church not only became the general rule in the Protestant lands of Europe, in most cases the arrangement has also proved a permanent one. It may be said, then, that the immediate political effect of the Reformation, owing to the peculiar conditions which confronted the reformers, was to promote political absolutism. This it did, first, by extending the authority of the secular governments over the church, from which domain they had been excluded before; and, secondly, by breaking down the only power that had demonstrated its ability to put a check upon the secular power, that is, the papacy.

The conditions of the time are more or less clearly reflected in the political philosophy of the Reformation. Luther does not appear to have entered upon his career of reform with any clearly defined ideas respecting the origin, nature and ends of the state. His views were largely determined by the exigencies of the moment. Thus he held the doctrine of the divine character of secular government, which is substantially identical with the medieval dogma of the two powers, but which had been greatly obscured during the later medieval period through the exaggeration of ecclesiastical power. Governments being sanctioned by God, it follows that

they must be obeyed by Christians. To this Christian duty of obedience to government Luther permitted two exceptions. When a government commands what is contrary to the law of God, or when it attempts to regulate purely spiritual matters, the Christian is under no obligation to obey. But both the general principle and exceptions broke down in practice. To leave to each individual the right to determine whether the thing commanded by the government was right or wrong was only to invite anarchy; while to leave the matter of interpretation in the hands of the government was to render the exception absolutely worthless. The other exception broke down during the peasant uprisings in western Germany, when Luther was obliged to recognize the opposite principle that the civil authorities must inevitably fix a limit of toleration for heretical beliefs, and suppress them by force when they go beyond that limit. Later he gave up even the general principle. This happened when the rupture came between the Emperor and the Protestant princes, and when he was obliged by the logic of events to admit that even in purely temporal matters the Christian may be justified in resisting an established government.

Melanchthon was even more of an opportunist in political matters than Luther. His political doctrines in general he based on the concept of natural right, *jus natura*, which he derived, first, from the commands of God, and, secondly, from right reasoning about the nature of man. To one or both of these sources all legitimate political institutions are traceable. According to this principle civil government finds its main justification in the Scriptural injunction of obedience to rulers. This injunction Melanchthon interprets with such literalness as to teach that not even impious rulers may be rejected or resisted. He modifies this, however, under the stress of circumstances to the extent of justifying tyrannicide when there is notorious and indisputable oppression; and frequently, too, the theoretical duty of subjects to obey their rulers is made to depend altogether on the more



practical question of the religious complexion of ruler and subject.

The political views of Zwingli do not differ materially from those of Luther and Melanchthon. Like them he held the abstract principle of passive obedience to government; like them, too, he freely modified it according to circumstances. In admitting that any other than a Christian government may be overthrown by the people, peaceably if possible, he went perhaps a step beyond both Luther and Melanchthon in the direction of political opportunism. The political differences between Zwingli and his German contemporaries were of minor importance and directly attributable to the differences between the political institutions of the aristocratic Swiss cantons and those of the monarchical states of North Germany.

Calvin differs from the earlier reformers mainly in this that he applied the Biblical test to matters of religious faith and practice with greater rigor and consistency than they had done. In applying the cardinal principle of the Reformation of conforming everything to the plain teachings of the Scriptures he was governed less by expediency; and consequently the churches which he founded contained in less degree elements foreign to the New Testament than the Protestant churches of Germany and German Switzerland. He appears to have chosen his various positions with greater care and truer insight, and to have held them when once chosen with greater tenacity. His earlier and later views on most questions are substantially identical. So wide was the sweep of his intellect, so clear his vision, so true his logic, that he rarely found occasion to amend his views. "The doctrine which he held at first," declares Beza, "he held to the last. He varied in nothing, a thing which can be said of few theologians." Schaff writes in similar vein: "Calvin did not grow before the public like Luther and Melanchthon, who passed through many doctrinal changes and contradictions. He adhered to the religious views of his youth unto the end of his life. His 'Institutes' came like Minerva in full panoply out of the head of Jupiter."

Again, if Calvin's general principles be compared with their practical applications, it will be seen that he exhibits in less degree than the earlier reformers a disposition to compromise with circumstances. This is owing in part to his genius for organization; partly also to the circumstance that he moved on a smaller stage than Luther, Melancthon and even Zwingli, and was therefore able to fill and dominate his environment as they could not have filled theirs even with his organizing talents; but most of all is it owing to Calvin's masterful personality, his majesty of character, his powerful intellect, his practical wisdom, his iron will.

Calvin's views on civil government are most fully worked out in his final revision of the "Institutes," published in 1559, five years before his death. It is to be kept in mind, however, in any study of his political influence that his political doctrines were only by-products. He was not consciously or intentionally a political reformer. His interests were overwhelmingly religious, and whatever influence he has had on the development of civil liberty has been indirect.

In the last chapter of the "Institutes" Calvin discusses at length and with consummate ability the nature and function of civil government. With respect to the abstract question of the comparative excellence of the several forms of government he expresses no very positive opinion. He rightly maintains that no one form is absolutely best, that political institutions and arrangements vary in excellence with times and places, that all are good in so far as they conform to the requirements of equity, and that all are compatible with Christianity. Each has its dangers as well as its excellences. "Monarchy," he says, "is prone to tyranny. In an aristocracy, again, the tendency is not less to the faction of a few, while in popular ascendancy there is the strongest tendency to sedition." On the whole, however, Calvin prefers either an aristocratic form of government or an aristocracy tempered with democracy. Either is safer than monarchy, for if the government is in



the hands of many rather than of one the many may afford each other assistance and restrain arrogance and ambition.

To this preference for an aristocratic form of government, which was based on the teachings of profane history, three other factors largely contributed. The first was the fact that God gave to his chosen people an aristocratic government. For one so thoroughly impregnated with the spirit of the Old Testament as Calvin was this must have had no little significance. In the second place, Calvin was by instinct and education an aristocrat. He lived in the realm of the intellect. He was more at home among cold abstractions than among the warm heart throbs of the common people. In his earliest writing, the *Commentary on Seneca*, there is an expression of contempt for the populace; and nowhere in his writings is there the slightest trace of the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people. The third factor was Calvin's experience at Geneva. What he saw there in the first years after his recall was little calculated to inculcate democratic principles. It served rather to strengthen his aristocratic inclinations; and it was not until after his final triumph over his enemies, when his opponents had been destroyed or driven from the city, and when a new generation had grown up under his system, that he began to introduce a larger measure of popular rule in church and state.

Like the earlier reformers Calvin adopted the principle of absolute obedience to government which he did not shrink from following to its most remote consequences. He lays down the general proposition, which he establishes by numerous citations from the Scriptures, that civil government is ordained and sanctioned by God, and that to resist civil rulers is to set at naught the law of God. It is the fact of a divine sanction, not the character of the ruler, that determines, according to Calvin, the duty of obedience. Even the worst character when invested with public authority must be obeyed by the Christian. "If we have respect to the Word of God," he says, "it will lead us farther and make us subject, not only

to the authority of those princes who honestly and faithfully perform their duty toward us, but all princes by whatever means they have so become, although there is nothing they less perform than the duties of princes."

Calvin makes a distinction between passive disobedience and active resistance to government. For the latter he has only unqualified condemnation. Under no circumstances, he argues, is organized and active resistance to be justified; for the punishment of evil rulers belongs to God alone, not to men, who can only obey and pray for such rulers, and endure in patience and humility until God exercises his judgment. "It behooves us," he declares, "to take the greatest possible care lest we despise or violate the authority of the magistrates, which is so full of venerable majesty, and which God hath sanctified by the gravest edicts, even though it should be vested in the most unworthy, and in those who do all they can to pollute it by their wickedness. Nor, because the vengeance of the Lord is the correction of unbridled tyranny, let us thence hastily conclude it to be entrusted to ourselves, to whom no other command is given than to obey and suffer."

The question of the rightfulness of resisting persecution by force was presented to Calvin in a very concrete form by the course of events in France. In the earlier persecutions the French Protestants, largely by Calvin's advice, had submitted meekly without thought of revolt. But later, with a growing consciousness of strength and the mixing of political aims with religious considerations, they began to entertain the project of an armed insurrection to arrest persecution. When the scheme was broached to Calvin, during the oppressive rule of the Guises and the minority of Francis II., he vehemently denounced it. "If one drop of blood is shed in such a revolt," he replied, "rivers will flow; it is better that we all perish than cause such a scandal to the cause of Christ and his Evangel." But his advice was disregarded and the result was the abortive conspiracy of Amboise. In similar strain Calvin wrote to the Protestants at Aix that as soon as



they used force against force they would thereby put away God's hand and help from themselves. He admonished them to leave it to God to avenge them, and support themselves on his promises to protect his people against the rage of the wicked. So far, indeed, did Calvin carry this doctrine of the wrongfulness of active resistance, that he advised persecuted believers to contend only by prayer and receive martyrdom as a grace from the hand of God, rather than attempt to escape from prison, whether by force or bribery or by means of keys surreptitiously obtained. He also held that Christian freedom is perfectly compatible with political servitude.

While active resistance is never justifiable, passive obedience is, under one condition. When a ruler commands that which is contrary to the law of God the Christian is absolved from obedience. In that case he must obey God rather than man. "We are subjects," he says, "to the men who rule over us, but subject only in the Lord. If they command anything against him, let us not pay the least regard to it, nor be moved by all the dignity which they possess as magistrates." But this is never applicable to active resistance. It does not give to the Christian the right to engage in sedition or rebellion when his sovereign's commands contravene the law of God. Sedition and rebellion are nowhere sanctioned by Calvin. The most that the Christian can do is to disobey and passively suffer the penalty.

In all this there is little to favor civil liberty. Indeed, if the right accorded to the Christian to disobey when his sovereign's commands contravene the law of God be excepted, Calvin's views on civil government are those of a thoroughgoing absolutist. While they were not inconsistent with his character and purposes, it is altogether probable that under other circumstances, particularly in the early part of his career when his views were formed, he would have spoken in more moderate fashion. There is little room to doubt that his extreme views with respect to the sanctity and authority of civil government were colored by the fanatical contempt of

government, which was manifested by the Anabaptists, and which brought upon the Reformation so much odium and suspicion. That Calvin was influenced by this is evident from the first edition of the "Institutes" which he dedicated to Francis I. In his celebrated letter, which forms the preface of the book, and which was addressed to the King who was then persecuting his Protestant subjects, Calvin explains that he was moved to write the book by two distinct purposes: first, to prepare students of theology for reading the divine Word; and, secondly, to vindicate the teachings of the reformers against the calumnies of their enemies, who had incited the King against the Reformation on the ground that it was a factious and seditious movement aimed at the subversion of all government.

The only redeeming feature of Calvin's purely political views from the standpoint of civil liberty was the exception which he permitted to the rule of absolute submission to civil government. That proved of far-reaching importance. For in the nature of the case the question whether a command of prince or king is contrary to the law of God must be decided by every thinking man for himself. Just as the Reformation placed the Bible in the hands of the individual, and bade him read and interpret it for himself, just as the Renaissance emancipated his intellect, so Calvin's principle that the law of God is superior to the commands of men emancipated him from political bondage. It is true Calvin did not himself recognize all the possibilities legitimately involved in this doctrine. But the inevitable consequence of his principle was to make men question the rightfulness of human statutes and institutions, and to demand some other sanction for obnoxious laws than the arbitrary will of kings and princes.

But the full import of Calvin's influence on the development of civil liberty cannot be gathered from his purely political teachings. It is rather in his views on the constitution and government of the church, and its relation to the state, that his most fruitful contributions to the cause of civil liberty



are to be found. The question of the relation of church and state is one that has vexed the Christian Church all through its history. It is not an easy task at best to draw a clear line of demarcation between two social interests so inextricably interwoven as religion and government. But in the sixteenth century such untoward conditions as the dream of universal empire in church and state, the universal rule of intolerance in religious matters, the corrupt state of the church, the rapacity of the civil rulers, and the ignorance of the masses, rendered the task infinitely more difficult. In modern times the problem of the relation of church and state has found its solution in the principle of a free church in a free state. But in the sixteenth century that principle was unknown. No one had yet dreamed of the possibility of the secular and ecclesiastical powers living peaceably together, each sovereign in its particular sphere, and neither interfering with the other. To prevent incessant strife between them there appeared to be no other alternative than to unite them in one common organization or subject the one to the other. Islamism and early Judaism chose the former. In ancient Greece and Rome, on the other hand, religion was controlled absolutely by the state. In its early history the Christian Church claimed dominion only in purely spiritual concerns. This is seen in the patristic writings which constantly inculcate the duty of obedience to the state in temporal matters. But as the Roman See increased in power and importance it claimed and exercised other than spiritual functions. This continued through a long process of growth until it had succeeded in acquiring a more or less absolute supremacy over the secular governments. And what was once accomplished in fact had not long to wait to be justified in theory. The medieval theory of the relation of church and state is thus stated by Aquinas: "The highest aim of mankind is eternal blessedness. To this chief aim all earthly aims must be subordinated. The chief aim cannot be realized through human direction alone but must obtain divine assistance, which is

only to be obtained through the church. Therefore the state through which earthly aims are attained must be subordinated to the church. Church and state are as of two swords which God has given to Christendom for its protection. Both of these, however, are given by Him to the Pope and the temporal sword by him handed to the rulers of the states. Thus the Pope alone received his power directly from the Almighty, the Emperor his indirectly through the Pope's hands."

In marked contrast to this the reformers held at first in theory that church and state are so far distinct that they cannot be merged into one, and that neither is subject to the other. Thus Luther regarded the church as the repository of ecclesiastical authority and claimed for it the power of the keys. The Augsburg Confession similarly restricted the jurisdiction of civil rulers to temporal concerns. But Luther was not able to put his theories into practice. After the Diet of Speier in 1526 the German princes who had adopted Protestantism everywhere assumed episcopal supervision and control over the churches in their respective territories. Under the stress of circumstances Luther and Melanchthon yielded to the secular rulers more and more authority in matters of religion, including the authority to punish offenses against the first table of the Law. While they realized their helplessness they clearly foresaw and lived to deplore the evil effects of the arbitrary power exercised over the church by the princes. Their fears were abundantly realized under the Peace of Augsburg which subjected the religion of each community to the absolute control of its prince. Under this system all ecclesiastical power was from above. The church had no autonomy whatsoever. The congregation was not even permitted to choose its own pastors, although it generally possessed the nominal right of confirming or rejecting nominations made by the prince through his administrative agencies, the consistories and superintendents.

The reformers of German Switzerland conceded somewhat more power to the people in ecclesiastical affairs, for the



Swiss were more familiar with republican institutions than the people of North Germany. At Zürich the supreme authority was vested in the Great Council which nominated pastors to the congregations, as the princes did in Lutheran communities; exercised the function of excommunication; and punished all offenses against the Word of God, although Zwingli had at first rejected the principle of coercion in matters of religion. Unlike Luther, Zwingli insisted on the democratic principle of the parity of the clergy, and on the still more democratic principle of a limited equality between clergy and laity. Zwingli was also the first among the reformers to organize a synodical church government. To superintend the doctrine and morals of the clergy and legislate on the internal affairs of the church, he established a synod composed of all the ministers of the canton, two lay delegates from every parish, four members of the Small Council and four of the Great Council. The chief features of the Zürich polity were adopted at Bern and Basel. At the latter place *Æcolampadius* attempted to introduce the principle of ecclesiastical autonomy by vesting the right to exercise discipline, including the power of excommunication, in the congregation. But all his colleagues as well as Zwingli refused to recognize the principle, claiming that the church was sufficiently protected by a government composed of faithful men.

In England the Reformation took the same course as in Germany and German Switzerland with respect to the relation of church and state. In fact the only immediate effect of the English Reformation was to substitute Henry VIII. for the Pope as the head of the Anglican establishment, and to vest the supreme authority in ecclesiastical affairs in the civil government. Nothing else was changed.

Calvin was the first—if the unsuccessful attempt of *Æcolampadius* at Basel be disregarded—to make a clear distinction between the spiritual and secular powers, and to maintain it in practice as well as in theory. He differed on the one hand from Luther, Melancthon, Zwingli and the

Anglican reformers, all of whom subordinated the church to the state; and on the other, from Catholicism which subjected the state to the church. Rejecting the principle of the supremacy of either over the other, Calvin asserted the supremacy of Christ over both. While each has its peculiar mission and is sovereign in its own sphere, church and state are bound together in a relation of friendly coöperation, on the basis of perfect equality, for a common end, and that end the realization of the kingdom of God on earth. The church's part in the attainment of this end is to teach pure doctrine, appoint pastors and ordain ministers, regulate church ordinances and forms of worship, and promote morality and religion in the state. Having to do only with the spiritual and eternal welfare of man, all worldly affairs are excluded from its control. The office of the civil government is not only to promote tranquillity and humanity, but also "to cherish and support the external worship of God, to preserve the true doctrine of religion, to defend the true constitution of the church," and see to it "that no idolatry, no blasphemy against the name of God, no columnies against his truth, nor other offenses to religion, break out and be disseminated among the people." But this duty of the civil government to maintain God's glory unimpaired, and to preserve the honor of divine truth, is not an exclusive power of the state, but only supplementary to that of the church. For the church in guarding its own purity and the honor of God cannot go further than the penalty of excommunication. To that extent it is absolutely independent of secular control. But there are offenses against religion, such as idolatry, blasphemy and flagrant heresy, for which the penalty of excommunication is clearly inadequate. The enormity of such offenses requires civil penalties over and above those lying within the jurisdiction of the church. The distinction, then, between Calvin and the early reformers is that they subjected the whole domain of ecclesiastical government and discipline to the absolute power of the state, whereas he claimed for the church a certain autonomy founded



on a holy authority given it by God and embracing the power of the keys.

Emancipated in this way from the control of the secular power in purely spiritual concerns, Calvin's church was necessarily referred to itself for its organization, government and discipline. While his theory of the relation of church and state resembled the traditional view of the Roman Church, since both denied to the state the right to interfere with the church in spiritual matters, and since in both the state was made to lend its power to the church as the executioner of ecclesiastical laws, the two theories differed widely with respect to the internal government of the church. In Calvin's polity the ultimate source of authority was the general body of believers; and all power was, therefore, from below. The basis of the church was for Calvin the Christian man. He was the sovereign to whom pastors and elders were alike responsible. Every group of such men was a church, self-governing, independent of all save God, supreme in its authority over its own spiritual and ecclesiastical concerns. The constitution of such a church necessarily took something of a democratic form. Some of the democratic features of the polity which Calvin laid down in the "Institutes" are the election of pastors and other officials, as elders and deacons, by the congregation; the exercise of discipline by officials responsible to the congregation; the parity of the clergy; and the parity of clergy and laity in government and discipline.

In recognizing the principle of self-government in ecclesiastical affairs Calvin boldly challenged the universal practice of his time. In the Roman Church all power was from above through a divinely-constituted hierarchy of pope, cardinal, archbishop, bishop and priest. The Pope was the ultimate source of authority and required implicit obedience from clergy and laity alike. Clergy and laity were distinct orders, the latter being passive in the ecclesiastical administration. In Germany, German Switzerland and England all ecclesiastical power was from above, too, that is, from the civil

government. While the laity were conceded more power than in the Roman Church, the preponderance of the secular power in ecclesiastical affairs rendered the concession of little practical value. For all lay-power rested on the authority of the state, not the sovereignty of the Christian man; and if the laity had more power and influence in the church in German Switzerland than in Germany and England, it was only because they had more power and influence in the state.

In marked contrast to all this Calvin admitted the laity into the various governing bodies of the church, as the representatives of the membership, on equal terms with the clergy, and thus swept away the long-standing barriers between clergy and laity. While Luther first proclaimed the doctrine of the general priesthood of the laity, it was Calvin who first applied it in a systematic way by making the laity a regular agency in the local congregation, as well as in the synods and councils of the church at large. Then as to the parity of the clergy as distinct from a *jure divino* hierarchy, whether papal or prelatical, Calvin maintained the principle of the original identity of bishops and presbyters, in which, says Schaff, he has the support of the best modern exegetes and historians. On this point, however, he did not differ so sharply from the early reformers. For Zwingli also held the doctrine of the parity of the clergy, and Calvin himself did not push it to the point of rejecting all distinctions which rest on human right and historic development, and denying the right of the church to adapt itself to varying conditions and circumstances.

While Calvin's polity was republican in its general character it carefully avoided the dangers of mob rule. Though recognizing the principle of the sovereignty of the Christian man, it did not vest the power of excommunication directly in the congregation, but in the representatives of the congregation acting in its presence, and with its knowledge and approval; so that the body of the people, without regulating the procedure, might as witnesses and guardians observe it and prevent the few from doing anything capriciously. Similarly,



in the election of pastors, Calvin provided that while ministers should be elected by the people, other pastors ought to preside over the election to avoid any error either through levity or bad passion or tumult.

Next to its autonomous and republican character the most significant feature of Calvin's polity was its discipline. Stahl says that Calvin introduced a new principle into Protestantism, namely, the glorification of God by the full dominion of his Word in the life of Christendom. The full significance of this principle can be realized only in view of the fact that it was proclaimed and also enforced at a time when Protestant liberty was in danger of degenerating into license. In marked contrast to Luther, who thought that the faithful preaching of the Gospel would in time bring about a reformation of morals, Calvin taught that discipline is one of the great gifts entrusted to the church for the training of its members. "No society," he says, "no house, can be preserved in proper condition without discipline. The church ought to be the most orderly society of all. As the saving doctrine of Christ is the soul of the church, so discipline forms the nerves and ligaments which connect the members and keep each in its proper place."

In claiming for the church an independent exercise of discipline Calvin revived the medieval theory. While he agreed with the medieval church in making the Christian life dependent on the training and repressive power of the church, he differed from it in this that he made the basis of his discipline and the rule of its application to be, not the wisdom of the church, as in the medieval system, but the Word of God. From another point of view Calvin's disciplinary system was a return to the practice of the early church. Among the reformers Calvin was distinguished for his zeal to restore the conditions of primitive Christianity. He had given to the patristic writings a more diligent study than any of his contemporaries, and he was impressed, as they were not, by the zeal of the early church to protect the sacredness of the Lord's Supper, the center of her life and the crown of her worship,

by guarding against the approach of unworthy communicants. Discipline was the nerve of the early church and excommunication the nerve of discipline. Hence to the two customary Protestant tests of a church—the preaching of the Word and the administration of the sacraments—Calvin added Christian living as a third, to be enforced through the discipline prescribed in the Word of God and practiced in the early church.

Calvin's doctrine of the organization and constitution of the church, and its relation to the state, is the most original thing in the "*Institutes*"; it is at the same time his most fruitful contribution to the development of civil liberty. In the first place, by steering a middle course between submission to the authority of the papal chair and the anarchy which follows in the wake of rationalism and individualism, Calvin alone of the reformers succeeded in throwing off one tyranny without putting another in its place. The church which he established was independent of the papal authority but not anarchical. It understood the difference between liberty and license. It was no stranger to law and authority, for Calvin's conception of the supreme duty of man to know and do the will of God, not, indeed, in order to salvation, but as the only fitting tribute to the honor of God, demanded a discipline of extraordinary severity. In giving to the world this new principle of a strenuous morality Calvin rendered a signal service to civil liberty. For his discipline infused into those who came under its influence that moral poise and power, that capacity for organization, and that practical efficiency, without which self-government cannot hope to endure. Besides developing in the individual the power of self-control Calvin's disciplinary system also exercised a leveling influence on worldly rank, for it recognized no distinctions of persons or station and subjected all classes to the same moral standards. The old glamour and veneration attaching to rank and wealth could not long endure when once pastors and elders, responsible to the people, "by the Word of the Lord might constrain



all the glory and rank of the world to obey his majesty and by that Word govern all from the highest to the lowest."

In vindicating the right of the church to perform its own functions unhindered by the state Calvin taught men to defend their rights against the tyranny of civil rulers; and by introducing the principle of republicanism into the internal government of the church he planted at the same time the seeds of republican institutions in the state. He thus made the church the nursery of civil liberty. For it is inconceivable that men should be shielded from political absolutism in one thing and not desire the same privilege in another; impossible that men should long hold one theory in ecclesiastical and another in civil government. The tendency of human nature is to think the same in one relation of life as in another. Why then, if ecclesiastical rulers are responsible to the people over whom they are placed, should not kings and magistrates be held responsible too? This was the great question that came to be asked wherever Calvinism succeeded in obtaining a foothold. And it was no accident that political tyranny was arrested in Holland, Scotland, England and America, and the foundations of modern constitutional government laid, by men bred in the doctrine and discipline of Calvin. In France, too, though it did not prove strong enough to put a permanent check on the despotic power of the crown, Calvinism nevertheless long kept back the rising tide of absolutism which finally engulfed the country in the reign of Louis XIV.

With respect to religious liberty the influence of Calvin was less wholesome. For the inevitable effect of placing in the hands of a friendly government the power of coercion in religion, to be exercised at the bidding of a church still governed by the medieval idea that there can be only one form of religion and one form of worship in a community, is religious intolerance. This was the immediate consequence of Calvinism both at Geneva and in the theocratic commonwealths of New England. Both were based on the assump-

tion that the Old Testament theocratic view was still applicable to civil society, that through civil laws the honor of God was to be protected as much as the property and lives of men, and that offenses against religion were to be punished by the same penalties as crimes against the state.

The normal effect of this principle may be seen in Calvin himself. In a letter to the Duke of Somerset in 1548 he strongly recommended the repression of the Papists and Anabaptists by the sword. Six years later, in his celebrated tract justifying the burning of Servetus, Calvin boldly maintained the wisdom and rightfulness of extirpating heresy by physical penalties. But lest he might appear to justify the Catholic persecutions he modified this by saying that the punishment of heretics belongs, not to all, but only to those who hold the true doctrine. "Whoever," he says, "shall now contend that it is unjust to put heretics and blasphemers to death will knowingly and willingly incur their very guilt. This is not laid down on human authority; it is God himself who speaks and prescribes a perpetual rule for his church. It is not in vain that he banishes those human affections which soften our hearts. . . . in a word, that he almost deprives men of their nature in order that nothing may hinder their holy zeal. Why is so implacable a severity exacted, but that we may know that God is defrauded of his honor, unless the piety that is due to him be preferred to all human duties; and that when his glory is to be asserted humanity must be obliterated from our memories." In this attempt at his own vindication nearly all his arguments are drawn from the Jewish laws against idolatry and blasphemy, and from the examples of the pious kings of Israel. The entire defense stands or falls with his theory of the relation of church and state and the binding character of the Mosaic code.

All this is in marked contrast to Calvin's earlier views. In the earlier editions of the "Institutes" he frequently exhibited a mild and tolerant spirit. Particularly in the Strasburg edition (1539) there were numerous passages advocating



the mild treatment of heretics which were omitted or materially modified in later editions. The following passage will serve as an illustration of Calvin's earlier views: "Wherefore, though it be not lawful on account of ecclesiastical discipline to live familiarly with excommunicated persons, yet we should strive by all possible means, by exhortation and teaching, by clemency and kindness, and by our own prayers to God, that they may be converted to better thoughts and return to the bosom of the church. Nor are these only to be so treated, but also Turks and Saracens, and the rest of the enemies of true religion. So little to be approved of are the methods by which many have hitherto endeavored to drive them to our faith by interdicting them from fire and water and the other elements, by denying them the common offices of humanity."

With respect to the question of religious liberty it must be said, therefore, that Calvin simply left it as he found it. In holding the principle that a community should have but one religion and use force to suppress open dissent he was only the child of his age, neither in advance of it nor yet behind it. And when this was combined with the principle of vesting in the state the power to punish offenses against religion Calvinism became no less hostile to religious liberty than the medieval church had been. It was only where Calvinism found itself in opposition to the civil government, or where the modern doctrine of the limited function of the state took root, that the principle of ecclesiastical autonomy laid down by Calvin became favorable to religious toleration; for the state either would not or could not then lend its power to the church as the executioner of its laws and judgments.

Besides his political doctrines, and his theory of the nature and constitution of the church and its relation to the state, Calvin's theological teachings had an important bearing on civil liberty. Of first importance is his doctrine of the sovereignty of God, which is the all-pervading principle of his theological system, and which taught that in comparison with the almighty Ruler of the universe, whose sovereignty extends over

all persons and events, and whose will is the ground of all that exists, all earthly potentates sink into insignificance. The effect of the intense spirituality which this doctrine inculcated was highly favorable to civil liberty, for it strongly tended to dissipate the halo attaching to worldly station and to dim the luster of all earthly grandeur.

At the same time that Calvin magnified God he also exalted man. By dispensing with a human priesthood, which had interjected itself between God and man, he brought the individual face to face with God. It was Calvin who in his doctrine that salvation rests on a personal relation of each man to God first revealed the worth and dignity of man, and gave to the individualistic spirit of the Reformation its fullest and most logical expression. The worth of the individual was still further enhanced by the doctrine of election; for the consciousness that God had a plan of salvation for each one from all eternity, and that nothing could frustrate the divine purpose in his behalf, was not only a tremendous moral support in times of persecution, but also a powerful and universal solvent of earthly distinctions, since it made the humblest equal in the God-appointed ordering of the universe to the greatest.

The leading doctrines of Calvin, political, ecclesiastical and theological, bearing on civil liberty having been examined, it remains yet to consider their practical application at Geneva and elsewhere.

Geneva had been a town of some importance under Roman rule. Adopting Christianity in the fourth century it became the seat of a bishopric; and at the downfall of the Roman Empire it was made the capitol of the newly established kingdom of Burgundy. After varying political fortune it was united to the German Empire in the tenth century as an "imperial city." While under the overlordship of the Emperor the administration of its temporal affairs was divided among three distinct powers: the Bishop of Geneva, the so-called Count of Geneva, and the citizens. This triangular



arrangement was not ordinarily a peaceful one, and the consequence was a frequent readjustment of powers. In the thirteenth century the bishops succeeded with the assistance of the rising and ambitious House of Savoy in breaking the power of the counts. A subsequent alliance between the House of Savoy, which had assumed the powers of the counts, and the citizens wrested from the bishops a number of privileges for the people and for Savoy the right to appoint the *vice-dominus* or episcopal deputy for temporal administration. A century later the citizens succeeded in extorting from the Bishop a charter which formally recognized their privileges. In accordance with this charter the citizens met annually in a general assembly for the election of four syndics or magistrates and a treasurer to be their representatives in the government of the city. These five together with the four syndics of the previous year—the syndics were not immediately eligible to reëlection—and sixteen others appointed by the syndics formed the Little Council, the inner executive body in that part of the administration which belonged to the citizens. A second council of fifty, later sixty, was established in 1457 to discuss matters not conveniently debatable in the General Assembly. Its members were appointed by the Little Council, not by the general body of citizens. To these two councils a third was added in 1526—the Council of Two Hundred—in conformity to the constitution of Bern and other Swiss cantons.

The *status quo* between the Bishop, the Duke of Savoy and the citizens was again violently disturbed in the fifteenth century when Amadeus VIII. of Savoy while Pope possessed himself of the bishopric of Geneva; thereafter it was almost invariably occupied by a member of the House of Savoy. But this did not satisfy Savoy whose dukes had long entertained the design of extending their control over Geneva. Nearly a century later in pursuance of this scheme Duke Charles induced Bishop John of Savoy to cede to the House of Savoy all his temporal rights. When the citizens refused their approval to the arrangement Charles inaugurated a

bloody persecution. To protect themselves the Genevese entered into an alliance with the cantons of Fribourg and Bern in 1526. The aggressions of Savoy continuing, both cantons finally took the field and compelled Savoy to sue for peace and renounce all its claims on Geneva. A little later, by renouncing all allegiance to the Bishops, and assuming all the rights formerly enjoyed by both Bishop and Duke, Geneva became a self-governing republic under the protection of Bern and the Swiss Confederacy.

At the time Geneva achieved her independence there was little or no sentiment favorable to the Reformation; and the final establishment of Protestantism was largely owing to two factors, neither of them religious in character. The first was the zeal of Bern, Geneva's warm ally, to accomplish the triumph of Protestantism throughout western Switzerland. With Bernese encouragement and under Bernese protection preachers of the new doctrine travelled over the French-speaking parts of Switzerland. It was in this way that the fiery Farel came to Geneva in 1532. The other factor was the profligate and tyrannical conduct of the Bishop of Geneva who had entered into an alliance with Savoy to recover his temporal authority. The effect of this was to identify Protestantism with political liberty in the minds of the people; so that the Reformation was largely a political movement. There was little religious conviction on the part of the people, notwithstanding the fact that stirred by Farel's bold preaching they had voted "to live in this holy evangelical law and Word of God, as it had been announced to them, desiring to abandon all masses, images, idols and all that which may pertain thereto." Nor was the Reformation followed by any moral improvement. Geneva was an important commercial and manufacturing town. Situated near the most frequented passes over the Alps it became early in its history a center of trade where the products of France, Germany and Italy were exchanged. It had, therefore, the vices of a commercial town. Its inhabitants were cosmopolitan in blood and



character; gay, excitable, riotous, luxurious and pleasure-loving; fond of masquerades and other mummeries; given to gambling, dancing, adultery and prostitution, the last sanctioned by the government. The introduction of scandalous licentiousness by the Savoyan courtiers had infected the entire population with a moral virus. To this must be added yet the moral decay caused by the thirty years' struggle for independence, the sudden destruction of the old order, political and religious, and the unchaining of the passions through constant tumult. Finally, the city was torn with factions. A considerable element including many of the oldest families still held to Catholicism. On the other hand, many who had been aroused by Farel's preaching, and others who had embraced Protestantism out of patriotic considerations, did not take kindly to the strenuous discipline established by Farel. The consequence was a growing spirit of discontent with the new order of things, and a growing clamor for the ancient customs and liberties. Such was the Geneva to which Calvin came.

When Calvin was recalled to Geneva in 1541 he came on his own terms. The main thing on which he insisted was the principle of ecclesiastical independence in the matter of government and discipline, the very thing for which he had unsuccessfully contended, and because of which he had been expelled from the city three years before. This point tacitly agreed to, Calvin lost no time after his return in applying himself to the task of ecclesiastical and political organization. On the very day of his return he petitioned the Little Council to appoint a commission to draw up a constitution for the Genevan church. Six councillors were promptly appointed in conjunction with the ministers, and in two weeks they reported the celebrated "*Ordonnances ecclésiastiques de l'Église de Genève*" which were almost entirely the work of Calvin. After some alterations at the hands of the several councils they were solemnly ratified by the General Assembly of citizens, January 2, 1542, as the fundamental law of the republic.

In accordance with the "Institutes" the Ordinances recognized four classes of officers: pastors, teachers, elders and deacons. The duty of the pastor was to preach, administer the sacraments and exercise discipline in conjunction with the elders. For purposes of discipline the city was divided into districts; and in each district a pastor and an elder were required to make house-to-house visitations in order to examine into the doctrine and manner of life of each inhabitant. Every family was to be visited at least once a year. The teachers were charged with the duty of instructing the faithful in sound religion, as well as in the necessary preliminary studies, and guarding the purity of doctrine. The elders were to exercise a moral censorship over the people, warn the disorderly, and give notice to the Consistory of cases requiring discipline. The office of the deacons was to care for the poor and sick. The right of electing teachers and pastors belonged to the ministers in office subject to the approval of the Little Council. The elders and deacons were elected by the Little Council with the approval of the Council of Two Hundred.

From these four classes of officials two governing bodies were constituted. The first was the Venerable Company composed of the pastors and teachers of theology. It was entrusted with the general supervision of all strictly ecclesiastical affairs but had no political power. The other was the Consistory which consisted of all the pastors and twelve elders chosen from the several councils by the Little Council subject to the approval of the Council of Two Hundred. The Consistory was the most distinctive feature of Calvin's ecclesiastical order and had no counterpart in any other Protestant church. It regulated public and private morals, and could summon for censure and excommunication any one who "opposed received doctrine, neglected church attendance, rebelled against ecclesiastical good order, or was of evil life." None were exempt from its authority for none were permitted to live in Geneva who had not made a profession of Christianity.



It had at its disposal an officer of the civil government to summon persons before it; if any one refused to appear when summoned the government compelled him to attend. Perverse and flagrant offenders after being excommunicated were handed over to the Little Council for further punishment.

This friendly coöperation between church and state in the matter of discipline gave to the Consistory a peculiar power. While nominally limited to censure and excommunication, it could in reality command any penalty through the civil government; for according to the medieval idea, which Calvin had retained from the Roman Church, the state must punish offences against religion only at the bidding of the church. To this there was considerable opposition on the part of the secular authorities; and when the Ordinances were under consideration the Little Council, notwithstanding the tacit acceptance of Calvin's terms at the time of his recall, insisted that to it, and not to the Consistory, should be given the power to punish ecclesiastical offences, including the right of excommunication. In accordance with this determination it inserted the following in the Ordinances: "We have ordered that the said ministers shall have no jurisdiction in this province [discipline], but simply should hear the parties and make the aforesaid remonstrances and on their report we can deliberate and render judgment according to the merits of the case." If this had been permitted to stand it would have completely invalidated Calvin's cherished principle of ecclesiastical autonomy; and before the Ordinances were finally adopted by the General Assembly of citizens he succeeded, but only with much difficulty, in having the action taken by the Little Council rescinded and the original provision with respect to discipline restored. But the Little Council notwithstanding its defeat did not relinquish its claims. In less than two years we find it boldly insisting on the right of excommunication and conceding to the Consistory only the right of admonishing. That it did not succeed in establishing its claim was altogether owing to the vigilance, energy and

courage of Calvin who declared that he would sacrifice everything and return into exile rather than admit the demand of the Little Council. The following year the right of the Consistory to excommunicate was again challenged, this time by the Council of Sixty which by a formal vote declared that "the Consistory has no jurisdiction or power to refuse [the Supper] but only to admonish and then report to the Little Council so that the government may judge the delinquents according to their demerits." Again Calvin's energetic protest that he would suffer exile and even death rather than recognize the right of the civil government, or any part of it, to exercise the power of excommunication, forestalled further action and left the question in the same unsettled condition as before. A period of comparative quiet followed but in 1553 the action of the Little Council in annulling the excommunication of a prominent citizen by the Consistory reopened the whole question. After vainly protesting against such an unprecedented assumption of power Calvin boldly defied the Council, declaring that under no circumstances would he administer the Lord's Supper to one who had been excommunicated. Here again, despite his initial failure, he won a moral victory in the end, inasmuch as the man by remaining away from the Communion, in accordance with the secret advice of the Council, failed to establish his rights. A little later the Council of Two Hundred entered the lists against Calvin by voting that the Consistory had no power to excommunicate without orders from the Little Council. When Calvin again protested it was decided to ask the opinions of the churches of Bern, Zürich, Basel and Schaffhausen. But when these arrived they were found to be so divergent that no further attempt was made at the time to reach a decision. It was only after Calvin's final triumph over his enemies in 1555, and after a commission had been appointed to consider the matter, that the right of the Consistory to exercise the power of excommunication was definitively recognized by the formal decision of the three councils to abide by the Ordinances.



A comparison of the Ordinances of 1541 with the principles of ecclesiastic government laid down in the "Institutes," and the Articles of 1537, as well as with the revised Ordinances of 1561, which were enacted after Calvin's final triumph over the Libertines, will show that Calvin yielded much to the peculiar conditions prevailing at Geneva, and also to the insistent and jealous demands of the Little Council. In the "Institutes" he had contended for the principle of a self-governing church based on the sovereignty of the Christian man. But the Ordinances vested the appointment of the lay portion of the Consistory, not in the congregation, but in the Little Council acting with the advice of the ministers and subject to the approval of the Council of Two Hundred. This together with the provision that the elders should be chosen from the several councils, and not from the congregation, was a departure from Calvin's principles. In other ways, too, the civil government exercised a larger control over ecclesiastical affairs than was warranted by Calvin's views. From the first the church was placed in a position of pecuniary dependence although Calvin had favored the principle of self-support. In a letter to Viret in 1542 he complained that at Geneva the church had been left naked, through the confiscation of all ecclesiastical property by the magistrates, in order to make the ministers more subservient. Besides fixing and paying the salaries of the clergy the magistrates frequently called them to account for their sermons; while on the other hand the rule which required the Little Council to consult the ministers in appointing the lay members of the Consistory was often omitted in practice. The government also voted on the confessions of faith and systems of discipline and gave them the power of law; and in cases where the ministers were not able to settle a doctrinal contention among themselves the Ordinances provided that the matter in dispute should be referred first to the elders and then to the magistrates. This made the government the court of last resort in matters of doctrine as well as of conduct. A final instance

of governmental aggression is afforded by the provision relating to the election of ministers. The original draft of the Ordinances had vested the exclusive right of electing a minister in the other ministers. It had also provided that before the election the candidate should be examined with respect to his doctrine and manner of life by the other ministers. But at the demand of the Little Council this was modified to the extent of giving to that body both the right to confirm the election and the right of being represented at the examination by two of its own members.

With respect to the internal government of the Genevan church the Ordinances exhibit a similar divergence from the principles of Calvin as laid down in the "Institutes." The most notable instance of this is the diminished influence of the people in ecclesiastical affairs. Calvin had held as a cardinal principle that ministers should be elected by the consent of the people. But the Ordinances proceeded on the view that this principle was satisfied by the participation of the secular government, that is, the Little Council, in the election; and in general silence was taken to mean consent so far as the congregation was concerned.

It must be evident, therefore, that in regard to both the relation of church and state at Geneva and the internal government of the church Calvin departed from his cherished views, not only as laid down in the "Institutes," but as seen in the constitution of the French Church which was almost entirely his work. For this there are various reasons. It is very probable that Calvin recognized that under the peculiar conditions prevailing at Geneva excommunication would be practicable only if exercised by laymen chosen by and from the secular government, and that to insist on its exercise by the clergy alone, or by persons elected by the congregation and responsible only to it, would defeat it altogether. It must be remembered that the government of Geneva had legal precedent, not to speak of the universal practice in Protestant lands, on its side when it claimed for itself the supreme au-



thority in ecclesiastical matters. The city had been ruled ecclesiastically by its bishop and when he was expelled the civil government naturally and legally succeeded to his powers and prerogatives; and what is still more to the point, freely exercised them in the interim between the overthrow of Catholicism and the arrival of Calvin, and again during Calvin's enforced absence from Geneva. The consequence was that the government, more particularly the Little Council, did not take kindly to the principle of ecclesiastical independence. It is also very probable that Calvin's previous experience at Geneva, as well as his experience at Strasburg, where he spent the greater part of his period of exile, and where he became acquainted with many of the German reformers, had broadened his outlook and inclined him more to temporize and bend to circumstances. His banishment from Geneva had taught him something of discretion, as well as a practical wisdom that is willing to sacrifice minor points in order to save the main end. He yielded much but he succeeded in saving and vitalizing with his own ideals the main thing—the principle of the moral life of the congregation regulated according to the Word of God through an independent exercise of discipline.

Geneva was both a church and a state; the latter no less than the former felt Calvin's molding power. The Ordinances had no sooner been presented to the Little Council than that body appointed another commission to revise and recodify the laws. In this task Calvin again took a leading part for which his legal training afforded an admirable preparation. The new code was completed in 1543 and continued in force until 1568, when it was superseded by a new revision, which was begun in 1560 under Calvin's immediate direction, and which remained the basis of legislation until the eighteenth century. For more than a century and a half, therefore, the civil constitution of Geneva rested on foundations laid by Calvin.

It will be recalled that the civil government at the time of Calvin's appearance was vested in a popular assembly composed of all the citizens and three councils. While the Coun-

cil of Two Hundred soon came to possess the final authority in making and repealing laws, the Little Council was by far the most important body in the state, possessing large executive and judicial as well as extensive legislative powers. At first its members, other than the treasurer and the eight syndics and ex-syndics, were appointed by the syndics. For a time, too, the syndics appointed the Council of Sixty. But inasmuch as this arrangement was thought to lodge too much power in the hands of the syndics the Council of Two Hundred in 1530 assumed the right of appointing the Little Council, that is, the sixteen members whose membership was not of an *ex officio* character. To restore the balance thus disturbed the Little Council was then given the power to appoint the Two Hundred. The members of the Little Council were also members of the Council of Sixty and both were included in the membership of the Council of Two Hundred.

While the supreme power of the state was at first vested in the General Assembly of citizens, without whose approval no treaties could be made and no law finally adopted, and while the syndics exercised their judicial and administrative powers only as the ministers of the General Assembly, the institution of the two larger councils had the effect of materially curtailing the powers of the general body of citizens. Furthermore, the two large councils met only at the summons of the Little Council, though any member could have either summoned provided he was willing to bear the expenses, amounting to a sol, about a franc, for each member. But the Little Council met regularly. Its membership was small, and also experienced, for it included both the syndics in office and those of the preceding year. The syndics presided over its meetings and had in their hands the immediate direction of the public business. They were the judges in all criminal cases, and together with the Little Council they had the power of passing sentence of death on condemned criminals. It is evident from all this that the real power was lodged in the Little Council.

Calvin left the main features of the Genevan constitution



just as he found them. But in practice the general effect of his influence was to strengthen the tendency towards the concentration of authority in the hands of the Little Council, which had set in long before his settlement in Geneva. Two of the most important changes effected by Calvin were the diminished power of the General Assembly of citizens and the limited range of choice in the election of some of the officials. Thus when the Two Hundred, who were themselves elected by the Little Council, elected the sixteen members of that body, their choice was limited to a list of thirty names submitted by the Little Council. When the General Assembly elected the syndics its choice was again limited to the nominees of the Little Council. Then as to the limited power of the General Assembly. While the Little Council held four regular sittings a week the regular meetings of the General Assembly were reduced to two a year; one in February to choose the syndics, and the other in November to fix the price of wine and elect certain police officials. Other meetings depended on emergencies but became less and less common, particularly after 1555, when Calvin succeeded in having a law enacted making it a high misdemeanor for any one to require a special meeting of the general body of citizens. Still another change enacted at Calvin's suggestion was the rule that nothing should be proposed in the General Assembly which had not been previously considered in the Council of Two Hundred; and nothing in the latter body which had not been considered in the Council of Sixty; and nothing in the Council of Sixty which had not been considered in the Little Council.

The effect, then, of Calvin's influence was to concentrate power in the hands of the Little Council. Apart from the fact that he was by instinct and training an aristocrat rather than a democrat, his experience at Geneva had taught him the unwisdom of putting much power in the hands of the turbulent populace. The conditions prevailing there, particularly during the first years of his rule, absolutely required, as he believed, for the accomplishment of his plans, the concentration of civil power in the hands of the few.

These are the main features of Calvin's civil and ecclesiastical constitutions, but more important than forms of government is the spirit which fills and animates them and the codes of law and morals which give expression to that spirit. The essential qualities of Calvin's legislation may be summed up by saying that it was inquisitorial in character, and that it proceeded from a consuming zeal for the honor of God. Its working principle was that minor offenses should be punished by the Consistory. When the offence merited something more than excommunication the offender was handed over to the Little Council for further punishment. Between the two every conceivable offense against religion, morals and good manners was punished.

Of first importance, of course, were offenses against religion. Neglect of the Lord's Supper was punished by a year's banishment. Absence from public worship was punished by a fine of three sols. For laughing during the sermon three men were imprisoned for three days. The authority of parents was guarded by severe penalties in the spirit of the Old Testament. For attempting to strike his mother a boy of sixteen years was sentenced to death, but on account of his youth the sentence was commuted to a public whipping and banishment. For singing worldly songs to Psalm tunes a young woman was beaten with rods. The saying of hard things against the refugees was severely punished, since things spoken against them, being spoken against martyrs, dishonored God. For abusing Calvin and the Consistory a woman was sentenced to ask mercy of God and required to leave the city within twenty four hours on penalty of losing her head. For daring to question the doctrine of predestination a student was whipped and banished forever from the city. Bolsec, Gentilis and Castelio were all banished for holding heretical opinions. Gruet was beheaded for atheism; and Servetus was burned for heresy and blasphemy. Death by burning was also the penalty for witchcraft. In 1545, during the ravages of the pestilence, not less than twenty men and women were burned for witch-



craft and for having engaged in a supposed conspiracy to spread the disease.

Any word or act which could be construed into approval of the Roman Catholic Church or criticism of the Reformed doctrine and practice was punishable by ecclesiastical or civil penalties or both. In 1552 the Little Council voted that the "Institutes" present "the holy doctrine of God" and that "in future no one shall dare to speak against that book or that doctrine." For playing on the day of the three kings a game associated with that festival some young people were excommunicated. For calling his child Claude, the name of a Catholic saint, instead of Abraham, and for saying that he would sooner leave him unbaptized fifteen years than call him Abraham, a man was sent to jail for four days. A goldsmith was punished for making a chalice; a barber for tonsuring a priest; a citizen for declaring the Pope a good man.

The severity as well as the inquisitorial character of the Genevan legislation is perhaps best seen in the minor points of discipline. Dancing, gambling, the manufacture of cards, luxury, excesses at public entertainments, extravagance and immodesty of dress, were punished by censure, excommunication, fines and imprisonment. Drunkards were fined three sols for each offense. Gamblers were placed in the pillory. The theatres were closed and for a time the taverns; and in place of the latter five "abbeys" were established to provide public entertainment. But no one was to be served with food or drink at these places who refused to say grace; all oaths and unseemly conversation was forbidden; and Bibles were required to be always at hand. The customary penalty for dancing was imprisonment. Marriage was strictly regulated. Brides were forbidden to wear wreaths in their bonnets. The wearing of jewelry and gay colors was forbidden. Eating and drinking were required to be moderate. Only one dish of meat and one of vegetables, no pastry, and only native wines, were permitted at an ordinary meal. Banquets and public entertainments were subjected to a strict supervision.

The having or reading of immoral books was punished by imprisonment.

Of the two leading features of Calvin's legislation, its inquisitorial character and its consuming zeal for the honor of God, the former was by no means peculiar to Geneva. A study of medieval municipal life will show that in this particular it did not differ from other medieval cities. It was in fact the universal medieval practice to regulate the private life to the minutest details. "Every instance quoted by modern historians," says Lindsay, "to prove Calvin's despotic interference with the details of private life can be paralleled by references to police books of medieval towns of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries." Not only was this narrow and inquisitorial legislation not peculiar to Geneva, but it was not even introduced by Calvin. Most of it had been placed on the statute books long before his settlement in Geneva, and in many instances it dated from Roman times. To say that he acquiesced in it, that he sanctioned its pains and penalties, that he followed its methods of procedure, is only saying that he belonged to the sixteenth century and was ruled by its ideas.

The distinguishing feature of Calvin's legislation was not its inquisitorial character, but its exceptional severity, the impartiality with which it was administered, and the ideals which inspired it. Calvin's character exhibits much of the spirit of the Old Testament. Reverence for law was a part of his being. To make the will of God as revealed in the Bible an authoritative guide for social as well as personal direction, to bring thought, feeling and will in subjection to it, to bring not only his own life but also the lives of others in conformity to it, was Calvin's supreme and absorbing purpose; and whatsoever dishonored or seemed to dishonor God by transgressing his law excited Calvin to a pitiless severity. That he was attracted to the Old Testament and profoundly influenced by its spirit of legalism was because he found there a divine example of national government. In this reverence for law and zeal for God's honor lies the peculiar spirit of Calvin's legis-



lation, although other factors like the desperate measures of his enemies, and the low moral tone of the populace, may have contributed to the same end. But that these were not the controlling considerations may be inferred from the fact that after his final triumph, and after the worst elements had been driven from the city, and the state of morals had materially improved, his severity instead of being moderated was intensified. The contention that Calvin did not always control the government, and cannot, therefore, be justly held responsible for the severity of the laws is equally untenable for two reasons. In the first place there is evidence to show that Calvin's zeal and severity were not infrequently moderated by the Little Council; and, secondly, after his final triumph in 1555, if not before, he was the absolute master of Geneva. It is true he never held civil office; in fact he was not made a citizen until 1559. He took no part in the proceedings of the several councils, and never appeared before them unless some ecclesiastical question was under consideration or his advice had been asked. And yet few sovereigns have ruled so absolutely as Calvin ruled Geneva. His counsel was sought in all important matters of state. When he wanted a new law he had only to present a request for it to the Little Council in the name of the Consistory. But while he ruled absolutely he ruled through his wonderful power of persuasion, though his masterful intellect and iron will, and above all through the moral power which came to him from the conviction that what he stood for was the will of God. He was Geneva. It made little difference that the relation which he set up between church and state was an impracticable one under ordinary conditions. His masterful personality preserved harmony between them because he was the mainspring of both. It made little difference that on paper his scheme subjected the church to the state. For whatever power was wanting to the church to protect itself against the aggressions of the state he more than supplied; so that, instead of the church being subject to the state, the state was in practice subordinated to the church.

Calvin's absorbing purpose was to make Geneva a model Christian community, not, however, for the sake of Geneva, but for the sake of Protestantism. He was constantly looking beyond the narrow confines of the little republic, advising, exhorting, comforting and instructing; and it was owing altogether to his masterful influence that non-German Protestantism, despite diversities of race, language, government and culture, became essentially one in doctrine and practice. It is only from this larger outlook that Calvin's influence on civil liberty can be measured, for not only would his influence have been insignificant if confined to Geneva, but the real significance of his principles was often obscured at Geneva by such untoward conditions as the presence and active coöperation of a friendly, if at times jealous, government, and its limited territory and population—Geneva at no time numbered over twenty thousand souls—which made possible the complete domination of secular and ecclesiastical interests by a single personality.

As distinguished from Lutheranism, Calvinism stood, first, for a certain type of doctrine, and, secondly, for a certain principle of ecclesiastical organization. Doctrinally they differed mainly with respect to the Lord's Supper. In ecclesiastical government Calvinism rejected the consistorial system of the Lutheran Churches which was based on Luther's theory that the *jus episcopale* belongs to the magistrate. While the Lutheran churches followed the medieval church on both points, that is, the doctrine of the Lord's Supper and the principle of ecclesiastical organization, Calvinism insisted on strictly following the teachings of the Word of God. It is true that the resemblance among the Reformed churches was closer in doctrine than in government. Nevertheless, with the exception of the Anglican Church, they accepted, in theory at least, Calvin's principle of ecclesiastical organization which they believed to be contained in the new Testament and exemplified by the primitive church. In practice, however, Calvin's principle that "the ultimate source of authority lies in



the membership of the Christian community, inspired by the presence of Christ promised to all his people," was materially modified by the prevailing fear that it might lead back to the medieval system of ecclesiastical arrogance and tyranny from which Protestantism was trying to escape. The consequence of this fear, and of the modifications of Calvin's principle which it inspired, was a considerable variety of ecclesiastical organizations among the Reformed churches. For while some of the Reformed leaders aimed at restoring the theocratic democracy of the primitive church, others like Cranmer and Zwingli believed that the civil authority might be safely left to represent the Christian democracy and regulate its ecclesiastical arrangements.

In order, therefore, to see Calvin's ecclesiastical idea at its best it is necessary to find a Reformed church struggling into existence and maintaining itself under the rule of a hostile government. Calvin's system of ecclesiastical organization was peculiarly suited to the needs of a church oppressed by the civil power and compelled to rely on its own inherent strength. Such a church was the French church, the "church under the cross," which reproduced more perfectly than any other the conditions of primitive Christianity, and which had more liberty to determine its own constitution than any of the Reformed churches.

Because of his ability as a theologian, his genius for organization, and his acknowledged authority, Calvin became the real founder of the French Reformed Church and to his death he remained its inspiring force. Then he was himself a Frenchman, not a foreigner, nor an enemy of France whom it would be treason to follow; while the chief source of his power, logic impregnated with the passion of conviction, was peculiarly a French quality. Calvin had many points of contact with France. As a student of law and the humanities he had made many acquaintances outside religious circles. With the leading Protestants he maintained an extensive correspondence. To the persecuted he sent letters of encouragement.

For those who had become involved in controversies because of their faith he prepared brief theological treatises. To the struggling congregations he sent models for confessions of faith and rules of discipline. Among his correspondents were many persons of social and political distinction. French refugees found a ready welcome at Geneva and came in large numbers, for it was situated on the borders of France and spoke its language. Besides refugees many students were attracted to Geneva by the fame of its schools. Calvin himself taught theology throughout his Genevan ministry; and through his influence many noted scholars were induced to settle in the city. In 1559 the educational system was thoroughly reorganized. At the same time the Academy was established. Its success was assured from the first for it opened with twelve hundred students. Of this number three hundred, most of them foreigners, were in the higher departments. Calvin's design was to make the Academy first of all a training school for French Protestantism; and for a full half-century his influence made it the leading theological school for non-German Protestantism. From it went forth large numbers of young men, who were convinced that Calvin's message was that of God, and who were eager to suffer and fight for the faith that it taught. Most of them were Frenchmen who returned to their native land to preach the new doctrine and be pastors to the struggling congregations that began to be organized soon after the middle of the century. In 1559 nineteen pastors were either asked for or sent from Geneva, and twelve the following year. In 1561 ninety were demanded but could not be supplied. Others, students and refugees, travelled over France as colporteurs distributing at the risk of their lives the Bibles, tracts and sermons which were printed by Geneva's thirty printing shops. The "Institutes" and many of Calvin's commentaries were distributed in the same way and were widely read by both clergy and laity.

In these various ways Calvin molded French Protestantism, not only giving it its creed, constitution and discipline, but



also breathing into it his own moral earnestness. The first congregation was organized at Paris in 1555 on the Genevan plan. Four years later a national synod was formed and a constitution drawn up by Calvin adopted. Under this constitution each congregation was governed by a consistory composed of ministers, elders and deacons. The elders and deacons were elected by the congregation, the ministers by the elders and deacons. Congregations were combined into groups over which were the colloquies consisting of the ministers and an elder from each congregation in the group elected by the consistory. Above the colloquies, and constituted in the same way, were the synods, provincial and national. This synodal feature of the French church was an extension of the Genevan system. For some reason Calvin made no attempt to establish synods at Geneva, but as soon as his system was applied to a large community they became a practical necessity.

The French church was more democratic in its internal government than the Genevan church, while its relation to the state was one of complete independence. Its independence extended even to pecuniary matters for it was entirely supported by the voluntary contributions of its membership, a feature which Calvin never succeeded in establishing at Geneva. The French church had the same rigorous discipline as Geneva. The consistory had the power of excommunication subject, however, to the approval of the provincial synod.

For more than forty years the French Protestants acted on Calvin's principle of uncomplaining submission to the civil government. But the renewed persecutions which followed the death of Henry IV. had the effect of making them more and more a political party, so that there was rapidly developed among them a spirit of hostility to the absolutism of the crown and a love of independence such as was unknown elsewhere in France; and this, too, at a time when the French crown was consolidating its power and crushing out every vestige of the old spirit of feudal independence. At a time also when statesmen still refused to see any middle ground between abso-

lutism and anarchy, this "church under the cross" was demonstrating the possibility of reconciling the two opposite principles of popular rights and supreme central control.

In England, Scotland and the Netherlands Calvin's influence was almost as great as in France. In all three, however, this influence was more pronounced in doctrine than in government and discipline. Thus the Scottish Confession of 1560, the *Confessio Belgica*, 1561, were purely, and the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England largely, Calvinistic. In the matter of government and discipline Calvin's influence was exerted in more indirect fashion. For Scotland and the Netherlands took their ecclesiastical constitutions from France rather than from Geneva. England, on the other hand, did not adopt Calvin's system of government at all save for a brief spell.

In the Netherlands the Reformation at first took the Lutheran form but the influence of France soon gave it a prevalingly Calvinistic tone. This came about through the influx of Reformed preachers from France into the French-speaking Walloon provinces of the south, from which the Reformed doctrines spread northward until the whole country had become strongly Calvinistic. This French influence was greatly strengthened by the general practice of sending young men from the Netherlands to Geneva to be educated. While Calvin's theology was accepted without question in the *Confessio Belgica*, his system of ecclesiastical organization suffered considerable modification. As long as the government was Catholic the Reformed Churches were altogether independent of the state as in France. When the government became Protestant some favored the giving to the state of a large measure of control over the church, while others contended that the church should exercise discipline through its own officers and appoint its own ministers. The result of the controversy was something of a compromise between the Calvinistic and the Lutheran systems of ecclesiastical organization. The church was limited to a provincial organization. The



provinces were divided into classes and each congregation was governed according to the Genevan model. The right to exercise discipline was vested in the elders with the right of appeal to the magistrates.

To Scotland Calvinism gave for the first time a really representative system of popular government. Her parliaments had long been merely the feudal gatherings of prelates and nobles in which peasant and burgher had little or no voice. But with the introduction of the Reformation the people were given a share in the administration of affairs, not only in ecclesiastical, but also in civil, matters, for the two were largely fused into one form of control. Monarchical power was limited both in theory and in practice. Not only did the Scotch reformers successfully insist on the freedom of the pulpit, and thus effectually establish the principle of liberty of thought and speech, but they also boldly contended, as Knox did more than once in Queen Mary's presence, that the people may rightly resist a tyrannical government, and that where kings neglect their duty the people may do it for them and even restrain them in case they spare the wicked and oppress the innocent. It has been well said that it was the descendants of men, taught by Knox to "with stand the divine right of kings to do wrong," who set the example to England of effective resistance resulting eventually in the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. "Thirty thousand armed Covenanters sitting down on Dun's Law" in 1639 became, as Carlyle expressed it, "the signal for all England rising up." James I. thoroughly understood the political quality of Calvinism and its effect on such theories of absolute monarchy as he entertained. At the Hampton Court Conference in 1604 he voiced his opinion in this fashion: "A Scottish Presbytery as well agreth with a Monarchy as God and the Devill. Then Jacke and Tom and Will and Dick shall meet, and at their pleasure censure me and my Councell and all our proceedings."

The earlier English reformers did not aim at anything more

than the correction of the practical abuses of the papacy. This conservative tendency continued until the return of the exiles who had fled to the continent during the reign of Mary. Because of their rejection of Luther's doctrine of the Lord's Supper these exiles had been coldly received in the Lutheran communities of northern Germany. But in the free cities of southern Germany and especially in Switzerland they received a cordial welcome. The consequence was that most of them settled at Geneva and Zürich. In one day in October, 1557, no less than fifty of these Marian exiles were given the right of settlement at Geneva; and in 1560 just before their return to England a number of them formally thanked the Genevan government for its hospitality.

The return of these exiles gave at once a more radical turn to the English Reformation, particularly in the matter of doctrine. The way for this had been prepared by Calvin's correspondence during the reign of Edward VI. with Archbishop Cranmer, the Duke of Somerset and the young king himself. By 1660 the earlier inclination of English Protestantism to the views of Luther had given way to Calvinism. After the accession of Elizabeth the "Institutes" were, as Blunt says, "generally in the hands of the clergy and might be considered their text-book of theology." Hardwick says that the "Institutes" became a sort of oracle and text-book for the students in the universities. As late as 1578 the use of Calvin's catechism was required at the university of Cambridge; and at both Oxford and Cambridge the professors of theology were pronounced Calvinists into the seventeenth century. When Elizabeth came to the throne she was strongly impressed with the importance of filling the more important posts in the church with men who could be relied upon to oppose Catholicism. But such men were to be found for the most part only among the Calvinists. Then, too, the younger ministers were largely Calvinists owing to the Calvinistic atmosphere of the universities. Finally, the soldiers sent by Elizabeth to the aid of the Dutch in their struggle for independence had returned



like the Marian exiles with their heads full of the doctrines of Calvin. The consequence of all these influences was that after English Protestantism turned away from the views of Luther all parties were Calvinists in theology until the coming in of Arminian theories in the reign of James I.

In the matter of ecclesiastical organization and discipline the influence of Calvin was not so apparent at first as in theology. When the Marian exiles returned from the continent they found the royal authority thoroughly enlisted in the cause of episcopacy. The reason why Elizabeth was resolved to maintain the episcopal system was its entire accord with her notions of absolute rule. She was shrewd enough to see in the possibilities of a church independent of the state what her successor, James I., expressed in the maxim, "No bishop, no king." And against the royal authority, strongly entrenched in the affections of the people and actively supported by a large party of moderate reformers, the followers of Calvin who wanted to introduce the Genevan discipline could make no headway.

A third thing which the Marian exiles brought back with them was a certain simplicity of worship which they had learned to admire at Geneva. They wanted a much more radical reformation of worship than the leaders of English Protestantism favored or Elizabeth would permit. They opposed the retention of everything from the Roman Church which was not positively enjoined by the Scriptures. In all this they were in thorough accord with the party which from the beginning had contended for a more radical departure from the practice of the Roman Church. This attitude did not at first involve any opposition to the Anglican Church on doctrinal grounds, for all parties in English Protestantism were Calvinists in theology; nor on the ground of the proper relation of church and state, inasmuch as this radical element was not opposed to the retention of bishops, although it stoutly denied the claim that bishops possessed powers superior to other ministers. Its opposition was aimed wholly at first at

the retention of certain vestments and ceremonies which to them savored too strongly of Romish superstitions. The determination of Elizabeth to retain these ancient observances, to which she was inclined both by personal and political considerations, and from which her advisers did little to dissuade her from fear, perhaps, of driving her back to Catholicism, divided the church at the very beginning of her reign into two parties, the Puritans and the Anglicans.

The continued opposition of the authorities of the church to the changes demanded by the Puritans led the latter to a critical examination of the foundations of the ecclesiastical system which permitted these relics of popery. They inquired whether such a polity could rest on a divine sanction; and the test which they applied was the Calvinistic principle that nothing must be permitted, whether in doctrine, worship or government, which is not expressly enjoined by the teaching of Scripture. The results of their examination were far-reaching. They held with Calvin that church polity is authoritatively taught in the Scriptures, and that the church is not at liberty to depart from it; that in this divinely ordained polity the management of church affairs belongs to the church itself and to its officers, and not to the magistrates; that while the magistrates may not dictate to the church they must nevertheless protect and defend it by repressing heresy and blasphemy; that the system of diocesan episcopacy is not, and the presbyterian system is, sanctioned by the Scriptures; and that the people of each parish ought to have a share in the selection of their ministers. All this is thoroughly Calvinistic, and nothing could be more diametrically opposed to the Elizabethan policy of governing the church through officers of royal appointment and laws of royal imposition.

Puritanism grew rapidly after the first decade of Elizabeth's reign; and when its opponents found themselves powerless to arrest its progress they gradually shifted their ground and gave a new character to the controversy. At first the principal argument of the Anglicans in behalf of a diocesan



episcopacy was the royal preference for it. But towards the close of Elizabeth's reign they set up the theory of its divine authority. The effect of this was to give to the whole controversy a political character, for it showed more and more clearly that the question of the relation of the clergy to the church, and of the church to the state, and the question of the relation of subject and ruler, were at bottom one and the same question. According to the Anglican view the clergy were either the representatives of the sovereign in the administration of religious interests, or a divinely appointed order, subject to the regulative control of the sovereign. In neither event were the clergy in any way responsible to the people to whom they ministered. In either case, too, it followed that by virtue of his authority over a divinely appointed order the sovereign must himself be of divine appointment and can be held responsible to his people for his actions no more than the clergy can to their flocks for their actions. In direct opposition to this the Puritan contended, as he had been taught by Calvin, that the minister can serve his congregation only by its consent and that consequently he is responsible to it alone. From Calvin the Puritan had learned also to test everything by the Word of God. This taught him to think for himself. But he did not have far to go before he found himself confronted by the question whether there was not some higher law than his will by which a king's acts might be judged, and whether he was not, in the last analysis, responsible to his subjects in much the same way as the minister was to his congregation.

The great body of Puritans did not contemplate separation from the church. They looked for its further reformation through the government which had already carried the church over from Catholicism to Anglicanism. Their immediate object, therefore, was to secure control of the government. Although this was accomplished during the Commonwealth the Puritans were not able, even during their brief political supremacy, to establish their political and ecclesiastical principles in their entirety. For while Parliament established in a

general way the presbyterian system, it refused to accept the Calvinistic theory of the Church as a power distinct from the church and having the independent right of excommunication. In serious matters of discipline it permitted an appeal from the highest ecclesiastical tribunals to itself. But before this system could be fully established the Independents under the leadership of Cromwell succeeded in possessing themselves of the supreme power in the state. The principles of the Independents, or radical Puritans, present a mixture of Calvinistic and Anabaptistic elements. They held the principle of the self-governing power of the local congregation, rejected the government of prelates and synods alike, favoring only voluntary associations for mutual counsel and the prosecution of Christian work. These radical Puritans were again divided into a moderate and a radical wing. The latter held that discipline should be administered as the work of the whole congregation, that each congregation should chose its own ministers and other officers, and even ordain those chosen to the ministry. The former were less democratic for they entrusted the work of ecclesiastical administration, not to the congregation, but to its officers, who were thus constituted a speaking aristocracy in the face of a silent democracy. In matters of doctrine, and in making the Bible the ultimate rule of polity as well as of faith, the several bodies of Puritans were not only at one but strict Calvinists.

The significance of Puritanism does not lie in any principle of religious toleration, for with the exception of some of the more advanced Independents like Vane and Milton, who strongly deprecated the use of coercion in matters of religion, and contended that the church should be independent of the state even to the extent of supporting itself by the voluntary contributions of its members, the Puritans were not the advocates of toleration. They believed that within a given community there should be uniformity of religious belief and practice, and that this uniformity should be secured and maintained through the coercive power of the state. The real import of



Puritanism is that it shattered the monarchical power in England at a time when monarchical power was bearing down all opposition in the other great European countries. It was not an accident that in those parts of England, in which Puritanism was most vigorous, the most effective opposition to the tyranny of the Stuarts was developed, and the future settlers of New England were mainly recruited. And furthermore, in fighting the battle of republican government in England in the seventeenth century, Puritanism laid the foundations of civil and political liberty for all time. "If there ever were men," says Fiske, "who laid down their lives in the cause of all mankind it was those grim old Ironsides whose watchwords were texts from Holy Writ, whose battle cries were hymns of praise. It was to the alliance of intense religious enthusiasm with the instinct of self-government and the spirit of personal independence that the preservation of English freedom is due." That England has exercised a profound influence on the Continent along political lines is shown by the fact that its civil institutions have been largely copied by the nations of northern and western Europe, and by the further fact that it was the study of English institutions by Montesquieu, Turgot, Voltaire and Rousseau that gave form and direction to the French Revolution.

In German Switzerland Calvin had comparatively little influence at first. Its Reformed churches had been established and their form fixed before Calvin's work began; and they were not, therefore, easily molded to his ideas. Then there were also more specific reasons. At Zürich Calvin's doctrine of the Lord's Supper was regarded as being too much like Luther's, and for a time, indeed, Calvin had felt himself drawn more to the Lutheran, than to the Zwinglian, Reformation. Basel never took kindly to Calvin's predestinarian views; while Bern persistently refused to be reconciled to Calvin during his lifetime, largely on account of his theory of ecclesiastical independence, but also because Calvin had in a number of instances effectually thwarted the schemes of

Bern to extend its control over Geneva. But after the middle of the century, beginning with the agreement between Calvin and Bullinger on the Lord's Supper in the *Consensus Tigurinus*, the doctrinal differences between Geneva and the Protestant churches of German Switzerland gradually disappeared through the adoption by the latter of the essential features of Calvin's system of doctrine, although these were often adopted in modified form. In the sphere of ecclesiastical organization and government the churches of German Switzerland were separated from those of the French-speaking cantons by persistent and fundamental differences. Calvin's strenuous discipline seems to have had no affinity for German-speaking peoples and none of the German cantons ever adopted it.

In Germany the Calvinistic theology was modified by Melanchthonian elements. At first the agreement between Melanchthon and Calvin was confined to the doctrine of the Lord's Supper. Because the followers of Melanchthon in the Lutheran Church accepted Calvin's theory of Christ's presence in the Supper they were fiercely proscribed by the Ultra-Lutheran party. This served to bring the former into still closer sympathy with Calvin, although the latter's predestinarian views were not generally accepted. The Academy of Geneva which attracted many students from southwestern Germany was a most important factor in bringing the two parties together. This union of Calvinism and Melanchthonianism is best seen in the Palatinate, which adopted the Reformed faith in 1563, and whose doctrinal standard, the Heidelberg Catechism, embodies the essential features of Calvin's system in irenic moderation. This catechism obtained wide approval beyond Germany, and in Nassau, Bremen, Anhalt, Hesse, Baden and Brandenburg, within half a century from its publication, it superseded the Lutheran standards.

In Germany as in German Switzerland Calvin's system of discipline never took root. In the matter of ecclesiastical organization the Reformed churches of Germany occupied an



intermediate position between Calvinism and Lutheranism. The only exception to this is to be found in the churches of the Lower Rhine, which were founded by Walloon refugees from the Netherlands, and which introduced the presbyterian system just as it had been developed in France. In the Palatinate, on the other hand, the Calvinistic system suffered considerable modification. While consistories were established in the congregations, the supreme power over all the churches was vested in a commission of three theologians and three laymen all appointed by the government. Between this commission and the congregational consistories there were superintendents or inspectors. Then there were also synods, provincial and general, composed only of ministers.

That Calvin has profoundly influenced the religious and political development of America can require no argument. The English Puritans, the Scotch and Irish Presbyterians, the Dutch Burghers and the French Huguenots, have established his faith, and, to a large extent, his polity wide over the continent. It was from these elements, trained in the spirit and principles of Calvin, that the earliest and most aggressive opponents of British tyranny came in the eighteenth century. It would have been strange, indeed, if these peoples who settled in such large numbers in the New World had not taken a leading part in the molding of its social and political institutions. It would have been stranger still if the followers of Cromwell and Milton, of Knox and Melville, of Coligny and William the Silent, all of whom acknowledged Calvin as their spiritual father, had left behind them, when they came to America, their sturdy spirit of civil and political liberty, and had become slaves after they and their fathers had learned from the teachings of Calvin to "withstand the divine right of kings to do wrong."

The significance of Calvinism for civil liberty may be summed up in the following propositions. Its burning realization of the absolute sovereignty of God, which is its all-pervading principle, and in the light of which earthly rulers are but

fellow-vassals, to be served and obeyed only in so far as they are faithful subjects of the King of kings, inspired men everywhere to battle against oppression. It furnished the only effective system for the organization and maintenance of an oppressed Protestantism, for while Lutheranism, Zwinglianism and Anglicanism were all dependent on the state, Calvinism could flourish, not only without state support, but even in the face of the active hostility of the state. It revived the medieval doctrine of the responsibility of kings to a spiritual power at a time when royalty was trampling all responsibility to God and man beneath its feet; at a time when kings recognized no law but their own wills, and demanded unquestioning obedience from prince and pauper alike, it brought royal conduct to the tests of the Gospel and human reason.

But it was only where it did its work as a discipline as well as a theology that Calvinism accomplished all this. On the other hand, where it was only a body of doctrine, as in Germany, and not also a peculiar conception of the Christian life, its influence on political thought and practice was inconspicuous.

LANCASTER, PA.



## VIII.

# CALVINISM IN THE REFORMED CHURCHES OF GERMANY.

BY PROF. GEORGE W. RICHARDS, D.D.

Different tendencies appeared in German protestanism from its inception. Luther indeed was the master spirit; but it became clear very early that not all the German reformers were Lutherans. The variations came to view as the work of reconstruction advanced. The point of divergence was the doctrine of the Lord's Supper. A contention arose through the spread of Zwingli's views in South Germany. His writings circulated, as rapidly and as widely as those of Luther, in Swabia, Franconia, Bavaria and Alsace. Three hundred copies of the "Auslegung der Schlussreden" (July, 1523) were sold immediately after their publication in Nuremberg alone. Albert Dürer and other prominent Nurembergers became ardent advocates of the Swiss doctrine.<sup>1</sup>

In Strassburg there was a group of independent reformers who were neither strictly Lutheran nor Zwinglian, though they sympathized with the latter. Their leader was Martin Bucer. At the Marburg Colloquy (1529), he and his associates (Hedio and Jacob Sturm) allied themselves with Zwingli and opposed the Wittenbergers. At the Diet of Augsburg (1530) the protestants were represented by three distinct confessions. The first was the *Augustana* of the Lutherans; the second, the *Tetrapolitana* of four free cities of south Germany—Strassburg, Memmingen, Constance and Lindau; and the third, the *Ratio Fidei* of Zwingli. That Bucer and his fol-

<sup>1</sup> "Tercentenary Monument in Commemoration of the Three Hundredth Anniversary of the Heidelberg Catechism," 1863; article by Dr. Ebrard, pp. 89-90.

lowers differed from Luther is evident from the fact that they were refused the privilege of signing the *Augustana*, the tenth article excepted, and therefore felt constrained to draw up a separate confession. That they did not agree in all points with Zwingli we may infer from a letter of Bucer and Capito to Melanchthon (July 28, 1530) saying: "No one is ignorant how nothing is common to us with him (Zwingli)."<sup>2</sup> Afterwards Bucer played the part of mediator between the Swiss and the Saxons, and by the adoption of the Wittenberg Concord (1536) for a time reconciled the two parties, especially in Germany.

Another division developed among the Lutherans themselves. It came to be known as Melanchthonianism, Phillipism, or Crypto-Calvinism. Up to the Augsburg Diet Melanchthon was a loyal disciple of Luther. He had no more sympathy with the Zwinglians than his inflexible master. He charged them with being unscriptural and with neglecting to mention in their writing justification by faith.<sup>3</sup> Not long after the memorable Diet he showed signs of wavering in some of his doctrinal positions.<sup>4</sup> He began to look with more favor on Bucer's theory of the eucharist. The latter, in a letter to Schwebel (November 9, 1530) wrote that "Melanchthon said he would be satisfied with him (Bucer) if only it were acknowledged that Christ is present in the Supper, not in the bread; and present to the soul, not to the body." Melanchthon, however, was slow in announcing his change of view. He was held in check partly by his regard for Luther and partly by his peace-loving and mediating disposition. Evidences of the change are found in his correspondence with

<sup>2</sup> "Book of Concord," Jacobs, II., p. 159.

<sup>3</sup> "Tercentenary Monument," p. 97. Ebrard adds that "Melanchthon must have given these *libri* a very superficial perusal."

<sup>4</sup> Schaff says: "But from the time of the Wittenberg Concord in 1536, or even earlier, Melanchthon began to change his view on the real presence as well as his view on predestination and free-will; in the former he approached Calvin, in the latter he departed from him" ("Ch. Hist.," VIII., p. 665). The variations are indicated in the footnotes of the *Augustana invariata* (Schaff's "Creeds," III., pp. 7-73).



his friends and in the church orders and liturgies which were prepared under his influence. He took a positive and public stand boldly announcing his variations from original Lutheranism in the *Augustana variata* of 1540. A comparison of his statements of the doctrine of the Lord's Supper in 1530 and in 1540, indicate a marked departure from the theory of the real presence as held by Luther and an approach to that of Bucer. Melanchthon had many followers, especially in the region from which the *Tetrapolitana* (1530) had come in South Germany.

Enough has been said to convince the reader that German Reformed protestantism was not wholly an importation from a foreign country. It was doubtless allied and indebted to Zwinglianism, and yet it differed from it. It reached its completion in Calvinism, and yet it existed in its earlier stage before Calvin came to Strassburg, and had a molding influence on Calvin himself. He was in a sense both a pupil<sup>5</sup> and a master. During his ministry in Strassburg he associated with Bucer and was on friendly terms with the Lutherans. The Germans generally counted him as an adherent of the Augsburg Confession as interpreted by Bucer and Melanchthon.<sup>6</sup> The Swiss gave him up as one of their number and criticized him as a deserter of their cause.<sup>7</sup> When he met Melanchthon at Frankfort he was gratified to find that they agreed substantially on the doctrine of the Lord's Supper and on the urgent need of ecclesiastical discipline.<sup>8</sup>

It must not be inferred, however, that he was in perfect accord with Luther or even Melanchthon, though more nearly

<sup>5</sup> Professor Williston Walker says: "No part of Calvin's life was more important in his spiritual and mental development, however, than the three years from 1538 to 1541, which he spent in Strassburg" ("Papers of the American Society of Church History," 2d series, I., p. 71).

<sup>6</sup> He subscribed the Augsburg Confession at Ratisbon in 1541. "Nec vero Augustanam Confessionem repudio, cui pridem volens ac lubens subscripsi, sicut eam autor ipse interpretatus est" ("Das Leben Johann Calvins," von Paul Henry, II., p. 505).

<sup>7</sup> *Idem*, I., p. 265.

<sup>8</sup> "Letters of Calvin," Bonnet, I., pp. 130, 136, 137.

with the latter than with the former.<sup>9</sup> He carefully distinguished his definition of the eucharist from Luther's.<sup>10</sup> He could not concede a corporal real presence and an oral manducation, nor could he admit the ubiquity of Christ's humanity which was a metaphysical presupposition of the Lutheran doctrine of the sacrament. On other points, such as the use of forms and ceremonies in worship, the organization and discipline of the congregation, and the conception of Christian life and morality, the Genevan and the Wittenberger differed, although these subjects for the time were overshadowed by the eucharistic controversy.

However congenial he and Melanchthon were, while the former dwelt on German soil, and even for more than a decade after he returned to Geneva, their correspondence became less frequent toward the close of their lives. They were men of totally different temperaments. Melanchthon's irenic spirit and almost cowardly diffidence, even to the sacrifice of truth and conviction, exasperated the logical, consistent, and courageous Genevan. On the doctrine of predestination they never could agree. Calvin wrote to his friend as follows: "To speak frankly my conscience forbids me to agree with you on this doctrine (predestination). You always hold to the general promise of the Scriptures addressed to all. Surely no one denies them but why is it that they are not realized in all? Because God does not impart His power to all."<sup>11</sup> He furthermore charged him with having drawn his pen across the article on predestination after he had read the *Consensus Tigurinus*. In spite of these differences they never ceased to respect each other, and in a most touching paragraph in his tract against Hesshuss, a year after Melanchthon's death,

<sup>9</sup> He warned Bucer against yielding too much to Luther, and called many of Luther's doctrines unreasonable and intolerable ("Johannes Calvin," Stähelin, I., pp. 200-201).

<sup>10</sup> See his "Short Treatise On The Lord's Supper" (Tracts, Eng. trans. II., pp. 195-198).

<sup>11</sup> Stähelin, II., p. 249.



Calvin paid a tribute to his distinguished and scholarly contemporary.<sup>12</sup>

For about two decades the Melanchthonian-Bucer-Calvinistic interpretation of protestantism was considered not only inoffensive but was generally accepted by the German Lutherans. The Wittenberg Concord was favorably received by the princes. The "enriched or amended" *Augustana* was submitted at the Colloquy of Worms (1540-1541) without protest either from the imperial deputies or the protestant theologians.<sup>13</sup> Luther himself, about that time, expressed himself as pleased "that the Confession stood firm." Melanchthon reported that "Calvin stood in great favor with Luther." But peace and harmony were not destined to continue in the German churches. The successful propagation of Melanchthonian doctrines, after Luther's death, stirred up a feeling in the Ultra-Lutherans that their very existence was in jeopardy.<sup>14</sup> They began a well-planned and stubborn contest (1553-1557) for the extirpation of Crypto-Calvinism and the restoration of genuine Lutheranism. The Naumburg Diet of the Princes in 1561 resulted in a permanent division of the evangelical party. The Melanchthonian tendency was suppressed as unsanctioned in the federation of the Augsburg Confession, and in other sections it was forced out of the church. The different tendencies in German protestantism could no longer exist peaceably side by side. They were regarded, not as different phases of one movement which might be tolerated with advantage, but as directly hostile and

<sup>12</sup> *Idem*, I., 253.

<sup>13</sup> Schaff says: "It was expressly approved by the Lutheran princes at the Convention of Naumburg in 1561, after Melanchthon's death, as an improved modification and authentic interpretation of the Confession" ("Ch. Hist.," VII., p. 665).

<sup>14</sup> The Augsburg and the Leipzig Interim (1548) permanently separated the Ultra-Lutherans and the Melanchthonians. The breach was widened by Westphal's writings on the Lord's Supper. In 1559 the Stuttgart Confession was issued as a "full-toned" Lutheran Symbol in distinction from Zwinglianism, Calvinism, and Melanchthonianism. See, also, Ebrard's article in "Tercentenary Monument," pp. 106-109.

mutually exclusive. The continuance of the one meant the death of the other. The polemics against Calvinism became unreasonably bitter. The Lutherans said: "Lieber katholisch als calvinisch." It was seriously questioned whether a Calvinist could be saved or not. The following prayer is still on record: "*Impleat nos Deus odio Calvinismi et Papismi.*"<sup>15</sup>

If the protestantism of Bucer and Capito, of Melanchthon and Calvin, was to be maintained on German territory, it had to separate from Lutheranism and effect an independent organization. Thus the original differences came to be finally embodied in hostile denominations known as the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches.

We shall summarize our conclusions so far as follows: (1) that from the beginning there were two distinct tendencies in German protestantism; (2) that Melanchthon became the leader of a school which was in sympathy with the south Germans, whose most prominent leader was Bucer; (3) that Calvin settled in Strassburg with peculiar views of the sacrament and other aspects of reform, but was on many points in agreement with Melanchthon and with Bucer; (4) that Melanchthon and Calvin, however, differed sufficiently to become leaders of separate schools; (5) that the Ultra-Lutherans began a vigorous propaganda against Phillipism and Calvinism, suppressing and excluding this element from Lutheran territory and churches; (6) that in consequence of this intolerant attitude German states, in order to preserve the Melanchthonian-Bucer spirit, were driven to organize independent churches and to pass over to Calvinism; (7) that these churches did not profess to renounce their former confession, the *Augustana variata*, but to advance beyond and logically complete it;<sup>16</sup> (8) that denominational lines were now sharply drawn and the Lutheran and Reformed Churches in

<sup>15</sup> "Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte," Moeller-Kawerau, III., p. 299.

<sup>16</sup> The Elector Frederick III. wrote in a letter that "his Catechism (the Heidelberg) was based on the Word of God and therefore did not contradict the highly prized Augsburg Confession which was also founded on God's Word" (Kluckhohn's "Briefe," 1868, I., p. 456).



Germany were recognized as separate and antagonistic organizations.

In the light of this preparatory stage we can see why the German Reformed Churches stand out as a distinct type in the Reformed family. They differ from the Reformed Church of France, of Holland, and of Scotland. The differences are due to national characteristics, to the method of approach to Calvinism, to religious leadership, and to doctrinal controversy—all of which factors had a molding influence on doctrine, cultus and polity. While all of them are to be classed as Calvinistic churches, their Calvinism is not the same. They show a marked difference of emphasis and of proportion.

Even the Reformed Churches of Germany are not uniform in doctrine and in polity. This can be accounted for by the way in which the several provinces entered the Calvinistic fold. They may be divided into two classes. First, those which passed directly from Romanism to Calvinism and became thoroughly Calvinistic, accepting not only Reformed doctrine but also the Reformed cultus and the presbyterial polity. They developed a strong individuality and their peculiar type of piety has been preserved in the Evangelical Union to this day. The churches belonging to this class are those of East Friesland, Jülich, Cleve, Berg, Mörs, the Lower Rhine, and the French refugees in Germany who were given the privilege of organizing independent congregations and thus maintained their Calvinistic character. Second, those which passed from Romanism, by way of Lutheranism and Melanchthonianism, into Calvinism. These became the more influential Reformed Churches, but were not as consistently Calvinistic as those of the first class. For example, they did not introduce all the elements of Reformed worship or polity. In practical piety, also, they conformed to a large extent to their Lutheran neighbors. They occupy an intermediate position between strict Lutheranism and pure Calvinism. They continued to appeal to the modified Augsburg Confes-

sion<sup>17</sup> and to Luther, but the Lutherans disowned them as deserters and contemptuously called them Calvinists. The churches of this class are those of the Palatinate, Nassau, Bremen, Anhalt, Baden-Durlach, Lippe, Hesse-Cassel, Brandenburg.

Of these the Palatinate Church is typical and normative. In it the south German genius and the Zwinglian, Melancthonian, Lutheran and Calvinistic tendencies were represented, and, it seems, happily united. It passed gradually from Romanism to Calvinism. To it the churches of the Lower Rhine are indebted for their catechism and liturgy.<sup>18</sup> It is also regarded as the Mother of the Reformed Church in the United States. We shall inquire, therefore, to what extent Calvinism shaped its standards and in what respect it is to be distinguished from other branches of the Reformed family.

Historians differ widely in their characterization of the Reformation in the Palatinate. The Lutherans considered the changes introduced by Frederick III, as an apostasy to Calvinism and deplored the step of the devout Elector. Heppe says: "But it belongs to the surest results of historical investigation that the German Evangelical system, which was first established in the Palatinate, did not have its roots in Calvinism but in German Lutheranism, and that it had for its object the conservation of the Melancthonian type of reform which was once dominant in all Germany."<sup>19</sup> Ebrard disagrees with Heppe's favorite theory, and denies that the Melancthonian doctrine, as opposed to the genuine Lutheran, was the more original, "the old protestant one." The Reformation in the Palatinate was, therefore, not a restoration of primitive German protestantism but a transition to a modified form of Calvinism.<sup>20</sup> Goebel speaks of Frederick III's conversion as a

<sup>17</sup> While Karl Müller concedes that the German Reformed Churches of this class continued to adhere to the *Augustana variata*, he still holds that it cannot be considered a Reformed confession ("Symbolik," p. 435).

<sup>18</sup> "Geschichte des christlichen Lebens," Goebel, I., p. 352.

<sup>19</sup> "Geschichte des deutschen Protestantismus," 1555-1581, I., p. 448.

<sup>20</sup> "Tercentenary Monument," pp. 90 and 103.



change from "Lutheran-Melanchthonianism to Melanchthonian-Calvinism." Two citations from historians still living are of special interest. Kawerau, the reviser of Moeller's "Church History," Vol. III., says: "A number of Lutheran provincial churches passed over to Calvin, which transition they did not regard a change of confession but a logical completion of the Reformation of Luther." Karl Müller says: "The character of the German Reformed Churches differs in a measure from strict Calvinism and is not in itself uniform."

The question of the proportion of Calvinism in this Church must be answered by a comparative study of the standards of Geneva and of the Palatinate—the catechisms, liturgies and church orders.<sup>21</sup> We shall, therefore, so far as space allows us, attempt a comparison in order to show points of agreement as well as of difference.

I. *Catechisms*.—In comparing Calvin's catechism and the Heidelberg we find that they have in common certain characteristics of the Reformed type of catechisms. With the exception of Capito's works, these were prepared in the interim between Luther's smaller catechism and the Heidelberg, and may be grouped as follows: the catechisms (1) of Strassburg and Upper Germany, (2) of Zurich, (3) of Geneva, (4) of Lasko and Micronius.<sup>22</sup> One can trace a gradual development in the art of making catechisms. The division of the material into five main parts, relating to the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, the Commandments, Baptism, and the Lord's Supper respectively, was taken by Bucer from Luther's smaller catechism, and generally followed in the Reformed Churches. The catechisms, however, differ from those of the Lutherans in detail, as for example the numbering of the Ten Commandments, the phraseology of the Lord's Prayer, and the order of arrange-

<sup>21</sup> The following documents were the result of Frederick III's transition to Calvinism: Catechismus (1563), Eheordnung (July, 1563), Kirchenordnung (November, 1563), Kirchenrathsordnung (1564), und das Edict über Kirchendisziplin (1570).

<sup>22</sup> "Der Heidelberger Katechismus," A. Lang, p. viii.

ment of the principal parts. The earlier catechisms were cumbersome and impractical. They lacked the confessional element. The material of some was not arranged in the form of questions and answers. In others the pupil is supposed to ask the question and the teacher to answer it. The speculative, theological, and at times the polemical elements bulked so large that they were not suitable for the instruction of youth. Bucer simplified the contents, eliminated the speculative material, and limited himself to distinctively religious truth. In his catechism, for example, there is not a word about predestination, though he himself was a predestinarian. He introduced and frequently reiterated the personal and experimental question "What then does this profit thee?" or, "What are you to learn by this?" In the earlier catechisms no attempt is made to unite the main divisions in a logical way. They are loosely conjoined. Both in the Genevan and in the Heidelberg the organic relation of the several parts is clearly shown in the introductory answers. For the exposition of the Commandments in the second part of the catechism we are indebted to Calvin. In the Heidelberg they are expounded in the third part. Ursinus gives the reason for this mode of procedure, saying: "The Decalogue belongs to the first part so far as it is a mirror of our sins and misery; but also to the third part as being the rule of our new obedience and Christian life." The Office of the Keys, or the necessity of excluding the unworthy from communion by a process of discipline, is explained in the last answer of Calvin's catechism, and is given a prominent place in the Heidelberg (Ques. 83-85).<sup>23</sup> The ob-

<sup>23</sup> The change in the theory of discipline becomes clear by comparison with the Liturgy of Otho Henry (1556), which was in use in the Palatinate before the Heidelberg Catechism, and is of a moderate Lutheran type. In its Catechism the question, "Welchs seind die schlüssel des himmelreichs?" is answered thus: "Das Predigtamt des Evangelions von Jesu Christo." The Heidelberg, "What is the Office of the Keys?" Ans. "The Preaching of the Holy Gospel and *Church Discipline*; by which *two* things, the kingdom of heaven is opened to believers and shut against unbelievers." The Calvinistic addition is "and Church Discipline." In the 85th answer this term is defined.



jection to the use of graven images and pictures in worship is found in both catechisms in the exposition of the Second Commandment.<sup>24</sup> The doctrine of the Lord's Supper is substantially the same in both.<sup>25</sup>

Though we may concede that in the main the Heidelberg is a Calvinistic symbol and that for its form and contents it is largely indebted to the Genevan Reformer, it cannot be granted that it is a mere replica of his catechism, or in full accord with his "Institutes." Gooszen contends that Bullinger's influence is predominant. Heppe regards it as Melanchthonian. Max Goebel says: "The Heidelberg Catechism may in the true sense of the term be considered the flower and fruit of the whole German and French Reformation. It has Lutheran inwardness, Melanchthonian clearness, Zwinglian simplicity, and Calvinistic fire, harmoniously blended." Dr. Nevin says: "Substantially Calvinistic as the Heidelberg Catechism is, however in its doctrine of the sacraments it has carefully refrained from committing itself in like manner to Calvin's doctrine of the decrees."

The differences, as well as the points of agreement, will appear by a comparison of the salient characteristics of the two catechisms. In the Genevan there are 373 questions and answers.<sup>26</sup> Its purpose is the instruction of the youth by the minister in the church, the teacher in the schools, and the

<sup>24</sup> In reference to Ques. 98 a critic of the Heidelberg, in "Verzeichniss der Mängel" published soon after the Catechism, says: "Pag. 66 ist der Catechismus auch ein bildtsturmer dan er sagt die bilder moegan als der leien bucher in der kirchen nicht geduldet werden."

<sup>25</sup> "Der Heidelberger Katechismus in seiner urspringlichen Gestalt," von Albrecht Wolters, 1864. In this book is found also a criticism of the catechism by a contemporary Lutheran, entitled, "Verzeichniss der Mängel," in which the following is affirmed (p. 181): "Man verstreiche es wie mans koenne so ist er (der Catechismus) vor der geburt und nach der geburt zwinglisch, und wil schlecht den leib und das blutt Christi nit wahrhaftig und wesentlich in dem nachtmal gegenwertig sein lassen." Ever since there have been men who have considered the doctrine of the sacrament in the Heidelberg as Zwinglian. This is, however, not tenable.

<sup>26</sup> "Der Genfer Katechismus von 1545," in "Die Bekenntnisschriften der reformirten Kirche," E. F. Karl Müller.

parents in the family. The questions are often longer than the answers; in fact the answer is at times included in the question. Then the pupil simply assents to the statement of the minister saying: "Ita ut dicis," or "sic sentio," or "ita res habet." Many of the questions are impersonal and theoretic, so that they might be asked with more fitness of a student of theology than of a catechumen preparing for an intelligent profession of faith in Jesus Christ. The introductory questions will illustrate this point: "What is the chief end of human life?" "What reason have you for affirming this?" "What is man's highest good?" "Why do you hold this to be the highest good?" Thus Socrates might have taught his disciples philosophy; but for catechetical purposes the method is too general and doctrinal, not personal, experimental and confessional. The contents are presumably to be comprehended by an intellectual process, not by the experience of faith.

The Heidelberg has one hundred and twenty-nine questions and answers.<sup>27</sup> Its purpose, as defined in the *Vorred* of the first edition, is not only the instruction of the youth in the churches and schools in Christian doctrine, but also to furnish the preachers and teachers a certain fixed form and standard by which they may be guided in teaching the young, and not follow their changeable fancies or introduce objectionable doctrine. There is a marked improvement on the Genevan in the form of the questions and answers. They are simpler, briefer, more rhythmical and compact. The catechumen is addressed directly in the second person, "thy," "thee." The answers are given in the first person, "I," or "we." Contrast this method with that of Calvin and you will find that the Heidelberg is conceived from a different point of view, has a different method of imparting religious truth, and regards the catechumen as occupying a different

<sup>27</sup> "Der Heidelberger Katechismus," von Wolters. Also, "The Heidelberg Catechism in German, Latin and English: with an Historical Introduction," by J. W. Nevin, tercentenary edition, 1863.



position in the Kingdom of Grace.<sup>28</sup> The appeal is made to his personal experience in Christ Jesus, which is the product of perennial fellowship with Him in His Church from childhood. Under the guidance of the minister this experience comes to fruition and finds appropriate expression in the language of the catechism. The youth, therefore, is not discussing theological problems with his instructor, nor is he taking a course in theology, all of which at the proper time is legitimate; but according to the catechism he now relates the great facts of Christian revelation, as he has comprehended them by faith, to his personal salvation. From them he draws comfort, assurance, inspiration, strength, hope and guidance.

The Genevan is divided into four parts which are outlined in Ques. 7: "In what way is God to be rightly honored?" Ans. "By our reposing in Him our whole trust (the Creed); by our endeavoring to devote our life to Him in obeying His Will (the Decalogue); by our calling upon Him as we are in any need, seeking safety in Him and all desirable good (Lord's Prayer); and finally by acknowledging Him both with heart and mouth to be the sole Author of all good things (the Word and the Sacraments)." It at once appears that this question is theoretical and lacks the personal note. The answer sets forth a scheme of doctrine according to which we are to shape our life, and the main parts are used to expound a theological system rather than to interpret and ripen Christian experience.

Compare with this the three-fold division of the Heidelberg, summarized in Ques. 2: "How many things are necessary for thee to know, that thou in this comfort mayest live and die happily?" Ans. "Three things: First, the greatness of my sin and misery. Second, how I am redeemed from all my sins and misery. Third, how I am to be thankful to God for such redemption"—sin, salvation, thanksgiving. The outline follows the divisions of the Epistle to the Romans. It repro-

<sup>28</sup> "Das Pfälzer Lehrbuch will nicht im Gegensatz zum Calvinismus verstanden sein; und doch ist alles in ihm allseitiger, freier, weniger von Zeitvorstellungen geleitet und inniger in das Zentrum der göttlichen Heilsoffenbarung hineingerückt" (A. Lang, "Der Heid. Cat.," p. ciii).

duces the historical order of Christian experience in every age, and is soteriological rather than theological. Thus the parts of the catechism are genetically related, bound together by the logic of life. Its contents cannot be comprehended by an intellectual process, nor be taught as abstract propositions. The whole scheme of the book is experimental and confessional. "It is a representation," says Dr. Nevin, "rather of the great facts of religion in their own living and concrete form, so ordered as to address itself continually to the believing contemplation of heart and soul."<sup>29</sup>

On the doctrine of election we find the following statements in the catechisms: The Genevan, Ques. 93: "What is the Church?" Ans.: "The body and community of believers whom God has predestined to eternal life." Ques. 96: "In what sense do you call the Church holy?" Ans.: "Because those whom God hath chosen He justifieth," etc. Ques. 100: "Can this Church be known other than by faith?" Ans.: "The Church is indeed also visible and marked by definite signs and notes, but here reference is primarily made to the congregation of those whom God has adopted by His secret election unto salvation"—"*quos arcana sua electione adoptavit in salutem.*"

It is evident that a *predestinatio gemina*, the predestination of some to eternal life and of others to eternal punishment, is not taught directly in the catechism. Calvin, however, leaves us in no doubt on this question in the "Institutes" where he says: "Predestination we call the eternal decree of God by which He has determined in Himself what He would have to become of every individual of mankind. For they are not all created with a similar destiny, but eternal life is foreordained for some and eternal damnation for others" (III, 21, 5). From the statements we have cited it is clear that only the decree of election is taught in the catechism. Nothing is said about the decree of reprobation; yet the doctrine of election is so stated that the doctrine of reprobation

<sup>29</sup> "The Tercentenary Heid. Cat.," p. 92.



is necessarily implied. The reason for the omission of the latter doctrine may be found in Calvin's preface to Melancthon's *Loci*, translated into French, in which he says: "With predestination he goes about thus. To avoid all unprofitable inquisitiveness the author has presented only that which it is absolutely necessary to know. The rest he leaves in darkness because he expects no results for the inner life in such explanations and discussions."<sup>30</sup> A similar motive doubtless contrained Calvin to keep the doctrine of a double predestination out of the catechism, and yet so to formulate the doctrine of election that the ultimate ground of salvation is not the believer's fellowship with Christ, but an eternal decree, accepted as an article of faith, apart from the historical Jesus though realized through Him. The church does not bring election to men; the election constructs the church out of the elect.

The Heidelberg is much more reserved on the doctrine of the decrees, which is especially remarkable because both its authors, Olevianus and Ursinus, were Calvinists. The following questions are said to teach election and to contain predestinarian doctrine. Ques. 27: Providence is defined to be "the Almighty and everywhere present power of God whereby as it were by His hands He still upholds heaven and earth, with all creatures, and so governs them that . . . all things come not by chance but by His fatherly hand." Ques. 1, in explanation of the name of Christ, says: "He is ordained of God the Father and annointed with the Holy Ghost to be our chief prophet," etc. Ques. 52, relating to the second advent of Christ, says: "He will take me with all His chosen ones (*cum omnibus electis*) to Himself unto heavenly joy and glory." Ques. 54 says: "Out of the whole human race from the beginning to the end of the world the Son of God, by His Word and Spirit, gathers, defends and preserves for Himself unto everlasting life, a chosen communion

<sup>30</sup> Stähelin's "Calvin," I., p. 243.

(*cœtum ad vitam æternam electum*), and that I am and forever shall remain a living member of the same.”<sup>31</sup>

These statements are far less positive in reference to predestination than those in the Genevan catechism. In fact all who have studied the Heidelberg have claimed to find in it the Calvinistic doctrine of election only by implication and inference. No one could deny that it teaches the sovereignty of God in realizing the eternal purpose of His creation; but not by an arbitrary decree which overrides the freedom of the creature and destroys human responsibility. In the doctrine of sovereign grace the catechism is in agreement not only with Calvin but with the Bible and with all protestantism. There is, however, a wide difference between the sovereignty of God, which is a religious truth that all Christians accept, and the speculative inference of the *decretum horribile*. The doctrine of a double predestination is a philosophical deduction to account for the fact that the gospel is accepted by some and rejected by others; it is not an original idea of faith necessary to religious life. It is significant, indeed, that it is not found in the first edition of the “Institutes.”

The 54th question is usually cited as an indubitable statement of the Calvinistic doctrine of election. Ursinus in his commentary on the Catechism discusses the whole question of predestination in his exposition of this answer. It must be remembered, however, that the activity of Christ by which He gathers a chosen communion, is throughout historical; there is no hint that He is merely executing in time an abstract eternal decree by which some have been elected and others rejected. The words “*electum cœtum*” refer to the church collectively, as a body called out and separated from the world; not to select individuals scattered over the earth and waiting to be gathered by Christ who lived and died for them only. The assurance of being and remaining a member of the church

<sup>31</sup> Thelemann finds the doctrine of election directly or indirectly in Quests. 1, 8, 20, 26, 28, 52, 53, 54, 65 (“An Aid to the Heid. Catechism,” Eng. trans., 218).



is not based on the metaphysical notion of election but on the believer's fellowship with Christ and the certainty of present vital union with Him.

By a comparative view of the general scheme of the catechism, perhaps as much as by detailed analysis, its peculiar doctrinal positions must be understood. In general it is Calvinistic and not Arminian. The Augustinian doctrine of sin and grace is held over against Pelagianism. The depravity and helplessness of the race through the fall are clearly affirmed. Neither the race nor the individual has ability to recover itself from this lost condition. The fall is traced to a concrete historical fact—the disobedience of our first parents. It is generic, involving all men; not, as in the Pelagian view, merely the individual. The origin of sin is not referred to a metaphysical mystery beyond the scope of historical revelation but to a definite act of man.

Man's salvation is attributed absolutely to the free and unmerited grace of God in Jesus Christ. The starting point is not in the divine sovereignty or in the eternal abstract will of God as metaphysically apprehended, but in Jesus Christ. He freely offers Himself a propitiatory sacrifice for all men. The catechism steers clear of synergism and Arminianism. It does not limit the atonement to the elect. As the fall is organic so is redemption. Yet the redemption wrought out by Christ inures to the salvation only of those who are born again and are made partakers of His life by the Holy Ghost. The subjective condition by which men become partakers of Christian redemption is faith. This involves not only assent to a doctrine or belief in a decree, but “a living apprehension of the whole perennial fact of Christianity as embodied in the Apostle's Creed.” Faith itself is not a product of the human will but of the Holy Ghost who “works it in our hearts by the preaching of the Gospel and confirms it by the use of the sacraments.” We find here, then, the substantial and positive elements of the Calvinistic system, at least under some of its aspects; but the subject is treated rather Christo-

logically than theologically, and the metaphysical questions pertaining to the sovereignty of God in relation to the human will are not brought forth.<sup>32</sup>

The most recent critical analysis and comparative estimate of the catechism has been made by A. Lang in a work entitled, "*Der Heid. Katechismus und vier verwandte Katechismen*," 1907. In the last pages of the Introduction he assigns the catechism its proper place in protestantism. We shall freely reproduce his statements. It is the rich, ripe product not only of Calvinism, but of influences which came from all the earlier Reformed catechisms, as well as from those of the German Lutheran Reformation. The Heidelberg is simplified, clarified, and made more practical. In it the religious and the ethical elements are separated from the theological, in spite of certain oversights, far more sharply than in any preceding catechism. It speaks to the heart more directly and reaches into life far more practically than either Calvin's or Bullinger's catechism. Not so much in a dogmatic tendency, but in the wealth of its contents, in the biblical purity of its religious and ethical motives, does the difference between the Heidelberg and the Genevan catechisms appear. The Heidelberg clearly shows a closer approach to the German Lutheran Reformation. This is affirmed not so much on account of the doctrine of the sacraments or of the remnants of Melancthonism in the catechism, but especially on account of the first two parts of the outline and the Christocentric tendencies according to which the Christian's only comfort is based, not so much on knowledge or on the covenant of God, as on the one offering of Christ on the cross. This is, of course, not an actual dogmatic difference from Calvin, but indeed a difference of tendency and of original religious feeling.

On account of these various qualities the catechism has obtained a certain ecumenical character within Reformed

<sup>32</sup> See "Report of Proceedings of the Second General Council of the Presbyterian Alliance," Philadelphia, 1880; paper on "The Theology of the German Reformed Church" by Dr. Thos. G. Apple, p. 484.



protestantism. A broad bridge leads from the Heidelberg to the Lutheran sister confession. Within the Reformed Church theologians have based on it different theological systems (Voetius, Coccejus), and developed various religious tendencies (orthodoxy and pietism). This ecumenicity is based on the fact that the Heidelberg, leaning on the earlier Reformed catechisms, combines the deepest and most efficient religious and ethical motives of Reformed protestantism, especially of its most important though not only branch, Calvinism, and presents them in biblical simplicity and purity.

II. *Liturgies*.—The first steps toward a reform of worship were taken by the Elector immediately after the Heidelberg Colloquy (1560), in which the doctrine of the Lord's Supper was the subject of discussion between the Saxon and the Palatine theologians. The former, however, failed to convert Frederick to their views and he issued a decree, August 12, 1560, that all the clergy of the province, who would not conform to Melancthon's doctrine of the Sacrament, should immediately vacate their places. The Elector now turned toward Calvinism and gave evidence of his transition by a conformation of worship to Reformed models. He was, however, not a servile follower of any party or school as will appear from a declaration he made to three German princes who urged him to retract Calvinism and return into the communion of the Evangelical Estates of the Empire (April 6, 1563). He replied that he would suffer neither the word of Luther nor of Calvin to be acknowledged in his church, but the word of Christ alone. Still under the guidance of the Bible and of his theologians he reached many of Calvin's conclusions. He ordered the removal of the remnants of Catholicism, which in his mind were a species of idolatry, from the churches. This meant the exclusion of altars, crucifixes, pictures, hosts, chalices, consecrated baptismal fonts, Latin hymns, organs (which were not again used for worship in the Palatinate till 1667), and the festivals of the Virgin and the saints. In place of these he introduced tables, bread, the cup,

baptismal bowls, and German psalms, without, however, giving up German Lutheran hymns. Heppe, while claiming that the catechism contained Melanchthonian doctrines to a hair, still acknowledges that the worship and ecclesiastical usages of the Palantinate became thoroughly Calvinistic.<sup>33</sup>

These changes were made before the Heidelberg Catechism was published. After its publication it became necessary to prepare a liturgy which embodied its peculiar genius and doctrines. The sources used in the preparation of this work were the Church Order of Lasko (drawn from Calvin's Liturgy of Strassburg, and in a modified form known as the Netherland Liturgy), the Genevan Liturgy, the Order of the Evangelical Church in France, with slight traces of the Nuremberg Church Order, and of the Saxon Agende (1539).<sup>34</sup>

Many of the forms of prayer were taken verbatim either from the Netherland or from the Genevan Liturgy. Both are Calvinistic in spirit. We shall simply enumerate the portions taken from these two main sources. From the Netherland Liturgy: first, the baptismal service as a whole, with some additions; second, the form of the administration of the Lord's Supper verbatim; third, the prayer following the afternoon sermon; fourth, the prayer for A Day of Prayer in abridged form; fifth, the morning and evening prayer; sixth, the form of marriage. From the Genevan Liturgy: first, the exhortation to prayer (Calvin used it as a "bidding prayer" in his daily lectures); second, the prayer before the sermon (Beza offered it at the Colloquy of Poissy (1561) where it called forth so much admiration); third, the intercessory prayer after the sermon; fourth, the form for the visitation of the sick; fifth, prayer for the dying; sixth, directions for discipline, concluding the form for the Lord's Supper.

The greater portion of the material is evidently taken from the Netherland and Genevan formulas. Ebrard says the

<sup>33</sup> *Mercersburg Review*, 1853, pp. 192-193.

<sup>34</sup> "Die evangelischen Kirchenordnungen des 16ten Jhdts.," Richter, II., p. 257.



Palatinate Liturgy is at bottom only a remodelling of the Netherland Liturgy. Its Calvinistic origin explains an important peculiarity, namely its somewhat heavy, stiff, didactic feature and its deficiency in the liturgical glow and devotional warmth. In these features it differs in a marked degree from the spirit of the Heidelberg Catechism, as all acknowledge, just as the rigid Calvinistic scholasticism of the so-called Commentary of Ursinus differs from the free, warm, practical, devotional fervor of the catechism itself. Hence, even in the Palatinate, it has long since gone out of use as having the radical defect which characterizes all liturgies produced from the standpoint and in the spirit of the old Calvinism.<sup>35</sup>

As in the catechism, so in the liturgy there are traces of customs and usages which are peculiar to the Reformed Church of South Germany, and which differentiate it from the Genevan and other Reformed Churches. There is no room made for free prayer which was first introduced in Geneva by Farel and accepted by Calvin.<sup>36</sup> The forms for confession and the declaration of pardon are placed after the sermon. In the Order of Geneva there is no formal declaration of

<sup>35</sup> "Tercentenary Monument," art. on "Creed and Cultus," by Henry Harbaugh, pp. 237-238.

<sup>36</sup> In his description of worship in the Reformed Churches of the Lower Rhine in the seventeenth century Goebel says: "Free prayers were, therefore, in the beginning not at all permitted; and were allowed later in consequence of the introduction of Labadism since 1677, when the Synod of Cleves resolved that 'for the better edification and comfort of the ignorant, the customary formularies shall on ordinary occasions be used; still freedom shall be allowed, at special times and occasions, to add some things to the ordinary prayers, or even to form other prayers, agreeing with the Scriptures and the matter of the prescribed forms.' The General Synod held the same year (1677) accepted this action, provided, however, 'That the customary formularies be not thereby contemptuously set aside.' Nevertheless in consequence of this permission, the custom and caprice of free prayer began to prevail to such an extent in the following century, that the prescribed liturgical prayers were gradually altogether dislodged" ("Geschichte des Christlichen Lebens," II., pp. 121-122). On the use of liturgical prayers in Reformed Churches of other lands see Harbaugh's article on "Creed and Cultus" in "Tercentenary Monument," pp. 282-285.

pardon. It is resolved into a petition for divine compassion in the opening prayer.<sup>37</sup> The German hymns were used in the Palatinate, while in Geneva the Psalms alone, with the exception of two or three ancient chants, were used. The preparatory service for the communion is to be held on the previous Saturday. Its chief feature is a sermon, followed by three questions based on the three divisions of the catechism, and addressed to the congregation, who answer audibly "Yes."<sup>38</sup> There is no provision made for this service by Calvin. In place of it he recommends that persons intending to approach the Lord's table shall call upon their pastor, before the celebration of the sacraments, for the purpose of receiving spiritual instruction and counsel.<sup>39</sup> In the Palatinate the Lord's Supper is to be observed at least every month in the cities, every two months in the villages, and in both on Easter, Whitsunday, and Christmas, and as much oftener as the necessities of the congregation may require. In Geneva a tri-monthly celebration in each parish is required. On Easter, Pentecost and Christmas the communion shall be administered in all the churches in such a way, however, that in the months in which those festivals occur it shall not be repeated.<sup>40</sup> In the first edition of the Palatinate liturgy the pericopal system is not maintained. It is directed that "the books of the New Testament, which are most profitable to the common people, and most edifying to the churches, are in preference presented and explained on Sunday."<sup>41</sup> In the edition of 1585, however, there is a closer approach to the common German usage of the pericopes in the Sunday service. "Otherwise, generally, the Sunday Gospels, as they are called, shall remain. Still the people shall be reminded what the Gospel is, and that the same is to be found in Paul no less than in the Evangelists." Calvin, on the other hand, opposed the pericopes. He de-

<sup>37</sup> "Codex Liturgicus," Daniel, III., p. 55.

<sup>38</sup> Richter, "K. O.," II., p. 261.

<sup>39</sup> "Codex Liturg.," Daniel, III., p. 157.

<sup>40</sup> "Ecclesiastical Ordinances."

<sup>41</sup> Richter, "K. O.," II., p. 258.



clared them to have been selected "*inepte nulloque judicio.*"<sup>42</sup> The church-year was not at first retained in Geneva. "In the time of the Reformation," says Dr. Herzog, "the great Christian festivals were everywhere retained in Switzerland except in Geneva, where, however, the solemn observance was soon again restored."

There was apparently a more radical tendency in the reformation of worship in Geneva than in Heidelberg. This is traceable more to the influence of Farel than of Calvin. It was followed by the Scotch Presbyterians and the English Puritans. The trend in South Germany and in Switzerland generally was toward a restoration of the church-year, the use of the pericopes, and the liturgical forms. Alt says, in reference to the common practice of the Swiss and German Reformed Churches: "Besides this, it is to be noticed that already the older liturgies in regard to the liturgical prayers for the single Sundays distinguished the seasons of Epiphany, the Passion, Easter, Whitsuntide, and the last one from the fall communion to Christmas. To this must be added the practice introduced at a later period of celebrating the four weeks before Christmas as the advent season, and of beginning a new church-year with the first Sunday of Advent."<sup>43</sup>

III. *Organization and Discipline.*—After the adoption of the catechism and the liturgy, a new form of church government and discipline was introduced. The Elector did not at first favor the Calvinistic polity. In the liturgy (Nov., 1563) he contented himself partly with a statement of principles and partly with promises, neither of which were at once put into practice. At the instigation of Olevianus, who wrote to Geneva for Calvin's Church Order, he made room in the liturgy for the function of elders, without, however, using the name, at the conclusion of the form for the holy communion where the necessity of discipline is explained. "Therefore, in every community several honorable and God-fearing men

<sup>42</sup> "Die Evangelischen Perikopen," Nebe, I., p. 53.

<sup>43</sup> "Das Kirchen-Jahr," p. 456.

shall be selected out of the congregation, who shall act for the sake, and in the name of, the congregation." The meaning of discipline is also taught in Questions 83–85 of the catechism. The unworthy are referred "to the Church or its proper officers, and if they neglect to hear them also, are by them excluded from the Holy Sacraments." Neither in the catechism nor in the liturgy is the title of "elder" used. This is all the more significant since the office and the name are found in the Ecclesiastical Ordinances, 1543, and in the last answer of the Genevan Catechism.

A step in advance was taken in the *Kirchenrathsordnung*, 1564.<sup>44</sup> It was prepared by Christopher Ehem, and is the first example of a consistorial organization in the Reformed Church. It rests on the presupposition that the prince is to superintend and provide for the spiritual and ecclesiastical training of his people. The Consistory was composed of six persons, three "*Theologis*" and three "*Politicis*." They were appointed by the Elector and had the general oversight of the churches in the province. They procured trustworthy ministers for congregations and teachers for schools. They had supervision of the doctrine and life of these officers, and oversight of the morals and discipline in the churches. They had authority to admonish and to excommunicate. Only in important cases did the Elector reserve the right of final decision. Each district was under the special control of an inspector or superintendent. He was practically the representative of the General Consistory or *Kirchenrath* and performed its functions in the district assigned him. What the *Kirchenrath* was for the whole realm, the inspector was in the particular district. Synods, composed of preachers and two lay and two ministerial delegates of the *Kirchenrath*, were held annually. The general work of the churches was reviewed and discussed, as for example, matters relating to doctrine, cultus, morality, officers in congregations and schools, alms, and church polity. The General Synod consisted of

<sup>44</sup> Richter, "K. O.," II., p. 276.



all the inspectors assembled at Heidelberg and met at the direction of the *Kirchenrath*.

A sharp controversy arose in reference to congregational Presbyteries (Consistories). Olevianus was the champion of this distinctively Calvinistic judicatory. In it was to be vested the power of discipline in the congregation. It was vigorously opposed by the Swiss Erastus, who denied that there were biblical sanctions for the practice of excommunication. Others conceded the theoretical value of the Presbytery, but held it impracticable in the Palatinate. The Elector finally yielded to Olevianus and issued a decree (July 13, 1570) ordering a Presbytery in every congregation. The members of this judicatory were not elected by the congregation but appointed by the *Kirchenrath* and served for life.

After 1580 the completed church organization of the Palatinate included the following judicatories and officers: (1) The Presbytery (our Consistory), with the pastor as president, charged with the oversight of the internal and external affairs of the congregation and the exercise of discipline including the right of excommunication; (2) the *Kirchenrath*, located at Heidelberg, having the general superintendency of all the churches and controlled by the Elector; (3) the district superintendents or inspectors, who mediated between the congregational presbyteries and the *Kirchenrath* and may be called the assistants of the latter; (4) the District and the General Synod.<sup>45</sup>

The government was not purely Calvinistic or presbyterial. It was a combination of the German consistorial and the Genevan presbyterial polity. The congregations did indeed have the essential element of the Calvinistic polity, namely the Presbytery, but the people were still deprived of the prerogative of choosing the members of the Presbytery and the ultimate authority was vested in the prince. Calvin, however, could not even in Geneva realize his ideal of congregational

<sup>45</sup> "Geschichte der Presbyterial- und Synodalverfassung seit der Reformation," von G. W. Lechler, 1854, pp. 110-126.

organization. He, too, had to compromise in a measure with the city council. In France where the Huguenots organized without civil authority, and in the congregations of refugees in Frankfort, Strassburg and London, where they were granted the privilege of organizing according to their personal preference, do we find the most consistent application of Calvin's principles of government and discipline. In the Lower Rhine provinces this polity was more closely followed than in the Palatinate. In general, however, there was an element in the German character which resented the strict discipline of Geneva and never accepted the puritanic and legalistic ideals which usually come in the wake of Calvinism.

After this somewhat extended survey of the origin and the formularies of the Reformed Churches in Germany, particularly of the Church of the Palatinate, we submit the following summary of results:

1. The first stage of German protestantism was a general evangelical movement shaped and colored in different sections by the personalities of the reformers and by political and racial characteristics. The Reformed Churches in distinction from the Lutheran, were not organized until the second generation. While they were indebted to the genius of Luther, their leaders were more than his forerunners or his epigones. They made original contributions, and were indispensable, to the development of the protestant system.

2. The churches of Reformed protestantism may be divided into four classes or families: The Zwinglian, the Calvinistic, the Anglican, and the German. They are animated by a common spirit so as to belong to one group as over against the Lutherans. They are divided by differences in doctrine, cultus, and polity so as to have a genius of their own and to represent distinct personalities in the same religious household.

3. Calvinism as expounded in Geneva was probably nowhere adopted without modification and adaptation to surrounding political, social and religious conditions. It had a molding influence on all the Reformed Churches; yet in



some, as in France and in Scotland, it was more nearly accepted in its entirety, while in others, as in Germany, it was adopted only in a partial or a modified form. Thus, in time, Calvinism came to mean something different in different lands. In Germany, in the sixteenth century, it stood for a theory of the sacraments in distinction from that of Luther and of Zwingli. In this conception of it emphasis is put on the church as an historical institution by whose ordinances and sacraments the gift of salvation is mediated to the members. This theory of the method of imparting and appropriating the blessings of redemption had a formative influence on doctrine, worship and organization of the Reformed Churches of Germany, especially of the Palatinate. In Holland (Synod of Dort, 1619) and in Great Britain (Westminster Confession, 1647) Calvinism meant a theological system in which the doctrine of the decrees was the ruling principle. The gift of salvation, in this view, is not conveyed to men through the historical and organized medium of the church, but by the absolute, unmediated will of God. The individual is separated from historic relations and brought into immediate and unmediated dependence on the Divine will. Calvinism of this type tends toward an unchurchly, unsacramental, unliturgical, subjective and legalistic form of Christianity. The Reformed Churches in Germany, accordingly, originating under peculiar circumstances and conditioned by other elements and relations, had a character of their own and were not simply an imitation of the Helvetic, Gallican, Belgic and Scotch Churches.

4. Even the German Reformed Churches did not agree in their Calvinism. Some adopted the Genevan system more consistently and more thoroughly than others. The Palatinate Church, as may be seen by a comparative study of its standards, was the product of a blending of the Bucer, Melancthonian, and Calvinistic tendencies. Yet that these were controlled and combined by a common principle superior to any one of them, may be inferred from the unique genius of

the South Germans, from the dominating minds of the movement, and from the catechism, liturgy and church order. These original differences are still discernible in the character of the German Reformed Churches, some of which have conformed more and more strictly to the Calvinism of the churches beyond Germany, accepting even double predestination and rigid puritanism. Others conserved the chirstological and sacramental spirit of the Heidelberg Catechism and in their life, custom, and piety are not so far removed from the surrounding Lutherans of the Melanchthonian School, though they still have a distinctly Reformed consciousness. A third class has lost altogether its Calvinistic features and has been absorbed in the Evangelistic Union.

This fact should be borne in mind when we, as members of the Reformed Church in the United States, seek our spiritual ancestry in the German Reformed Churches to-day. To which branch we shall ally ourselves and which we shall regard the legitimate offspring of the sixteenth century, depends largely on our previous training and personal preferences.

5. All the reformation churches have been affected to a greater or less extent by the history of the last four centuries. They could not stand aloof from, and remain untouched by, confessionalism, pietism, rationalism, romanticism, criticism, mediationalism, and liberalism. These movements have left their impress in the way of readjustment, reaction, modification, or radical revision. The churches at present have their schools and parties, most of them professing loyalty to the fathers and yet none of them is a mere photograph of the original. The attempt at restoration is, indeed, futile. The way of loyalty to the past, of spiritual progress, of solving problems, and of transforming the world, is not by reaction, revolution, or desertion, but by action, evolution, and coöperation under the guidance of the glorified Christ, ever-living and ever-present in His church.

6. The unique place of the Reformed Church in the United States, in American protestantism and among the Calvinistic



churches, must be explained by reference to the characteristics of the original German Reformed Churches and their development during the intervening centuries. The schools of thought and the theological controversies which have existed, and in a measure still exist, in this denomination in America have had their counterpart in the Mother Church in Europe. The German and Swiss pioneers had so strong a denominational consciousness that in spite of almost insuperable difficulties they have clung together in a distinct Christian organization and have resisted absorption by larger and allied bodies. They lived for their catechism, worship, and religious customs. To show how the sense of distinctness from other Reformed and Presbyterian Churches was a powerful motive in the men of the last generation we shall quote the words of two acknowledged leaders. In a sermon before the alumni of the Mercersburg Theological Seminary, delivered at Reading in 1856, Dr. J. H. A. Bomberger said:

“Let us have it fairly understood, therefore, that it is not to Saybrook-platform Protestantism that we have plighted our faith and service, nor to the Protestantism of Hartford, Princeton, or New Brunswick, but to that form of it which is distinctly laid down in the standards already alluded to, and which may be easily ascertained by every candid inquirer. . . . As a Church, therefore, or as an integral portion of the Evangelical Church we have not only a right to maintain our distinctive character, but we are placed by Providence under special obligations to do so. We are not German Presbyterians, as we are sometimes called. There would be far more propriety in the Presbyterian Church calling itself English Reformed. The title Presbyterian relates to a comparatively unimportant characteristic of the true Church. But we are German Reformed. The strong tendency of the more earnest theology of all the evangelical churches is towards those principles on which the German Reformed Church was originally founded, and for which she has from the first contended. This is the case, with reference to what are usually

styled the five distinctive points of Calvinism. The preaching of our day savors far less of the Institutes of Calvin, of the canons of Dort, or of the Westminster Confession, in reference to these points, than the mild, conciliatory, declarations of the Heidelberg Catechism. And so of the Sacraments."

These words are quoted with approval in an article in the *Mercersburg Review*, July, 1872, by Dr. Thomas G. Apple, who adds:

"These Puritan and Presbyterian Confessions, including the Canons of Dort, are certainly a one-sided expression of the old Reformed faith, as expressed in so rich and catholic a spirit in the Heidelberg Catechism.

"The subject which we have considered, may serve to throw light on our relation to the Calvinistic churches around us. We have much in common with the Presbyterian and the Dutch Reformed Church. But it is clear that our own doctrinal position is more comprehensive than theirs, and better adapted to form a basis of union for the branches of the Reformed Church than theirs. Especially is there much in the history of both denominations to bind us to the Dutch Reformed Church. But we would consider it a great calamity, if we should think for a moment of giving up our broad, catholic position, for one that would give a one-sided expression of the old Reformed faith and life. Nothing would be gained, but much lost, by yielding to a temptation to gain some outward advantage, while at the same time we should surrender any of our internal strength of position."

LANCASTER, PA.



## IX.

### ILLUSTRATIVE ANECDOTES FROM THE LIFE OF CALVIN.

BY REV. VICTOR WILLIAM DIPPELL, PH.D.

A man's self is often bodied forth in an anecdote more fully than in pages of a biography. The following incidents have been gathered and thus loosely strung together with this idea in mind. A life so rich and varied offers almost limitless stories; but these may suffice.

Calvin says: "When I was yet a little boy, my father destined me to theology, and even as David was taken from the sheep-folds to a high position, so have I, by the hand of God, from a small beginning, been exalted to this high office, and become a herald of the gospel."

. . . . .

Of his teaching he once said: "Although in my fear I fled the world, there gathered thirsting souls about me, the inexperienced recruit, so that each obscure corner was turned into a public school."

. . . . .

In days of great persecution and danger of death such words as these were heard from his lips: "It is not worth your while that ye trouble yourselves concerning me. There were far greater trials experienced by Moses and the prophets, who were leaders of God's people." And again: "Trusting in the purity of my motives I fear no assault, for what can they do to me more than to take this life." Again: "I am ready to endure death in any of its forms, if it is but in defense of the truth."

When in 1552, he was in great danger, he said: "They

want to taste my blood, although I doubt whether they would like the taste as well as their own sins. But God lives and this faith encourages me. And if all Geneva conspired to kill me, I would yet cry out the word for which they so bitterly hate me—Repent.”

. . . . .

Of Calvin's life at the University of Orleans, when studying law, Beza says that after supping moderately, he would spend half the night in study, and devote the morning to meditation on what he had acquired.

. . . . .

When, in 1533, his friend Nicholas Cop was elected to the rectorship of the University of Paris, Calvin wrote the inaugural oration, taking for his theme the necessity of a reformation of the Church and of theology on the basis of the New Testament. Of course, Calvin and Cop had to flee. Calvin, so the story goes, escaped by the window with the help of several sheets, and fled under the guise of a vine-dresser, having secured the clothes from a friend.

. . . . .

Calvin was nicknamed “spitzkopf”—long-head by the crowd, as over against Luther whom they called “dickkopf”—thick head.

. . . . .

Calvin says, in the preface of the first edition of the “Institutes,” of the reason for the book: “My intention was . . . to indicate some elementary truths, by which those interested in religion might be trained to true piety—and at this task I toiled chiefly for our French, multitudes of whom I saw to be hungering and thirsting after Christ, but very few to be possessed of even a slight knowledge of Him.”

In the preface to his “Commentary on the Psalms,” he says: “Leaving my native country, France, I retired into Germany, expressly for the purpose of being able there to enjoy in some obscure corner the repose which I had always



desired, and which had been so long denied me. But lo! whilst I lay hidden at Basle and known only to a few people, many faithful and holy people were burnt alive in France; and the report of these burnings . . . excited the strongest disapprobation among a great part of the Germans . . . In order to allay this indignation, certain wicked and lying pamphlets were circulated . . . I opposed them to the uttermost of my ability . . . This was the consideration which induced me to publish my ‘Institutes.’ . . . When it was then published, it was not that labored and copious work which it now is . . . my object was not to acquire fame . . . Whatever else I have done I have taken care to conceal that I was the author of that performance; and I had resolved to continue in the same privacy and obscurity, until at length William Farel detained me at Geneva . . . by a dreadful imprecation.”

. . . . .

The following story is told of Luther’s reception of one of Calvin’s books. “A year before his death when he was coming from his lecture, his students around him, he stopped before the shop of Hans Luft, the bookseller, and hailed his assistant, who had just returned from Frankfort, saying ‘Maurice, what is the good news from Frankford? Will they burn the arch-heretic Luther all up?’ ‘Most reverend sir, I did not hear anything about that,’ said the other; ‘but I have brought with me a little volume which John Calvin wrote some time ago, in French, upon the Lord’s Supper, and which has just been published in Latin. They are saying of Calvin that, though quite young, he is a devout and scholarly person. In this little book this Calvin is said to show where your reverence and Zwingli and Œcolampadius have gone too far in the strife.’ He had hardly finished when Dr. Luther cried, ‘Give me the book.’ He sat down, looked it through, and said as he finished, ‘Maurice, he is most certainly a learned and pious person. I might from the very first have well left to him this whole controversy; I confess, for my part, that had the other side done the same, we would have been on good terms from

the start. If Ecolampadius and Zwingli had expressed themselves in this way at the first, we would never have been betrayed into such prolonged controversies.' ”

. . . . .

Luther said of Calvin's letter to Sadolet: “ This writing has hands and feet and I rejoice that God has called upon such people, who if it be his will, may give the final blow to the papacy, and finish, by his help, what I began against Anti-Christ.”

. . . . .

Calvin said of his own work: “ I have labored with all my strength for the common good. It would be hypocrisy not to own that the Lord has been pleased to employ me, and that not unprofitably, in his service.”

. . . . .

Here is a traditional picture of the man. A man of middle stature and attenuated frame. Face thin and keen, complexion sallow, nose prominent and finely chiseled, brow high and commanding, eyes black as night and gleaming with that peculiar bluish light, which indicates deep and clear thinking, mouth large and well formed; a man who in every line of face and in every action betrays his Latin origin.

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He wrote to Farel, in his thirtieth year, of the sort of a woman who would attract him the following: “ Do you want to know what sort of beauty alone can win my soul? When loveliness and modesty are joined to simplicity, sufficiency and tenderness.” A year later he writes the same friend: “ A young lady of the nobility, above my rank and rich, has been proposed. There are two things that kept me from this union: first, she did not understand our language; and then I feared lest she might think too much of her rank and her training.” Later, it will be remembered he married Idelette de Bures, a widow.



He loved his wife intensely and of her he writes: "My wife is ill; hence my thoughts are distracted." Again: "She flits night and day before my eyes, alone as she is (she left Strassburg on account of the plague) and comfortless and without support." He called her "*singularis exempli fœmina*," a unique example of a woman. After her death he writes to Viret: "You know the tenderness or far rather the weakness of my heart, and therefore you know full well that, if I had not exercised the whole force of my spirit, I could not have borne it. And indeed the cause of my distress is not a trifling one, I am separated from the best of companions."

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He was a man of irascible temper, which he called "His wild beast." In his farewell address to the Council of Geneva, he said: "I own specially that I am greatly indebted to your kindness for bearing so patiently with my often unbridled impetuosity. I hope and trust that God will forgive me the sin, which I have thus committed."

Again in reference to his quick temper, Calvin made this acknowledgment: "I have had no harder battles with my failings, which are great and many, than those which I have had with my impatience. This ravenous beast, I have not yet conquered."

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When Calvin stood with Servetus before the council in that famous trial, the following words are said to have been uttered. Calvin, it must be remembered, is seeking to expose the error of his opponent. Servetus exclaims, "everything is God." Calvin replies, "What! do you mean to say that floor on which we tread is God? And what if I ask if Satan is also really God?" Servetus rejoined with a mocking laugh, "Well, do you not believe that?"

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Of his work in Geneva, Lord has summarized amongst other things the following: "If a man not forbidden to take the

sacrament neglected it for one year he was condemned to banishment for one year. One was condemned to do public penance if he omitted a Sunday service. The military garrison was summoned to prayers twice a day. The judges punished severely all profanity, as blasphemy. A mason was put in prison three days for simply saying, when falling from a building, that it must be the work of the devil. A young girl who insulted her mother was publicly punished and kept on bread-and-water; and a peasant boy who called his mother a devil was publicly whipped. A child who struck his mother was beheaded; adultery was punished with death; a woman was publicly scourged because she sang common songs to a psalm tune; and another because she dressed herself, in a frolic, in man's attire. Brides were not allowed to wear wreaths in their bonnets; gamblers were set in pillory, and card-playing and nine-pins were denounced as gambling.

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In a letter dated 1547 to the faithful in France he wrote of the church in Geneva: "As for the rumors which are flying about concerning our troubles, first they have for the most part been invented. . . . It is true we have several hard-headed and stiff-necked rebels . . . and especially are our young people very corrupt, so that when they are not allowed every license they go from bad to worse. Of late they were very angry about a trifle. It is because they were not allowed to wear slashed breeches, which have been forbidden in the town for the last twelve years. Not that we would make too much of a point of this, but because we see that, beginning with the breeches, they wish to introduce all sorts of dissolute ways. However we have insisted that the slashing of the breeches was but a bit of foppery not worth mentioning, and we have had another end in view, which was to curb and repress their follies."

. . . . .

In his will he says: "I do testify that I live and purpose to



die in this faith which God has given me through his gospel, and that I have no other dependence for salvation than the free choice which is made of me by Him. With my whole heart I embrace his mercy, through which all my sins are covered, for Christ's sake, and for the sake of his death and suffering. According to the measure of grace granted unto me, I have taught his own, simple Word, by sermons, by deeds, and by expositions of the Scripture. In all my battles with the enemies of the truth, I have not used sophistry, but have fought the good fight squarely and directly. But alas, my good will and my zeal, if I may so name it, have been so lukewarm and cold that I have fallen immeasurably below the mark in fulfilling my office."

. . . . .

In his last moments of great pain, he was often heard praying: "Lord, thou bruise me, but it is enough for me to know that it is Thou! Who will give me the wings of a dove that I may fly to Thee!"

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"Fearless and without guile" was the motto of Calvin.. His coat of arms consisted of a hand offering a burning heart to God.

LEBANON, PA.

# THE REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW

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## I.

### THE MARKS OF A TRUE RELIGION.<sup>1</sup>

BY THE REV. GEORGE F. MOORE, D.D.

Where are the gods of Hamath and of Arpad? Where are the gods of Sepharvaim, of Hena, and of Ivvah?—2 Kings, XVIII, 34.

The officers of Sennacherib, standing beneath the walls of Jerusalem, summon the rebellious city to surrender. The other cities of Judah had already been taken, thousands of their inhabitants were captives in the hands of the invaders. Hezekiah was shut up in his capital, in Sennacherib's own words, "like a bird in a cage"; Isaiah describes the wide devastation in the midst of which Jerusalem was left "solitary as a lodge in a vineyard." Further resistance was vain; how should the city withstand the victorious armies of the great Assyrian empire? (See Isaiah x., 13 f.) In what did Hezekiah put his trust? In his military strength? The envoys tauntingly wager that if they should give him two thousand horses he could not find riders for them. In his Egyptian allies? Had not Egypt always proved a cracked reed, piercing the hand of everyone who leaned upon it? In his God? What was his god more than the gods of a hundred kingdoms which the Assyrians had destroyed in the might of their god Asshur?

<sup>1</sup> Sermon preached to the graduating class of the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church at Lancaster, Pa., May, 1909.



“Who among all the gods of the countries have delivered their countries out of my hand that Jehovah should deliver Jerusalem out of my hand?” “Where are the gods of Hamath and Arpad, of Sepharvaim, of Hena and of Ivvah?”

Where are the gods of Nineveh? history seems to echo with its own irony. Within less than a century after the Assyrian king uttered his taunt the empire he thought invincible perished from the face of the earth almost in a day, its capital, Nineveh, was laid in ruins, the very race seems to disappear from history. Only in our own time, the buried cities on the banks of the Tigris have been unearthed and the long forgotten names of their gods deciphered by curious scholars.

And where are the gods of the empires which contested with Assyria the rule of the world or succeeded it in the dominion—the gods of Egypt and Babylon, of Persia, and Greece, and Rome? One only of all the gods of that ancient world has escaped its fate—the despised god of Jerusalem against whom Sennacherib made his proud boast; of all the ancient religions Judaism alone has survived the centuries and become the mother of two daughters greater than itself, Christianity and Mohammedanism, which transcending the bounds of nationality have become the faiths of the most diverse races.

Why is it that the religion of Jehovah has thus outlived all its rivals? The cause cannot be found in its external fortunes. Israel was never a great political power; its religion was not carried to empire by the progress of a victorious nationality. Nor had the Jews the prestige of great intellectual achievement; their religion was commended by no philosophy, glorified by no poetry, no art appealed to the sense and imagination of men in its behalf.

The secret of its success must be something in the religion itself. What is it? At first glance the question seems hard to answer. In Hezekiah's time the religion of Jehovah appears to the external observer to differ in no way from the religions of the other peoples. Jehovah was the national God of Judah, as Chemosh was the national god of Moab or Asshur of Assyria.

He was worshipped in the same way as other gods; his temple in Jerusalem was like the temples of Phœnicia and Syria; an image in the form of a serpent was worshipped in it until Hezekiah himself removed it; the older sacred object, the ark, remained; the vestments of the priests, the sacrifices, the ceremonial restrictions, while in some minor respects peculiar, were not different in nature from those of the other Syrian religions. Why did it live while they died? Some one may answer: "The religion of Jehovah was the *true* religion; therefore it lived." But how do we recognize the religion of Judah in the days of Hezekiah as the true religion, except that our own very different religion has grown out of it, as we recognize the germ by the tree? This reflection seems to put us on the right track. The religion of Jehovah had in it, as the history of succeeding centuries to our own time shows, the potentiality of unlimited development which was lacking in its rivals. At a certain moment in the history of man on the earth the progenitors of the highest and the lowest races which we know and of many that have perished stood upon the same plane of culture; physically, mentally, morally, to all outward seeming, they were alike; but in the one, as the event shows, was capacity for progress, while others, lacking this, remained where they were or advanced for a time and then became stationary or retrograded and degenerated. So it has been with whole civilizations; so it is with religions. The law of the survival of the fittest holds in this sphere also, but fitness to survive is not mere adaptation to the present, it is adaptability to a future.

The characteristic of true religion is, thus, the power of unending progress. In this power of progress three elements may be distinguished:

*First.* The power to develop from within, with a strong and healthy growth, according to the law of its own type.

*Second.* The power to take up and vitally assimilate what is true and good in other religions, in philosophy, science, social movements.



*Third.* The power to cast off, in due time, the forms of thought, ritual or life which belong to outgrown stages of its development and have become a hindrance to further progress.

1. All these are exemplified in the history of Judaism. At the moment when the Assyrian envoys were delivering their message there stood by Hezekiah a man whose courageous faith was a surer reliance than walls and gates, the prophet Isaiah. He was one of the leaders in the prophetic movement of the eighth century whose great achievement was to establish the ethical character of true religion. The will of God is moral, *wholly* moral; what he demands of men is not worship, but uprightness, justice, kindness, tenderness of heart, faithfulness. (Hosea, ii., 19 f.) The sins which provoke God's wrath and draw down his judgment are the wrongs which men inflict upon their fellows—the great estates acquired by crushing out the free peasantry, the luxury procured by fraud and extortion, the unjust laws, the corrupt judges, the greedy and sensual priests, the prophets who say to such as do these things, “Ye shall not surely die.”

The standard of right is the same among all nations, and this identity of the moral law and its sanctions leads to the unity of God. Monotheism among the Jews was not reached from the metaphysical, but from the ethical side, and it always bore the stamp of its origin in its personal and supermundane idea of God, the moral governor of the world, in the corresponding conception of sin, not as infirmity, imperfection, but as transgression of the will of God; and in the idea of salvation as conditioned by repentance and reformation and consisting in reconciliation with God. The consequences of this “ethical monotheism” were more fully developed as the generations passed, and were gradually wrought into the whole life of the people.

With all its moral strenuousness Judaism was not lacking in the mystical—or, if the word offends, spiritual—element, without which a religion cannot long satisfy the deepest needs and aspirations of the human heart. The Psalter contains

some of the immortal classics of the spirit which finds in the consciousness of God's presence and his love, of oneness of will with him, the supreme good: "Whom have I in heaven but thee, and since I have thee what need I more on earth?"

Finally, religion had for the prophets an ideal end. It is not enough that God's purpose in and for Israel be fulfilled by its becoming a righteous and godly people; God had a larger purpose. The true religion must become the universal religion; all nations shall one day know the true God and rejoice to do his will. Israel is the prophet of the true religion among the nations, its martyr, discouraged, persecuted even to death, but sure of final success.

2. Judaism showed in a no less marked degree the power to take up and assimilate religious ideas of other peoples. In the fifth and fourth centuries the Jews were brought into close contact with the Persian religion, and can hardly have failed to feel in it an affinity to their own. The "Wise Lord" Ahura Mazda, was indeed in many ways like their own Lord, Jehovah. The moral strenuousness of Mazdaism was not inferior to that of Judaism, and it lent to its law the tremendous sanctions of the hereafter, the judgment of individual souls, in which every man was strictly requited according to his deeds, the blessedness of heaven, the pains of hell, the resurrection, the final complete triumph of the good. Its angel ministers doing the Lord's will in the world, its evil spirits working ill, fell in well with the tendency of theology more and more to exalt God out of the world. Somewhat later, after the conquests of Alexander, Greek religions and philosophy began to exert upon the Jews their strong and subtle power, these also bringing a doctrine of the unity of God, of the immortality of the soul and of retribution after death. In adopting these, Judaism proved not only its hospitable mind toward the truth in other faiths, but its power to penetrate and transmute these truths by its own spirit, so that, even when we can most clearly discern their origin, they do not appear borrowed and foreign elements in the religion, but integral to it.



3. The third factor in the power of religious progress is the ability to cast off, in due time, forms and beliefs which have been outgrown. The first illustration of this which will doubtless suggest itself to all is the prophetic rejection of tangible representation of God. The holy stone or tree, the image, had once been the seat, the abode, of the deity—let us be just—the means to realize the presence of God. To the more enlightened age it was a symbol, but even as a symbol it was incongruous with a spiritual conception of God. The ark in the adytum of the temple in Jerusalem was a most holy thing in the eyes of the people; its disappearance was like the loss of a palladium. If they knew the truth, the prophet Jeremiah says, they would not lament it nor wish its restoration. When Pompey entered the holy of holies he marvelled to find it empty.

In the last centuries before our era Judaism let the name of God fall into disuse. Instead of Jehovah (Jahvè) they said "God" or "the Lord." Whatever other motives may have been at work, we must recognize, I think, a true religious instinct that a proper name for God is inconsistent with a monotheism; those who acknowledge but one God have no need to distinguish him by name from others. Nothing contributed more to make the spread of Judaism and of Christianity possible than that it did not come to men as one of the host of foreign mysteries of which the world was full, with a particular god of its own, but fell into line with the whole monotheistic trend of philosophic and higher religious thought in the gentile world.

Sacrifice, which could be offered only in Jerusalem, ceased to have any immediate religious value to the great multitude of the Jews in the dispersion, who visited the holy city perhaps but once or twice in their life. The synagogue was their temple, and the religious instruction of the synagogue, the reading of the Scriptures and comment on them, with the common prayer of the congregation, was their spiritual worship. By the purity of its idea of the one God who is worshipped without symbol or sacrifice, by the rational character of its synagogue

service, and by the authority of its venerable scriptures, Judaism appealed to many minds among the Gentiles, and exerted an influence far greater than the number of proselytes would indicate.

On the other hand, Judaism was cumbered with minute and burdensome observances covering the whole of life—in great part survivals from lower stages of social and religious development—which it lacked power to cast off. Nay, regarding them as positive divine ordinances, it attributed to them the greater religious value the less rational or religious they really were—they were the better test of fidelity to God's commands. The danger lay near that the tithing of mint and anise and cummin should be regarded as the weightiest matters of the law because they were the smallest, beside which truth and uprightness and goodness seemed commonplace and almost pagan virtues; just as in the Christian Church exact and minute faith in doctrinal formulas or exact observance of rites has sometimes been made of more worth than love to God or men.

In opposition to these tendencies and errors, Jesus laid the whole stress of his teaching on the spiritual and ethical in religion. The Father in Heaven as the essentially religious conception of God, love to God and our neighbor as the whole law, likeness to the heavenly father as the ideal of character, the good world in which right and love everywhere prevail as the end of individual and social life. The energy of life in these convictions, born of his own profound consciousness and experience, throws aside, not only as worthless in themselves but as a hindrance to true thinking and good living, the ceremonial observances, the trivial regulations, which seemed to the scribes so momentous. Traditions which made the word of God of none effect Jesus indignantly repudiated.

Paul, the apostle to the Gentiles, draws the final consequence; the law, as a religious institute, had in its time a pedagogic value; but it had now outlived its purpose and was to be rejected as a cumbrous survival of an economy that is



past. He preached "God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself" as a gospel of salvation.

Christianity showed from the beginning not only the power of vigorous and sound development from within and the power of this new life to throw off forms of thought and observance which were incongruous with its higher ideas and ends, but the power to think and speak in the language of the world in which it found itself and to take to itself the truth which it found in the world. The theology of Paul and John is the exposition and justification of Christianity to contemporary Greek thought. John boldly connects his interpretation with the speculations concerning the divine Word which were current in the Jewish-Alexandrian as well as in contemporary Stoic philosophy. The theologians of the early Church set themselves the task of showing that the great truths of philosophy are Christian truths—Christianity is the true philosophy—and of construing the content of Christianity in the forms of contemporary philosophy, not without change in the substance. Nor was it only philosophy which Christianity claimed as its own; it took up into itself all that was true and really living in the religions of the age and penetrated it with its own spirit. Only by so doing was its conquest of those religions possible. The pagan religions unsuccessfully imitated it in this. There is an interesting letter from the Emperor Julian to Arsacius in which he expresses the conviction that, unless the old religion can make its own the spirit of Christian charity it is doomed. In this process Christianity took over many adhering elements of paganism, and the beginning was made of a new accumulation of incongruous survivals, beliefs, rites, customs, of Greek, Roman, Teutonic origin under which, in the mediæval church, Christianity was almost buried, until the Protestant reformation, with its revival of vital religion, and more consequently the Puritan reformation, cast them off.

Thus, through all its history, this religion has shown the same capacity to develop from within, to assimilate from without, and to reject its own outgrown modes. Some ages

have been conspicuously ages of internal growth; the essential principles of religion have been worked out in thought and life; others have been times of great influence from without in both thought and life; others, still, ages of clarification and reform. But the interdependence of the factors is always clear; only the vigor of the inner growth makes assimilation safe or reform natural and real.

The signature of true religion is the power of progress, the ability to keep in the closest touch with the developing religious and moral consciousness of man, the advance in knowledge of the universe by science, and the unification and rationalization of that knowledge by philosophy, the ability to adapt itself (not by mere accommodation) to the needs of men in all stages of culture and in all the experiences of life. Its unity is not constancy to invariable type, but continuity of development.

I have made much use of the word development; I have spoken of religion as having in itself the capacity of development, and have tried to analyse this development. Such language may, however, easily be misleading. Historical development is not a mechanical or biological process. The factor of progress in history is human intelligence, conscience and will; and all great advances are made under the leadership of great men. So it is in religion. Every ethical religion was founded or reformed by a religious genius—Moses, Zoroaster, Buddha, as well as Jesus. But the very supremacy of the founder's genius, especially when associated with the idea of revelation and sacred scripture, tends to stereotype the religion and turn its face to the past instead of the future. The progress of such a religion is dependent on a succession of men who from age to age revive religion by bringing it into living interaction with the thought and conscience of their own time, and rising above their times carry forward the standard, the ideal toward which succeeding generations shall aspire and strive.

Judaism and Christianity have been remarkable for this prophetic, this true apostolic succession, men who have had the consequence and courage to cast off the encumbrance of sur-



vivals—knowing that it belongs to the prophetic office to pull down and destroy as well as to build up and to plant—and the divine insight to discern and point out the way of new advance. Very different in surroundings, gifts and character, they have been possessed by one spirit, they have, however partial their vision, always had their eyes turned to one goal. From the historian's point of view they are the bearers of the development, from the religious point of view they are the organs of one age-long divine revelation.

For God's revelation is not a thing of the remote past, ended forever when the canon of the New Testament was closed. If it had been so, the development of Christianity would have ended there; which is but another way of saying that there Christianity died—what remained was a dead religion, literally, a *superstition*.

If we believe that Christianity is the true religion, we must believe that it has still a limitless development before it, not of expansion only, but of growth from within and of adoption of truth from without; that in their time other men of the spirit, prophets as great as any whom we revere in the past, will arise to reveal the saving truths of the age.

To this progress we, who do not measure ourselves by the standard of the prophets, must dedicate our lives in the same spirit. And we shall contribute to it our best, not by striving for progress as an end in itself, but by seeking truth, right and goodness with a single eye to perceive them and a single mind to make them prevail in our lives and in the world.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

## II.

### THE CONSERVATION OF OUR RESOURCES.

BY NATHAN C. SCHAEFFER, D.D., LL.D.

On May 13, 1908, there was a remarkable gathering at Washington. In the East Room of the White House were assembled the cabinet officers, the justices of the Supreme Court, members of the Senate and House of Representatives, the governors of all the States except two, and captains of industry like Andrew Carnegie and James J. Hill. The meeting was called for the purpose of starting a movement to conserve our national resources. In the opening address President Roosevelt used startling language. "The Nation," said he, "began with the belief that its landed possessions were illimitable and capable of supporting all the people who might care to make our country their home, but already the limit of unsettled land is in sight, and indeed but little land fitted for agriculture remains unoccupied save what can be reclaimed by irrigation and drainage. We began with an unapproached heritage of forests; more than half the timber is gone. We began with coal fields more extensive than those of any other nation and with iron ores regarded as inexhaustible, and many experts now declare that the end of both coal and iron is in sight."

Men of science had discussed at their associations the waste of our soil and fuel and mineral supplies, but their words were like the voice of one crying in the wilderness—no one paid any attention to the noise they were trying to make. But when the President drew attention to the necessity of conserving our resources for the benefit of future generations, the voice of conservation became the voice of the nation and arrested the attention even of the governments of Canada and Mexico.



Furthermore the conferences at the White House have given rise to literature on the conservation of our national resources that will materially modify our methods of teaching and studying geography. There are at least four points of view from which the subject may be taught and studied:

1. The elementary school seeks to impart a knowledge of the forms of land and water and of the political divisions which man has made for governmental purposes. It seeks to develop the basal concepts which enable the pupil to interpret a map, to grasp a route of travel and to understand what he reads in books, magazines and the newspapers.

2. The study of geography becomes scientific when the learner is taught things in their causes and essential relations. It is the mission of science to trace the relation of cause and effect, of reason and consequence, of law and its applications. Geography when studied from this point of view has high disciplinary value and is a fit subject for the curriculum of the high school and the college.

3. Our schools for the study of trade and commerce teach geography from still another point of view. Schools of this sort aim to familiarize the learner with the geography which bears upon his particular vocation, teaching him whence the raw materials are derived and whither the finished product must be sent so as to find a ready market.

4. In distinction from these points of view the memorable meeting at the White House emphasized the study of the earth as a fit place for the abode of man. Perhaps it would be more correct to say that it revived the method of Karl Ritter, who studied every country with reference to the resources which make it a place fit to live in. As soon as the resources of a country are exhausted, population moves elsewhere, and the locality loses its interest, geographically speaking. At one time Pithole was the next to the largest post office in Pennsylvania. To-day it is no longer on the map; only a few houses mark the site; the exhaustion of its oil field caused a migration to places better suited for making a living.

The history of the Holy Land teaches the same lesson.

Forests, woods and groves are frequently mentioned in the Old Testament, but these words do not occur in the New Testament. In Ecclesiastes (II., 6) Solomon says: "I made me pools of water, to water therewith the wood that bringeth forth trees." The Children of Israel had the purest form of religion among the nations of antiquity, but this did not save them as a nation when their material resources and the fertility of their soil began to fail. The destruction of the forests, the failure of the water supply, and the deterioration of the soil were factors as potent as the decay of religious faith.

"The surface of Palestine," says Marsch, "is composed in a great measure of rounded limestone hills, once no doubt covered with forests. These were partially removed before the Jewish Conquest. When the soil began to suffer from drought, reservoirs to contain the waters of winter were hewn in the rock near the tops of the hills and the declivities were terraced. So long as the cisterns were in good order and the terraces kept up, the fertility of Palestine was unsurpassed, but when misgovernment and foreign and intestine war occasioned the neglect or destruction of these works—traces of which still meet the eye of the traveler at every step—when the reservoirs were broken and the terrace walls had fallen down, there was no longer water for irrigation in summer, the rains of winter soon washed away most of the thin layer of earth upon the rocks, and Palestine was reduced almost to the condition of a desert."<sup>1</sup>

It is very instructive to study from this point of view the region which was settled in colonial days by the Reformed, the Lutherans, the Mennonites and German Baptist Brethren.

Like the other early settlers of Pennsylvania they came from the best people in Europe and were noted for their piety and religious earnestness. These traits could not have laid the foundation of their subsequent prosperity, had they not settled in a region as well fitted for the abode of man as the countries from which they came. The student of geography can not find a better country to live in than the area between the

<sup>1</sup> Marsh's "Man and Nature," pp. 369-370.



Delaware River and the Allegheny Mountains, bounded on the north by the Blue Ridge and on the south by the Potomac River. According to the last census Lancaster County is the richest agricultural county in the United States. The great valley stretching from Easton to Harrisburg and thence to the south as the Cumberland Valley is an area that was well timbered, well watered, possessing a rich soil, a salubrious climate, and an abundance of iron ore and of the other things which contribute to health and strength and happiness. Some have regretted that the Blue Ridge does not contain any useful minerals or precious metals, but the geologist Leslie claims that one should not look so good a gift horse in the mouth. By this figure of speech he meant that the Blue Ridge condenses the vapor into rain clouds and causes a rainfall and a fertility of the land more valuable than mines of gold and silver. The streams furnished motive power for grist mills; the abundance of wood and iron ore kept the charcoal furnaces a-going, and there was plenty of anthracite nearby when the charcoal began to fail. The climate invited the farmers to practice rotation of crops; the soil is as productive to-day as it was two hundred years ago. The denominations which care for the religious faith of the people settled in this region will have a future worthy of their past history.

The automobile and Sunday baseball have not diminished the attendance at their churches; race suicide has not diminished their population; the richness of the soil and the abundance of other resources will always sustain a thriving yeomanry upon the farms. Their houses look as if the inhabitants meant to stay. Their dialect may die out, but the people will perpetuate themselves, their prosperity and their religious faith so long as their resources, their institutions and the fertility of the soil can be kept up. To the inhabitants of this region the recent appeal for the improvement of country life had little meaning, and the President's plea for the conservation of our resources seemed needless. It is necessary to take a more comprehensive view in order to feel the need of the movement for conservation.

Man can live forty days without food, four days without water, and not four minutes without air. Air, food and water may sustain life in tropical countries, but in the temperate zone man needs also fuel and shelter, clothing and building materials. From the air, the water, the soil, the forest and the mine he gets what he needs for food, for raiment, for houses and for his industrial life. The sea furnishes less than five per cent. of our food supply; the fish which were once so abundant in our streams that apprentices stipulated they should not be given shad more than twice a week and the game in our forests which was plentiful enough to sustain the life of the first settlers, must now be left out of the account in estimating the real sources of our food supply. Fortunately the American people grow more than they eat; but how will it be when two hundred million people will have to be fed? An area sufficient to sustain a population of ten millions can be reclaimed by irrigation and drainage, but the bulk of the people will have to be sustained upon the soil now under cultivation. At the close of the Civil War it was not unusual to hear people say and sing that Uncle Sam is rich enough to give us all a farm. To-day the lands open to homesteaders cover a comparatively small area. The land suited for raising corn has all been taken, and the British territory fit for growing wheat which unlike corn does not need warm nights to ripen, is now attracting the pioneers who are seized with the lust for land.

Are the American people getting the best return from the soil which they till? Listen to the words of an expert. In no other important country in the world, with the exception of Russia," says James J. Hill, "is the industry that must be the foundation of every state, at so low an ebb as in our own. According to the last census the average annual product per acre of the farms of the whole United States was worth \$11.38. It is little more than a respectable rental in communities where the soil is properly cared for and made to give a reasonable return for cultivation. There were but two states in the union whose total value of farm products was over \$30 per acre of improved land. The great state of Illinois gave but \$12.48, and



Minnesota showed only \$8.74. No discrimination attaches to these figures where all are so much at fault. Nature has given to us the most valuable possession ever committed to man. It can never be duplicated because there is none like it upon the face of the earth. And we are racking and impoverishing it exactly as we are felling the forests and rifling the mines. Our soil, once the envy of every other country, the attraction which draws millions of immigrants across the seas, gave an average yield for the whole United States during the ten years beginning with 1896 of 13.5 bushels of wheat per acre. Austria and Hungary each produced over 17 bushels per acre, France 19.8, Germany 27.6 and the United Kingdom 32.2 bushels per acre. For the same decade our average yield of oats was less than 30 bushels, while Germany produced 46 and Great Britain 42. For Barley the figures are 25 against 33 and 34.6; for rye 15.4 against 24 for Germany and 26 for Ireland. In the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark a yield of more than thirty bushels of wheat per acre was the average for the past five years."

The discouraging part of the comparison is that the yield per acre is actually diminishing. The authority just quoted says: "The average yield of wheat per acre in New York for the last ten years was about 18 bushels. For the first five years of that ten-year period it was 18.4 bushels, and for the last five 17.4 bushels. In the farther West, Kansas takes high rank as a wheat producer. Its average yield per acre for the last ten years was 14.6 bushels. For the first five years it was 15.4 and for the last five 13.18. Up in the Northwest, Minnesota wheat has made a name all over the world. Her average yield per acre for the same ten years was 12.96 bushels. For the first five years it was 13.12 and for the last five 12.8. We perceive here the working of a uniform law, independent of location, soil or climate. It is the law of a diminishing return due to soil distruction. Apply this to the country at large, and it reduces agriculture to the conditions of a bank whose depositors are steadily drawing out more than they put in."

It takes ten thousand years for nature to make a foot of soil and careless farming may ruin it in ten years. Three processes are clearly visible, soil exhaustion, soil erosion, soil destruction by mining and other operations. "When our soils are gone, we too must go unless some way is found to feed on raw rock or its equivalent." Single cropping and no fertilization are not the only factors that conspire to destroy the soil. Erosion and soil wash are equally destructive. Every time a heavy rain falls, the streams grow muddy, which means that soil is being carried off to the mouth of rivers, forming deltas to obstruct navigation. The Secretary of the Inland Waterways Commission estimates that over a billion tons of our richest soil, valued at not less than a billion dollars, is annually washed away to clog our rivers and harbors. That amount represents about half a ton per acre, or if placed in one pile would make a block a mile square and a thousand feet high.

Mining and manufacturing operations also help to ruin the soil. "At Ducktown, Tennessee, the fumes of  $\text{SO}_2$  from the roasting and smelting of the copper ores," says President Bogert of the American Chemical Society, "together with flue dust have killed all vegetation for miles around, and the land thus denuded has eroded with startling rapidity." The Secretary of Agriculture cites it as a striking illustration of the completeness of destruction that may result from erosion in this region when the protecting forest is once removed." Another authority states that there are localities where one tenth of the arable land has been destroyed by erosion. Mining operations have destroyed entire valleys. The greed of this generation will surely inflict suffering upon our descendants.

Fifty years ago Lord Macauley used these words: "As long as you have a boundless extent of fertile and unoccupied land your laboring population will be found more at ease than the laboring population of the Old World, but the time will come when the wages will be as low and will fluctuate as much as they do with us. Then your institutions will be brought to the test. Distress everywhere makes the laborer mutinous



and discontented, and inclines him to listen with eagerness to agitators who tell him that it is a monstrous iniquity that one man should have a million and another can not get a full meal. . . . The day will come when the multitudes of people none of whom has had more than half a breakfast or expects more than half a dinner, will choose a legislature. Is it possible to doubt what sort of a legislature will be chosen. . . . Either civilization or liberty will perish. Either some Cæsar or Napoleon will seize the reins of government with a strong hand or your republic will be as fearfully plundered and laid waste by barbarians in the twentieth century as the Roman Empire in the fifth."

The observance of Arbor Day has made the average reader familiar with the rate at which our forests are disappearing. Every year we cut three times as much timber as the growth of our forests, and it is predicted that in twenty years our people will begin to feel the effects of a lumber famine.

Since 1880 the total cut is estimated to be more than 700 billion feet, enough to make a floor one inch thick over Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island and Delaware, an area of 25,000 square miles. What this will ultimately mean to our civilization no one ventures to predict.

The nations which have iron and coal now rule the world. This explains the power and supremacy of the United States. When the republic was founded there were in the present area of the United States exclusive of Alaska and our colonial possessions ten billion tons of iron ore, two trillion tons of coal, 850 millions acres of forest, and an amount of petroleum and natural gas impossible to estimate. Writers applied the word inexhaustible to our resources of iron, coal, wood and other forms of fuel. The quantities were so enormous that the mind ordinarily conceives of them as a mere row of figures. The devices of the school master must be employed to give an adequate idea of what these figures mean. Take the coal mined in a single day. If loaded on trains of cars with fifty tons in each car and thirty cars to a train, the combined length of trains would encircle the globe at the equator two and

two third times. Every year we cut enough timber to cover with a floor an inch thick the entire area of Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island and Delaware, and we destroy by fire as much timber as we use. Since the annual cut is three times the annual growth, it is predicted by experts that the American people will begin to feel the effects of a timber famine in twenty years. Andrew Carnegie predicts that by 1937 one eighth of the available iron ore will have been used. Our methods of coal mining waste a large amount of coal—in some instances one half of the available supply. “Of all the sinful wasters of man’s inheritance on earth,” said the late Professor Shaler, “and all are in this regard sinners, the very worst are the people of America.” In no respect is this so true as in the lavish waste of natural gas, “the purest form of fuel, ideal in every respect, self transporting, only awaiting the turning of a key to deliver to our homes and factories, heat, light and power.” Professor White, the state geologist of West Virginia, estimates from personal knowledge of the conditions which exist in every oil and gas field that not less than a billion cubic feet of gas go to waste daily, this waste being equal to a million bushels of coal. He claims that the tonnage originating in the Pittsburg district and passing through it now exceeds that of the four greatest seaport cities of the world, London, New York, Liverpool and Hamburg combined, and that if the wasteful methods of the past are to continue, if the flames of 35,000 coke ovens are to continue to make the sky lurid within sight of the city of Pittsburg, consuming with frightful speed one third of the power and one half of the values locked in her supplies of coaking coal, the present century will see the end of this supremacy.

The most alarming feature in this waste is the fact that coal and iron when once mined can never be replaced in the bowels of the earth. We seem to be facing a period when our supplies of fuel and iron will be exhausted. It is indeed hard to conceive the readjustments which will be necessary in our mode of living after we begin to feel a scarcity in these sources



of daily comfort and national greatness. We do not build a house nor construct a bridge nor cook a meal nor operate a machine without using iron, wood, coal or other forms of fuel. Modern warfare, modern industry and modern methods of transportation would be impossible without iron and steel and coal or other fuel.

In view of these facts and predictions shall man grow pessimistic over his future? In Iceland where no supplies of coal and iron are found and where nothing bigger than a birch can grow (it seems to be heaven ordained that a birch should grow wherever a boy can grow) the people have attained a high state of culture and a rare appreciation of the things of the mind and the higher life, but the civilized races of the temperate zone will never be satisfied to live the life of the people of Iceland, if inventive skill can find substitutes for fuel and iron. The application of science to art will in due time solve the problem. Ages ago sunlight was stored for the use of man in the three states of matter. Coal and wood are sunlight in solid form. Petroleum is sunlight stored in liquid form. Natural gas is sunlight in the third state of matter. The sun motor is still in operation. On a clear day heat equal to 7,500 horse power is poured upon every square acre of the earth's surface. It is possible to concentrate this heat as in the Portuguese priest's heliophore at the St. Louis Exposition, which produced a temperature of 6,000 degrees Fahrenheit—"a heat in which the most solid steel melted like a snow ball in a Bessemer Converter."

Even if there should continue to be difficulty in the direct utilization of the sun's rays, the indirect use is in sight. Carry a bucket of water to the top of a building and in pouring it upon the earth you liberate as much power as was consumed in carrying the water to that elevation. The sun is constantly lifting vapor into the sky which falls as rain, giving rise to streams, waterfalls and motive power far in excess of the power locked in our fuel.

It is estimated that it would take all the coal mined in a year to pump back the water which tumbles over Niagara in

twenty-four hours. The time will come when all our rivers will be utilized for motive power and when every rivulet on the farm will be made to generate electricity for lighting, heating and motive power. In his desire to quantify everything, the scientist has calculated the quantity of rain which falls upon the surface of the earth. Including both land and water areas the total rainfall is estimated at 215 trillion cubic feet. Of this total over half is evaporated; about a third flows into the sea; the remaining sixth is either consumed or absorbed. The theoretical power of the streams is 230 million horse power, of which the amount now in use is 5,250,000 horse power. The amount available is estimated at 37 million horse power which exceeds our entire mechanical power and would "operate every mill, drive every spindle, propel every train and boat, and light every city, town and village in the land."

The age of transportation by inland canals is evidently just dawning. The lessened cost of shipping merchandise by water would have saved consumers and manufacturers a sum in excess of \$250,000,000 as compared with the cost of transportation by rail. Nevertheless the canals which cost Pennsylvania upwards of fifty million dollars and were sold for about six million dollars, have been allowed to fall into ruin and decay—another example of sinful waste on the part of the American people. Much has been done to check the waste of our national resources and to restore our soil and our forests. The land-grant colleges, the public schools and public officials, from the governors of our Western States down to the itinerant lecturer, are advocating rotation of crops, better methods of farming and intelligent systems of forestry. Millions of trees are planted on every Arbor Day. Almost a million acres have been set apart for forestry in the Keystone State. New York leads us in this movement. Even Yale University has planted a school of forestry in Pike County—that is on Pennsylvania soil. We support a school of our own in Franklin County. Any person riding on the train from Philadelphia to Pittsburg must have noticed the thousands of trees which



the Pennsylvania Railroad has planted in the hope that the growth will furnish the crossties which will be needed to repair its tracks.

By a decision of the Supreme Court of Maine the cutting of lumber owned by private parties can now be regulated by judicious and wise legislation.

There is difference of opinion with reference to President Roosevelt's services upon political matters. There can be no difference of opinion as to his service in the conservation of our national resources. When he took the office of President, our timber, our minerals, our coal in all the eastern and central parts of the United States had passed into private hands. A beginning had been made of the reservation of the forests of the west before President Roosevelt's time, but during his administration practically all of the great forests of the west which still remained have been withdrawn from public entry and remain the property of the nation. Not only so, but the mineral fuel also is no longer subject to entry but remains subject to the nation. And following these two great acts he took up the question with Congress, with the governors, with the people as to the conservation of all our resources, both those in public and those in private lands. "I believe," says President Van Hise, "that the work which the President has done in this matter will among future generations mark him as not only one of the greatest statesmen of this nation, but of all nations in all time."

At this point we may allow our imagination to reënforce our hopes. The new knowledge which science is evolving, is furnishing gleams of hope in new directions. The very language as well as the concepts which have been evolved from discoveries in the last six years are so new that one can scarcely talk so as to be understood unless he be endowed with gifts like those of Helmholtz, Tyndall and Huxley. In discussing intra-atomic energy Professor Duncan says that March, 1903, is a date to which in all probability the men of the future will often refer as the veritable beginning of the larger powers and energies which they will control. It was in March, 1903,

that Curie and Laborde announced the heat-emitting power of radium.

More recently Ramsey announced the transmutation of copper into lithium, which, if true, realizes the dream of the alchemists. Recently Dr. Comstock announced the discovery that matter and energy are distinct entities. More recently Mr. Baker announced a new method for restoring exhausted soils.

Professor Duncan in his book on the New Knowledge predicts the end of coal-mining. "It is impossible," he says, "for us to come to any other conclusion than that there is locked up in all the so-called elements of matter an enormous store of energy which, except in those elements of heaviest atomic weight like radium and thorium, remains latent and unknown. Professor Thomson, as the result of his calculations, concludes that a gram of hydrogen has within it energy sufficient to lift a million tons through a height considerably exceeding one hundred yards; and that since the amount of energy is proportional to the number of corpuscles composing the atom of the element, the energy of the other elements such as sulphur, iron or lead must enormously exceed this amount. "We have already shown," says he, "that Professor Thomson's calculations have a habit of squaring with fact. The energy whence we obtain our manufacturing power, whether derived from burning coal or gas or any other chemical reaction, depends upon the action of one system of atoms upon another. It is absolutely insignificant compared with the limitless energy locked up within the atoms themselves. We know that this energy exists, but to-day we have no control over it. We can neither let it loose nor tie it up in any way whatever. We can only observe it. But it would be rash indeed to predict that our impotence will last forever. Strange things happen nowadays and yet stranger things may, nay will, be seen by future men. We have no real warranty that this infinity of energy will be tapped by man, except this, that what man earnestly longs for he will obtain. If he knows that every breath of air he draws has contained within itself power enough to drive



the workshops of the world, he will find out some day, somehow, some way of tapping that energy. . . . It has been playfully suggested by Rutherford that some day it might be possible to construct a detonator which would send a wave of atomic disintegration through the earth and decompose the whole round world into helium, argon and other gases, leaving literally not one stone upon another. Without being frightened by any such humorous suggestion as this, we can easily grant that with the continuous acceleration of scientific research where one year of the present counts for a cycle of former time, there will come a day in the unending succession of days when men will look with mingled horror and amusement at the burning of coal and wood, and will date the coming in of their kingdom to the time when Curie and Laborde demonstrated the existence and extent of intra-atomic energy.”<sup>2</sup>

This brings us to the most terrible of all the wastes of our day. In 1907 9,000 persons were killed and wounded in the mines. The waste of human life in our mines, in our factories, upon our railroads, is a destruction greater than that of any battle in modern times—and alongside of this is another fearful waste, the waste of brains through child labor and imperfect methods of education.

Sir Humphrey Davy says that the greatest discovery which he ever made, was when he discovered Michael Faraday. The best asset which our nation has, is children, and yet children are stunted in their growth by methods of work in the mine and the factory and by faulty methods of education and living which send thousands to an early grave and prevent tens of thousands from attaining the complete development of all their powers. The most thrilling book I ever read is Cobden’s book on White Slavery in England, which tells how, in the days when the Arkwrights and the Peels piled up colossal fortunes upon the underpaid toil of women and children, little children were obliged to get up before daylight to pull bunkers through coal shafts too small for a mule to pass through. The brightest page of English history tells how, since 1802, Parlia-

<sup>2</sup> Duncan’s “New Knowledge,” pp. 176–178.

ment has passed one act after another to put an end to this slavery of children and women. The laws of nearly all the states now seek to protect childhood from work in mines and factories which is calculated to stunt their growth. We have laws that compel children to go to school and other laws which keep them out of school and out of work until the age of sixteen, and by that time we have made them criminals if they neither work nor study.

I begin to think that the mother who raises a family of children and trains them for useful citizenship does far more for our country and for humanity than the man who piles up millions and alongside of the millions practices race suicide. In a word science requires well-educated, fully developed men and women if our resources known and unknown shall be conserved and used for the highest welfare of humanity.

Religion is needed to curb the sinful transgressions which do so much to deteriorate the vigor and vitality of the human race. A sense of man's relation to his maker will always be needed to strengthen his conceptions of duty and to elevate his ideals and hopes. Without material resources the race will die from hunger and starvation, without religion the children of men will perish through sin and transgression and iniquity. The home, the school, the church and the state should work in harmony to preserve our national resources and to perpetuate our moral vigor for the benefit of the generations that are still unborn.



### III.

## THE LEGACY LEFT US BY DARWIN AND HIS COLLABORATORS.<sup>1</sup>

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I am deeply sensible of the honor your society has done me, in asking me, through your learned member, Professor Schiedt, to speak now on the naturalist and philosopher, Charles Darwin. My sense of high responsibility is coupled with the grateful remembrance that I can regard him as a fellow countryman; as one who—like his father and grandfather before him—was student in a common Alma Mater, Edinburgh University; as an illustrious discoverer in my chosen field of natural science; and as the man who had opened wide vistas of biological study to our student-day eyes, vistas these that have ever lengthened with the passing years.

Student days always recall fond memories, and they again insensibly lead us back to pre-student enthusiasms and hopes. So there rises before me the picture of a group of lads in my native town, sixteen to twenty years old, who were striving to reach out, even to the most momentous and intricate questions of the universe. It is appropriate that youthful hopes and youthful wisdom go hand in hand, for in time the increase in the latter helps to decrease the former, and so life's mean is struck though it may be after many years.

But wisdom after all, like each phenomenon of this world, is a relative quantity. So every one of our score or thereby of young aspirants to knowledge, entered with hearty good will

<sup>1</sup>Delivered before the Linnean Society, the faculty and students of Franklin and Marshall College, and citizens of Lancaster, Pa., February 27, 1909.

into the exercises of our "Mutual Improvement Society." And our young lives had been flung forth into the world's arena at an epoch-making age. For had not "The Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation" stirred deepest thoughts and apprehensions in parental minds; had not Spencer's "Social Statics" been read and pondered by our elders for twenty years; had not "The Origin of Species" seemed to upset all traditions; had not "The Descent of Man" but recently appeared and called forth magazine articles that we followed with avidity, if not always with appreciation? The debates in that little society, for and against evolution, often waxed hot and eloquent, were supposedly settled by a vote of the assembled members before each meeting broke up, but anew were reopened as we scattered to our homes, and scarcely were they settled when our heads settled on our pillows for the night.

Later years at college only served to emphasize the ferment that was working in the human mind. For while the genial and able Wyville Thompson had left his classes, to conduct scientifically the "Challenger" expedition round the world, his place had been taken temporarily by Huxley, whose long raven hair in heavy locks, broad-spread nose, searching eyes, set mouth and mellow fluent "catching" diction all "caught" the students. Little wonder was it then that on Sir Wyville's triumphant return, with the treasures of a world's ocean-depths in his keeping, even he failed to recapture the errant ones, nay rather had in time to follow his young inexperienced but wayward flock in their evolutionary wanderings.

During the nine hours of the college day we might stray into one class room to hear diatribes against all who would even suggest that species were mutable, into another where a younger teacher would hail "Darwinism" as the new scientific salvation, into still another where gentle sarcasm was heaped on all Darwinian followers. But the new creed had come to stay for us, and therefore we at one time ran, at another time stumbled on, and failing either, groped forward where we could not see to follow.



You will pardon these personal reminiscences when I say that they represented the average university as well as lay attitude toward evolutionary teachings from 1860 to 1880.

Today how great is the contrast! During the past weeks and months, as well as in those that are to come, an international tribute to the genius of Darwin, and so of all associated with him in building up the great doctrine of evolution, has been and will be offered that will probably remain unequalled in the history of any one man. This evening we have gathered to attest our interest in the man, in the cause and in the issues of that cause for humanity. Therefore it is that I have chosen to speak on "The Legacy Left us by Darwin and His Collaborators."

In family or in social affairs, a legacy may represent varied interests or commodities; land, houses, money, jewels, or special investments amongst others. Not less varied is the evolutionary legacy. Contrast the material, the mental, the moral, the spiritual horizons of 1859, when "The Origin of Species" appeared, with those now surrounding us a half century later. We would at once boldly assert that the advance has been remarkable. But we would also suggest that in some relations stagnation or retrogression has occurred.

In the material and the mental, a progressive evolution has been effected, whose magnitude we often scarcely estimate aright, because we live amid its highest results. The material advance is due to that happy combination of manifold discoveries in pure chemistry and physics, with direct application of these in the arts and sciences, so as to increase human well-being and human wealth. But in part, at least, this advance has resulted from a correlated, orderly, scientific mode of approaching these subjects, which may well be called the evolutionary method; or in other words, observation, analysis, synthesis and deduction have gone hand in hand. The inventors of earliest days had it, but to them it was a happy and often haphazard combination, not an accepted rule of conduct as now.

As regards mental relations and viewpoints the change has been phenomenal. In 1859 living things, and man himself, were regarded as separate entities, each species being blocked off by hard and fast lines from others of more or less near affinity. "The proper study of Mankind is Man" had been so dwelt on and hackneyed that knowledge of the mental attitudes of lower animals was scant and erratic in the extreme, while plants were viewed as living things only in a distant sense, and as mainly worthy of study from their economic relations, or as ministering to man's sense of the beautiful. Abstract philosophy, classical linguistics and mathematics held the field, but only in occasional cases held the men who thought of a university course. Medical science alone practiced true methods of study—though in rather imperfect manner—and had sheltered under its protective wing botany and zoölogy, the two great sciences of which medicine was only and is now a very limited department. Naturalists were almost wholly engaged in classification efforts, while morphologists and physiologists were making strong but restricted efforts to expand. Finally the church, of every sect, denomination, creed or connection, required implicit trust in its tenets, no matter how it viewed problems of life or of human development. Each individual was thus made a link in a system of thinking, acting, speaking, that gave small opportunity for individual opinion and still smaller scope for the expression by individuals of new and wide views concerning cosmic origin or modification.

The changed result of today, while powerfully heralded by Lamarck, was begun when Lyell published his "Principles of Geology" in 1833, Chambers his "Vestiges of Creation" in 1844, Spencer his "Principles of Psychology" and "Principles of Biology" from 1855 to 1866, and Darwin his "Origin of Species" in 1859. Such works, published almost within a quarter of a century, and each viewing cosmic and biologic phenomena from standpoints as different as were their authors in personal characteristics, could not fail to awaken wide interest in the minds of the laity and did not fail to excite hostile demonstration in every section of the church.



The rapid spread and acceptance of many of the more pronounced views amongst thinking people, and even by minds like those of Kingsley, Maurice, Tennyson and Fiske, soon indicated the trend of events, though one may say that it was a return to and homage paid to the prophetic scientific insight of the poet Goethe. But the mental and hereditary convictions of centuries could not readily be thrown aside unless by abundant illustration and proof drawn from every source. In furnishing this through full forty years of patient labor, Charles Darwin towered head and shoulders above his most illustrious contemporaries. While we regard it as proved that some of the widest generalizations to which he attached prime importance—as for example, natural selection—pale in fundamental value before Lamarck's environmental or direct variation factor, it nevertheless remains true that the sum total of his reconstructive work caused us to view, not merely plants and animals, but all scientific questions from an altered standpoint. And so we justly honor him to-day with richest homage.

Throughout this period of mental stress and strain, we can clearly recognize three groups of collaborators, who may be said to have worked on three successively ascending planes of evolutionary action, that carry us from the evolving inorganic and organic planes, to the higher and more humanistic realms of morals and religion.

First Darwin, as well as his co-worker and henchman, Huxley, resembled Lamarck in that they so largely concentrated attention on organic evolution, up to the stage of man's commencing civilization, that they largely laid aside any serious attempt to estimate man from his moral and religious side. True, Darwin in his "Descent of Man" touched questions of deepest import, and at times followed them to a high plane; while Huxley in some of his later essays, even carried the stage further. Darwin's final position on questions of religion is quite correctly summed up by him in 1876. "The mystery of the beginning of all things is insoluble by us; and I for one must be content to remain an agnostic." This is the at-

titude of a humble learner whose knowledge is as nothing alongside the unfathomed truths of the universe. It is also, as his son and biographer clearly points out, in striking contrast to the avowed atheist's "I-know-everything" attitude, that is as unscientific as it is withering to further investigation.

It is wholly due to this last attitude that many during the past half century have resolved by word and action to abide on the plane of the present and the past, of man's history, instead of attempting to reach out to a higher and a nobler ideal. Stagnation and degeneration are ever present results in the life history of every organism if the environment be created that will favor their progress. So we believe that in some cases the past half century has brought individual retrogression.

But secondly, during the period under review three other minds—not to mention additional contributory ones,—were active, and two especially were attempting far wider incursions into the evolutionary field of the world. Herbert Spencer, Alfred R. Wallace and Ernest Haeckel availed themselves gladly of the teachings of Lamarck and of Darwin, while the first and last pushed their studies back to the origin, constitution and motions of unicellular organisms, of the molecules of which these consisted, of the energy and the matter that were invariably correlated in the molecules and even in the case of the first and last named, they have attempted to reach the great first causes of the world or of the universe. All three moreover have striven to picture or to follow man's evolution to still higher planes of perfection. So Herbert Spencer, in his "Principles" of Biology, of Psychology, or Sociology and of Ethics, constructed a system that if not sound in all of its generalizations, is at least imposing in its magnitude.

Wallace, soon after publication of the "Descent of Man" diverged in friendly spirit from some of Darwin's conclusions. Reflecting on man's marked superiority over the highest apes, he could not accept it that continuous evolutionary adaptation and selection had produced such a result; rather that



by some discontinuous process high mental endowment had resulted that made him in very deed "Lord of Creation." In line with this he has since been a constant advocate for the rights, the improvement and the peace of mankind, by socialistic or coöperative effort. Even though in his advocacy of spiritualism, we may join with many in saying "not proven," our profound ignorance of many unseen forces should cause us to welcome him as an investigator in that field, until its scientific value has been proved or disproved.

But of the three, Haeckel, brilliant though steady, daring yet to some degree cautious, generalizing stupendously though busy analytically, from 1865 up to our own day, has swept the gamut of speculation and deduction in a sublime—some might say in a rash—manner. No one can read his Altenburg address of 1892 on Monism, without being impressed by the determined earnestness, the eloquent presentation, the lofty aspiration and the almost prophetic faith that animate the whole and that bind together its sentences. Those closing words are impressive: "In the hope that the defence and promotion of these may still be continued, I conclude my monistic Confession of Faith with the words: 'May God the Spirit of the Good, the Beautiful and the True be with us.'"

The latter part of the past half century has produced a third group of investigators who have fully realized the value and applicability of evolution to man, as to the rest of the organic world, but who have been profoundly impressed by the religious factor in man's recent and highest progress. They have largely shared the fate of those who try to reconcile opposing forces. For it is safe to say that Drummond, Kidd and Chamberlain have been viewed with mistrust and suspicion by the church at the same time that they have been severely left alone by most biologists.

All three have presented facts of suggestive value, they have largely disentangled themselves from dogma and unverifiable assertions, they have tried to view man in process of evolution during recent millenia and have tried to forecast his continued

evolution to higher planes. Their volumes are stimulating, elevating, original, yet, though they have been widely read and reflected on, they seem as yet to have failed in reaching a suitable niche within evolution's mental temple. We need not stay to ask whether this is the fault of the men, of their views or of scientific opinion in relation to these.

In what follows it will be our endeavor to try to estimate the methods, the aims and the accomplishments of the three groups of men thus briefly outlined.

Charles Darwin belonged to the first of the three, but he occupies preëminent and unquestioned position. Spencer had already outlined, in thought at least, many of his subsequent volumes when "The Origin of Species" appeared; but he gladly testified that Darwin had been his great illuminator. Even though, as by Huxley and Haeckel, increasing prominence was given by some to environment, with resulting direct or exact variation, as a factor that at least equaled or excelled natural selection in importance, the position of Darwin has not been questioned and needs no vindication. This is due we believe in large measure to the following causes.

First, during his entire public career of exactly half a century (1831-1881) he was a continuous, devoted and simple-minded observer and interpreter of nature in its widest aspects. He lived John Burroughs' verses:

I stay my haste, I make delays,  
For what avails this eager pace;  
I stand amid the eternal ways,  
And what is mine shall know my face.

The stars come nightly to the sky,  
The tidal wave unto the sea,  
Nor time, nor space, nor deep, nor high,  
Can keep my own away from me.

This sentiment is reëchoed with fervid enthusiasm by Haeckel, in the closing chapters of his "Riddle of the Universe" as being the only pathway to truth and knowledge. Neatly also the *Times* wrote, on the day that Darwin was carried to West-



minster: "He thought, and his thoughts have passed into the substance of facts of the universe. A grass plot, a plant in bloom, a human gesture, the entire circle of the doings and tendencies of nature, builds his monument and records his exploits." The secluded quietness of Down became for forty years his focal centre for such "nature study." But a spirit like his could not be chained by time or place, and so the plant and animal surroundings of his summer homes, Kew or Edinburgh Botanic Gardens, the nurseries of England, the fields and forests of the United States and Brazil as seen through the eyes of two of his unseen friends, the gardens and the mountains of the European mainland were all laid under tribute.

In such observings he retained to a marked degree the open unbiased mind, though he naïvely confesses that, like all of us, he at times inclined to allow his preconceived notions—his dogmatics—to run ahead of his judgment. Witness his confession of how, on first reflection, he deemed it unnecessary for the Venus' flytrap leaf to close its spikes rather loosely after first contraction, and to tighten up by degrees, but how nature caused him to reverse his judgment after continued watching. His books abound with such illustrations.

In common with his collaborators, he rightly revolted against the view that man alone possesses all the superior gifts of mind and reason. Thus in a letter of 1886 to Asa Gray he says: "The coolness with which" the reviewer "makes all animals to be destitute of reason is simply absurd." In this connection he was probably the first naturalist who showed the essentially degraded, narrow and egotistic attitude that man had taken to natural objects below him. It was eminently appropriate then, that *he* should have demonstrated how even the poet in his flight of fancy had erred in exclaiming "Full many a flower is born to blush unseen, and waste its sweetness on the desert air," when the discriminating eye of discriminating insects had so often flitted around these, ages before man's appearance on earth, and that beneficent results should thereby have come alike to flowers and insects.

A second and equally noteworthy quality was his method of acquiring facts. Even had he only lived to teach mankind this, he would well have deserved the appellation "The Interpreter of Nature." Take any one of his dynamic works, in which he carries us stage by stage through the history of a large related group. Take for example his "Climbing Plants." Note how at one time he gathers great bodies of observed facts that suggest some movements in common, as well as peculiarities in these movements that differ. Note how he experiments by retarding the motion at one time, by reversing it at another, by making environmental agents like too thick a stick prove a hindrance rather than a help to upward climbing. Proceeding thus, he accumulates observations and experiments that become simultaneously indicative, cross questioning and excluding. By the exercise of that process which Haeckel in his "Wonders of Life" has well expressed as "a preponderant tendency to and capacity for a comprehensive perception of the universal in particulars," and which he has well remarked is combined with the above analytical capacity "only in natural philosophers of the first rank," Darwin then proceeds to deduce fundamental principles that enable us to perceive how widespread is the phenomenon of revolving motion, and even that this may be an evolved and modified expression of simpler swaying from side to side.

Similar accumulation of evidence, sifting of it, turning over even of a piece that may seem doubtfully to deserve a place in the mental rubbish pile, but that possibly has some truth in it, the massing of the whole into a great body of evidence, and the deduction therefrom of some far-reaching principle or law, characterize his "Insectivorous Plants," his "Forms of Flowers" and other works, but find highest expression in his largest and most celebrated publications.

We claim it therefore as one of his preëminent merits, that he has taught two generations of workers, in various fields of natural science, to garner and to marshal facts that will unravel many of the most complicated inter-relations of plant



and animal life. Even where such results have weakened some of his conclusions or have favored evolutionary developments that he viewed with doubt, he it was who taught the best methods by which such might be attained. Thus the studies of Lesage and Lothelier on the direct action of environment, in bringing about fundamental changes in the tissues even of the first generation of plants experimented with, formed a welcome and exact confirmation of the truth of Lamarck's teachings. The two experimenters followed the Darwinian method to verify Lamarckian results. Similarly, and in recent years, the patient, far-reaching experiments, observations and deductions of DeVries on the evening primroses have been reached by the exercise of like methods. For as one stands amid the many demarcated and carefully guarded plots in the Amsterdam Botanic Garden one vividly realizes that it is a descendant, so to say, of that at Down, where Darwin spent so many hours of his outdoor life.

Another legacy that we owe in large measure to Darwin is, that even the most startling and unlooked for combinations may occur in nature. Here it should be said that Darwin had two forerunners, alike in method and in interpretation whose greatness has only been properly gaged within the past half century. The Swiss naturalists, Huber, lived amid their bees and ants. The son especially watched the ants so closely, lived in the fields or on the hill-sides amongst them and so truthfully interpreted their life relations that his little book reads like a fairy tale. But his facts were largely laughed at by the wise ones of his day. The writer well remembers, as a young man, asking for the book at the library of his Alma Mater. A little faded volume was brought, that the librarian wiped and beat the dust from, while he remarked as he handed it "that at least has not been a popular book." Today we honor the observer as well as his accurate observations and deductions. Darwin utilized Huber's wisdom to the utmost, and turned to the ant for information. But in a letter he reveals how even he could scarcely outlive the narrow man-centered

views of nature. He says "I have just forwarded two most extraordinary letters to Busk, from a backwoodsman in Texas who has evidently watched ants carefully, and declares most positively that they plant and cultivate a kind of grass for store food and plant other bushes for shelter! I do not know what to think, except that the old gentleman is not fibbing intentionally." Darwin lived to accept this as fact, while the more wonderful culture of food-fungi by the ants amid decaying leaves, as patiently traced by Möller in Brazil, carries the wonder almost to a human plane of reasoning.

But though the above constitute valuable legacies from Darwin, the great laws that he so skillfully traced out and elaborated are a lasting monument. The final placing on a satisfactory footing of the law of variation; the application to all organisms of the great Malthusian law of Selective Survival; the far-reaching application of his law that "Nature abhors perpetual self-fertilization"; his contributions to hybridization, to geographical distribution, to digestive action, to intercellular propagation of stimulus, to irritable movements in plants, to coloration relations in plants and animals, as well as many other branches of study, are as varied and valuable as were the fields wide, in which these studies were collected.

That he effected reconciliations and joined groups of workers hand in hand who formerly were isolated, has been exquisitely worded by my departed friend, Dr. Maxwell Masters, who says: "Let any one who knows what was the state of botany in this country even so recently as fifteen or twenty years ago compare the feeling between botanists and horticulturists at that time with what it is now. What sympathy had the one for the pursuits of the other. The botanist looked down on the varieties, the races, and strains, raised with so much pride by the patient skill of the florist, as on things unworthy of his notice and study. The horticulturist, on his side, knowing how very imperfectly plants could be studied from the mummified specimens in herbaria, which then constituted



in most cases all the material that the botanist of this country considered necessary for the study of plants, naturally looked on the botanist somewhat in the light of a laborious trifler. Both classes carried on their investigations in a narrow spirit of isolation, unconscious or unheeding of the assistance that either might give to the other.

The investigations of Gaertner, of Kölreuter, of Sprengel, of Vaucher, had been allowed to remain by British naturalists as so many dead letters. It was a chance if a page or two were devoted to them in text-books; rarely if ever were they mentioned in lectures, still more rarely was their bearing on horticulture alluded to.

Darwin, by his renewal and extension of these experiments, and especially by his deductions from them, altered all this. He made the dry bones live; he invested plants and animals with a history, a biography, a genealogy, which at once conferred an interest and a dignity on them. Before, they were as the stuffed skin of a beast in the glass case of a museum; now they are living beings, each in their degree affected by the same circumstances that affect ourselves and swayed, *mutatis mutandis*, by like feelings and like passions."

But it is unquestionably true that Darwin never realized how far-reaching, how precise, how rapid in action and how varied are the forces of environment, nor how exactly organisms often respond if environmental change be made. His candor and love of the truth would have led him willingly to accept it, we believe, as new years brought added and diverse evidence.

Like all preceding naturalists of philosophic mind, he was deeply impressed by heredity as witnessed in the unending procession of plants and animals. They might migrate, they might vary, they might be in large measure swept from the field of time, but those surviving showed a precision of inheritance from the parent forms, that was as profoundly suggestive as it seemed profoundly puzzling. To him a tangled puzzle of nature was that which had to be unraveled. A

friend stood near Huxley, full thirty years ago, patiently endeavoring to untie the knot of a book package. In a moment the great biologist's knife was out, the string was cut, and the remark was dropped, "Life is too short for the unraveling of knots." But such was his own and Darwin's life work. So the latter essayed at least the explanation of heredity, and tried to unravel the knot in his ingenious theory of pangenesis. He clung to his views with typical tenacity against the doubts, denials and even rejection of them by friends. It may be also that we have not heard the last of it.

But no matter what the final and true explanation be, the marvelous condensation and locking up of the minutest details shown by two individual organisms, in those small cells that we call the egg and sperm, their fusion and the subsequent unfolding therefrom of a new individual, that blends in reduced and often balanced degree the parental details, is evidence at once of molecular organization and exactness that the mind can scarcely grasp. Darwin groped after the explanation, it is reserved for others to furnish it conclusively.

His life work thus consisted in demonstrating the order, the continuity, and the increasing diversity of all organisms, as these evolved with the increasing age of the world, and as these showed increasingly complex responses and modifications to their surroundings. Therefore reviewing all those laws and discoveries that he, his predecessors, and his collaborators laid bare, the history of organisms, as they file in procession before us, might be epitomized as follows: Heredity upbuilds, struggle for existence stimulates, environment carves and chisels, reproduction blends and continues, selective survival sits as the final arbiter of life or death for the individual and at length for the species.

Such sentences may seem far distant from us, and to carry a scientific or academic import only. But to every plant and animal, to you and to me, they become immediate and claimant problems of first import. It was this bringing near to our doors, to our persons, of each phase of the whole, that caused



the mental upheaval in 1871 when the "Descent of Man" appeared. Even the best of men at times kick when they discover that they live under eternal law. Their revolt was the more evident when it was seen that some of the most cherished human doctrines were alike man-made and contrary to evolutionary facts.

The Darwinian controversy then became no mere academic problem, that each might intellectually take sides on. It was not a question of Hegelian versus Cartesian philosophy. It was not merely a discussion of religious faith or belief, it did not involve terms that could be explained away. Mankind began to realize that it carried bound up in it the very warp and woof of human life, of your life and mine.

Possibly it may be conceded that as Darwin enunciated it, and as Huxley fought for it, the view seemed only and constantly to be pressed home of "nature red in tooth and claw." Darwin concluded his study of man at the stage where this seemed truest. One longs to know, and may try to picture, what might have resulted had he changed from a negative to a positive attitude when he wrote "I have never systematically thought much on religion in relation to science, or on morals in relation to society; and without steadily keeping my mind on such subjects for a *long* period, I am really incapable of writing anything worth sending."

We turn now from Darwin to the second group of collaborators, Spencer, Wallace and Haeckel. All three tried to grapple with the moral, and one might truly say for each of them, with the religious side of man. For they viewed him as the cope stone of organic evolution. Let me remind you here of the discriminating, learned and eminently fair criticisms of the first and third of these, that you have already had from my friend, Dr. Schiedt.

Spencer, like his writings, presents a calm calculating critical but cautious front. Wallace and especially Haeckel, the two evolutionary giants still left to us in honored age, have sounded the depths and shoals of human questions, the former

in a reverent, sympathetic, somewhat restricted spirit, the latter as a fearless, brilliant militant leader along any avenue of thought or action that research seems to open, or that speculation and imagination even suggest.

Spencer's "Social Statics" took precedence of "The Origin of Species" by nine years, his "Principles of Psychology" by four. In both, man is the pivotal organism round which facts are arrayed. In both he studies man not merely as a complex highly organized individual, he constantly emphasizes the thought that each has a relation and duty to his fellow man. And here moral relationship with mental superiority are both dwelt on and expanded. Nay more, to give perfect continuity and finish to his system, he traces the gradual evolution of life, as well as of mental processes, from the minutest cell up to man, and links with this the conception of an all-pervading power, energy or action that later may have formed the basis for Haeckel's pantheistic utterances.

To the writer an impressive feature of Spencer's "Psychology" and still more of his "Sociology" is his intense yearning after brotherhood, coöperation and peace, as correlated with and flowing from an intelligent individualism. But the sympathetic side of this desire never permitted him to lose sight of the fact that such results as had already been acquired were achieved by slow determined evolutionary means, during which man had waded through blood and suffering to achieve his high ends, as witness his letter to Wallace on publication of "Progress and Poverty." This notwithstanding, Spencer's ideal reduced to an aphorism is "Society an Organism."

The last forty years of his life saw the sure because gradual rise of coöperative societies, of trades unions, of business organizations, that all mark a mental and in most cases a moral advance on the competitive and often brutal individualism of the earlier years of the century. But he failed to see a direct guiding principle that animated and propelled the movement, while his outlook was often local and patriotic, rather than



world-wide and comprehensive. So in "Facts and Comments," the closing book of his life, such chapters as "Rebarbarization," "Regimentation" and "Barbaric Art" show that while a few years before he believed that he had built up a comprehensive evolutionary system, he failed to realize that human imperfections existed in it, which other and later workers had yet to correct. So his mental attitude is retrospective, gloomy and despairing, while he failed to concede that an international temple of peace was being planned, that international socialism was marching forward rapidly, that artistic products of highest value were being manufactured wholesale by coöperative groups of workmen on every side of him and that the forward march of education was the most remarkable feature of the decade in the middle of which "Facts and Comments" appeared.

We must all grant that Spencer has bequeathed us a large legacy. With no pretensions to the observational or experimental breadth of Darwin; lacking in large measure therefore the freshness and originality that come from direct contact with nature; largely ignorant of the continuous details of botanical and zoölogical papers as clearly evidenced from his scant reference to current or preceding literature, and as candidly confessed by his secretary, Collier, he nevertheless showed a wide analytic and synthetic grasp, that in its very expansiveness carried him far beyond the regions that the greater seer so fully and successfully explored. Some of his most fundamental and cherished principles, the writer believes, will ultimately be set aside or reduced to minor place, but equally the man and his work will live as strong links in the great chain of evolutionary history.

Royce's sympathetic estimate is worth quoting: "His beautiful straightforwardness of personal character, his noble independence of spirit, his loyalty to what he conceived to be his task, his humanity, his advocacy of rational, social and international peace and liberty,—these things compensate for much imperfection in the result of his philosophy. His demand

that the evolutionary concepts shall be unified, remains a permanently inspiring logical idea which will bear much fruit in future. His service as a teacher of his age will never be forgotten."

Wallace's earlier studies were practically confined to zoology, and much of that work had been more exhaustively paralleled by Darwin, if we except his splendid investigations into the geographical distribution of animals, on warning colors in insects and other valuable biological inquiries. But the appearance of Darwin's "*Descent of Man*" caused Wallace to indicate his dissent to the conclusions on man's mental and moral sides. Both naturalists had seen much of some of earth's lowest human tribes. Darwin, like Spencer and Haeckel, regarded the evolutionary continuity as unbroken and uniform. Wallace considered "that there is a difference in kind, intellectually and morally, between man and other animals; and that while his body was undoubtedly developed by the continuous modification of some ancestral animal form, some different agency, analogous to that which first produced organic *life*, and then originated *consciousness*, came into play in order to develop the higher intellectual and spiritual nature of man." We would regard the hitherto adduced evidence as largely in favor of the first three naturalists.

But Wallace has been a lofty and consistent advocate of man's freedom, his rights, and the necessity for his continued mental and moral elevation. This, again, led him unreservedly to accept socialism on perusal of Bellamy's and related works. As already stated, he further accepted spiritualism as a definite phenomenon to be accounted for in man's higher being. The closing years of his life therefore see him aspiring, even more earnestly than Spencer, toward "society as an organism." Why, it may here be asked, did both naturalists, and to a modified degree, Haeckel, advocate such views? In answer it might be replied, and perhaps correctly, that coöperative or socialistic effort has proved most beneficial in the evolution of many of the highest groups of animals. The bees,



ants and some wasps, among insects, groups of well-known and cosmopolitan birds, as well as many of the most widely dispersed and abundant mammals show distinct social tendencies. The resulting benefits for themselves and their young offspring are many and have unitedly enabled them to become, in number of individuals, in wide distribution and in specialized efficiency "dominant races." But we believe that a far more important and a far-reaching law is involved, the discussion of which has not yet been attempted. The attitude of both naturalists, however, is a legacy worth treasuring, view it as we may.

Haeckel, the outstanding champion of unification of the world processes, is still happily left to us. No one can read his "Monism" (1895), his "Riddle of the Universe" (1900) or his "Wonders of Life" (1904) without feeling that here are focused up messages to man from one who had, by his minute study, wide reading, deep thinking and love for his fellows, qualified himself as few ever did for the task. If Darwin was denounced by many in high places for trying to unfold the truth, Haeckel has been thrice denounced. This has been largely due to his impetuous scorn of all that would shackle man's intellect, that would destroy his freedom of body, that would waste his time, or that would impose on his credulity through a want of knowledge to combat error.

For him also man is the organism of supreme importance, though he is but the highest expression of one great indestructible *world-substance* that is permeated by *world-energy*. From this one ever-working, ever-changing combination, monistic action flows. This expresses itself in physical, organic, mental and moral action under appropriate surroundings and combinations. Reason and religion are its highest manifestations. "But it is only in the most highly developed vertebrates—birds and mammals—that we discern the first beginnings of reason, the first traces of religious and ethical conduct." In man this attains highest perfection, while the all-embracing pantheism of his faith finds expression in the words "the

monistic idea of God, which alone is compatible with our present knowledge of nature, recognizes the divine spirit in all things. It can never recognize in God a 'Personal Being' or, in other words, an individual of limited extension in space, or even of human form. God is everywhere."

For Haeckel it must be said that even his worst and most critical opponents present a less logical front and have stood less the test of time than he. Du Bois-Reymond's famous seven world-enigmas have—in three or four of them—been in large part penetrated and satisfactorily solved. The revolutionizing relations of radium as already studied, give a possible monistic explanation to chemico-physical action, while his forerunners, Spinoza and Goethe, probably never had a more numerous following than now. But to Haeckel, as to all philosophers, the origin of the great first cause, the origin of substance and of energy, are as insoluble now as when man first began to reason on his relation to the universe.

Haeckel fails also largely in recognizing the noble character, powerful originality and pure teachings of Christ as well as some of his disciples, and so has misinterpreted and completely under-estimated the fundamental importance of the Christ movement. This has largely been due, as we believe, to his having failed to separate the dross of subsequent base concretions from the gold that has helped the world on to this day. Haeckel repeatedly acknowledges with gratitude "the lofty principle of universal charity and the fundamental maxim of ethics, the 'golden rule' that issues therefrom." But he as often tries to evade its importance by saying "both, however, existed in theory and in practice centuries before the time of Christ." But will we today belittle Darwin's labors because Buffon, Lamarck, Wells, Matthew and Spencer all more or less antedated him?

The very fact that the altruistic doctrines of Christ and of Paul overran the old world against fearful odds and prevailed, at one time in Waldensian valleys, at another in Moravian homes; here on English plains against the persecu-



tion of a Charles, there across Scottish moorlands amid the murderous assaults of a Claverhouse; at length in the Netherlands and from there to American shores, finding that triumph that has come as a precious legacy to us, is proof of the potent and pervasive character of the leaven. Equally true is it that during Frederick the Great's "insane period of history," from the fifth to the sixteenth century, the highest representatives of spurious Christianity, from Pope down to priest, cursed the Christian world, but that the primitive doctrine still flowed pure in many streams to energize humanity, and that the highest development of the race has been reached as a post-Reformation effect. These are partial evidences in favor of the positions so ably advocated by Drummond, Kidd and Chamberlain.

Disguise it as we may or as we wish to, the great central Gospel law, the "Golden Rule," is the perfected monistic morality and religion of two millennia ago, that has helped and inspired mankind up to the present day. This law interpreted in Haeckel's phraseology would be "Love the great World-power that energizes and lives in matter, and that governs all processes; love also the units detached from it, and that will be received back into it, as you would love yourself, since all are equally derived." Such is the fundamental concept that Christ as well as Paul and other of the early seers taught, as being alone able to develop "Society as an organism." Such the branches of the Christian Church teach when they please, but they too often fail in large measure to commend it or to mould it to daily life.

Haeckel's legacy to us will, we believe, be an increasing one for the future, as representing final freedom for the intellect, highest aspiration after noble ideals and a reverential outlook on all world forces. But whatever is best in that legacy will be retained, by quiet and patient cross questioning of natural phenomena, rather than by dogmatic insistence that "all is finished," "all is proved." Final results have not yet been reached, wide fields of study have yet to be explored.

The third group of workers, personified amongst others by Drummond, Kidd and Chamberlain, may well be called the post-Darwinian idealists, since their labors began when the most active period for the others closed. Their studies also have largely been concerned with the higher evolution of the mental, moral and the religious sides of man. The writer believes he is neither unjust nor inaccurate in saying that most scientists have regarded them as unworthy of consideration, because the scientists have not had the true measuring rod by which to estimate them, while the high priests of religion have placed them in the outer court of the Gentiles, for reasons that are manifest. But their day is in the future, and when the impartial survey of nineteenth century thought is made, their contributions will occupy no mean niche in the temple of evolutionary truth. The writer considers that they largely stand alone, because in the interpretation of natural and religious processes the true continuity-relation has been overlooked. But it would be impossible here and now to demonstrate the correctness of this statement.

If we attempt, then, in a few words, to estimate the methods by which the evolutionary legacy of to-day has been secured, it might be said that Darwin and Wallace thought wisely, Spencer thought widely, Haeckel thought daringly, the last group reverently. All have united in a successful effort to free the mind of man from misconceptions, to guide him into true lines of reasoning, to use the knowledge of all ages that has proved of permanent value, to perfect new methods of investigation and experiment, to scatter widespread the acquired knowledge, as being for all future times and peoples.

It is recognized that the one organism Man possesses, dominates, and will still more fully dominate the earth, so that man's evolution is now the great and central problem of the system that Darwin, Spencer, Wallace and Haeckel have established. His world-wide advance and occupancy may seem to be checked at one time by selective survival of the Russian thistle, at another by the insidious relation and action of the



mosquito, in one place by the temporary fertility of the rabbit, in another by "plague" of divers sorts. But the nineteenth century, *the evolutionary century*, has included the year of his "coming of age." Man now no longer sees with the eyes of the individual; he penetrates the past, the present, the future with the compound eyes of "society as an organism." Nationality counts now for little and will count for less in the future. World problems are before us, for man's exploitation of the world is becoming increasingly easy.

Whether, therefore, it be an international study of infection by mosquito or by tuberculosis germ; of selective breeding along exact lines, for production of the best races of plants or animals; of the acclimatization and adaptation of useful forms; of the reclamation and the enrichment of the earth; of the best devices for man's mental and ethical improvement; the bonds of municipality, of state, of nationality can no longer fetter or limit.

Such questions do not concern only sociologists, economists or moralists. They are biological questions. *And every human being is a biologist.* For though each may not be trained in this or that *laboratory* so called, each daily experiences and is affected by environmental agents, to which response is made. Each records also, if in the least degree thinking and reflecting, the cyclic changes noted in plants and animals around. Results therefore accumulate that each describes to the home circle, to friends, to the world, as impressively and effectively mayhap, as does a teacher in some great university. This it is which explains in large measure the remarkable success which the works of Darwin, Spencer, Wallace, Huxley, Haeckel, Drummond and Kidd have achieved. This is the thinking, reflecting, acting age of mankind, and so when it was groping after such works, because it needed them, they were found and welcomed. The truths these works contain will gradually be gathered and conserved, as jewels of the nineteenth century. The slips, the mistakes, the rash statements, the false generalizations will be eliminated, but meanwhile

mankind will march forward, as new seers arise to guide by added truths.

May we not regard it then as the crowning legacy of nineteenth century advance, that knowledge is now for all, that schools, colleges and universities no longer exist to manufacture a select and privileged cult, but to people the world with the highest types of earnest thinking individuals, that as to-day is the best day in the world's history, so future days will be on ever higher planes?

No more beautiful, pathetic, longing reflection was ever penned than Herbert Spencer's last chapter on "Facts and Comments," that he called "Ultimate Questions." It has in it the color of the autumn leaf, the twittering wail of the English robin which feels that winter is coming, the first snow-fall of the Swiss mountain tops that brings early death to the alpine flowers and butterflies. Spencer thought of each life—of his own life—in its apparent insignificance, as compared with *space*, illimitable *space*, with all its mysteries, and he felt overpowered by his own littleness.

Though we may linger affectionately on the reflection, we would not forget that every individual fills a place in that space, and by all evolutionary laws must fill it to the fullest and best degree. That is the call made on each of us. Each one fills it best who most highly and most perfectly responds.



#### IV.

### A NEW BOUNDARY STONE OF NEBUCHAD- REZZAR I. FROM NIPPUR.

#### A REPLY.

PROF. WM. J. HINKE, PH.D., D.D.

Under the above title the University of Pennsylvania published in December, 1907, a book, prepared by the writer, and in part submitted by him as his thesis for the Ph.D. degree. It was reviewed in the January number of the REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW of the current year (Vol. XIII., pp. 114-121) by Professor I. H. DeLong. I regard his adverse criticism, with which he greeted the book, as so eminently unfair and entirely unjustified, that I feel constrained to write a reply. I do it all the more unwillingly because it is the first time that I have engaged in anything like a controversy. I would have passed by his unexpected attack upon my scholarship and reputation, if I did not feel that my friends in the Reformed Church expected me to defend myself.

In answering my reviewer I cannot possibly follow his curiously arranged criticisms, which pass without order and plan from one point to another. He begins with a discussion of some symbols of the Nippur stone, pictured on page 120 of my book. Then he passes to some grammatical questions mentioned on pp. 180 and 176. This leads him to the "Corrections and Additions," pp. 320-323. From the end he turns to the introduction, pp. 1-115. Then he visits with his disapproval a judgment of Dr. Clay. Next he finds fault with my supposed Pan-Babylonianism (p. 75). This leads him, by some mysterious association of ideas, to the curses, mentioned on the boundary stones, especially to what is said on page 185. From that he passes quite easily to a discussion

of the Assyrian verb *alâku*. Then he takes up the "misleading" title of the book. Next follows a criticism of the centaur on page 99. But before he is through with that, he thinks he can discover a flaw in my statement with regard to the Assyrian word *ilku*, page 177. After this diversion he opens his heaviest fire on the round zodiac of Dendera, from which he emerges with the consciousness of having thoroughly established his point, that my book is altogether unreliable and richly deserving of a solemn warning to all readers to beware.

My critic will pardon me if I prefer a more methodical arrangement, and take up his points, which he selects for criticism, in the order in which they appear in my book.

What I regard as one of the most undeserved criticisms is that referring to the title of my book. What I object to particularly is the insinuation (wholly unworthy of a theological professor) that the title was chosen only to advertise myself (*der Reklame wegen gewählt*). Why should he use the German phrase? Was he ashamed to put it into plain English? Or, may I ask, was there anything in my book or in my previous record, which justified such a slur? Was it not rather an exhibition of those well-known, literary manners, in vogue in continental Europe, which my critic seems to delight in? But how does he justify such a criticism? He tells his readers that my title is "misleading." This is a singularly ill-chosen word. Webster defines it as leading one astray "through false information or erroneous judgment." Now what part of the title gave false information? Is it not true that my book contains a full description of the Nippur stone, together with a translation and interpretation of its inscription? To quote an illustration: Professor W. Wright, in his "Comparative Grammar of the Semitic Languages," p. 18, justly calls the title, under which one of the later Syriac versions of the gospels was first published, namely, "*Evangeliarium Hierosolymitanum*," misleading, because there is nothing to connect this lectionary (now in the Vatican



library) with Jerusalem. But my critic can neither challenge the fact that the inscription, which I published, was that of a boundary stone, nor that it came from Nippur. The title was, therefore, not misleading. It might be called "not comprehensive enough," or something similar, but it did not deserve the description of my critic. The reason for the form of the title of my book, which my critic says is beyond his understanding, appears perfectly plain and reasonable to other, more fair-minded men. Thus for example Dr. Ward, the well-known editor of the *Independent*, writes in the "Old Penn Weekly": "The *modest* title of this book by a young scholar comes from the fact that the boundary stone alone was the subject of a doctor's thesis." In view of the many scholars, who had preceded me in the treatment of Babylonian boundary stones (see my bibliography), I was well aware that I could not offer startling discoveries, but could give only a systematic discussion of the various problems, raised in connection with this subject, I therefore chose the more modest title to indicate that I regarded the translation of the new text from Nippur as my main contribution to these studies. And why should I not be permitted to enjoy this liberty, without being subjected to such harsh and unjust criticism? Does not my attitude in this matter stand somewhat in contrast to that of my critic, who seems to use his review of my book to advertise the fact that he regarded himself, by his travels, as amply qualified to pass an authoritative judgment on my book? On page 114 of his review he informs his readers that he has been "among the modern Bedouin and felaheen of Palestine some time"; page 115, that he "made inquiries among the natives during his connection, as Thayer Fellow, with the American School for Oriental Study and Research in Palestine"; page 117, that he "made a list of all Arabic curses that we heard in the land"; page 118, "while in Egypt, as a member of the American School, the Hathor temple of Denderah was one of the special places of study and observation." Of course his readers could not be expected to be

acquainted with all these interesting facts, and therefore (although they did not throw any light on Babylonian boundary stones) it was desirable to give them this important and valuable information. But, we might well ask, why was all this information put into the review of a book? Reviews are usually not written for such purposes. The main purpose of a review, as I conceive it, is to give a fair and adequate statement of what a book contains, together with an estimate of the main position of the author. In both of these points my critic has failed utterly as a reviewer. He has neither given the readers of the REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW a fair statement of what my book contained, nor has he offered an adequate criticism of my *main* contentions. He has rather lost himself in minutiae, in all of which he might be entirely correct and yet he would not have touched the real merits of my book. As one of my friends, a well-known Assyriologist, puts it in a letter, which is before me while I am writing: "I am astonished that one who is no Assyriologist should pick out a few infinitely small misprints and other secondary and tertiary matter, and represent them as of utmost value and review your book on the basis of these, as he does."

Let us now take up some of these points, to which my critic attaches so much importance.

On page 116 he charges me with having joined or being on the way of joining the Pan-Babylonists. This he does because I express the opinion, on the basis of the investigations of Winckler and Jeremias, that according to the belief of the Babylonians earthly conditions find their prototypes in heaven and that, therefore, Babylonian temples were supposed to be modelled after heavenly patterns. Now if Professor D. does not accept this statement let him prove that it is erroneous and not obscure the issue by raising entirely different questions. By giving my adherence to this one, definite point, I am far from endorsing every position, taken by Winckler and his school, still less am I compelled to extend, like Winckler, the Babylonian "Weltanschauung" to the inter-



pretation of the Old Testament. Those are entirely different questions. My statement dealt with the beliefs of the Babylonians and not with the interpretation of the Old Testament. In defence of my position I may state that (1) among the symbols of the boundary stones stage-towers are found (see Fig. 22, p. 74, of my book), (2) these towers are called *eshrêti*, "sanctuaries, temples," in the inscriptions (see p. 73 f.), (3) that these temples are heavenly appears from the astral character of all the other symbols (p. 115), and (4) that the heavenly temples are the patterns for those on earth, follows from the Babylonian doctrine, which may be expressed with Jeremias: "Das Himmelsbild ist gleich dem Weltenbild";<sup>1</sup> or with Ungnad: "Der Mikrokosmos ist nur ein Abbild des Makrokosmos."<sup>2</sup> If Dr. D. is able to prove this thesis wrong he is welcome to do it. But neither ridicule nor generalities will accomplish it.

From pp. 118–120 my critic labors long and hard to prove that I fell into a number of errors with regard to the round zodiac of Dendera. In the first place he claims that my description of the archer on that zodiac must certainly be wrong, because my picture (fig. 33) does not agree with my description. The tail of the centaur cannot be a horsetail. It is too long, it does not have the right shape and the hoofs of the animal are cloven. All these acute observations, however, are misspent, because, as I shall presently show, my reference on page 99 was not at all to fig. 33, but to the centaur on fig. 34, to which none of the objections of my critic apply. As far as fig. 33 is concerned I have good reasons, I believe, for thinking that the tail of the centaur was meant for a horsetail, in spite of the objections of my critic.

Besides questioning my statement with regard to the centaur, my critic also challenges my drawing of the centaur of fig. 33, because I state in my "List of Illustrations," that it was taken from Boll's "Sphæra," pl. II. This cannot be cor-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. "Das alte Testament im Lichte des alten Orients," 1st ed., p. 8.

<sup>2</sup> Ungnad, "Die Deutung der Zukunft bei den Babyloniern und Assyriern," p. 8. This view is also endorsed by Professor Jastrow; cf. his "Religion Assyriens und Babyloniens," Vol. II., p. 433, note.

rect (he says), because it differs from that figure in several particulars. The question, however, which is of greater interest to me is, whether my picture is a faithful representation of the original. The materials which I used were a photograph of a cast, now in the Louvre,<sup>3</sup> the picture of a drawing as found in the "*Description de l'Égypte*"<sup>4</sup> and a drawing in the "*Memoires de l'Institut Royal de France*," Vol. XVI. My picture is a combination of all these sources, the most important, the photograph of the cast being indistinct in some places. What source I should mention in my list was a matter of judgment. I might have quoted pl. III. of Boll, or pls. II. and III., as I probably would have done if my attention had been called to it in time. If the professor had examined pl. III. of Boll as carefully as I tried to have it reproduced, he would have found the second tail of centaur exactly as I give it. A beginner in German knows, that when Boll says: "*Es ist nicht deutlich*" (it is not distinct), he does not mean to say that it is invisible. Indeed to my mind the word "indistinct" is too strong. I should say "somewhat indistinct," as my eyes are able to see all but a tiny portion.

But my critic claims that there are other errors in connection with my statements about the round zodiac of Dendera. I am supposed to be hopelessly confused both as to its designation and its date. As Boll shows, on the basis of earlier investigations, the rectangular zodiac dates from the time of the emperor Nero (p. 159) and the round zodiac belongs, according to Letronne, to the time of Augustus (p. 160). This is exactly as I give the dates below my pictures of these zodiacs (figs. 34 and 35). But on page 99 I refer to a "square" zodiac of Dendera, dating from the time of Nero, and showing a double-headed centaur, drawing a bow, winged and having two tails, the lower of a horse and the upper of a scorpion. Now what zodiac did I mean? The round zodiac does not date from the time of Nero, nor does my description agree with the picture on the round zodiac. From this it follows that by

<sup>3</sup> Boll, "*Sphæra*," pl. III.

<sup>4</sup> Boll, "*Sphæra*," pl. II.



the term "square" I actually meant the rectangular zodiac, because that alone fits my description. If therefore my critic was so anxious to correct me he should have made the right correction and should have said: "The word 'square' is a slip for rectangular," for that is what it really was. This simple solution of the difficulty, which Dr. D. should have recognized at once, shows that I was not confused as to designation or date. There is no confusion at all, but an unfortunate failure to express correctly what was really in my mind. There is a mistake in the single word "square," but it does not involve me in the mental confusion on which my critic wastes so many words.

On page 114 of his review Dr. D. refers to the symbols, nos. 3, 6, and 9 of the Nippur stone, which he informs his readers are comparatively common on the monuments. In this he is entirely mistaken. The truth of the matter is that these symbols as they appear on the Nippur stone (see fig. 47) are absolutely unique, for they have animal heads in their center such as are found nowhere else. Even without these heads, maces with globular tops (as I called them) are far from common, for, as my critic could have learnt from page 242 of my book, they are found only five times on the thirty-seven stones described by me. The assertion that these symbols and even the spearhead (fig. 47, no. 1) are at times regarded as phallic emblems is news to me. I have never seen such a truly remarkable claim. At least no Assyriologist was ever guilty of it. How could a spear or a club with a big ball at one end represent a phallic emblem? But what is true is that a whole boundary stone is regarded by some<sup>5</sup> as representing a phallus. Of this, however, there is no evidence aside from its peculiar shape. The comparison of these Babylonian symbols with present-day Arabic weapons, as proposed by Dr. D., is not likely to produce any tangible results.

The discovery of the Aramaic word הלכא on the Babylonian contract tablets and its equation with the Babylonian word

<sup>5</sup> See e. g., Jeremias, "Das alte Testament," etc., 1st ed., p. 262, note 1.

*ilku* will remain to the credit of Professor Clay, in spite of Dr. D.'s objections. He has utterly misunderstood Professor Clay, if he imagined him to admit that Prof. Montgomery made that discovery. My critic should have noticed that the word הלכא occurs at two other places in the Aramaic dockets published by Professor Clay. It appears plainly on no. 48, l. 2,<sup>6</sup> and also on no. 35, l. 3.<sup>7</sup> All that Prof. Montgomery did was to suggest (as Professor Clay plainly states) that in no. 26, l. 1<sup>8</sup> the letter ה was written on ש. This Dr. Clay recognized at once gave him a third instance of the word הלכא. The reason why I did not quote the plainest case (no. 48) was because it was unpublished, and the second (no. 35) was incomplete.

The suggestion of my critic (p. 117) that the Babylonian word *alâku*, occurring in the new Nippur text (Col. II., 2) should be connected with the Arabic *halaka* is worthless, for (1) the Hebrew dictionaries of Gesenius and Briggs-Brown show that this Arabic word belongs to the Hebrew word הלך, "to go," which passed through a similar development of meaning as the Latin *ire* and *perire*, or the German *gehen* and *vergehen*; (2) The Assyrian syllabary, quoted by me, shows that there was an Assyrian word *alâku*, used as a synonym of *nadû*, "to throw down" and *maqâtu*, "to fall" and "to fall upon." (3) The other passage quoted by me (p. 179) shows that it was used of herbs thrown into the flame of the altar. Aromatic herbs do not "perish" on the altar, nor are they "destroyed" on it. This leads me to think that one who cannot claim to be an Assyriologist should refrain from further attempts to elucidate Assyrian lexicography.

If it had been my object to quote besides the curses of the boundary stones curses as found in other literature, especially in the Bible, I could have easily done so. The Old Testament furnishes much closer parallels than the one in the book of Revelation, to which Dr. D. calls attention. With the Baby-

<sup>6</sup> Cf. p. 316 of "Old Testament and Semitic Studies in Memory of William Rainey Harper."

<sup>7</sup> P. 312, l. c.

<sup>8</sup> P. 308, l. c.



lonian curse: "May another own the house he built" (p. 69) compare Deut. 28:30: "Thou shalt build an house and thou shalt not dwell therein," or with the curse of Gula: "May she put destructive sickness into his body, so that dark and bright red blood issue forth as water" (p. 59); compare II. Sam. 3:29: "Let there not fail from the house of Joab one that hath an issue of blood, or that is a leper, etc."

My critic finds one of the most serious faults of my book in the long list of "additions and corrections." But he failed to state that more than a page of the additions is taken up with a description of the zodiac of Gezer, which was not published till after the first part of my book was in print. The same is true of my reference to the new book of Kugler (p. 321 last note). Eight of the notes, covering in all 54 lines (more than a page) were communicated by Professor Hilprecht, and reached me only after the page proof was in my hands, and therefore could not be inserted in their proper places without much cost. Thus there remain only about a page of corrections, which instead of being a sign of carelessness should rather be regarded as an endeavor on my part to send out the book as perfect as I was able to make it. That all my other critics regarded them in that light is evident from the fact that none of them referred to these corrections. In looking at other books I find myself in very good company. The new Hebrew dictionary of Briggs and Brown has eight and a half pages of Addenda. Wellhausen in his famous book "*Reste des Arabischen Heidentums*" adds eight pages of "*Nachträge and Berichtigungen*." But why multiply examples? After my critic has published some books himself he will doubtless be glad to avail himself of the opportunity of adding such a list.

I have now reviewed the professor's criticisms. I fail to find that he has succeeded in showing the least inaccuracy in any of my pictures. Nor has he given any adequate justification for his solemn warning against my book at the end of his review. Aside from a few self-evident misprints and the wrong use of a single word (which he failed to explain cor-

rectly), I am unable to accept any of his corrections. His judgment on page 115 of his review that my first chapter (pp. 1-115) is "in the main nothing more than a partial summing up and registering of previous results of scholars working in this particular field of Assyriology" can only be regarded as that of an incompetent judge, because he is neither an Assyriologist, nor a specialist on Babylonian boundary stones.

If Dr. D. had been a specialist, I am sure he would not have made such a statement, for he would have known it to be inaccurate. That this is the case can readily be shown. My first chapter (pp. 1-115) to which Dr. D. applies this judgment consists, as my list of contents shows (pp. viii-ix), of nine sections. The first eight sections (pp. 1-71) had not been treated connectedly by any one, as far as my knowledge goes. If Dr. D. knows of any books or even articles in periodicals, where any of the subjects are treated, let him name them. The contents of the last section, the symbols of the boundary stones, have often been discussed. I give the earlier literature fairly complete on pp. 71-73.

The symbols of the boundary stones are, in the first place, symbolic representations of the various Babylonian deities (p. 87). Of the more than forty symbols twenty can now be identified with their respective deities (p. 96, note 2). What I contributed to this list may be seen from the review of Dr. Ward in the *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie*. He says: "Hinke deserves credit for the ingenuity with which he recognizes the various emblems of *Nebo*. . . . The mace or rather ashera with the lion's head Hinke finds to be the emblem of *Nergal*, as he reads the sign GIR for Nergal on De Morgan's Kudurru I. This is important because it makes the ashera with the two lions' heads *Ninib*. . . . Hinke is also to be credited with making it very probable that the reading in De Morgan's Kudurru I., of the inscription attached to the walking bird is *Bau*. This is important because it differentiates *Bau* from *Gula*." Independently of Dr. Ward I also recognized that the shrine with the yoke or better headdress is probably



a representation of *Nincharsag* (p. 95). Thus while I based my investigation on earlier work, I added something of my own, as Dr. Ward frankly acknowledges (p. 409 of his review). How my critic can justify the qualifying adjective, a "partial" summing up, I cannot understand. I believe it to be entirely unwarranted by the facts in the case. If not, let Dr. D. supply the parts that were wanting to make the summing up complete. From all this it follows, that after eliminating the word "partial," the judgment of Dr. D. could only refer to the last section (pp. 71–115) of my introduction. But even with this limitation it is not entirely correct. On pp. 92–95 I do not only register the opinion of Professor Zimmern, but seek to combat it with arguments. A new boundary stone, published since the appearance of my book by Professor Scheil,<sup>9</sup> has justified my contention.

But the symbols are more than symbolic representations of the gods. I contended that they were also by implication figures of certain constellations (p. 96). By the leading authorities (Hommel, Winckler, etc.) they are regarded as representations of the zodiacal signs. I do not simply copy this opinion but try to show that it should be modified (pp. 98–106). Finally I compare with these symbols the pictures of the "Dodecaoros," as found in Greece, Egypt, Tibet and India. Here again I do not simply register the opinion of one of the leading astronomers, Redlich, but suggest a modification of his views (pp. 106–115). Instead of being, therefore, a simple registering of previous results, an unbiased criticism will acknowledge that I have tried to make this section an independent examination of the whole question, confirming partly earlier views, modifying in part others and adding finally some new suggestions of my own.

There is, however, another method of showing that Dr. D.'s judgment of my book as a whole cannot be accepted as conclusive. That is by quoting the opinions of specialists, whose brilliant investigations in the various departments of Assyriology entitle them to speak with authority, and whose hearty

<sup>9</sup> "Délégation en Perse," Vol. X.

endorsement of my book proves conclusively that it is not as faulty and worthless as my reviewer has tried to make it appear.

Professor Hilprecht: "Your book, which I watched from beginning to end required an enormous amount of personal labor and devotion, an extensive knowledge of cuneiform and other literature, and a great familiarity with Babylonian grammar, lexicography and palæography. Assyriologists may differ from you on some minor points, but every fair-minded specialist will agree with me that your book is an excellent piece of work, which for years to come will serve as *the* handbook *par excellence* for the study of the *kudurru* inscriptions and the much discussed pictures often occurring in connection with them. It goes without saying that your volume, compared with similar previous publications, denotes a very decided advance in our correct understanding of this important and instructing class of documents. It seemed to me, therefore, very natural that your book should find that universal enthusiastic reception, which characterized its appearance both in Europe and America. I can speak very positively on this point, as quite a number of our leading authorities on their own account have written to me in very appreciative terms about your book."

Professor Jastrow: "It is a splendid contribution to the subject and one that redounds to your credit as well as the institution in which you received part of your training."

Professor Clay: "The work which takes such high rank as a scientific contribution is a most excellent production of American scholarship, in which the author may justly take pride, for the volume will serve as the basis for future studies in this interesting class of inscriptions."<sup>10</sup>

Professor Barton, of Bryn Mawr: "My cordial congratulations on the accomplishment of so fine a piece of work."

Dr. Ward, long a recognized authority on Babylonian divine symbols: "It is a very full and careful discussion of the character and purpose of these objects, a collection, with figures, of those thus far known, and the identification as far as pos-

<sup>10</sup> *Records of the Past*, January-February, 1908.



sible, of the objects represented on them. . . . Hinke has carefully gathered the fruit of German and French scholars on this fascinating subject and has added something of his own."<sup>11</sup>

Professor Grimm, of Gettysburg, formerly fellow in Semitic languages in Johns Hopkins University: "Professor Hinke has done a valuable service for the elucidation of these interesting monuments by his clear, thorough, scholarly treatise."<sup>12</sup>

Professor Sayce, of Oxford: "The book is an admirable example not only of printing, but still more of Assyriological research. It is, in fact, a model of what a work of the kind ought to be, and approaches perfection as nearly as is possible for human endeavor. It is full of new light, as well as of photographs and other illustrations of the symbols found on the Babylonian boundary stones."<sup>13</sup>

Professor Johns, of Cambridge: "In glancing through it I see enough to congratulate you on a most excellent piece of work, which fills a long-felt gap."

Dr. Daiches: "A concordance of proper names, a list of symbols and a glossary enhance the value of this industrious, well arranged and well printed book. To every future student of this branch of Assyriology Dr. Hinke's treatise will be indispensable."<sup>14</sup>

Luzac's *Oriental List*: "What we have said will serve to indicate that the volume forms a valuable contribution to the study of a subject which is now engaging very general attention. . . . Dr. Hinke is to be congratulated on the manner in which he has made an important Babylonian text available for study." (March-April, 1908.)

Professor Hommel, of Munich: "It is a fine book and will make a good impression. One can see that you have had an excellent teacher and have also yourself done excellent work." (Es ist ein feines Buch und wird einen guten Eindruck machen. Man sieht Sie haben einen ausgezeichneten Lehrer

<sup>11</sup> *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie*, Vol. XXI., p. 408 f.

<sup>12</sup> *Lutheran Quarterly*, October, 1908.

<sup>13</sup> *Expository Times*, August, 1908.

<sup>14</sup> *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1908, p. 876.

gehabt und haben aber auch selbst ausgezeichnetes geleistet.)

Professor Meissner, of Breslau: "The make-up of the book is indeed wonderful. Now we have all the so-called boundary stones lucidly placed together, so that every one interested in them can without difficulty study these questions. The philological treatment of the inscriptions pleases me very much; there is hardly anything to be found fault with." (Die Ausstattung des Werckes ist ja wundervoll. Nun haben wir alle sog. Grenzsteine übersichtlich neben einander gestellt, und jeder Interessent kann ohne Mühe diese Fragen studieren. Die philologische Behandlung der Inschriften gefällt mir sehr gut, es ist wohl kaum etwas daran auszusetzen.")

Professor Bezold, of Heidelberg: "That is indeed a splendid compendium of *kudurrus*." (Das ist in der That ein herrliches *Kudurru* Compendium.)

Professor Lehmann-Haupt, of Berlin: "The volume of Hinke is very valuable." (Hinke's Band ist sehr wertvoll.)

Dr. Ungnad, of Berlin: "For books which prepare the way for later labors as well as yours, science must be especially grateful to the author. There is indeed an enormous amount of labor involved in the complete literary references which you give." (Für Bücher, die späteren Arbeiten so gut den Weg bahnen wie ihres, muss die Wissenschaft dem Autor besonders dankbar sein. Es steckt ja eine enorme Arbeit namentlich in den vollständigen Literaturnachweisen, die Sie geben.)

Dr. Zehnpfund: "We are indebted to Hilprecht himself in no small degree, that from his school such a thorough and scientifically sound work could come." (Wir danken es nicht zum wenigsten Hilprecht selbst dass aus seiner Schule eine solche gründliche, und wissenschaftlich gediegene Arbeit hervorgehen konnte.)<sup>15</sup>

These and other opinions of prominent specialists have come to the writer either through scientific journals or private letters. Where no other source is given the opinions are taken from private letters, which have been written unsolicited to the author.

<sup>15</sup> *Theol. Literaturblatt*, September 11, 1908.



V.

THE ETHICS OF SUFFERING.

BY REV. JOHN BENJAMIN RUST, PH.D.

O Qual, O Qual!

Die Angst jagt mich auf! Warum schlug mir nicht  
Sein Arm durch die Brust mit zweischneid'gem Schwert?

Elender ich, weh, weh,

Im Elend versunken ganz ohne Trost.

Sophocles, "Antigone," 1306.

Um deine Sophistereien auf einmal einzureissen, frag' ich Dich nur das:  
Du glaubst das Dasein Gottes, die Unsterblichkeit der Seele, die Freiheit  
des Menschen. Gleichwohl dachtest Du ohne Zweifel nicht, dass der  
Mensch blos zum Ungefaer auf die Welt gerufen worden, blos um zu  
leben, zu leiden, und zu sterben. Hat es keinen moralischen Zweck und  
Gegenstand?—Jean Paul Richter, Lettre xxii., Werke LXV., 190.

El destino del hombre en este mundo es gozar poco, padecer mucho,  
y siempre esperar.—Spanish Proverb.

They that sow in tears shall reap in joy. He that goeth forth and  
weepeth, bearing precious seed, shall doubtless come again with rejoicing,  
bringing his sheaves with him.—Psalm 126.

Mortalis nemo est, quem non attingat dolor morbusque.

Cicero, "Tusc. Disp.," III., 25.

In contemplating the work of creation, the world around us,  
the deep earnest facts of existence, and the glimmering stars  
that stud the sky, faintly suggesting to us the vastness of the  
universe, both faith and reason, in the effort to fathom the  
cause of things, rest in the thought, as in no other, that an  
infinite will, the will of God, lies back of, and sustains the  
domain of nature. We can trace His guiding hand in the  
growth of the plant, in the change of the seasons, in the diurnal  
periods of labor and recuperation, and in the watering of the  
earth. In the silvery stream we see reflected the image of  
our Maker. In the storm, the torrent, the lightning's flash,  
and the thunderbolt, we read His boundless power. All  
things point to Almighty God as the First Cause, as the Au-

thor of heaven and earth. Our hearts go out to Him in thankful submission and childlike reverence, because we realize that He is good, that His works are good, and that we depend wholly upon Him for life, for light, for truth, for happiness, and for immortality. But there exists one fact which troubles us. We cannot understand the presence of evil. The problem of human pain we are unable to solve. At every turn it meets us. The older we grow, the more real and the more stubborn does it become. We move along quietly perhaps for years on the even tenor of our way, when suddenly some terrible catastrophe awakens us from the pious calm of cherished hopes, and shakes our system of faith to its very foundation. Then we say that the world is less beautiful than we had imagined, and human life a possession less to be coveted than we had taught ourselves to believe. We confess that the fears, the agonies, the broken hopes, the wrecked happiness, the ruined futures, the periodically widespread destruction of human life, mar this great theater of action, this earth, made by the Hand of God, the Holy, the Just, the Good. The answer that there exists no real evil, that all evil is only hidden good, does not satisfy us.<sup>1</sup> We know better. But we find it to be well nigh impossible to reconcile that knowledge with the Being and Character of God. And the common solution that *sin* is the ultimate source of all our ills as a race, fails sometimes, in the hour when pain weighs heavily upon us, to explain the mystery. If we could look into the future and read all its individual possibilities, we might think differently, and then perhaps there would not be so many tears, such countless regrets, such untold sorrows, nor the frequent rebellion against God. Then the purpose of suffering, as we shall see, would fail utterly, and leave us poorer by reason thereof. We cannot read the future, nor can we guess at its secrets with sufficient confidence to satisfy our hopes. We live in the present. Hence our judgment and our feelings

<sup>1</sup> "We too often forget that not only is there 'a soul of goodness in things evil,' but very generally also, a soul of truth in things erroneous." (Herbert Spencer, "First Principles," Chapter I.)



are biased, are governed largely, among most men wholly, by the experiences of the present, or by those of the past as recurring in the present. It is the veiled future, the omnipresent mystery of existence, which causes suffering often to be so keen, worse for those who witness than for those who experience it.

We may speak of the laws of nature as being inexorable. We may extend our conception of the world so as to sacrifice the individual and lose sight of the particle in the contemplation of the great harmony, the universe, the all. But the stern realities of everyday, the orphan's cry, the widow's wail, the beggar's petition, the patriot's blood, the prayer for liberty on the lips of the serf, the gasp of the dying, and a thousand other griefs which appear to us all along the way through life, teach us that as philosophers we are cruel, unjust, inhuman.

We must live near the heart of humanity. We must sympathize with all who feel the heavy hand of sorrow. And when it comes to us, as come it will, we shall know better how to receive it, and how to interpret its meaning. It is not sufficient for us to cling to our faith in the goodness of God as displayed everywhere, even where we cannot trace it. We dare not flee from the problem of evil. We know that God takes no delight in the anguish of His creatures. Christ the Compassionate, the loving, heavenly One, came to save that which is lost. He healed the sick and the afflicted. He restored what was broken, and breathed the Holy Spirit into the darkness of the unconverted heart. Surely this settles the question concerning the source of all evil in the world, and intensifies our adoration of the unseen Maker of heaven and earth. We realize through His own revelation that He is kind and good. We are taught by the Prophet-Messiah that our God and Father purposes to harmonize the relations and to recompense the actions of mankind. Yea, more, we are led to see that a profound meaning and object underlie the great, the unconquerable, the universal fact of human suffering and pain.

Though the result of sin, they are made to contribute to the moral and spiritual growth of the heart and of the race. At times we deem them to be inconsistent with the perfections and omnipotent government of God. But in such moments we overlook the infinite wisdom of the heavenly Father, which lies back of all ill, and so rules the world of men that the imperfection and misfortune which human sin created, are turned from the path of destruction which they follow, and are forced to minister to the development and sanctification of Christian character and life. "And we know that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to His purpose."<sup>2</sup> Pain, suffering, toil, want, misfortunes of every description, therefore, have an ethical foundation. Suffering is not born of mere caprice. It is not pressed upon men mercilessly as the fruit of sin, to weigh them down without one spark of Divine compassion.

This law of the Kingdom of God, this spiritually defining moral power which prevents evil and ill from terminating in ultimate destruction, the ethics of suffering in other words, we propose as the subject of our inquiry. Since not any fact is more firmly established by experience than pain, both physical and mental, and that there is no exemption from it for any person by reason of station, temperament, or acquirements, the necessity of having correct ideas and well founded religious convictions concerning it becomes imperative.

The Scriptures teach us, and the Christian conscience lends assent to what they say, that there are two elements which constitute the ethics of suffering. The first is penal or retributive in its nature, and the second is corrective or educational.

## I.

One fundamental teaching of the Bible, which, often in crude form, holds a prominent place in all religions, the doctrine namely that in human life there are punitive acts whose ultimate source is the Divine Justice, many deprecate

<sup>2</sup> Romans 8: 28.



and deny. It is declared to be inconsistent with the boundless goodness of God, and wherever it appears as an article of faith, as a principle or ruling motive of action among enlightened men and in their communities, it must be adjudged as a survival or revival of an ancient superstition. It cannot be denied that a great deal of bloodshed in the history of mankind grew out of false notions of justice. The judicial crimes committed by bigoted kings and fanatical religionists, resulted directly, without exception, from a usurpative, confusing, and unwarranted divorce between the providential acts and revelation of God, and the human conscience. By investing an ecclesiastical institution, whether identical with the State, or superior to it, with more than the guardianship of spiritual truth, by making it, in other words, the chief and final arbiter of human life, incalculable injury was done to the dissemination of right conceptions of the nature, extent, and ministration of primitive justice. The Scriptures themselves brand the charge brought against them that retribution is inconsistent with the goodness of God, as false, and prove the spirit of vengeance displayed in the whole history of mankind, including the cruel and bloody sacrifices offered upon the unholy altar of bigotry, to have been, and to be high crimes against the solemn truths of the Gospel, against the blessed life and example of Christ, for which an atonement will have to be made, if it has not yet been rendered, by the deluded men who perverted, and by those who continue to make a mockery of the principle of Christian liberty. "He was in the world, and the world was made by Him, and the world knew Him not."<sup>3</sup> High over this vast tide of inhumanity, over the aberrations of power, and the criminal abuse of authority, resound in divine numbers the words of Almighty God, given to Moses as an everlasting statute, and reiterated by Saint Paul as a universal law of righteousness: "Dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves, but rather give place

<sup>3</sup> St. John 1: 10.

unto wrath: for it is written, vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord.”<sup>4</sup>

God speaks through the conscience. Every man bears about with him, in his own heart, a tribunal before which he is judged in this life, as to spiritual states, conditions and responsibility, both for their own sake, and in relation to conduct. The conscience may become seared and diseased through long indulgence in wickedness, but it is there, and sooner or later asserts itself. When it begins to stir, perhaps in the hour of danger or death, the grim spectres of transgression rise up before the soul to mock it, to dare it to repent, to pray, and to bring it the message of swift destruction. No, no, we cannot separate God from the heart of man, in a study of ethics. It is impossible to weigh correctly the moral attributes of the Almighty, apart from human needs, shortcomings, and transgressions. Just as mercy displays its holy, assuaging, pardoning, justifying power through the inner life of man, so justice declares itself through the conscience. “For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these having not the law, are a law unto themselves, which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another.”<sup>5</sup> In this fact then, that the heart of man, through the conscience, stands in direct communication with the moral Ruler of the universe, is to be found the penal element of suffering and pain.

An unregenerated heart neither loves nor obeys the precepts of God. It does not sustain harmonious relations to His moral government. Therefore it is in a state of rebellion against the kingdom of truth and righteousness. Now rebellion leads to defiant and continued transgression of all the laws of God, which obtain both in the material and spiritual world. If men wish to live to a ripe old age, and to spend the autumn of their days in contemplating with thankful

<sup>4</sup> Deut. 32: 35; Romans 12: 19.

<sup>5</sup> Romans 2: 14, 15.



contentment the achievements of the past, and in dwelling with expectant assurance upon the fast approaching glories of the life to come, they must vigilantly heed the laws of nature, and ever strive to keep them. If parents hope to be remembered by their children and children's children, to the latest generation, with unbroken blessing for pious example and ennobling influence, they must act in accordance with the constitution of the physical and moral world. The results of right living are always sure to manifest themselves. And these results are not confined to the prescribed limitations of isolated individuals. They extend further. They enter and act upon the broad stream of humanity, because mankind is a unit. "He gives to all life and breath in every respect, and has made of one blood every nation of men, to dwell on all the face of the earth."<sup>6</sup>

That which is true concerning physical relations, applies in a far higher sense to psychical and spritual activities. Contentment of soul, peace of heart, and the hope of ultimate salvation, increase in a ratio commensurate with the observance of the divine precepts, the imitation of Christ, and the enjoyment of the means of grace. Such is the constitution of nature and of mind that it becomes utterly impossible to break the laws which obtain in either sphere without calling forth dire and destructive consequences. Unnecessary exposure of the body, uncleanness, the use of ardent and intoxicating spirits as a beverage, vicious habits of every description, result finally in the undermining of health. By the law of heredity the sins of the parents in only too many instances are transmitted to their offspring. Thus whole families and generations are made unhappy, while death prematurely reaps a rich harvest among them. The physical equilibrium is

<sup>6</sup> Acts 17: 25, 26. This thought of the unity of the human family is older than Saint Paul, but existed in pre-Christian heathen antiquity merely as a philosophical fragment, intimation, conjecture, and unconscious prophetic guess. The saying of Pindar: *αἰὲ ἀνδρῶν ἐν θεῶν γένος· ἐκ μιᾶς δὲ πνέομεν ματρὸς ἀμφότεροι* essentially is monistic emanationism. Compare Sirach 40: 1.

disturbed, and the vital organs, before they succumb to the fell destroyer, in the process of failure and decay, set up a protest against the ravages of disease, and cause great anguish of body and of mind.

In like manner the transgression of moral law creates most deplorable conditions in the heart of man. Irreligion inevitably bears the fruit of remorse. One who wastes the golden opportunities offered by the Gospel, to live in its light and its holy promise, to teach, to preach, and to pray, will soon or late feel the heavy hand of unsanctifying sorrow, and receive the sting of hopeless regret. Man was fashioned a moral being. The whole end and aim of his existence, normally, is to glorify God and enjoy Him forever. When he fails to fulfill that high mission and destiny, to which he was appointed in the beginning by his Maker, he does violence to the laws of the spiritual realm to which he belongs, and will, if he persists in following the bypath of error, plunge into endless grief and shame. In looking upon the ruin he has wrought in his own heart, in contemplating the sad condition of his children and their offspring, their worthlessness and positive injury to the community in which they live, a feeling of deep despair will settle upon him, and he may be tempted to curse the day of his birth. This fact we know from observation, has its exceptions. Therefore we ought not to rush to a fatalistic extreme in the endorsement of the principle of hereditary transmission of evil.<sup>7</sup> Some very good parents are

<sup>7</sup> A curious and interesting trait in the character of Samuel Johnson, illustrative of the traditional biblical doctrine of the willfulness and guilt of sin, is described apologetically and apparently with a slight antinomian implication, by Boswell in his "Life of Doctor Johnson." "On that account, therefore, as well as from the regard to truth which he inculcated, I am to mention, with all possible respect and delicacy, however, that his conduct, after he came to London, and had associated with Savage and others, was not so strictly virtuous, in one respect, as when he was a younger man. In short, it must not be concealed, that like many other good and pious men, among whom we may place the apostle Paul upon his own authority, Johnson was not free from propensities which were ever 'warring against the law of his mind'—and that in his combats with them, he was sometimes overcome. Hence let the profane



troubled with unappreciative, ungovernable, and irreclaimable children. When a vicious character and life cannot be even partly accounted for by deficient ancestral antecedents, neither on the paternal nor the maternal side, the case is sporadic, in a sense a freakish manifestation of wickedness, but none the less in line with Adamic sin, and responsible to the moral law. The experiences of everyday offer numberless instances to prove the truth of these assertions. It is very plain to be seen that good results follow normal ways of thinking and living, and crown with blessing the career of the faithful, while evil consequences follow hard upon the heels of the workers of iniquity. Turn your eyes to the reform farms of the land, to the jails, and penitentiaries of every State in the Union, to the houses of correction, to the asylums for the insane and the imbecile in every civilized country on the globe, if you wish to see the bolder effects of sin. The first draught from the cup of transgression may be sweet and soothing, but its dregs are more poisonous than the sting of the asp. Who will, who can consistently deny that these harvests of good and evil, carrying with them as their inseparable attendants the sense of peace and the sense of guilt, are

and licentious pause. Let them not thoughtlessly say that Johnson was an *hypocrite*, or that his *principles* were not firm, because his *practice* was not uniformly conformable to what he professed. Let the question be considered independent of moral and religious association; and no man will deny that thousands, in many instances, act against conviction. Is a prodigal, for example, an *hypocrite*, when he owns he is satisfied that his extravagance will bring him to ruin and misery? We are sure he believes it; but immediate inclination, strengthened by indulgence, prevails over that belief in influencing his conduct. Why then shall credit be refused to the sincerity of those who acknowledge their persuasion of moral and religious duty, yet sometimes fail of living as it requires? But let no man encourage or soothe himself in 'presumptuous sin,' from knowing that Johnson was sometimes hurried into indulgences which he thought criminal. I have exhibited this circumstance as a shade in so great a character, both from my sacred love of truth, and to show that he was not so weakly scrupulous as he has been represented by those who imagine that the sins, of which a deep sense was upon his mind, were merely such little venial trifles as pouring milk into his tea on Good-Friday." (Boswell, "Life of Doctor Johnson," Vol. II., pp. 595, 596, Dutton & Co., New York.)

not rewards and punishments. The penal element is present in all suffering which in the least degree grows out of sin, however remote, refined, and imperceptible the latter may be. "Behold," says Solomon, "the righteous shall be recompensed in the earth; much more the wicked and the sinner."<sup>8</sup>

Lavater in his criticism of Holbein's painting of Judas says that there is a wonderful amount of realism in it, but that it lacks nobility. It is the true physiognomy of an avaricious man, but not of an avaricious apostle, of a base but not a great soul, which, seized by a mighty passion, becomes a satan indeed, while yet it continues to be great. We are not to laugh too soon at these strange combinations among the traits of human character. They are not taken out of the air. Judas is the basest of men, and yet a great man, for the Apostle can still be seen through the mantle of his misdeeds. Had Judas appeared as Holbein has painted him, Christ would surely not have chosen him as an apostle. A face like that cannot for a single week endure the presence of Jesus. Though it is the basest characterization that can be imagined, and much is still wanting to complete the expression of falsehood and flattering cunning, at the same time, as a picture, it is by far not good enough for the better side and the great talents of this apostolic personage.

Holbein's Judas is a thief, says Lavater, in whose soul deep anger has been aroused because none of the one hundred pieces of silver expended to purchase ointment for the Saviour, were to be given to him. He is capable of offering to barter away the best of men to his bitterest enemies, for a paltry sum of money. He lurks at the heels of large-hearted innocence. He sounds with cunning unrest the purpose of his Master. He asks with indescribable coldness: "Is it I?" He remains unmoved it seems, in the face of the most searching warning ever pronounced in ten or twelve words. Possessed by Satan, he assumes the leadership of the persecutors of his Lord, and gives to Him the most accursed of kisses. Of all these base deeds is that man capable, who, having such

<sup>8</sup> Proverbs 11: 31.



a forehead and such lips, with this gaze looks into the face of Christ. But this brow, capable of so much baseness, will not soon again be lifted so high, to labor and battle, with the help of this noble power, against the many-sided stream of destroying thoughts. Judas has played the part of a devil, but he has acted like a devil who is sufficiently gifted to be an apostle.

Continuing the analysis, Lavater finally observes that now the terrible question may be asked: "In case a man comes into the world with such a brow, and with such culture, would it not be better if he had never been born? And is it his fault that he was born so?" Then the answer follows: No, it is not his fault, my friend, if he is born so; but he is not born in that condition, or state. He is born otherwise. These wrinkles and lines on his brow, this glance of calculating greed, are not native to him, as little as greed is a natural talent. Greed and its consequences grow out of habit. "But this forehead, this outline of the skull, what of these?" They also do not spring forth directly from the hand of nature, and foreheads which seem to bring into the world the fundamental elements of this form, have wrought themselves in the midst of the whole mass of tendencies and influences into the noblest, at least the bravest of mankind. And yet, if it is true that Judas appeared as Holbein has painted him; yes, if it could be proved that already at his birth he possessed all those principal features shown in the painting, even then it would be possible for Him who gives to men the great hope: "Behold, I make all things new!," to change this vessel of wrath into a vessel of honor. "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God: how unsearchable are His judgments and His ways past finding out!"<sup>9</sup>

## II.

In addition to the retributive, there is present in suffering also an educational element. Trial and affliction uplift the human soul, give it a taste of, and an insight into the higher

<sup>9</sup> Johann Kasper Lavater, "Ausgewaelte Schriften," Band I., Seite 90.

life. They widen its outlook, paradoxical as this may seem, by leading it into the valley of humiliation. Therefore those who have never felt the heart ache, who never have shed tears of disappointment over the blasting of their fondest hopes commit the sin of sacrilege against a most holy means of grace, when in haughtiness of spirit and in the coldness of unbelief they declare that trial, sorrow and tears are a standing indisputable evidence of an unjustifiable and unpardonable defect in the divine government. No doubt if sin had never entered the world, and the human family had remained free from its taint, the relations of things would have been different. But we are not here to fold our hands in idle murmurings regarding the past, and in bitter fruitless speculation as to what might have been. We move and have our being in the living present. We must rise to action, with a heart for any fate. "Courage in the face of danger, resignation before calamity, endurance in the path of duty in spite of any suffering that may be involved—these will always command the admiration of men; but empty suffering, with no necessity to explain it, or no high end to dignify it, is without moral contents."<sup>10</sup> It is one of the most sacred obligations of our earthly mission to turn to spiritual account, to transform into the gold of heavenly longing and apprehension, all the experiences of life. Men who have suffered, women who have wept, and through their trials, tears, and purifying sorrows, have seen the light and the way which make for righteousness, bless the Name of the Lord God Almighty for the hallowing temptation and the refining humiliation which His Grace enabled them to endure.<sup>11</sup>

One of the strongest of the passions—for there are many—which color the thought, govern the motives, and determine the actions of the natural man, is pride. The characteristic of self-sufficiency lies at the root and foundation, and is involved in the causes of all unbelief, worldly-mindedness and wickedness. Under the Eye of God its effects can be traced in every human life, with one sublime exception, from the days

<sup>10</sup> Black, "Culture and Restraint," p. 250.

<sup>11</sup> I. Cor. 10: 13.



of Adam to the present hour. As a motive power it lies back of innumerable deeds and activities which grow out of the social relations of mankind in the family, in the church, and in the state. Scarcely is a child born into the world, when it already betrays the presence of this fleshly weakness, however elemental its manifestation may be. Never does a man become too old to be deceived by its subtle impulses, exactions, and influence. It is found in every form and degree among mankind, from unveiled offensive grossness, to keen, calculating, polished, politic, and refined suavity, the *crème de la crème* of selfish self-sufficiency, posing in the mask of tenderness, mercy, and truth, as the lover of God, the disciple of Christ, and the friend of men.

How insolent is upstart pride!  
Hadst thou not thus, with insult vain,  
Provok'd my patience to complain,  
I had conceal'd thy meaner birth,  
Nor trac'd thee to the scum of earth.<sup>12</sup>

Only the all-seeing eye of an Eternal Judge can follow the ranges of self-exaltation in which the human heart indulges. Out of it grow tyrannies, persecutions, denials of God, revilements of truth, backbitings, deceptions, and jealousies. It is the fruitful soil of many a transgression and the background of many a crime. Wherever it holds sway it causes men to be distrustful and unhappy, because it leads to universal sacrifice for the sake of self-interest. It is king in the realm of the negative.

The infernal Serpent; he it was, whose guile,  
Stirr'd up with envy and revenge, deceived  
The mother of mankind: what time his pride  
Had cast him out of heaven, with all his host  
Of rebel angels; by whose aid, aspiring,  
To set himself in glory above his peers,  
He trusted to have equall'd the Most High,  
If he opposed; and, with ambitious aim  
Against the throne and monarchy of God,  
Raised impious war in heaven, and battle proud,  
With vain attempt.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Gay, "Fables," Pt. I., Fable 24.

<sup>13</sup> Milton, "Paradise Lost," Book I., line 34.

In this world the human heart is the seat of this blighting form of the mystery of evil. The remedy for it must be applied to every human being singly and alone, as if every individual soul were distinguished from every other by this disturbing principle, and the restoration of order throughout the universe depended upon the banishment of the passion from that one soul. The angels in heaven rejoice over one repentant sinner. There is no other help for it than the overthrow of pride through the instrumentality of humiliation and sorrow. There may be exceptions to the rule, but it does seem that preliminary providential leadings through the dark valley of trial, in which the heart becomes conscious of the touch of the great Under-arm,<sup>14</sup> are necessary to break all false and unworthy self-reliance.<sup>15</sup> Brought to a realization of absolute dependence upon a Power not itself, and feeling the crushing weight of woe the suffering soul, if not frenzied by a demon, will cry out: "What is man that Thou art mindful of him, and the son of man that Thou visitest him!" Trial, especially that type of it which possesses the quality of vicariousness, changes and deepens the sympathies, clarifies the moral vision, converts, and spiritualizes. It saves men from themselves. It causes pride to vanish like the mist of early morning. It fits the heart for the indwelling of Christ and His spirit.

But affliction does more. While it robs the soul of all false self-reliance, it does not leave it shorn of all power whatsoever.

<sup>14</sup> Psalm 23.

<sup>15</sup> Dr. McCosh says of pride and humiliation: "In the former, we form and cherish and entertain a high and self-satisfied opinion of ourselves, of our abilities, of our conduct, or of certain qualities supposed to be possessed by us, or of certain acts we have done. In the latter, we are not satisfied with ourselves, we do not believe we have qualifications for certain offices, and we depreciate what we have done. The one state, when it is self-righteous, may become a sin offensive to God, and *self-conceit* denounced by man; the other, if it is yielded to, and not counteracted by a sense of duty, may become a *poorness of spirit* which prevents us from engaging in anything that requires courage and perseverance. The one, if we dwell only on the good qualities we possess, may become *self-respect* to keep us from what is mean and unworthy; the other, when it leads us to take a lowly attitude before God and our fellowmen, may become the grace of *humility*." (McCosh, "The Motive Powers," pp. 107, 108.)



New energies are awakened. New capacities and capabilities are called into being and reveal themselves to the eye of the inner consciousness. By this we mean that stage in the development of the *self* where it secures command of better things in its own new world of the higher life. Holy emotions start into action and reach out to meet the love of God. Sympathies as large as the human family envelop the heart. A zeal to bring sacrifices for the benefit of mankind, sets it all aflame. A sacred longing to achieve something permanent in the cause of truth, righteousness, and salvation, asserts dominion, in the name of God, over every other impulse. A heart bowed down with grief, and purified by sorrow, when the shadows lift, becomes pious and poetic. It seeks utterance through the medium of the true, the beautiful, and the good. Its language is art, its food is religion, its home is God. When Beethoven found that he was growing deaf, he became very melancholy and shunned the companionship of his fellow-men. His affliction almost drove him to suicide, but the love of his art, and the voice of conscience restrained him from committing so dreadful a deed. His greatest works, the concertos and symphonies, *Fidelio*, *Prometheus*, and *Mount of Olives* were all composed after he had grown totally deaf. His affliction led him to choose Patience as his daily companion, and isolation undoubtedly made possible the concentration of mind, under the sway of genius, necessary to call forth those kingly harmonies which could be created only through silent communion with God. They are raptures transported from the Unseen.

Had he not been blind, John Milton might never have written *Paradise Lost*. An immortal confession which fell from his pen, reveals to us how great was the sanctifying influence of the affliction he humbly bore for many years, a deprivation which he felt all the more keenly because of the unfortunate character of his domestic surroundings.

I am old and blind—  
Men point at me as smitten by God's frown,  
Afflicted and deserted of my kind.  
Yet I am not cast down.

I am weak, yet strong;  
I murmur not that I no longer see;  
Poor, old, and helpless, I the more belong,  
Father supreme to Thee.

Thy glorious face  
Is beaming towards me, and its holy light  
Shines in upon my lonely dwelling place,  
And there is no more night.

On my bended knee  
I recognize Thy purpose, clearly shown;  
My vision Thou hast dimmed, that I may see,  
Thyself; Thyself alone.

Visions come and go;  
Shapes of resplendent beauty round me throng,  
From angel lips I seem to hear the flow  
Of soft and holy song.<sup>16</sup>

If the life-history of all true men of God were minutely recorded and lay before us, so that we might trace the growth of those personalities, we would find in every instance that changes for the better, toward broader views of men and things began in some hour of crucial sorrow. In the darkness and the doubt the old pride is abandoned, the false self-reliance and self-sufficiency are uprooted, or slain, that a higher self, with concentrated moral energy, may step into the light to act a hero's part for truth, with a heaven-born sense of obligation to the larger purposes of God, and of duty to the erring race of man. The cross of pain and humiliation helps the soul to understand the words uttered by Jesus, when, as part of the act of restoration to the Apostolate, He recommissioned Saint Peter, saying: Feed my lambs! Feed my sheep!<sup>17</sup>

The early Christian martyrs, both men and women, thanked God for the crowning glory of immolation which persecution brought them, and blessed the Name of Jesus because they were judged to be worthy to share His pain. The intense interest in

<sup>16</sup> The poem in full consists of seven stanzas, and is found only in the first edition of Milton's works.

<sup>17</sup> St. John 21: 15.



her erring son, and her invincible faith, taught Monica, the mother of St. Augustine, absolute reliance upon God. After a discipline of more than nine long years, her prayers were finally answered, and her storm-tossed faith was crowned with joy. A few days before her death, in middle life, while visiting her son at Ostia, on the Tiber, she said to him: "My son, as for myself, I delight no longer in anything in this life. What yet here I may do, and why I linger here, I know not, now that the hope of this life has died within me. There was but one thing for which I longed to tarry here a while, that I might see thee a Catholic Christian before my death. And this my God hath given me even more abundantly, so that I even see thee His servant, and able to despise mere earthly happiness. What do I here?"<sup>18</sup>

As affliction disciplines, so poverty awakens to better purposes the affections, desires, and aspirations of the soul. It teaches men to labor and to wait. Nearly all the great men the world thus far has seen, and whose influence for good it has felt most, came from the ranks of the lowly and the poor. J. G. Holland, the American humanitarian, thanked God that he had not been born in affluence. The whole of human experience, if studied in the right light, though it is impossible to understand and to explain every manifestation of affliction and trial, since the eye of reason cannot follow the winding course of cause and effect everywhere, proves that disappointment, sorrow and suffering contain a mighty educational element whose purposes touch the eternities. "In view of the utilities of natural death which are coming to be known, we may the more confidently conclude that the Creator will never need to apologize to the creation for having permitted the door for the entrance of natural evil to stand open for a while into nature. For it has been opened for life's sake."<sup>19</sup> "For our light affliction," says Saint Paul, "which is but for a moment, worketh for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory."<sup>20</sup>

<sup>18</sup> "The Confessions of St. Augustine," Chapter 10.

<sup>19</sup> Newman Smyth, "The Place of Death in Evolution," pp. 55, 56.

<sup>20</sup> II. Cor. 4: 17. See also Ps. 34: 19; I. Peter 1:7.

The disciples of our Lord, whenever the afflictions of the people of God were pointed out to them in a special way, as was often the case, directed the eyes of the weary, weeping, and stricken ones to the Saviour of the world. To them He was the ideal sufferer. His wounds were holy. His cry of distress was an intercession. His tears were tears of infinite tenderness, love, and sympathy. His humiliation was the gateway, the outer court to His exaltation. His sacrificial death served to reconcile the world to God by expiating its guilt. "For it became Him, for whom are all things, and by whom are all things, in bringing many sons unto glory, to make the captain of their salvation perfect through suffering."<sup>21</sup> "For in that He himself hath suffered being tempted, He is able to succor them that are tempted."<sup>22</sup> "Though He were a Son, yet learned He obedience by the things which He suffered, and being made perfect, He became the Author of eternal salvation unto all them that obey Him."<sup>23</sup> Christ's work of expiation, His mission of reconciliation, His life of sorrow and obedience, found their consummation in the return to the Father's throne in glory. The idea the ancients had of sin, and the interpretation they placed upon pain and suffering, notably in the heathen world, were both inadequate and far behind the truth. Plato wrote as follows: "Those who are punished by gods and men, and improved, are those whose sins are curable; still the way of improving them, as in this world so also in another, is by pain and suffering; for there is no other way in which they can be delivered from their evil."<sup>24</sup> The Buddhist system lacks the biblical idea of conscience, as well as the Christian idea of sin, as a deep moral estrangement from, and inevitable responsibility to a supernatural, a divine Person. Hence there the finding of happiness consists in recession from the world, and a withdrawal into a state of dreamy non-resisting quiescence.<sup>25</sup> Thus, in Christianity, as in none of the

<sup>21</sup> Hebrews 2: 10.

<sup>22</sup> Hebrews 2: 18.

<sup>23</sup> Hebrews 5: 8, 9.

<sup>24</sup> Jowett's "Plato," Gorgias 534.

<sup>25</sup> Bishop Copleston, "Buddhism," p. 99.



ethnic faiths, and in a sense wholly its own, is there this upward flight from sanctifying depths to glorified heights, the veritable apotheosis of suffering.

In all the penal anguish, in all the affliction which men experience, by which at times their hearts are paralyzed, as they stand upon the brink of darkness, but which are meant to train them in faith, in obedience, and in holy love, they must fix their eyes upon the Crucified One. "It is a faithful saying: For if we be dead with Him, we shall also live with Him; if we suffer, we shall also reign with Him; if we deny Him, He also will deny us."<sup>26</sup> Pass through the crucible fearlessly. Bear the penitential grief patiently. Lift your soul to Heaven's throne with trust unshaken. Perform humbly, but obediently the work thy hands are given to do. Strike the heart's harp of a thousand emotions in the power of the Spirit of God. Let angelic voices dictate the songs that fall from the lips of faith and praise. Help to call multitudes away from the danger stations and the waste places, out of sin and sorrow into the joy of God's redeeming love. In wandering through the dark valley, lean upon the great Underarm. We weep now. Later on we shall rejoice. We bear a cross here. Yonder we shall wear a crown. On earth fierce conflict, trial and pain engage us. In Heaven we shall join in the peans of victory which rise up forever before the face of Him who made us and built for us a City of Peace.

TIFFIN, OHIO.

<sup>26</sup> II. Timothy 2: 11, 12.

## VI.

### IS THE BEST IN BURNS TYPICALLY SCOTCH?<sup>1</sup>

BY REV. E. S. BROMER, D.D.

This question seems to bear in it the implication that the poetry of Robert Burns is so Scottish in spirit, so reveals the poet himself as a Scotchman and is so associated with the moors and fens, lochs and streams, banks and braes and highlands of his good, bonnie Scotland as to circumscribe his name and fame within these national limits.

There is much to be said in favor of the implication. Robert Burns was truly a Scotchman. His poetry can only be understood and appreciated when viewed and studied as the product of Scottish life and environment. His fidelity to his native dialect lifted it into literary standing and recognition. His genius also won for Scottish ballads a place in the literature of the world. His patriotism made him the idol of his countrymen. He never lived beyond the boundaries of his native land and rarely visited even England. His once projected emigration to Jamaica was thwarted by his sudden rise to fame among his own countrymen. He was, therefore, a thorough-going Scotchman, whether studied from the point of view of his personality, his work or his residence. He is well known as "the national poet of Scotland."

A brief sketch of his life will confirm the implication that the best in Burns is typically Scotch. He was born January 25, 1759, about two miles from Ayr. His father was a yeoman farmer, whose life was one of long struggle and many misfortunes, but who, despite these handicaps succeeded in

<sup>1</sup> This paper was prepared for the Adelphic Club of Greensburg, Pa., and read before the club at an open meeting of January 25, 1909, the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the birth of Robert Burns. On the program of the evening it was preceded by an essay on "Robert Burns and the Scottish Bards," by Professor C. R. Fisher, hence the abrupt beginning of this paper.



giving his children a creditable education and a legacy of faithfulness and piety. The poet was of robust frame and active body, having withal a vigorous intellect and acute sensibilities. As early as fifteen years he was made to do the work of a full-grown man.

Like Sappho of old, Burns learned to sing his songs through love, his first experience being at Mt. Oliphant, whither his father had moved, when he fell in love with a "bonnie, sweet, sonsie lassie" and gave utterance to his passion in the poem—"Handsome Nell." Love was both his making and unmaking. The gentle goddess during his innocent growing years led him to his best ideals and noblest efforts, but in the days after his sojourn in Irvine, when he adopted more liberal ideas and a looser life, she led him into much misery and many a fool's errand. With his unreined passions went the lust of intemperance. Amid these two evil tendencies neither his early piety nor his sturdy Scotch conscience could be overwhelmed. His better moments are always true to the higher ideals of humanity.

After his father's death Robert and his brother Gilbert moved to a farm at Mossgiel which they had rented a short time before. Their hard labors here were hardly more remunerative than elsewhere, and it was clearly demonstrated that Robert was no farmer but evidently a poet of great promise. Here too his weaknesses of character showed themselves in the most glaring manner. During these Mossgiel years he wrote many poems and got into much trouble through his way of living and writing. In 1785 he formed a liaison (which was, according to the usage of Scotland, virtually a marriage) with Jean Armour, a person somewhat above his station in life. She bore him twins. The resentment of her father against the poet made all efforts of publicly acknowledging the marriage temporarily a failure. Finally the poet in discouragement and desperation planned to emigrate to the new world. Before completing the arrangements and with a view of raising funds he published his first edition of poems,

which netted him twenty pounds. Their success was at once pronounced and immediate. He changed his plans and decided to remain at home. The following chapters of his life are given by Principal Shairp in his biography as follows: First Winter in Edinburgh, Border and Highland Tours, second Winter in Edinburgh, Life at Ellisland, Migration to Dumfries and Last Years.

It was in 1788 that he openly declared his marriage with Jean Armour. About the same time he received his appointment as an officer in the excise with a salary of 50 pounds a year, which was later raised to 75 pounds. His intemperate habits, irregular life and pecuniary distress finally overwhelmed him and he died in July 21, 1796.

In emphasizing the primary elements of his character and work, we find it is true that the best in Burns is Scotch. The contradiction between his genius as a poet and his weakness of character as a man makes a painful tragedy. Despite all this he is the man and poet whom the peasantry of Scotland loved as no other. He interpreted their wants, trials, joys, sorrows and obscure lot. He glorified their own homely language and revealed its musical sweetness to the world. He stirred their deepest depth through their simple elemental human sympathies.

Not only so, but he is the restorer of Scotland's nationality. At a time when leading Scotchmen aped French life and ideas and were despised by Englishmen in general, Burns aroused the native spirit of the people. Into the midst of the literary circle and learned cosmopolitans of Edinburgh walked the poet ploughman and made the Scottish life they ignored and the language they despised the subject of his poetry and conversation. The ancient spirit, almost quenched, revived and spread with almost electric speed and power. On this rising tide the poet was borne to popularity and fame. To-day he is acknowledged as "the national poet."

Is the best of Burns Scotch? Yes, we answer, but because it is truly Scotch in its primal elements, it is human and universal.



In a general way there are two types of poets, the objective and the subjective. The former is impersonal and descriptive; the latter is personal and introspective. The one requires little or no knowledge of the poet and his surroundings to be understood; the other demands the poet's intimate acquaintance and an introduction to his neighbors and surroundings in order to be best appreciated. The typical example of the former is Shakespeare, of the latter is Browning. It is to the second that Robert Burns belongs. You recognize Chaucer in his gracious wit and humor, Milton in his Puritan firmness, Pope in his modish regularity, Burns in his amorous ditties, convivial and patriotic songs, in his struggles with debt and nature, in his piety, his sense of oneness with both the land and the common people.

This side of our question is plainly understood and in most of the estimates made of Burns and his poetry is quite generally accepted. But we wish in this paper to try to show that in being true to the common elements of Scottish scenery and life and himself as a Scotchman, our poet rises truly to the realm of the universal experience of the race. So that it may be said of him that the best in Burns is not typically Scotch, but human. He uses, as it were, Scottish pigments and canvas, scenery and life, but the motive and moral and spirit of the picture are natural, human and universal. He has the point of view of the Scotch peasant, but his vision is of man—

A man is a man for a' that.

He himself is always a poet, but more than a poet, for he knew men and nature. His point of contact with life was with the common people of his own country, but the current of his own being touches poor, struggling humanity wherever man is found. Though the fragrance of the highland heather and rose-hue of its bloom is found in his poems and songs, the heart of universal nature throbs in unison with the reader's. Though you hear the lowing of the cattle on the hills of Scotland, the call of the plough boy, the jesting of the crude farm hands, you feel the life blood quickened in your own veins. Though

his love affairs are many and various, his struggles with himself are long and hard, though his defeats and victories are peculiarly his own, yet who can fail to see in them all the simple elements of human life.

Ruskin defines the art of literature as "writing as you see." If this is an adequate definition, then Burns is a master; for the one basic element of power in his poetry is his absolute truthfulness, coupled with an intense sense of reality. He is truthful to the objects he saw and to himself as the seer of them. It is in this way he rises to catholicity, *i. e.*, through absolute fidelity and truthfulness to the peasantry of Scotland he strikes the simple, fundamental experiences of the universal man. In this he is unlike Browning, Goethe or Shakespeare. Their way of approach and expression was very different. Burns is always the Scotchman, never the cosmopolitan. The genuinely concrete is always an emblem of the universal. As one of his biographers says:

Reality, the most intense human reality, substantiality of the most solid contents, is the stuff of which his verses are made (Blackie).

We, therefore, as suggested above, view the best in Burns as typically Scotch, but that which is thus typically Scotch is not the best in Burns. He goes beyond the Scotchman to that which makes the Scotchman a part of the human race. He sees the streams, banks, braes and highlands of Scotland, but these are, however, only the drapery of the universal spirit, fit settings for the life of man as man.

We will briefly illustrate our point of view by references which show his touch with nature, his sympathies with animal life, his fidelity to Scotch life, customs and manners, his insight into human nature and his faith in God.

With nature he lived at first hand. His love for her is intense but simple as a child's. There is none of the later Wordsworthian adoration or philosophizing subtilty which so became the vogue during and after the rise of the evolutionary view of science. For refreshment and sympathy he goes out in the world of fresh air, hills, streams, meadows,



clouds and sunshine. For him nature is never a thing apart from man. It is but part of the universal life and given especially as the background of the greater pictures of life and human character.

Out of many examples we select but two or three.

In "The Brigs of Ayr" he sees and feels his oneness as a poet with nature's own sympathetic self and revels in her freedom.

The simple Bard, rough at the rustic plough,  
Learning his tuneful trade from ev'ry bough:  
The chanting linnet, or the mellow thrush:  
Hailing the setting sun, sweet, in the green thorn bush:  
The soaring lark, the perching red-breast shrill,  
Or deep-ton'd plovers, grey, wild-whistling o'er the hill  
Shall he, nurst in the Peasant's lowly shed,  
To hardy independence bravely bred,  
By early poverty to hardship steel'd,  
And trained to arms in stern Misfortune's field;  
Shall he be guilty of their hireling crimes,  
The servile mercenary Swiss of rhymes?

It is thus that he makes his protest against the formality of Pope and Dryden before ever John Keats came to break the spell and give English poetry its rebirth of freedom.

And again he says:

'Twas when the stacks get on their winter hap,  
And thack and rape secure the toil-won crap;  
Potatoe-bings are snugged up frae skaith  
O' coming Winter's biting, frosty breath;  
The bees, rejoicing o'er their summer toils,  
Unnumber'd, buds as Flow'rs, delicious spoils,  
Seal'd up with frugal care in massive waxen piles,  
Are doom'd by Man, that tyrant o'er the weak,  
The death o' devils, smoor'd wi' brimstone reek;  
The thund'ring guns are heard on ev'ry side,  
The wounded coveys, reeling, scatter wide;  
The feather'd field-mates, bound by Nature's tie,  
Sires, mothers, children, in one carnage lie:  
What warm, poetic heart, but inly bleeds,  
And execrates man's savage, ruthless deeds!  
Nae mair the flow'r in field or meadow springs:  
Nae mair the grove with airy concert rings,  
Except perhaps the Robin's whistling glee,

Proud o' the height o' some bit half-lang tree;  
The hoary morns precede the sunny days,  
Mild, calm, serene, wide spreads the noontide blaze,  
While thick the gossamour waves wanton in the rays.

Another suggestive example is the following verse from Hallowe'en:

Whyles owre a linn the burnie plays,  
As thro' the glen it wimpl't;  
Whyles round a rocky-scar it strays;  
Whyles in a wiel it dimpl't;  
Whyles glitter'd to the nightly rays,  
Wi' bickering, dancing, dazzle;  
Whyles cookit underneath the braes,  
Below the spreading hazel,  
Unseen that night.

We rise a step in his warm sympathy with nature when we speak of the flowers. They always touched him deeply. "To a Mountain Daisy" is but one among many examples. Who can fail to feel keenly these opening lines:

Wee, modest, crimson-tipped flow'r,  
Thou's met me in an evil hour;  
For I maun crush amang the stoure  
Thy slender stem.  
To spare thee now is past my pow'r,  
Thou bonie gem.

This same poem in the second verse leads us to his relation to animals and his intimate knowledge of animal life, when he says:

Alas! it's no thy neebor sweet,  
The bonie lark, companion meet!  
Bending thee 'mang the dewy weet!  
Wi' spreckl'd breast,  
When upward-springing, blythe, to greet  
The purpling east.

Man's relation to animals always reveals two aspects of his life. They are either friends or enemies. With Burns the later evolutionary conception of the survival of the fittest was impossible. Tennyson, the scientific poet of the nineteenth century, might say,



Arise and fly  
 The reeling Fawn, the sensual feast:  
 Move upward, working out the beast,  
 And let the ape and tiger die.

but with Burns the animals are rather companions enduring with man the same struggles and disappointments. "The Twa Dogs," one of the best of his poems, is in reality a keen discussion of gentry and the peasant life, of which the dogs are as truly a part as the nobles and farmers of his day. His two poems "To a Mouse" and the other "To a Louse" show both the sympathetic seriousness and the jolly humorous side of his view of animal life.

#### THE MOUSE.

Wee, sleekit, cow'rin, tim'rous beastie,  
 O, what a panic's in thy breastie!  
 Thou need na start awa sae hasty,  
     Wi' bickering brattle!  
 I wad be laith to rin an' chase thee,  
     Wi' murd'ring pattle!

I'm truly sorry man's dominion  
 Has broken Nature's social union,  
 An' justifies that ill opinion,  
     Which makes thee startle,  
 At me, thy poor, earth-born companion,  
     An' fellow-mortal!

I doubt na, whiles, but thou mayst thieve;  
 What then? poor beastie, thou maun live;  
 A daimen-icker in a thrave  
     'S a sma' request;  
 I'll get a blessing wi' the lave,  
     And never miss 't!

Thy wee bit housie, too, in ruin!  
 Its silly wa's the win's are strewin!  
 An' naething, now, to big a new ane,  
     O'foggage green!  
 An' bleak December's winds ensuin,  
     Baith snell an' keen!

Thou saw the fields laid bare and waste,  
 An' weary winter comin fast,

An' cozie here, beneath the blast,  
Thou thought to dwell,  
Till crash! the cruel coulter past,  
Out thro' thy cell.

That wee bit heap o' leaves an' stibble,  
Has cost thee mony a weary nibble!  
Now thou's turn'd out, for a' thy trouble,  
But house or hald,  
To thole the winter's sleety dribble,  
An' cranreuch cauld!

But, Mousie, thou art no thy lane,  
In proving foresight may be vain;  
The best laid schemes o' mice an' men  
Gang aft a-gley,  
An' lea'e us nought but grief an' pain,  
For promis'd joy.

Still thou art blest, compar'd wi' me!  
The present only toucheth thee;  
But, Och! I backward cast my e'e  
On prospects drear!  
An' forward, tho' I canna see,  
I guess an' fear.

It seems a violation of the rule of proportion to quote this and the following poem—"The Louse"—at length, but they are so *a propos* to our purpose and so typical of Burns at his best that we freely presume on your judgment and patience.

#### THE LOUSE.

Ha! where ye gaun, ye crowlin ferlie!  
Your impudence protects you sairly:  
I canna say but ye strunt rarely,  
Owre gauze and lace;  
Tho' faith, I fear ye dine but sparely  
On sic a place.

Ye ugly, creepin, blastit wonner,  
Detested, shunn'd by saunt an' sinner,  
How dare ye set your fit upon her,  
Sae fine a lady!  
Gae somewhere else, and seek your dinner  
On some poor body.



Swith, in some beggar's haffet squattle;  
 There ye may creep, and sprawl, and sprattle  
 Wi' ither kindred, jumping cattle,  
     In shoals and nations;  
 Whare horn nor bane ne'er dare unsettle  
     Your thick plantations.

Now haud ye there, ye're out o' sight,  
 Below the fatt'rèls, snug an' tight;  
 Na, faith ye yet! ye'll no be right  
     Till ye've got on it,  
 The vera tapmost, tow'ring height  
     O' Miss's bonnet.

My sooth! right bauld ye set your nose out,  
 As plump and gray as onie grozet;  
 O for some rank, mercurial rozet,  
     Or fell, red smeddum,  
 I'd gie you sic a hearty doze o't,  
     Wad dress your droddum!

I wad na been surpris'd to spy  
 You on an auld wife's flainen toy;  
 Or aiblins some bit duddie boy,  
     On's wyliecoat;  
 But Miss's fine Lunardi! fie,  
     How daur ye do 't!

O, Jenny, dinna toss your head,  
 An' set your beauties a' abroad!  
 Ye little ken what cursed speed  
     The blastie's makin!  
 Thae winks and finger-ends, I dread,  
     Are notice takin!

O wad some Pow'r the giftie give us  
 To see oursels as others see us!  
 It wad frae monie a blunder free us  
     And foolish notion;  
 What airs in dress an' gait wad lea'e us,  
     And ev'n Devotion!

Other poems of similar significance are "The Auld Farmer's New Year Morning Salutation to His Auld Mare, Maggie," "On Scaring Some Water Fowl in Loch-Turit," etc.

When we come to his descriptions of Scottish life, customs

and manners we find it difficult, within our time limits, to arrange our material to advantage because of its abundance. His poems and songs are the finest portrayal of the land and the common people to be found in the language. It is here we find his truthfulness most manifest. For a picture of the pious, old-type Scotch family what could be more beautiful than "The Cotter's Saturday Night"? The contrast of the life of the peasantry and the aristocrats is most characteristically set forth in "The Twa Dogs." "Hallowe'en" abounds in references to Scottish life and customs. "The Holy Fair," "Address to the Unco' Guid and Rigidly Righteous" and "Holy Willie's Prayer" are illustrations of the religious tendencies of his day, revealing the fray between the Moderates and the Evangelicals. He is noted for his moral raillery against the "Holy Willie" type, and is often charged with sacrilege and blasphemy. "The Holy Fair," no doubt, is the poem most severe on the New Light people, and to this day offends the sense of propriety in a great many of his readers. For a most refreshing view of the farmer and his simple life one should read "The Auld Farmer's Address to His Auld Mare Maggie," "The Ploughman," "The Cotter's Saturday Night." Besides there are numerous indirect references which yield glimpses of the life of the farmer.

In general it may be said that Burns knew the life of the common people in all its phases. From "The Jolly Beggar" to "The Holy Fair" he runs the whole gamut of common life. The frieze of the Parthenon is no more beautiful panorama of Greek life than the poems and songs of Robert Burns are of life, customs and manners of Scotland's common people.

Burns as a student of human nature was preëminent. He knew men—all sorts of men. Those who revelled with him in Poesie Nancy's Inn, those whom he described in "The Jolly Beggars" were but brothers after all with them who lived in better style and nobler manner. Man as man was Burns' passion. It is here perhaps more than anywhere else that we catch his spirit as a poet. His use of nature and his sympathy



with birds and animals were but ways and means of setting forth the humanity of man, and among men he most loved the poor who languished in the huts of Scotland's peasantry. To them he gave a voice, in them he aroused a new spirit of hope and recognition; with them he lived and nothing could induce him to forsake them. In being true to them he brings clearly to view the deep foundation springs of the human heart. Through them he rises to a true sense of that which is universal in man as man.

Is there, for honest poverty,  
 That hangs his head, and a' that;  
 The coward-slave, we pass him by,  
 We dare be poor for a' that!  
 For a' that, and a' that,  
 Our toil's obscure, and a' that;  
 The rank is but the guinea's stamp,  
 The man's the gowd for a' that.

What though on hamely fare we dine,  
 Wear hodden grey, and a' that;  
 Gi'e Fools their silks, and knaves their wine,  
 A man's a man for a' that;  
 For a' that, and a' that,  
 Their tinsel show, and a' that;  
 The honest man, though e'er sae poor,  
 Is king of men for a' that.

Ye see yon birkie, ca'd a lord,  
 Wha struts and stares, and a' that;  
 Though hundreds worship at his word,  
 He's but a coof for a' that;  
 For a' that, and a' that,  
 His riband star, and a' that:  
 The man of independent mind  
 He looks and laughs at a' that.

A prince can mak' a belted knight,  
 A marquis duke, and a' that;  
 But an honest man's aboon his might—  
 Guid faith he mauna fa' that!  
 For a' that, and a' that,  
 Their dignities, and a' that,  
 The pith o' sense and pride o' worth  
 Are higher ranks than a' that.

Then let us pray that come it may,  
As come it will for a' that,  
That sense and worth, o'er a' the earth,  
May bear the gree and a' that.  
For a' that, and a' that,  
It's coming yet, for a' that,  
That man to man, the warld o'er,  
Shall brothers be for a' that.

Through his idea of man to man in his essential elements, however, simple and plain, he attains his insight into human hearts. Blackie, one of his biographers, says:

If inferior to Coleridge in ideal speculation, to Wordsworth in harmonious contemplation and to Southey in book learning, in all that concerns living men and human life and human society, he was extremely sharp sighted, and not only wise in penetration to the inmost springs of human thought and sentiment, but in judgment of conduct eminently shrewd and sagacious: gifted in the highest degree with that fundamental virtue of all sound Scotchmen, common sense, without which great genius in full career is apt to lead a man astray from his surroundings and make him most a stranger to that with which in common life he ought to be most familiar.

We have noted that Burns is effective because he knows and is true to common life. The point of contact between it and the higher universal life of men is warm and real. We will illustrate with but a few examples, reviewing life along the general lines radiating from his own personal center, namely, the social, political and religious.

The phases in his social life selected are home-life, the former, the lover, etc.

The cheerfu' supper done, wi' serious face,  
They 'round the ingle, form a circle wide;  
The sire turns o'er, wi' patriarchal grace,  
The big ha'-Bible, ance his father's pride:  
His bonnet rev'rently is laid aside,  
His lyart haffets wearing thin an' bare;  
Those strains that once did sweet in Zion glide,  
He wales a portion with judicious care,  
And "Let us worship God!" he says, with solemn air.

\* \* \* \* \*



From scenes like these old Scotia's grandeur springs,  
 That makes her lov'd at home, rever'd abroad:  
 Princes and lords are but the breath of kings,  
 "An honest man's the noblest work of God:  
 And certes, in fair virtues heavenly road,  
 The cottage leaves the palace far behind;  
 What is a lordling's pomp? a cumbrous load,  
 Disguising oft the wretch of human kind,  
 Studied in arts of hell, in wickedness refin'd."

The Song of the Ploughman shows Burns in his native element. He himself in a letter to a certain Mr. Miller declares:

I want to be a farmer on a small farm, about a plough-gang, in a pleasant country, under the auspices of a good landlord. I have no foolish notion of being a tenant on easier terms than another. To find a farm where one can live at all is not easy. I only mean living soberly, like an old style farmer, and joining personal industry.

The ploughman he's a bonnie lad,  
 His mind is ever true, jo,  
 His garters knit below his knee,  
 His bonnet it is blue, jo.

Then up wi't a', my ploughman lad,  
 And hey, my merry ploughman;  
 Of a' the trades I do ken,  
 Commend me to the ploughman.

My ploughman he comes hame at e'en,  
 He's aften wat and weary;  
 Cast off the wat, put on the dry,  
 And gae to bed, my Dearie!

I will wash my ploughman's hose,  
 And I will dress his o'erlay;  
 I will mak' my ploughman's bed,  
 And cheer him late and early.

I hae been east, I hae been west,  
 I hae been at Saint Johnston,  
 The bonniest sight that e'er I saw  
 Was the ploughman laddie dancin'.

Snaw-white stockings on his legs,  
And siller buckles glancin';  
A gude blue bannet on his head,  
And O, but he was handsome!

Commend me to the barn-yard,  
And the corn-mou,' man;  
I never gat my coggie fou  
Till I met wi' the ploughman.

He dignifies his calling as poet of the country and country people in his "Poem on Pastoral Poetry" with a devotion worthy of Virgil's *Bucolics*.

As a lover he fills every possible role. With idyllic tenderness he describes the innocence, directness, sweetness and power of early love.

O happy love! where love like this is found!  
O heart-felt raptures, bliss beyond compare!  
I've paced much this weary, mortal round,  
And sage experience bids me this declare—  
If Heaven a draught of heavenly pleasure spare,  
One cordial in this melancholy vale,  
'Tis when a youthful, loving, modest pair,  
In other's arms breathe out the tender tale,  
Beneath the milk-white thorn that scents the ev'ning gale.

It is amazing how spontaneously he could enter into his various love affairs. It was his very life as shown in his poem dictated to David Siller, his poet friend.

But tent me, Davie, ace o' hearts!  
(To say aught less wad wrang the cartes,  
And Flatt'ry I detest)  
This life has joys for you and I;  
And joys that riches ne'er could buy;  
And joys the very best.  
There's a' the pleasures o' the heart,  
'The lover an' the frien';  
Ye hae your Meg, your dearest part,  
And I my darling Jean!

It warms me, it charms me,  
To mention but her name;  
It heats me, it beets me,  
And sets me a' on flame!



His political poems are not in his best vein. They reveal his wider outlook, however, and show keenly how he judged the character of the leading men and issues of his day. His poem, "A Dream," was written on the birthday of King George III. and is a keen criticism of the times, in which the elder and younger Pitt, beside all of the M. P.'s of Scotland, together with the Prince of Wales and the King himself receive attention. The stanza addressed to the young Prince runs as follows:

For you, young Potentate o' Wales,  
I tell your Highness fairly,  
Down Pleasure's stream, wi' swelling sails  
I'm tauld ye're driving rarely;  
But some day ye may gnaw your nails,  
An' curse your folly sairly,  
That ere ye brak Diana's pales,  
Or rattl'd dice wi' Charlie,  
By night or day.

Among his other political poems, more or less personal and illustrative of his keenness of insight into human life are "The Five Carlins," "To Mr. Graham of Fintra," and the four "Election Ballads." That he was a truth speaker and a public reprover in the political realm cannot be denied.

It is, however, in the religious outlook of his life that we find him most trenchant in his criticism as well as positive in his predilections. He took sides with the Moderates against the Evangelicals or New Lights on the one side and the High Calvinists or Auld Lights on the other. Almost all his satires are born out of this struggle of creeds. Indeed his best satires are those ridiculing the hypocrisy and pretensions of the so-called extreme Holiness People of his day, *e. g.*, "The Holy Fair," "The Ordination," "Address to the Unco' Guid or the Rigidly Righteous," "The Kirk's Alarm," "Holy Willie's Prayer," "The Twa Herds."

O thou, wha in the heav'ns dost dwell,  
Wha, as it pleases best thyself,  
Sends ane to heaven and ten to hell,  
A' for they glory,  
And no for only guid or ill  
They've done afore thee!

I bless and praise thy matchless might,  
Whan thousands thou hast left in night,  
That I am here afore thy sight,  
    For gifts an' grace,  
A burnin' and a shinin' light  
    To a' this place.

What was I, or my generation,  
That I should get sic exaltation?  
I, wha deserve sic just damnation  
    For broken laws  
Five thousand years 'fore my creation  
    Through Adam's cause.

When frae my mither's womb I fell,  
You might ha'e plunged me into hell,  
To gnash my gums, to weep and wail,  
    In burnin' lake,  
Where damned devils roar and yell,  
    Chained to a stake.

Yet I am here, a chosen sample,  
To show thy grace is great and ample;  
I'm here a pillar in thy temple,  
    Strong as a rock,  
A guide, a buckler, an example  
    To a' thy flock.

O L—d! thou kens what zeal I bear  
When drinkers drink, and swearers swear,  
And singing there, and dancing here,  
    Wi' great and sma';  
For I am keepit by thy fear,  
    Free frae tham a'.

But yet, O L—d! confess I must,  
At times I'm fashed wi' fleshly lust;  
And sometimes, too, wi' warldly trust,  
    Vile self gets in;  
But thou remembers we are dust,  
    Defiled in sin.

\*        \*        \*        \*        \*

Maybe thou lets this fleshly thorn  
Beset thy servant e'en and morn,  
Lest he owre high and proud should turn,  
    'Cause he's sae gifted!  
If sae, thy han' maun e'en be borne  
    Until thou lift it.



L—d, bless thy chosen in this place,  
 For here thou hast a chosen race:  
 But G—d confound their stubborn face,  
     And blast their name,  
 Who brings thy elders to disgrace  
     And public shame!

L—d, mind Gawn Hamilton's deserts!  
 He drinks, and swears and plays at cartes,  
 Yet hae sae mony takin' arts  
     Wi' great and sma',  
 Frae G—d's ain priests the people's hearts  
     He steals awa'.

An' whan we chastened him therefore,  
 Thou kens how he bred sic a splore,  
 As set the warld in a roar  
     O' laughin' at us;  
 Curse thou his basket and his store,  
     Kail and potatoes!

L—d, hear my earnest cry and prayer,  
 Against the presbyt'ry of Ayr;  
 Thy strong right hand, L—d, mak' it bare  
     Upo' their heads!  
 L—d, weigh it down, and dinna spare,  
     For their misdeeds!

O, L—d, my G—d! that glib-tongued Aiken,—  
 My very heart and soul are quakin',  
 To think how we stood groanin', shakin',  
     And Swat wi' dread,  
 While Auld wi' hinging lip gaed snakin',  
     And hid his head.

L—d, in the day of vengeance try him!  
 L—d, visit them wha did employ him!  
 And pass not in thy mercy by 'em,  
     Nor hear their prayer.  
 But, for thy people's sake, destroy 'em,  
     And dinna spare!

But, L—d, remember me and mine  
 Wi' mercies temp'ral and divine.  
 That I for gear and grace may shine,  
     Excelled by name,  
 An' a' the glory shall be thine.  
     Amen, amen!

This last verse reminds us of the prayer frequently quoted—

“Lord bless me, my wife, my son John and his wife. We four and no more.”

As a Moderate he tried to avoid the extremes of action. One almost feels, however, that much of his satire is but a cloak to his own peculiar weakness. His sentiment in “Address to the Unco’ Guid or Rigidly Righteous” reminds us of one of Robert Louis Stevenson’s sayings: “There is so much bad in the best of us, and so much good in the worst of us, that it hardly behoves any of us to talk about the rest of us.” He begins by addressing these rigidly righteous ones

O, ye wha are sae guid yoursel’  
Sae pious and sae holy,  
Ye’ve nought to do but mark and tell  
Your neebour’s faults and folly!

and finally concludes:

Then gently scan your brother man  
Still gentler sister woman;  
Though they may gang a kennin wrang,  
To step aside is human;  
One point must still be greatly dark,  
They moving why they do it!  
And just as lamely can ye mark  
How far, perhaps, they rue it.

Who made the heart, ’tis he alone  
Decidedly can try us,  
He knows each chord—its various tone,  
Each spring—its various bias;  
Than at the balance let’s be mute,  
We never can adjust it;  
What’s done we partly may compute,  
But know not what’s resisted.

We could easily multiply similar examples, but these suffice for our immediate purpose.

We wish to conclude with Burns’ own religious tendencies. We cannot defend his weaknesses of character as a man. Genius never pardons irregularities, but we can apply his own standard of judgment of his fellow-man to himself. In a letter dated March, 1784, he writes:

I have often observed, in the course of my experience of human life, that every man, even the worst, has something good about him; though very



often nothing else but a happy temperament of constitution inclining him to this or that virtue. For this reason, no man can say in what degree any other person, besides himself, can be, with strict justice, called wicked. Let any of the strictest character of regularity of conduct among us, examine impartially how many vices he has never been guilty of, not from any care or vigilance, but for want of opportunity, or some accidental circumstance intervening; how many of the weaknesses of mankind he has escaped, because he was out of the line of such temptation; and, what often, if not always, weighs more than all rest, how much he is indebted to the world's good opinion, because the world does not know all; I say, any man who can thus think, will scan the failings, nay, the faults and crimes of mankind around him with a brother's eye.

The man who so tried to scan his brother man in love could not fail to have experienced the deeper, fundamental elements of religious experience. Man as man stands and lives at first hand with his fellow-man and with his Maker. Witness the poem already quoted, "A Man's a Man for a' That," and again the "Epistle to Davie, a Brother Poet"—

What tho', like commoners of air,  
 We wander out, we know not where,  
     But either house or hal' ?  
 Yet nature's charms, the hills and woods,  
 The sweeping vales, the foaming floods,  
     Are free alike to all.  
 In days when daisies deck the ground,  
     And blackbirds whistle clear,  
 With honest joy our hearts will bound,  
     To see the coming year:  
     On braes when we please then,  
     We'll sit and sowth a tune:  
     Syne rhyme till't, we'll time till't,  
     And sing't when we hae done.

It's no in titles nor in rank;  
 It's no in wealth like Lon'on bank,  
     To purchase peace and rest;  
 It's no in making muckle, mair:  
 It's no in books, it's no in lear,  
     To make us truly blest:  
 If happiness hae not her seat  
     And center in the breast,  
 We may be wise, or rich, or great,  
     But never can be blest:

Nae treasures, nor pleasures,  
Could make us happy lang:  
The heart ay's the part ay,  
That makes us right or wrang.

Ah! truly—"Out of the heart are the issues of life."

Representative of his sense of confession before Almighty God, could there be a psalm more touching than the following poem:

Is there a whim-inspired fool,  
Owre fast for thought, owre hot for rule,  
Owre blate to seek, owre proud to snool,  
Let him draw near;  
And owre this grassy heap sing dool,  
And drap a tear.

Is there a Bard of rustic song  
Who, noteless, steals the crowd among,  
That weekly this area throng,  
O, pass not by!  
But, with a frater-feeling strong,  
Here, heave a sigh.

Is there a man whose judgment clear,  
Can others teach the course to steer,  
Yet runs, himself, life's mad career,  
Wild as the wave;  
Here pause—and, thro' the starting tear,  
Survey this grave.

The poor inhabitant below  
Was quick to learn and wise to know,  
And keenly felt the friendly glow,  
And softer flame,  
But thoughtless follies laid him low,  
And stain'd his name!

Reader, attend—whether thy soul  
Soars fancy's flights beyond the pole,  
Or darkling grubs this earthly hole,  
In low pursuit:  
Know, prudent cautious self control  
Is wisdom's rott.

Or again, note the resignation in the poem—"A Prayer Under the Pressure of Violent Anguish."



O Thou great Being! what thou art  
Surpasses me to know:  
Yet sure I am, that known to Thee  
Are all Thy works below.

Thy creature here before Thee stands,  
All wretched and distress;  
Yet sure those ills that wring my soul:  
Obey Thy high behest.

Sure, Thou, Almighty, canst not act  
From cruelty or wrath!  
O, free my weary eyes from tears,  
Or close them fast in death.

But if I must afflicted be,  
To suit some wise design:  
Then, man my soul with firm resolves  
To bear and not repine.

His versions of the first psalm and the first six verses of the  
ninetieth psalm are like confessions of faith.

O Thou, the first, the greatest friend  
Of all the human race!  
Whose strong right hand has ever been  
Their stay and dwelling place!

Before the mountains heav'd their heads  
Beneath Thy forming hand,  
Before this ponderous globe itself  
Arose at Thy command.

That pow'r which rais'd and still upholds  
This universal frame,  
From countless, unbeginning time  
Was ever still the same.

Those mighty periods of years  
Which seem to us so vast,  
Appear no more before Thy sight  
Than yesterday that's past.

Thou giv'st the word; Thy creature, man,  
Is to existence brought;  
Again thou say'st, "ye sons of men,  
Return ye into nought!"

Thou layest them, with all their cares  
In everlasting sleep:  
As with a flood thou tak'st them off  
With overwhelming sweep.

They flourish like the morning flow'r,  
In beauty's pride array'd:  
But long ere night cut down it lies  
All wither'd and decay'd.

We return to the statement of the subject—"Is the Best in Burns Typically Scotch?"

We have developed an argument in outline and illustration for the negative side of this question somewhat unlike the rather slight references of his biographers. The appeal is usually made to the few poems in which he actually reaches beyond his native land for material, as in a few of his political poems or in the few instances where his poems rise to clear, abstract statements of universal truths or principles. In making clear the case along these lines, the material would be scant indeed and the plea often made for Burns' larger universality on the basis of these arguments is rather weak and ineffective. We have preferred to take Burns in his strongest points of emphasis, and we would say that Burns at his best is typically Scotch, but that the best in Burns is not merely typically Scotch, but human and universal. He goes to the depth of the Scottish personality and patriotism and lays bare the deeper springs of the heart and mind and we see Scotland in the brotherhood of nations and the Scotchman at one with his fellows in the brotherhood of man. His faithfulness to his point of view and contact leads him to the vision of the universal in the individual and the race. Even as a master mind that enters any one of the arts, finds in his own the universal laws of unity, proportion, movement and of life, so our poet true to the peasant and peasantry of Scotland, plays upon the invisible strings of humanity's æolian harp. We hear the music and lo, a sort of Pentecostal miracle is wrought again and "we hear, every man in his own tongue," the wonderful and infinite things of the human heart.



## VII.

### CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY.

BY PROF. A. V. HIESTER.

The first division of this introduction to the study of contemporary sociology has been concluded. It has to do with social experimentation as a source, a most important source, indeed, of social doctrine. It is to the infinitude of experiments, which have been projected from time to time by leaders of thought and action for the improvement of the social order, that the world owes so much, in the last analysis perhaps all, of its knowledge of the nature of human society, and of the peculiar limitations which surround it. These experiments, whether they failed or succeeded, have had the effect of awakening the social consciousness, inspiring social study and thought, and demonstrating the existence of a telic force in human society by which social growth may be controlled and the social order directed to a given end through the purpose and will of man. And with the larger interest in social phenomena, which is so characteristic of our time, the importance of primitive conditions and institutions for scientific sociology is being more and more recognized; so that the records of the past are being ransacked to-day as never before in the hope that they may throw new light on the problems and processes of the present.

The second division may be termed, somewhat loosely perhaps, social philosophy. Its province includes those contributions to social doctrine which have been made by the various ideal schemes of social organization contained in the writings of philosophers. Between these ideal schemes and the experiments for the improvement of the social order, which constitute the subject matter of the first division, there is a constant

and intimate connection. Social empiricism and social philosophy, like theory and practice everywhere, must necessarily advance in *pari passu* fashion. For, on the one hand, social experimentation is inevitably inspired and directed by philosophical ideals. And on the other, social experiments must influence social doctrine, since the speculative philosopher is after all more or less dependent upon objective realities to awaken and shape his ideals. Hegel says somewhere: "No one can escape from his own age; the spirit of his age is his own spirit likewise." There is in the world of mind something very analogous to the physical law of the indestructibility of matter. What is commonly called the creative imagination cannot create out of nothing any more than the mason or the carpenter. It can only take the materials supplied by the actual world of experience and combine or rearrange them into new, perhaps fanciful and even fantastic, forms, but forms, nevertheless, which are suggested and conditioned by that which already exists. And so the social philosopher—again using the term more or less loosely—or better perhaps, the social dreamer, idealist or visionary, is limited and controlled at every step, whether he is conscious of it or not, by the things which are implicit in the social order about him.

It is important to distinguish between two sorts of social philosophies. There are first those fancy-woven dreams of philosophers, which, while they have had no little influence in awakening thought on the nature of society and in guiding social practice, are not, and never have been, realizable, and which their authors never expected to be realized in their entirety. Some are keen but just criticisms of the existing social order designed to attract attention to social evils in the hope that adequate remedies may ultimately be found. Others are the unthinking protests of generous and humane persons keenly sympathizing with the miseries and wrongs of the masses, and striking blindly at the social evils of their time without knowing or waiting to know the causes of these evils.



Still others are the visions of minds filled with despair by existing political and economic conditions, and solacing themselves with weaving dreams of a perfect social state in which all wrongs will be righted and all men be happy and contented. Some of these dreams, again, have issued in immediate and ill-considered attempts to improve social conditions, while others have long remained confined to the realms of dreamland only to influence the social thought and practice of later ages. Sometimes they have been garbed in sober prose. But more frequently they have donned the robes of romance. This is obviously a convenient and safe device for those who are able to look beyond the horizon of their own age, as well as for those who fear to express their social opinions in plain terms. But the inevitable effect of once adopting the form of romance for a scheme of social organization is to give free sweep to the imagination, so that society is painted "without any thought as to whether it is realizable in a given time or place, or whether it is compatible even in a general way with the moral and physical conditions of human nature." And the usual result is a chimerical and impossible goal which is not in accord with man's psychical nature, nor with the laws of his physical existence, nor yet with his material environment, and which is not, therefore, realizable by any forces subject to human purpose or will.

The other class of social philosophies differ from the first in being based, not on idle dreams, but on a scientific study of human society. They are the product of the logical faculties of the mind rather than of the imagination, and they exhibit, therefore, an enduring practical faith that is altogether wanting in the others. They profess to be compatible with the general conditions of human existence. Instead of setting up impossible ideals their aim is to show, not only what human society can be through the operation of forces subject to the purpose and will of man, but what, indeed, it is destined to be through the progressive interplay of natural and human forces in a process of evolution. An excellent illustration of this class of social philosophies is modern socialism.

A. Social philosophies of the first class are commonly known as utopias. The word is derived from the Greek *οὐ τόπος* which means "nowhere land" and has been generalized from the title of Sir Thomas More's famous romance of the sixteenth century. While utopias may be found in every age and in many different lands they have usually appeared in the presence of social crises. It is when men find themselves face to face with social conditions fast culminating in scepticism, despair and anarchy, and when they have lost their bearings amidst the crumbling foundations of the past and the mysterious forces of a new era, that they turn most readily to the making of imaginary states. And these imaginary states naturally reflect the particular conditions which produced them, so that at one time they are religious in character and at another philosophical or materialistic.

It is not possible to penetrate far enough into the past to distinguish the beginnings of social philosophy. For ever since the time when there was the first glimmering of social consciousness, that is, ever since man was man, there have been those who have thought and philosophized about society. While fragments of utopian schemes, such as more or less concrete plans of government, law, industry or religion, may be met with before Plato's time, he was not only the first to advance general theories and systems, but no one before him knew so well how "to give a body to these imaginary conceptions and make the most of them by the graces of poetry and the power of dialectics." The age of utopians may very properly, therefore, be said to begin with the Athenian philosopher.

Plato's state is described at length in the "Republic" although many of its political and ethical views are to be found also in his other writings, notably the "Protagoras," "Meno," "Gorgias," "Philebus" and "Laws." Like later utopias the "Republic" presents two faces. From one point of view it is a state framed on Hellenic lines. Its institutions and circumstances, as well as its historical and environmental setting, are in many instances those of the prevailing Greek city-state



which was so familiar to Plato. It is even possible to trace certain features to particular Hellenic states. Thus the prohibition of money, the vesting of the government in a military caste, and the training of all youth in military exercises, are clearly of Spartan origin. Like other distinguished Athenians Plato was most favorably impressed by the rigid discipline which obtained in Sparta and which was so palpably lacking in democratic Athens. From Athens, on the other hand, he took his principle of personal freedom, his grace and beauty of life, and his scheme of literary and philosophical education.

That Plato was strongly influenced by Hellenic thought and practice is shown by another body of facts. In his state, as in all the Hellenic states, whether democratic or aristocratic in their forms of government, citizenship is limited to a superior class. While no specific mention is made of slaves the existence of such a class is clearly implied. Of the modern principle of democracy, of the notion of a state in which all classes are harmonized, Plato knows nothing. The size of his state is that of the usual Greek city-state and its problems are the problems with which every Hellenic state was struggling. It is equipped for war as though war were a constant possibility. It has little or no friendly intercourse with other nations, and knows nothing of a federation of states to promote the mutual interests of its members. On the other hand, it implies the existence of such internal evils as individual self-seeking, the political struggles between rich and poor, the corrupting influence of wealth, the failure to utilize the energies and talents of all the inhabitants, and the lack of a trained and disinterested statesmanship. All this clearly reflects the actual circumstances of the Hellenic states in Plato's time, democratic Athens, no less than military Sparta, wealthy and oligarchical Corinth and despotically governed Syracuse. It is altogether probable, too, that Plato was materially influenced in his social views by the Pythagorean religious brotherhoods within the Greek world and the Egyptian caste system without it.

The other face presented by the "Republic" is that of a

purely imaginary state, a vision of a city in the clouds, in which social elements are combined that were never before put together, and to which nothing in the world of actual existence as Plato knew it bore any resemblance. Plato's state is, therefore, at the same time both an actual state on earth and an imaginary city in the skies, a history and a prophecy, a summing up of the past and an anticipation of the future. And it is just this two-facedness, this constant combining of diverse elements and tendencies, that gives to the "Republic" its strange and paradoxical character. The two faces which it presents cannot go together and it is, therefore, an imperfect whole. Whether this arises from an enlargement of the plan of the work or from its composition at different times is a mooted question. Jowett ventures the opinion that the apparent discrepancy may be owing to the discordant elements which Plato has attempted to unite in a single whole without being himself able to recognize the inconsistency which is so obvious to us.

The "Republic" is a comprehensive scheme of government, industry and morals, and only its larger features can be noted. It is professedly an inquiry into the nature of justice—righteousness is a better word—which is made to consist, not in each receiving what is his due, but in each laboring for the good of the whole. It is an ideal of duties, therefore, rather than of rights. Writing in a time of social and political fermentation when the opposite forces of despotism and democracy were struggling for the mastery, Plato would avoid the greed of egotism, the common principle of both, by completely subordinating the individual to the state. But the only effective means of accomplishing this, according to his way of thinking, is to suppress absolutely all sense of private interest; for so long as there are private pleasures, pains and interests, men will pursue their own ends and the state will suffer. Hence Plato proposes a communistic state in which the principle of private property, together with all its attendant evils, and all social and political distinctions depending on wealth, will be abolished.



But Plato's communism does not stop with the transformation of economic conditions. In his zeal to suppress all sense of private interest he does not shrink from a community of wives and children. It is at this point that he parts company with most modern communists. While modern communism aims chiefly at the equal division of the material things of life, and is, therefore, primarily an economic movement, that of Plato is based on moral grounds. Something of its moral character may be seen in the singular fact that he applies it only to the rulers and guardians of the state. The lower classes are completely ignored, and apparently he does not care whether they are bought under the rule of communism or not. But a more convincing proof of the immaterial character of Plato's communism is its extension of the communal principle to wives and children. This makes it something very similar to the communism of the monastic orders of the Latin Church, for both rest on the principle that property cares and family ties are incompatible with the higher life of the individual, that they divert him from the pursuit of the ideal and heroic, and that they prevent him from serving the state with wholehearted devotion.

The communal ownership of wives and children is undoubtedly the most chimerical feature of Plato's state, and likewise the one that offends most against modern ideas of morality. But it was not so impossible a thing in Plato's age as it seems to us. For among the Greeks the tie binding the members of a family together was regarded as inferior in strength and sanctity to that of tribe or country. Then again the small size of a Greek state, and its historic development from clan and tribe, would naturally lend to the communal principle a sanction which it could not hope to obtain under the conditions of modern political life. But even for a small city state, such as all the Hellenic states were, Plato's ideal of a unity of the state so complete as to leave no difference save in degree between the government of a household and that of a state is altogether impracticable. And, furthermore, it does not fit

in with the general scheme of Plato's state, for the hard and fast line which he draws between the ruling class of guardians and warriors and the subject class of workers, and which existed in all the Greek states, must be an effectual bar to that perfect concord which he postulates for his state. Such a line of cleavage can only make two states, not one.

And then there is the very practical problem of the relations of the sexes. It was pointed out already by Aristotle that Plato's scheme for equalizing property would prove unworkable unless the state exercised a firm control over the birth rate. The criticism is sustained by modern experience for history teaches that the danger of overpopulation is certain to arise wherever men cease to be responsible for the care and support of their own children. Plato appears to have been aware of this danger. He would limit the size of his state to that of an average Greek city state. In this he was probably influenced as much by the necessity of maintaining a proper concord and community of interest in his state as he was by any Malthusian fear of overpopulation. To maintain the population of his state at the proper level, then, and also to avoid licentiousness, Plato proposes a system of marriage festivals at stated intervals for the effective regulation of marriage. Still another purpose of such regulation is the improvement of the race. At these marriage festivals the good will be mated with the good as often as possible and the bad with the bad as seldom as possible. The good will also be mated more frequently than the bad. Participation in these festivals is limited to prescribed age periods, from twenty-five to fifty-five for men and from twenty to forty for women, and any one forming a marriage connection without these limits, or at any time within them except with the consent of the rulers, will be guilty of impiety. The offspring of superior parents, that is the capable, the virtuous, the strong, the beautiful, the courageous, the patriotic, are taken from their mothers at birth and reared under the direction of the state; while the offspring of inferior parents, as well as the deformed and defective offspring of superior parents, will be destroyed.



While all this is chimerical to the last degree it touches a most important problem. Not only are the instincts of human nature too strong to be crushed out in this fashion, but even if the scheme could be carried out in the way proposed by Plato it would be at the cost of the best and highest things in life. The refining influences of home, the unselfish devotion of the members of a family to one another, the affections and higher emotions, all sentiment and imagination, would be sacrificed in the interest of a supposed improvement of the race, so that human nature would be reduced to the level of animals. But Plato's airy treatment of a pressing social question must not be permitted to obscure its real character and importance. The problem which he recognized and which he attempted to solve is still plaguing the social philosopher and scientist. In the light of our larger knowledge of such pathological phenomena as degeneracy, crime and pauperism it is receiving increasing attention, and biologists and students of eugenics are asking more and more insistently whether marriage should not be regulated by the state in the interest of a higher level of social well-being, and whether a healthy and capable race of human beings is not worth cultivating as much as a good strain of horses and cattle.

A less chimerical feature than communism, and one that is being increasingly realized in modern times is the principle of the equality of the sexes. This does not mean that the sexes are equal in capacity, for Plato admits in general the superior capacity of the male sex, but only that they have the same nature and that they should have, therefore, the same education, the same occupations, the same gymnastic exercises, the same training in the arts of war. As among the lower animals sex is only a superficial difference, and its incidents should not be made the basis of industrial, political and social distinctions. That the state should have the benefit of the services of all its citizens whatever their capacity is for Plato a fundamental principle.

In all this Plato was far in advance of Greek, as well as of

eastern, practice. Thus in Athens the woman was in no sense the equal of her husband. She had no share in his public activities. In the domestic sphere her position was one of marked inferiority. She was only her husband's housekeeper and the mother of his children; not his companion, not the mistress of his home, not the entertainer of his guests.

All social utopias make much of education but there are two considerations which give to education in Plato's state an unusual importance. The first is the provision already noted that all children are taken from their mothers at birth and reared under the direction of the state. The effect of this is to make the state directly responsible for all education. The other consideration is that the government which Plato provides for his state is a government of trained philosophers, so that its well being and perpetuity will largely depend upon the sort of training which it gives its future rulers.

The first purpose of education, as Plato sees it, is to provide a good environment for the child, "to place him in an atmosphere of health, in happy circumstances in which no sights nor sounds of evil, no allurements of passion, can hurt the character or vitiate the taste." He would, therefore, overhaul the old mythology and banish from the nursery and school all that is false and corrupting, the old nursery tales to which he applies the epithet of "blasphemous nonsense," and all stories that portray the vices and weaknesses, the lusts and treacheries, of gods and men. To provide the proper sort of literature for children Plato proposes the establishment of a censorship of stories which would accept only such as inculcate the virtues of truthfulness, temperance, purity, obedience and unselfishness. Over poets, painters, sculptors, architects and musicians he would exercise a similar censorship, forbidding them to portray in their works what is base or corrupting.

The supreme end of education, according to Plato, is the inculcation of truth. But by truth he means something very different from the modern understanding of that term. In common with the ancient philosophers he makes truth consist,



not in facts as modern philosophy does, but in ideas; not in particulars, but in abstractions and universals. He constantly depreciates the world of sense though admitting that sense particulars are shadows of the truth. Hence the first desideratum in education is the habit of abstraction which can be acquired, however, only through the study of the mathematical sciences, since they alone are capable of giving ideas of relation and arousing the dormant energies of thought. Another peculiarity of Plato's conception of truth is the identification of the moral and intellectual virtues. This is the Sociatic doctrine that the good and true are one, that virtue is knowledge, and that evil arises from ignorance.

Education is divided by Plato into two parts: music or literature to train the mind, and gymnastics to train the body. The two must be developed in harmonious proportions. Not only must the training of the body not be inconsistent with that of the mind, but the body must be trained wholly for the service of the mind. Plato was the first to maintain this principle.

Plato's preference for a government of philosophers is well calculated to shock modern notions, and the reasons which he assigns for such preference only add to its visionary character. Only philosophers are fitted to bear rule because they alone can apprehend ideas, that is, truth. In order to secure the rule of the best, for that is what aristocracy really means, a close watch will be kept over the children and youth to learn who exhibit steadily and consistently the virtues of truthfulness, temperance, courage and justice, who are apt to learn, who can govern themselves, who are faithful to every duty regardless of pleasure or pain, and who prefer the welfare of the state above every other interest. Those who have thus approved themselves are set apart and specifically trained for political service. If inquiry be made into the particular nature of this training it will be found to consist of instruction, not in finance, jurisprudence or military technique, as might be supposed, but again in abstract mathematics as a preparation

for the still more abstract conception of the good, which, according to Plato, is the ultimate ground of all truth. Probably no feature of the Republic other than its community of wives and children is so chimerical as this. The notion that merely to contemplate the idea of the good without any thought of the application of ethical principles to concrete conditions is a piece of nonsense. And the other notion that this knowledge of abstract good is to be found only in the pursuit of mathematical studies is still more absurd.

On its economic side the "Republic" is least chimerical. It contains some just economic analyses and in general reflects the accepted economic notions of its time. Plato's aim is to establish a self-sufficing commonwealth with as little contact as possible with the outside world. Foreign commerce is discouraged, and to this end Plato locates his state at some distance from the sea. In internal commerce the use of the precious metals is dispensed with as far as possible, and the lending of money at interest is practically forbidden. Slavery is accepted as an ordinance of nature. The lowest forms of labor are given over to slaves and foreigners. The industrial classes are regarded as an inferior order of beings, so degraded by their habitual occupations as to be unfit for the higher duties of men and citizens. There is no conception anywhere of the dignity of man as man. All industrial activities are strictly regulated to the end that the higher classes may be duly supplied with the necessities and comforts of life.

Plato's communism obviously leaves no room for social distinctions based on wealth or birth, for there is neither private property nor family life in his state. He does, however, recognize social classes, political and economic, which depend on capacity, which is in turn largely a matter of heredity. Thus God has created certain ones of gold to be the rulers of the state, others of silver to be helpers and auxiliaries, and still others of brass and iron to be husbandmen and craftsmen; and each must take his place in the state in accordance with his God-given nature. While the general tendency of nature



is to reproduce the qualities of the parents in their children, Plato admits that the nature of the child does not necessarily follow that of his parents. A golden father may have a silver son and *vice versa*. Then the son must go up or down in the social scale in accordance with his personal worth. The effect of this principle is a constant transposition of ranks as between parents and children. The particular manner in which this transposition of ranks is to be accomplished Plato unfortunately leaves to the imagination of the reader.

This conception of society as a ceaseless flux and flow is one of the most remarkable notions of the republic. It is not only contrary to Hellenic ideas but totally unlike anything with which Plato could have been acquainted anywhere. The only thing that can be compared with it is the Spartan practice of enfranchising Helots and degrading citizens under special circumstances. But this occasional and limited feature of Spartan life differs widely from the universal equality of opportunity, the always open door to power and privilege, which Plato provides for the citizens of his state. No such degree of social fluidity was known to the ancient world, and in modern times it has remained an unrealized and unrealizable ideal even in the most advanced democracies.

One more fanciful feature of the republic is the analogy which Plato draws between the state and the individual. As there are certain types of individual character so there are certain corresponding forms of the state. Corresponding to the ideal or aristocratic state there is the perfect individual, the aristocratic man, in whom the lower faculties are held in due subordination to the higher. In like manner Plato describes in a series of parallels four perverted states, the timocratic, the oligarchic, the democratic and the tyrannical, together with their corresponding types of individual character. These several types of state and character succeed one another in a fixed order, a prescribed cycle, in which each is derived from that which preceded it.

Much of this is pure fancy for it pushes the analogy, which

undoubtedly exists between an individual organism and a social organism, too far. A state is a complex of many individuals. Its character is the resultant of many individual characters mixed together; its will the balance of many divergent wills. No body of men can move with the pliancy and facility of a single man. The more action and feeling are diffused through a community the weaker and more uncertain they become.

A final inquiry has to do with the manner in which this ideal state was to be realized. Like the ancients Plato had no idea of the perfectibility of the human race. Like modern socialists also he had an abiding faith in the unlimited efficacy of laws and outward social arrangements generally as though society had no power of spontaneity and was moved only by external impulses. Hence he expected his ideal to be realized in so far as it was realizable—and it was more realizable in Plato's day than it would be in ours—not through a slow and painful process of growth and development, but suddenly and with overwhelming force. It was not something that should come through a gradual transformation of human character, but something that should spring in full panoply from the head of the legislator.

Because of its freshness and brilliancy, and the singular charm of its style, the republic is easily the most celebrated of the ideal social systems of antiquity. It is the unrivaled representative of what must have been a considerable literature but much of which has been lost. Among the Greeks, owing to their undoubted talent and predilection for speculation, every eminent writer who thought about political and economic phenomena at all had his ideal state. Xenophon's "*Œconomicus*" and Aristotle's "*Politics*" have something of this speculative quality. But the Greek utopia which above all others deserves mention next to the "*Republic*" is Plutarch's *Lycurgus*, in which, under the guise of a biography, the author paints an ideal state as the conception of the half mythical or all mythical Spartan lawgiver. The general characteristics of Greek utopias have been noted in connection with the "*Re-*



public." They are: the complete subordination of the individual to the state in the interest of his development and its welfare; the minute regulation of every department of human life by the state; and a supreme belief in the efficacy of laws and institutions.

Apart from the writings of Hellenic poets and philosophers the ancient world contributed little to speculative social literature. In comparison with the Greeks the Romans were intensely practical, realistic and utilitarian, and probably the only social utopia which can be accredited to them, certainly the only one by an eminent writer, is Cicero's "*De Republica*," and of it only a few fragments have been preserved. These fragments clearly reflect Plato's ideas, for they borrow freely—in some instances they are hardly more than translations—from the "*Republic*," as well as from the "*Phædrus*," "*Phædo*" and "*Timæus*."

The spirit of the oriental theocracies of antiquity was altogether opposed to political and economic speculation. Their aim was the complete regulation of human life on the basis of inherited practical ideas, and the main characteristic of their social order was stability and conservation which usually degenerated into stagnation.

LANCASTER, PA.

## VIII.

### NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

**JESUS AND THE GOSPEL:** Christianity Justified in the Mind of Christ.  
By James Denney, D.D., Professor of New Testament Language, Literature and Theology, United Free Church College, Glasgow. New York, A. C. Armstrong & Son.

This is an interesting, a timely, and a very able work. It deals throughout with one of the vital problems in the theology of the present day. Was the Jesus who lived and wrought and taught in Galilee the same as the Jesus whose portrait has been transmitted to us in the Gospels? Or has the portrait of the real Jesus been so colored by the worshipful regard of his followers, and so overlaid by legendary accretions of the early church, that, when at last we succeed in recovering it, it will be found to differ very greatly from that presented by our New Testament writers? Difficult as it may be to believe it, that is the problem which a century of investigation into the life of Jesus has forced upon us. In the work before us, Dr. Denney deals with this important but difficult problem.

The New Testament represents Christianity as the life of faith in Jesus Christ. Christ is conceived as a person of transcendent greatness. He is also represented as a real, historical person; and the representations of his greatness are conceived as true. Can this representation be maintained? Generally the question has been answered in the affirmative; but there has been a reaction, and this reaction has been profound and far-reaching. It has raised two questions which Dr. Denney examines at length in the present work. What those questions are he himself states in the following form: "The first is, How far is the description just given of the New Testament correct? Is it the case that the Christian religious life, as the New Testament exhibits it, really puts Jesus in the place indicated, and that everything in this life, and everything, especially in the relations of God and man, is determined by him? In other words, is it the case that from the beginning Christianity has existed only in the form of a faith which has Christ as its object, and not at all in the form of a faith which has had Christ simply as its living pattern? The second question is of importance to those who accept what seems at a glance the only possible answer to the first. It is this: Can the Christian religion, as the New Testament exhibits it, justify itself by an appeal to Jesus? Granting that the spiritual phenomenon is what it is



said to be, are the underlying historical facts sufficient to sustain it? In particular, it may be said, is the mind of Christians about Christ supported by the mind of Christ about himself? Is that which has come to be known in the world as Christian faith—known, let us admit, in the apostolic age and ever since—such faith as Jesus lived and died to produce? Did he take for himself the extraordinary place which he fills in the mind and the world even of primitive Christians, or was this greatness thrust upon him without his knowledge, against his will, and in inconsistency with his true place and nature? We are familiar with the idea that we can appeal to Christ against any phenomenon of our own age which claims to be Christian: is it not conceivable that we may have to appeal to him even against the earliest forms which Christianity assumed?"

As will be seen at a glance, the problem is one of profound significance. If both questions can be answered in the affirmative, our faith in the reality and truth of our holy religion will be reassured and strengthened; if even the second only must be answered in the negative, that faith will have to be very greatly modified, if not altogether abandoned.

Dr. Denney's book naturally falls into two parts. In the first he gives his answer to the former of the two questions, under the general title, "Christianity as it is exhibited in the New Testament." In the other he deals with "The historical basis of the Christian faith." He answers both inquiries in the affirmative.

In the second part of the work, which is by far the larger, the author presents a very able apology for the Christian religion. It is true, he tells us that his aim was not primarily apologetic; yet, before he reaches the end, he has given us a very able defence of our faith. He refutes, and refutes successfully as it seems to us, many of the negative conclusions of certain critics, who, starting out with the presupposition that Jesus was only a man such as we are, have tried to discredit the historic credibility of a large part of our Gospels, and thus to reconstruct a thoroughly naturalistic portrait of our Lord. Not only did the disciples conceive of Jesus as unique, and as standing in a class all by himself; but all that we know of him forces us to the conclusion that that was the way in which he conceived of himself. All the facts of the New Testament, as well as of the Apostolic Church, force us to that conclusion.

We most heartily commend the book to all our ministers. No one will make a mistake in buying and studying it. It will, we believe, prove a wholesome tonic for all whose faith has been disturbed by negative and destructive criticism of the New Testament. There is much searching criticism in the book; but it is of a positive and constructive character. It is not vitiated before-

hand by the negative, naturalistic presuppositions which characterize so much of the Biblical criticism of the present day.

WM. C. SCHAEFFER.

THE IDEA OF THE RESURRECTION IN THE ANTE-NICENE PERIOD. ("Historical and Linguistic Studies in Literature Related to the New Testament," Series II., Part VIII.) By Rev. Calvin Klopp Staudt, Ph.D. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press. Price, 50 cents.

This is a dissertation submitted to the faculty of the Graduate Divinity School of the University of Chicago in the author's candidacy for the degree of doctor of philosophy, and now published in the form of a neat brochure of ninety pages.

The author's aim is to trace historically the development of the idea of the resurrection from its origin in the Old Testament, through Jewish and Christian literature, to the end of the first quarter of the fourth century. The topics treated are as follows: Jewish and Greek Literature; The New Testament; The Apostolic Fathers; The Apologists; The Gnostics; The Great Polemists; The Alexandrian School; The Later Writers.

The work shows careful study and investigation of the extant literature of the period. The author seems to have gone over, not only the books of the Old and New Testament, but also all the extant works of the Fathers, and to have carefully examined the passages bearing on the subject in hand. As such he has given us a distinctive and valuable contribution to our knowledge of this important doctrine. Such a historical study can not but be helpful at a time when the subject of the resurrection has once more become a burning question in our theological discussions. When the best minds of the age are trying to gain a clearer conception of the great mystery, and to restate the doctrine in such a form as to make it comprehensible by the modern mind, it is a matter of the first importance to trace its origin and development in the earliest extant literature on the subject. What was Jesus' conception of the resurrection? How did his designation, "The resurrection of the dead," or "The resurrection from the dead," become transformed into that of the creeds, "The resurrection of the flesh" and "The resurrection of the body"? How did the more spiritual conceptions of Jesus and of the New Testament degenerate into the more materialistic conceptions of the Fathers? These are among the subjects which Dr. Staudt has treated in an able and generally interesting fashion. We commend the essay to all who are interested in gaining a more accurate survey of the history of the doctrine of the resurrection.

WM. C. SCHAEFFER.



**THE ATONEMENT.** By the Rev. James Stalker, D.D., Professor of Church History and Christian Ethics in the United Free Church College, Aberdeen, Scotland. New York, A. C. Armstrong and Son. Pages 138.

This volume contains three lectures, delivered by the author, under the auspices of the Trustees of the McDonald of Ferintosh Trust, at Inverness, October 6, 7, 8, 1908. The subjects of the lectures are as follows: The New Testament Situation; The Old Testament Preparation; and The Modern Justification.

The lectures are in Dr. Stalker's well-known and felicitous style. By his former works, especially his *Life of Christ* and his *Life of St. Paul*, he has become widely and favorably known to the American religious public. Many who have enjoyed these earlier books will no doubt welcome this volume. It is a popular presentation of a great theme.

The lectures were no doubt intended to be what they are—a popular presentation of the subject treated: and one should hence not be disappointed in not finding in them an attempt at a systematic or scientific treatment of the doctrine of the Atonement. It is not a book for the student who is looking either for a history of the doctrine, or for its systematic statement. It goes but little beyond the Biblical statements. Yet many a devout believer, who is not looking for scientific theology, will find much that is both instructive and edifying in these lectures.

WM. C. SCHAEFFER.

**A SECOND LEAR OF SUNDAY SCHOOL LESSONS FOR YOUNG CHILDREN: A Manual for Teachers and Parents.** By Florence U. Palmer. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1908. Price, \$1.25 net.

This volume contains a series of lessons selected, arranged and adapted for the use of young children. As stated on the title page, it is intended to be a Manual for teachers and parents, and of course not to be placed into the hands of the children themselves. It assumes the need for the living teacher; and it contains only such selections of topics and Scripture passages, together with suggestive treatment, as the teacher can use in the presence of the class.

There are fourteen topics, each subdivided into from two to five subtopics. These topics are: Love, Courage, Joy, Speak the Truth, Our Heavenly Father, A New Commandment, Play, Happiness, Doing for Others, Work, Helping, Sharing, Thanksgiving and Christmas. Counting the subtopics there is a lesson for every Sunday in the year. The book likewise contains suggestions for review, as well as selections of music and illustrations.

In the present demand for graded lessons for the Sunday-school, this book will no doubt meet the wants of many. The selections are good, and the treatment suggestive. The story is

employed as the method for presenting and illustrating the truth. The primary teacher, even if she does not follow the order of topics, will find the book helpful. Yet we question whether it will pay any school to turn aside from the International Lessons for those here presented, especially now that an excellent series of graded lessons is prepared by the committee.

WM. C. SCHAEFFER.

**THE CHURCH AND MODERN LIFE.** By Washington Gladden. Boston and New York, Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1908. Pages 221. Price, \$1.25 net.

The author is well known as a prominent Congregationalist preacher and former moderator of that denomination, and has a wide reputation as a writer of forceful religious works. He has contributed to progressive theological thought in such books as, "Who Wrote the Bible?" "How Much is Left of the Old Doctrines?" and "Where Does the Sky Begin?" which questions he has answered in clear and convincing style for popular reading. His main concern in recent publications, however, has been with social questions, as is evidenced in his books, "Tools and the Man," "Applied Christianity" and "Social Salvation." He has been a leader rather than a follower in treating of Christianity from the social standpoint, and presents his ideals as a prophet of righteousness.

In the preface of the book under review, he quotes: "The time is come for judgment to begin at the house of God," and thus prepares us for a criticism of the Church in its relation to the needs of modern life: He looks forward hopefully to the work that confronts the Church and studies the conditions with the constant thought of the young men and women to whom its future is committed. He defines the Church as "the entire body of Christian disciples who are organized into religious societies and are engaged in Christian work and worship," thus giving a broad basis for his discussion, which moves always upon a high plane of thought.

He leads up to his theme by considering the roots of religion, which he finds in our relation to nature, the revelation of Jesus, and the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. He compares our religion with other religions, and finds that all indications point to the survival of the Christian religion as the permanent, universal religion. All this is preparatory to the discussion of the social side of religion, which brings him to the heart of his subject. To him, the essence of Christianity is that "the blessedness of life must be in our social relations." In this connection, he demonstrates the necessity of social worship, and, by implication, the need of the Church as an organization. The primary function of



the Church he takes to be the Christianization of the social order. "The business of the Church is to save the world by establishing here the kingdom of heaven." He quotes freely from Rauschenbusch and other recent writers to show how imperfectly the Church has performed this function, and prophesies a new reformation to "bring society to Christ as a social Savior." He calls for the quickening of the social conscience and the redemption of society by a new evangelism. Of this new evangelism, he says "It will not emphasize the interest of the individual; it will rather emphasize the truth that the individual can only be saved when he identifies his own welfare with the welfare of his fellow men." In inspiring words, he appeals to the young men and women of this generation in the Church to make the Church what it ought to be, in inspiring worship, helpful charity, democracy, simplicity, and the extension of the life of the Church into every department of human life. The modern viewpoint, clear style, sane optimism, prophetic earnestness and constructive spirit make this work valuable for the preacher as well as for the young men and women to whom it appeals.

ROBERT JAMES PILGRAM.

INDIA, ITS LIFE AND THOUGHT. By John P. Jones, D.D., of South India. New York, The Macmillan Company. Pages 448. Price \$2.50 net.

This is a most interesting and illuminating book on a subject that possesses great power of fascination for the western mind. The author has lived thirty years in India, the land of mystery, and even now he says modestly that he cannot claim to speak *ex cathedra* on the subject. But there is abundant evidence all through the book, of his thorough knowledge, genuine sympathy, fairness of view and sound critical judgment. The book lacks the glow of poetry so conspicuous in H. Fielding Hall's works; but it is undoubtedly the most sane and satisfactory presentation of the life and thought of India that has appeared in recent years.

It is well known that in this "land of quiet repose" there is abroad, just now, a spirit of discontent and unrest so widespread and deep as to cause a great deal of concern to British statesmen. In fact there have been serious apprehensions of another great rebellion in India. Dr. Jones regards this movement as a part of what has been called the awakening of the East, and he gives an excellent analysis of the causes and conditions, political, social and religious, which have led to the present state of things. At the same time he is hopeful that a better mutual understanding between the British and the natives will remove the trouble and restore peace and good will to the land.

India, the author says, is the home of many faiths, the mother or foster-mother of nine great religions. These systems of re-

ligion, their environment, the physical features of the country, and the home life of the people, are all described in a very attractive way so that the reader gets an insight into the working forces which mould the institutions of the country. The chapter on the Caste System is especially illuminating. The author first refers to the entrance of four different races into India, differing in color and features, as lying at the foundation of the four different castes, and then mentions the traditional theory of the Hindus themselves to the effect that the Brahman proceeded out of the divine mouth of Brahmâ, the warlike Kshatriya from his shoulders, the commercial Vaisya, from his thighs, and the menial Sudra from his feet. The modern students of social order, however, discard these explanations, and offer instead the following theories: (a) The Religions; (b) The Tribal; (c) The Social; (d) The Occupational; (e) The Crossing Theory. The caste feeling, we are told, has never been more intense than at present, and it has never been nearer its dissolution.

In discussing the forms of religious life and thought, the details of which are brought out with great judgment and keen insight, stress is laid upon the great difference between a religion that is a mere philosophy or an aspiration, and one that is the concrete realization of the divine life in the soul. The Hindu ideal of life which finds its consummation in rest, contemplation and final absorption in the divine, also presents a sharp contrast to the Christian idea of an eternal life of activity and individuality in their higher perfection, commensurate with the difference between Karma and grace, the Buddha and Christ.

The strength and weakness of Islam in India receive due attention, and the modern religious movement is carefully analyzed and discussed. On the whole the progress of Christianity in India is very encouraging and in the final chapter the author takes a hopeful view of its ultimate triumph. He thinks, however, it will not be precisely the type of Western Christianity in its ecclesiastic and institutional forms, but a Christianity that "breathes of the spirit, and speaks forth in the language and life of the people."

JOHN S. STAHR.

OUTLINES OF THE LIFE OF PAUL. By William C. Schaeffer, D.D., Professor in the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church, Lancaster, Pa. Philadelphia, Sunday School Board of the Reformed Church, 15th and Race Sts. Pages 91. Price 25 cents.

This clear, concise, suggestive little book, although very modest and unpretending, is really of great value both to the ordinary student of the Bible and to the Sunday-school teacher. It would be difficult to find within the same compass another book equally



sane, free from technicalities, and clear in presentation. Dr. Schaeffer indicates at the beginning of each chapter the Scripture passages which bear on the subject discussed, and he gives abundant evidence of a careful study of all the leading authorities, showing both the scholarship of the student and the skill of the teacher in his manner of presentation. The book is divided into sixteen chapters in which the leading events in the life of the great missionary apostle and his many-sided activity are carefully discussed, while the difficult problems and doubtful questions involved receive judicious and satisfactory treatment.

JOHN S. STAHR.

JOHN CALVIN, THEOLOGIAN, PREACHER, EDUCATOR, STATESMAN. By Rev. Philip Vollmer, Ph.D., D.D., Professor in the Central Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church, Dayton, Ohio. Philadelphia, Heidelberg Press. Pages 218. Price 75 cents.

This book comes as a welcome contribution to the celebration of the four hundredth anniversary of the birth of the great Reformer. It aims to be popular and practical rather than critical and exhaustive. At the same time the author shows careful study of his subject and thorough familiarity with the forces at work, the currents and counter-currents of life and thought during the period in which Calvin labored and in the shaping of which he had so large a part. It is evident, too, that he writes *con amore*, which makes his treatise all the more interesting.

The author treats first of all of the life of Calvin, his birth and training, his studies at the Universities, his conversion, and his activity as a minister and teacher. His great learning, his indefatigable energy, his great power as an organizer, his skill as a controversialist, and his unbending firmness in what he believed to be right and true are all set forth in the vicissitudes of his public and private life. After this we have a discussion of Calvin's personal character, his theology, etc.; and finally his relation to civil liberty and morality, and to modern thought, and his influence on Great Britain and Holland, on Switzerland and Germany, and on America, receive due consideration. The last two topics are treated respectively by Rev. J. I. Good, D.D., and Rev. Wm. H. Roberts, D.D., LL.D. The book is valuable as a contribution to church history and especially important and helpful at this time when the thoughts of men are so strongly centered upon the life and activity of this great leader.

JOHN S. STAHR.

# THE REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW

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No. 4.—OCTOBER—1909.

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## I.

### THE RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF TENNYSON'S "IN MEMORIAM."<sup>1</sup>

BY W. WILBERFORCE DEATRICK, SC.D.

Lovers of music throughout the world are, to-day, celebrating the centenary of the birth of a great musician, the precocious, rarely-gifted, intensely patriotic Polander, Frederic Francois Chopin. Less than a month ago, on February 5, the centennial of another likewise precocious, divinely endowed artist in sounds, Jacob Ludwig Felix Mendelssohn Bartholdy, was observed. This year of grace 1909 is, beyond many years of the recent past and more than for many years to come, a year of notable centenaries. The year 1809 was a truly wonderful year in that in it a more than ordinary number of children, who later served their generation most conspicuously, were born. Besides the great musicians who have been named, there were born in that year, just a century ago, at least seven other men, preeminent in various fields of human endeavor, who attained to high place in the esteem of their contemporaries and of posterity. Already we have celebrated the centenary of Edgar Allan Poe (January 19), of Charles Robert Darwin (February 12), of Abraham Lincoln (February 12), and of Cyrus Hall McCormick (February 15). Three more

<sup>1</sup> Read at meeting of the Lehigh (Reformed) Ministerial Association, South Bethlehem, Pa., March 1, 1909. Printed by request.



centenaries will be observed with more or less of national or of world-wide enthusiasm before the year shall end. The next is that of Alfred Lord Tennyson (August 5); following his will come that of the genial "Autocrat," Oliver Wendell Holmes (August 29), while, last of all, almost at the very end of the year (December 29) the hundredth birthday of "the Grand Old Man," William Ewart Gladstone, will demand and receive recognition from millions of the Anglo-Saxon race.

There is much in common in the life and work of these gifted men, especially of those who were really great. Concerning some of these nine there is, indeed, dispute as to their essential greatness, the rank of others is certain. Of one, a musician, it has been noted that his fame was greater half a century ago than it is now. The fiftieth anniversary of his birth was celebrated with greater enthusiasm than was his centenary. Another, a poet, though deemed by enthusiasts, especially by those beyond the seas, to have been the greatest man of letters as yet produced here in America, has so far, to the chagrin of his votaries, been unable to obtain a place in our Hall of Fame. We are as yet perhaps too near these men in point of time rightly to estimate their relative rank among their fellows, or properly to gauge the genuine value of their service to mankind. The fame of others of this remarkable group of gifted men has been steadily growing and their fame seems secure. Only the other day, all over this broad land, and even beyond ocean, honor was paid to one whose fame bids fair by another century to surpass, as even now it seems well nigh to equal, that of him who has been heretofore "first in war, first in peace, and first in the hearts of his countrymen."

Three of the nine great worthies of this centennial year were of our Anglo-Saxon kin in old England. What shall be the final estimate of "the Grand Old Man" who declined a peerage that he might remain one of the people it is too early to say. Of Darwin, first hated, then tolerated, then admired, given a resting place in Westminster Abbey, named by Churchmen "the doorkeeper of the universe," now almost

reverenced by all who are acquainted with his work and the methods thereof, with his life and the manner of the same, it seems safe to prophesy. His theories may be criticized, may be amended, may, in large measure, be superseded, but because he, more than all others of his century, whether right or wrong as to his honest conclusions, did more to make men think and think on lines which concern the deepest interests of mankind, his place is established, the priority of his rank is conceded, his fame is growing, and will grow.

And that other one, the author of the poem we are to discuss to-day—what of him? His fame grows too. He was one of the greatest men of his age. Of the really great poets of the Victorian Age there were but two: Browning and Tennyson. And most men hold, and hold rightly, that of these Tennyson was the greater, for reasons that may perhaps appear. Possibly by and by men shall speak of the Age of Tennyson instead of the Victorian Age, so greatly does this poet surpass his contemporaries. Distance lends enchantment to the view, and we are yet too near to Tennyson to see his life and work in proper temporal perspective. What is his rank among the greatest poets of the Anglo-Saxon race, or of the world? There are three great English poets: Shakspeare and Milton and Tennyson. Possibly "the bard of Avon" shall always rank the chief. None other is so myriad-minded. But of Christian poets who is to be, or shall be, accounted greatest? By most students, without doubt, Milton has been deemed the greatest Christian poet of our English tongue. Whether this estimate shall hold in the centuries to come seems questionable. Near the close of the last year the tercentenary of Milton's birth was celebrated. There was regrettable, though perhaps justifiable, lack of interest and of enthusiasm. Was this an indication that men are not estimating the great Puritan poet so highly as they were wont to do? Some one has said that every one concedes "Paradise Lost" to be our great English epic, one of the greatest poems of the ages, but most of those who grant this meed of praise have never read it



through, or, having once read it, do not return to it. That this religious poem has profoundly affected the thought of Englishmen, especially of Protestant Englishmen, there can be no doubt at all. As David dominated the religious thought of the Hebrews by his psalms, as Dante gave direction to Papist theology for centuries, so Milton has been, frequently more than the Bible itself, too much and too often, the inspiration for the thought of Protestant divines. Much of English Protestant theology has been Miltonic rather than Scriptural, just as much popular knowledge of sacred history has been derived through his great poem indirectly from the Bible rather than, as should be the case, directly from the sacred Scriptures themselves, as was finely illustrated by the case of a Bible class student who, when asked "Who was the father of Moses?" replied by quoting, not from the Pentateuch, but from "Paradise Lost," "the potent rod of Amram's son." Undoubtedly, as Simonds remarks: "The scope of its ['Paradise Lost's'] plan is the most ambitious that a poet could conceive." Nevertheless, there is much in the great epic that is unscriptural, extra-biblical, much that is mythological. Theologically it is out of touch with the thought of the present age. It deals so largely with themes which are beyond and away from our present, personal, social, religious interests, foreign to what we regard as the problems of humanity and of Christianity. It is coldly, wonderfully great. This is not the case, as we shall see, with the great masterpiece of the late British poet laureate.

It is worthy of note that critical estimates of Tennyson, of the art of his verse, of the nature and value of his service to humanity, and of his rank in comparison with other poets of our Anglo-Saxon speech have changed very materially as the years have past. At first fiercely assailed, then ridiculed, later damned with faint praise, before he died he was freely admitted by most critics to be the foremost poet of his age. Now that he is gone and the centenary of his birth approaches we find that careful students are more and more coming to laud

him greatly, to ascribe to him increasingly the highest rank not only in his own age but in all ages of English verse. It seems not unlikely, from the present trend of criticism, that when a greater stretch of time shall separate the critic from the subject of his criticism, when a truer perspective of the ages shall allow a more exact comparison, it will be seen and allowed on all sides that Tennyson was, if not the greatest English poet, nevertheless, the greatest Christian poet of English-speaking lands. Somehow already it seems that he ranks with the greatest religious poets, not only of the Anglo-Saxon race, but of all races and all the ages, with Job the ancient, and with David the sweet singer of Israel. The comparison with these masters of religious verse may appear further on in our study.

Of the deep and reverent religiosity and essential Christianity of Tennyson's verse as well as of his life there is no question among those who are conversant with both. Tennyson, more than other poets, lived the ideal which he sang in his poems and his poetry is the mirror of his life. Of his purity of life and absolute honesty of his purpose a recent writer (Robert F. Horton, in "*Alfred Tennyson, A Saintly Life*") says: "It is necessary to state succinctly yet distinctly, that Englishmen have had among them in the nineteenth century, one who, according to the fine Miltonic ideal, being set on the composition of poetry, found it essential himself to be a true poem. . . . Here was a piece of living which for its heroism, its singleness of aim, its human tenderness, its Divine outlook, passes forever into the treasure house of humanity. . . . Not only is there nothing base in the large volume of his verse, not only is he delicate as a girl in handling the dark problems of sin, but a burden of lofty teaching, a teaching which grew clearer with the years, gives a continuity to all his work. It is a burden of the same kind, though not of the same content, as that which came to the old Hebrew prophets. It is essentially the burden of the valley of vision. . . . He was like Chaucer's parson:

For first he wrought, and afterward he taught.



And he deserves the gratitude of men . . . for having given to the truths (which he stated) the peculiar weight which comes only from living them afresh in the special conditions of a man's own time."

Horton points out that the burden of Tennyson's religious message to his age was a threefold one. His three dogmas were: (1) the sanctity of marriage, (2) the supreme greatness of love, and (3) the certainty or assurance of immortality. Our present purpose does not permit digression to show how the first two great truths are exemplified in his life and are forcefully set forth in his poetry. Study of his poems will reveal that, especially if these are read by the aid of Horton's illuminating comments. It is with his greatest poem, a poem that more than all other poems of all ages deals with this third dogma of certainty or assurance of immortality, the sum and substance of the conclusion of which is the same as the utterance of Job, "I know that my Redeemer liveth," that we are now concerned.

I have called "In Memoriam" Tennyson's greatest poem, his masterpiece. Such I believe it to be. It is fair to say that respecting this there is difference of opinion. Some think that "The Idylls of the King" are greater. Hillis (in "Great Books as Life Teachers," p. 162) says: "From one view-point Tennyson's 'In Memoriam' is the most important religious poem of the century, but from another 'The Idylls of the King' forms a poem of equal value and importance. Because they represent the maturity of his art, his deepest convictions, and his highest wisdom, the 'Idylls' would seem to form the poem upon which his fame must ultimately rest. The works of Tennyson include more than three hundred quotations from the Bible, and are pervaded with a spirit so deeply devout that men have come to feel that he is our essentially religious poet, and that it is in the realm of religious thought that his genius has found its highest expression. If the 'Paradise Lost' looks backward and shows how one sin sent one man into the wilderness; if the 'Divine Comedy' looks forward

and shows how sin may be punished and purged away; the 'Idylls of the King' forms a study of the present and offers an outlook upon the great epochs and teachers of the soul."

Possibly "The Idylls" is Tennyson's greatest work: I am inclined to think, however, that the supreme place will finally be given by common consent to "*In Memoriam*." When the poem first appeared it was greeted with contemptuous criticism, even with derision. The critics very generally failed to see both beauty and purpose. One missed all so badly as to write: "These touching lines seem to come from the full heart of the widow of a military man," mistaking his cue because of the fact that the poem was first published anonymously. "But," as Mrs. Oliphant says, "criticism has died away into almost sacred respect for this unique poem. . . . These outcries . . . soon hushed in the universal adoption of this wonderful poem into the very heart of hearts of the English-speaking world." Morton Luce (in "*Handbook to Tennyson's Works*," p. 282) says: "Among the greater poems of Tennyson '*In Memoriam*' . . . is best known and best loved: the wisest, the most spiritual, often the most beautiful. It is one of the greatest poems of the nineteenth century."

Henry Van Dyke (in "*The Poetry of Tennyson*," p. 131) remarks: "Many beautiful poems, and some so noble that they are forever illustrious, have blossomed in the valley of the shadow of death. But among them all none is more rich in significance, more perfect in beauty or form and spirit, or more luminous with the triumph of light and love over darkness and mortality, than '*In Memoriam*,' the greatest of English elegies." It is worthy of study as an elegy, of comparison with the great elegies of all ages and of all lands, with David's lament for Jonathan, with Bion's elegy on the death of Adonis, with "the hopeless words of Catullus over his brother's tomb," with Milton's "*Lycidas*," or Gray's "*Elegy in a Country Churchyard*," or Shelley's "*Elegy on the Death of John Keats*," or, to come to our own time, with the verses of Swinburne occasioned by the death of Charles Baudelaire.



But it is not as an elegy that we are studying the poem. It is an elegy, the greatest of elegies, but it is more. Van Dyke himself, a little further on remarks: "It has . . . a twofold character; it is a glorious monument to the memory of a friend, and it is the great English classic on the love of immortality and the immortality of love. And so, as we prize, of David's verse, the beautiful, comforting, gloriously optimistic twenty-third psalm above his mournful lament for Jonathan, so do we value "In Memoriam" not so much because it is the greatest of elegies, but because though it "is a dead march, it is a dead march into immortality," as our last quoted author aptly phrases the thought.

Awhile ago it was hinted that there is a resemblance between "In Memoriam" and the book of Job. This resemblance struck me forcibly long ago. I had not known that others had noted the resemblance. Yet I was not surprised, a few days ago, to find that this similarity has been commented on. William J. Dawson, in "Quest and Vision," written in 1892, though I did not come upon the observation till so recently, says: "The 'In Memoriam' is the nineteenth century's book of Job, and is inseparably inwoven with the history of the century because it is woven out of the sentiment of the century." It seems to me that we may profitably carry the comparison further than does the brief allusion of Dawson. Closely studied the two great poems have much in common, and what has made Job a Biblical classic of the Hebrews may well make "In Memoriam" the modern secular Christian classic. Both are poems of splendid faith in the midst of difficulty, of sorrow, and of extreme trial. Both are a philosophizing about things as they are and as they ought to be, a struggle against doubt, and through doubt, to a radiant optimism and to a triumphant faith. Job suffered, Tennyson suffered. There was difference, of course, in their afflictions. But Job's sorest trouble was not his boils: neither was Tennyson's deepest grief his regret for his dead friend. Both had trials greater than these. When Job's afflictions came the

greatest affliction of them all was the temptation to question the goodness and wisdom of Jehovah. His wife said to him: "Curse God, and die." Then came his companions to comfort him. But instead of comfort they brought him greater distress. They were the "Wisdom" philosophers. But their philosophy brought him no comfort; indeed, when it was applied to his case, his trouble was increased, for according to it he was suffering justly for some wrong doing which he was unwilling to confess or for some sin of ignorance such as those for which the Israelite was to make an offering after he had offered for all the errors of which he had knowledge. There was every reason, apparently, for unfaith, for doubt, but Job wrestled with all the objections and with all the doubts and finally triumphed in a glorious faith. Just so it was with Tennyson.

The son of an orthodox churchman, grandson of a clergyman on his mother's side, carefully nurtured in a godly home, he grew up a professed Christian. He was familiar with the teaching of the Church, he was not unlearned in the Holy Scriptures, as is indicated by the number of allusions to the Bible found in poems written and published before the appearance of "*In Memoriam*." He had what is sometimes called faith, what often passes for faith, but what he later learned, and what we all should learn, was not true faith but merely credulity, the acceptance of asserted truth on untested authority. When this so-called faith of his was first shaken we do not certainly know. Andrew Lang (in "*Alfred Tennyson*," p. 68) speaks of "doubts and hopes and fears, which had been with Tennyson from his boyhood, as is proved by the volume of 1830." Possibly, while at Cambridge, he came under the influence of, as he certainly came into contact with, the growing agnosticism and infidelity of the time. Probably his interest in the philosophical discussions indulged in by the students were, at the time, little more than academic, as is often the case with young men in our colleges to-day. There may have been or may not have been anything of strong per-



sonal conviction in the positions which he took. But in 1831 when he was called home from Cambridge to the rectory at Somersby, and when a few days afterwards his father died, this question which the agnostics had declared to be an unanswerable one, "When a man dies shall he live again?" became a personal one for the young poet. This was his first coming face to face with eternal problems. Then his confidence was shaken. Doubts came or, if he had them before, increased. It is, however, in the nature of things for the old, for fathers well advanced in years, to die and, dear though they be, the shock of their death is not always so great as is the sudden taking away of an intimate friend with whom one has planned long years of active companionship and of mutual labor and helpfulness. Within two years and a half came the greater shock. Arthur Henry Hallam, the bosom companion of Tennyson,

Dear as the mother to the son,  
More than my brothers are to me,

as he expresses the intimacy of the relation, was suddenly and fatefully struck down in the prime of life, in the budding promise of a brilliant future. Then doubts came in earnest. Then the things of which he and his fellows had disputed at the university began to trouble his soul. The significance of the scientific studies which he had made perplexed him in real earnest. His personal loss made these questions very real to him. He doubted, and doubted seriously but honestly. The philosophy of the day gave him no help. Like the wisdom philosophy of the time of Job, it served only to perplex him the more. He could not hold to his old confidence and he did not wish to let it go. He could not bring himself to accept the conclusions of the skeptical philosophers and, at the time, could not repose placidly in his early "faith." Nevertheless, he would not blatantly, as some now do, parade his doubts, his lack of belief, to the discomfiture of others. This, it seems to me, was his mood when he wrote the beautifully unselfish canto XXXIII :

O thou that after toil and storm  
May'st seem to have reached a purer air,  
Whose faith has center everywhere,  
Nor cares to fix itself to form,

Leave thou thy sister when she prays,  
Her early Heaven, her happy views;  
Nor thou with shadow'd hint confuse  
A life that leads melodious days.

Her faith thro' form is pure as thine,  
Her hands are quicker unto good:  
O, sacred be the flesh and blood  
To which she links a truth divine!

See thou, that countest reason ripe  
In holding by the law within,  
Thou fail not in a world of sin,  
And even for want of such a type.

But such a faith, "of such a type," though pure, was not for him. Bible and dogma did not satisfy his mind. He doubted, and boldly but honestly faced his doubts. Yet he loved, and his love held him true in spite of his doubts. Nor did he regard his doubt as sinful any more than did Job of old. Tennyson saw that his doubting was the means of solving the questions that harassed him. This attitude is evidenced in Canto XCVI:

You say, but with no touch of scorn,  
Sweet-hearted, you, whose light-blue eyes  
Are tender over drowning flies,  
You tell me, doubt is Devil-born.

I know not: one indeed I knew  
In many a subtle question versed,  
Who touch'd a jarring lyre at first,  
But ever strove to make it true:

Perplexed in faith, but pure in deeds,  
At last he beat his music out.  
There lives more faith in honest doubt,  
Believe me, than in half the creeds.



He fought his doubts and gather'd strength,  
 He would not make his judgment blind,  
 He faced the spectres of the mind  
 And laid them: thus he came at length

To find a stronger faith his own;  
 And Power was with him in the night,  
 Which makes the darkness and the light,  
 And dwells not in the light alone,

But in the darkness and the cloud,  
 As over Sinai's peaks of old,  
 While Israel made their gods of gold,  
 Altho' the trumpet blew so loud.

This canto tells the story, this gives us the key to the religious significance of "In Memoriam." The poem is a life history. It is the autobiography of one who, through doubt, found the "stronger faith," the genuinely true faith, so greatly in contrast with the early "faith," which was only acceptance of authority. And so the prologue which, first in the poem as we have it now, was written last, gives the conclusion to which, after wandering through the maze of doubt, the poet arrived:

Strong Son of God, Immortal Love,  
 Whom we, that have not seen thy face,  
 By faith, and faith alone, embrace,  
 Believing where we cannot prove;

Thine are these orbs of light and shade;<sup>1</sup>  
 Thou madest Life in man and brute;  
 Thou madest Death; and lo, thy foot  
 Is on the skull which thou hast made!<sup>2</sup>

Thou wilt not leave us in the dust:  
 Thou madest man, he knows not why,  
 He thinks he was not made to die;  
 And thou has made him; thou art just.

<sup>1</sup> Reference is made to the planets.

<sup>2</sup> There is here, doubtless, an allusion to certain old paintings which represented a skull at the foot of the cross, and, possibly a reference also to a legend which says that Adam was buried at Golgotha (the place of a skull) where Christ was crucified.

Thou seemest human and divine,  
The highest, holiest manhood, thou:  
Our wills are ours, we know not how;  
Our wills are ours, to make them thine.

. . . . .  
We have but faith: we cannot know;  
For knowledge is of things we see;  
And yet we trust it comes from thee,  
A beam in darkness: let it grow.

Let knowledge grow from more to more,  
But more of reverence in us dwell;  
That mind and soul, according well,  
May make one music as before,

But vaster.

Thus Tennyson wrought his way through doubt to reverent, absolute trust in God and Christ, to cheerful and complete submission of his will to God's will. And that is what true faith is, and that is the chief religious significance of "*In Memoriam*."

"*In Memoriam*" teaches us better than any other human composition in what true faith really consists. When, while yet a boy, I studied the "*Heidelberg Catechism*," I was greatly concerned as to the nature of true faith, and I never could understand satisfactorily the theological phrasing of that honored standard. But I have learned what it is from "*In Memoriam*." There is no true faith save that which comes after one has doubted. Faith is much misunderstood by even those who should know better. There are four stages in the process of attaining to faith. These are: (1) credulity—or incredulity, (2) doubt or injury, (3) belief, (4) faith. There can be no real belief without doubt. A man may say "I believe," may subscribe to a creed and assert that to be his belief, may even lay his hand upon the Holy Scriptures and declare that he accepts them, but unless his mind has wrestled with doubts and laid the doubts, there is nothing volitional, moral, personal, in his asseverations or professions.



Such a one is not believing, he is merely credulous. Nor is belief enough. We read that "the devils believe and tremble." Faith is necessary, not that "pure faith" of the sister, not mere assent to authority, however exalted, but the more noble faith, the faith that comes through doubt and is greater and more efficacious than mere belief.

Men use the words belief and faith carelessly and inexactly, often as though they were synonymous. But the terms are not synonyms. We should distinguish between them. The distinction is that faith is belief plus trust. Love makes the difference. He that believes and trusts has the higher, nobler faith, the genuine faith. It is the absence of loving trust from the devils' belief that keeps the devils from being saints, for the devils hate and do not love and so cannot trust. Consequently devils have no faith.

Whatever other significance "In Memoriam" may have, it has this for the thoughtful student in these days of wonderful scientific discoveries; it traces the progress of a professed Christian through doubts, accentuated if not originated by the discoveries which, as an intelligent man, he can not ignore or avoid if he would, to the exultant, optimistic faith that characterizes the saint, the faith that results in trustful, absolute surrender of the individual will to God's will and consequent devotion of the personality with all its powers to the service of

That God, which ever lives and loves,  
One God, one law, one element,  
And one far-off divine event,  
To which the whole creation moves.

The Christian world will, I confidently expect, come more and more to value this great poem even as it treasures certain of the psalms of David to which it is so closely akin in more ways than one. It might be interesting and profitable to trace this kinship. Suffice it to remark that in no other production of modern times do we have a human heart in time of storm and stress speaking so directly to other sorely tried human hearts. Above all other secular compositions it is, for-

sooth, the "epic of the inner life" or, perhaps, to be more accurate, these "swallow-flights of song" are truly lyrics of the soul.

Time fails to attempt an estimate of what has been accomplished by "In Memoriam" as "a real *apologia pro Christiana fide*,"<sup>3</sup> for such it is. One sentence from Horton (p. 126) may serve as a brief summary. He says: "Partly of set purpose and acting, as we may well believe, under the breath of the spirit, he had struck a blow, the deftest blow that could be struck, in the cause of faith."

Two characteristics of Tennyson, his absolute honesty and his unerring accuracy, have won the respect and confidence both of religionists and of scientists, and so his poem has accomplished in some quarters what the most fervid exhortations of preachers have failed to accomplish. "In Memoriam" surpasses all other attempts to reconcile science and religion, and its excellency rests largely in these two characteristics of its author. Tennyson knew science and he knew his Bible. In this respect this great poet stands forth in vivid and commendable contrast with many other writers, both scientists and theologians, on such themes.

Preachers often err when dealing with scientific problems, and such as are inclined to discuss questions involving scientific knowledge may well take Tennyson as their model. Much harm is not infrequently done by inaccuracy in illustrations or in exposition of scientific theories. As President Faunce remarks in his recent volume, "The Educational Idea in the Ministry": "Young men trained by scientific methods in college are not to be attracted by unscientific and inaccurate thinking in the pulpit." And this remark is not unwarranted, as a few well authenticated instances clearly indicate. One clergyman, preaching the presidential sermon at the opening of classis, taking as his text "science falsely so-called," made a violent attack on certain eminent scientists and their teachings. The preacher was entertained by one of his auditors.

<sup>3</sup> Horton, "Alfred Tennyson, A Saintly Life," p. 122.



Seated in the library the host said to his guest, "that was a vigorous sermon you gave us to-night." "Thank you," said the preacher. "And it was all right except for one thing," continued his entertainer. "Ah! and what was wrong?" "It was not true. You misrepresented entirely the authors whose opinions you attempted to condemn." The host, aware that the preacher had not a single standard scientific book in his library and having drawn out the admission that he had not read the authors he condemned, went to his own bookshelves and taking down a masterpiece of science, read aloud the last paragraph of the book, asking his friend his opinion of that. Confession was made that no exception could be taken to that utterance. Yet that book was the standard one on the subject of which it treated and was written by the immediate pupil and most intimate friend of one of the scientists whom the preacher had pilloried by name in his sermon. Another clergyman, in a neighboring state, discussed evolution in a sermon which, whether the theory of evolution be true or false, was so blatant and passionate, so grossly inaccurate in its statements, displaying so extended ignorance of what advocates of the theory assailed really do maintain, that the discourse disgusted all intelligent hearers and by its palpable partisanship and dishonesty drove out of the church a scholarly and devout college professor who could not condone the sham.

Scientific illustrations and allusions are frequent pitfalls to unwary preachers who delight in such embellishments. Some years ago a most worthy divine, preaching to a congregation composed in large part of students of a preparatory school, attempted to appeal to this portion of his audience by enforcing a potent truth by an illustration from geography. But the point taken would have been far more emphatic without the illustration because not a student present but knew that the illustration was faulty, since the assumed geographical fact had long been recognized as an error by competent geographers the world over. The preacher took as his authority

the text-book he studied when a boy. Yet another pastor blundered pitifully in addressing children at a Christmas service declaring that "Christ is like the sun which shines by its own light while Christians are like stars *which shine by light reflected from the sun.*" The harm done by such sermons, such illustrations, such allusions can hardly be estimated. Assumption of scientific knowledge which is not possessed must be avoided by the Christian preacher if he would hope to hold the confidence of intelligent auditors or to win to faith doubters and those not already believers in the Christian revelation.

Inquiry into the phenomena, the processes, the laws of nature, which is one form of divine revelation is, however, neither uninteresting nor unprofitable. Such inquiry on the part of a Christian minister is entirely proper and nature sermons have their place and may accomplish great good. But in his study and his preaching, in his effort "to justify the ways of God to man," to solve convincingly the problems which in this age will rise, will hold the attention of his most thoughtful and earnest hearers, the preacher, if he is to profit himself and them that hear him, if he is to maintain his rightful eminence as an authority on spiritual things, must be honest and accurate, must shun inaccuracy and superficiality. He must not commit the error of the average preacher who, essaying such themes, succeeds, too often, only in disgusting intelligent hearers who, knowing more about these things than the preacher does, and recognizing the superficiality of his pronouncements on matters scientific, not illogically rate his religious utterances at the same value as they must rate his scientific ones. It is of sermons by preachers of this sort that Dr. Henry Van Dyke, in his "Gospel for an Age of Doubt," makes the discerning observation that "as a rule nothing could be of less value than the scientific sermons of preachers who have only a bowing acquaintance with science."

Illustrations like those given above might be multiplied to prove the assumption of the genial Van Dyke, but the reverse



should be true, and it may be true if only the minister in this "age of doubt" will be like the author of "*In Memoriam*," if he will be but painstaking and patient, reverent, accurate and honest in his study of problems such as these. It is imperative that he take the attitude taken by our poet in his search for truth. The phenomena of the natural world richly reward such study. To one maintaining such an attitude they are deeply suggestive and confirm faith instead of destroying it. Plucking a flower from the wall and reverently regarding it, Tennyson wrote:

Flower in the crannied wall,  
I pluck you out of the crannies,  
I hold you here, root and all, in my hand,  
Little flower—but *if* I could understand  
What you are, root and all, and all in all,  
I should know what God and man is.

It is the privilege and the duty of the minister to study the creation, the unwritten Word of God, as Tennyson did. Then, discovering the truth in nature and the relationship between the two words and declaring that truth clearly to his people, he may in his discourse really illumine their understanding, bringing them to realize in fuller measure than otherwise the wisdom and goodness of their Father, confirming the devout in their confidence, convincing scientists who hear him that his messages are authoritative and true, and winning even doubters of revelation to faith in the Master in whom he believes, in whom he trusts, and whom he serves.

KUTZTOWN, PA.

## II.

### THE RIGHTS AND LIMITS OF BIBLICAL CRITICISM.<sup>1</sup>

BY PROF. WILLIAM C. SCHAEFFER, D.D.

As will be readily seen, the subject which the committee has assigned to me is very comprehensive. It is too large to be disposed of within the limits of this paper. Hence I deem it prudent at the outstart to limit its scope to much narrower bounds, and, instead of speaking of Biblical criticism as a whole, to speak only of that of the New Testament. Even here it may be expedient to confine ourselves to a consideration of one aspect of the subject, that namely which has to do with the Gospels. It is here especially that we meet with the crucial problems, which at the present day confront the Biblical student. The time was when Old Testament criticism occupied the field; at least, it had attracted to itself almost the entire attention of the public. That time is past. If we can not say that the problems in Old Testament criticism are in the main settled, it is not too much to say that Old Testament students are approaching common ground and beginning to arrive at more nearly unanimous conclusions. And in any event, the problems of the Old Testament are not so vital for our faith as those of the New; for it is only when we come to the problems which criticism has started with reference to the New Testament, and especially the Gospels, that we come to the heart of our most holy faith. I deem it, therefore, expedient to confine my remarks exclusively to the criticism of the New Testament, and almost entirely to that of the Gospels.

<sup>1</sup> Read at the Nineteenth Annual Assembly for Spiritual Conference of Ministers and Laymen of the Reformed Church, at Lancaster, Pa., July 27, 1909.



I need not remind you that Biblical criticism falls into two distinct branches: the lower, or textual criticism; and the higher, or literary and historical criticism. Though the main interest, as well as the principal issues, lie within the scope of the latter, a few things should be said with reference to the former; for all true criticism, as well as all thorough study of the Biblical books, must begin with the determination of the text. No matter how thorough and painstaking the literary critic may be, his results can have comparatively little value so long as he is dealing with a corrupt text.

As every student of the New Testament knows, our *textus receptus* has back of it very slender manuscript authority. It is based almost exclusively on late manuscripts, and those of inferior value. The Elzevir publishers were no doubt thoroughly honest, when, in publishing the second edition of their Greek New Testament in 1633, they said in their preface, "Textum ergo habes, nunc ab omnibus receptum: in quo nihil immutatum aut corruptum damus." "Therefore thou hast the text now received by all: in which we give nothing altered or corrupt." They did the best they could. They made use of the editions of Alcala, of Erasmus, of Beza, and of Estienne; and these were the best known in their day; but they knew nothing of the great uncials, nor of the age of the manuscripts which had been employed in the determination of their text. The unfortunate sentence, above quoted, helped to foist their edition on the public; and for a period of about two hundred years it held despotic sway over Christian scholarship.

The story of how the *textus receptus* was finally revised by the patient and painstaking labors of men like Carl Lachman, Tischendorf, Tregelles, Westcott and Hort is a long and interesting one; but it must be passed by here with a single reference to the results which have been attained. Most of the results have been embodied in our Revised and Standard versions; and all of us are hence more or less familiar with them. They consist mostly in improved readings; but in several cases the critics have used the knife, and cut out passages which

before had been received. It is true, that, considering the great amount of labor expended, and the large number of readings which have been emended, the number of passages which have been eliminated is very small. After an entire century of textual criticism there are only three passages which critics affirm have no place in the New Testament, and only three others which probably should be excluded. The former are 1 John 5: 7, 8, the passage on the heavenly witnesses; Mark 16: 9-20, the conclusion to the second Gospel; and John 7: 53-8: 11, the account of the woman taken in adultery. The latter are Luke 22: 43, 44, the reference to the angel in Gethsemane; Matthew 16: 2, 3, the saying of Jesus with reference to the signs in the sky both evening and morning; and John 5: 3, 4, the reference to the angel troubling the waters at the pool of Bethesda.

With reference to the former passages, these observations may be made: the disputed words in 1 John 5: 7, 8 are omitted in both the Revised and the Standard versions, without so much as a reference to them in the margin; Mark 16: 9-20 is printed in both the revisions, but with a space separating it from the main body of the Gospel, and with the marginal statement, "The two oldest manuscripts, and some other authorities, omit from verse 9 to the end"; John 7: 53-8: 11 is printed in both the revised versions, but separated from the main body of the Gospel both by spaces and by brackets, and in the margin the statement is made, "Most of the ancient authorities omit John 7: 53-8: 11." With reference to the second triplet both revisions add in the margin, in each case, the statement that the passages are omitted in many of the ancient manuscripts.

The question of the rights and the limits of textual critics in making these excisions, and in casting doubt upon the authority of the other passages, has probably already suggested itself to some of you. Have the critics the right to cut out from First John the words, "And there are three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost,"



and in the following verse the words "in earth"? Any one who has studied the history of the passage, and who has any realizing sense of the way the words were foisted into the text, will no doubt answer in the affirmative; for they have no authority in the ancient manuscripts; and they owe their origin apparently to a heretic of the fourth century, to Priscillian, a Spanish bishop, who, strange to say, did not accept the doctrine of the Trinity, though the passage is sometimes quoted as if it were a very bulwark of said doctrine. Has the critic the right to cut off the last twelve verses of the Gospel according to St. Mark? Undoubtedly the authority of the oldest manuscripts is against the passage, as a part of the Gospel; and a few years ago Frederick Cornwallis Conybeare found an old Armenian manuscript which ascribes these verses to the Presbyter Aristion. Very much the same state of affairs holds with reference to the story of the adulteress in John 7: 53-8: 11. Most of the ancient authorities omit the passage; and those which contain it vary very much from each other.

We are constrained, therefore, to say that the critics have the right to cut out these three passages from the text; for the evidence is almost entirely against them. But are there not also limits which must be imposed on the critics at this point? Undoubtedly; for all that the textual critic can say is that, on the strength of the best evidence obtainable, these passages did not belong to the respective books, as originally written. But they can not on the same ground affirm any thing as to the truthfulness of the statements themselves. Take the concluding verses in Mark. They are a summary of the resurrection story, giving us the main facts stated in the other Gospels, and possibly on the authority of a man who personally stood as near to Jesus as Mark himself. At any rate, we must admit the correctness of the report which the passage gives; for it clearly comes to us from a very early time, and it is corroborated by the other evangelists. As to the story of the adulteress in the Fourth Gospel, it is safe to say, that there is so much intrinsic probability in it that most persons would be inclined to admit

its truthfulness on that ground alone. It is probably one of those fragmentary narratives which, as Luke tells us, floated about in the Apostolic church; and it may be that, to preserve the beautiful story, some scribe copied it into the margin of John's Gospel, from which a subsequent scribe transferred it to the text.

With reference to the textual critic we should hence say that his rights are as full as the evidence of his manuscripts goes. If new manuscripts should be discovered, which should clearly antedate our great uncials, and if they should change any important readings, we should clearly have to follow any further emendations of the text, which the critics, after careful investigation, should feel it necessary to make. But the textual critic is just as clearly limited by the evidence of his manuscript authorities. He has no right to change the text at any point merely to suit his own subjective feeling, or to make it agree with any preconceived notions. And he is limited to the determination of the text. When that is accomplished, his mission is at an end. When it comes to the determination of the historic and religious value of any portions which his evidence compels him to exclude from the true text, he must give way to the literary and historical critic—to what, for want of a better term, we call the higher criticism.

And this brings us to what is really the more interesting and the more important part of my theme, and to what your committee probably had more particularly in mind, when they assigned to me this topic. What are the rights and limits of the higher critics? And we raise the question more especially with reference to the New Testament.

In order that there may be no misunderstanding, it may be well to pause here for a moment to define our terms; for, though the higher criticism has been defined so often that there ought to be no reason for repeating the definition, yet there is still so much confusion and misunderstanding on the subject that a few words in passing may be pardoned.

To quote here the *Century Dictionary*, "Criticism is the art



of judging of and defining the qualities or merits of a thing, especially of a literary production." "In a restricted sense," it is, "inquiry into the origin, history, authenticity, character, etc., of literary documents." It applies to the Classics as well as to the Scriptures, to Shakespeare as well as to the Bible; and the canons which regulate the process are substantially the same, whether the document under investigation is a sacred or a merely literary composition. The higher criticism is simply a method of study; its aim is to ascertain all that can be known with reference to the origin, the history, the authenticity, the character, and the original meaning of a writing. It employs the lexicon, the grammar, rhetoric, history, philology, and all kinds of contemporary literature to reach its conclusion. It has accomplished its task only when it has subjected the book to all possible tests for the ascertainment of the facts.

Turning now to our Gospels, and especially the Synoptic Gospels, it will be seen how exceedingly important the process is. If the Gospels are a part of the Word of God, if they contain the only authentic account of the life, the work, and the teaching of our Lord, we want to know all about them that human wisdom and learning can teach us. We can not afford to allow any serious misconceptions with reference to their origin, their history, their authenticity, or their character, to stand between us and a full understanding of their precious contents. As Marcus Dods has said, if God had not raised up critics to do this work for us, we should undoubtedly be under the necessity of appointing men for the task.

Now, the rights of the higher critics with reference to our Gospels is determined by the very nature of their work. They have a right to a full and impartial hearing on all points involved in the literary and historical study of the Gospels. It is they who discovered the intricacies and the difficulties of the Synoptic problem; and it is they who will have to work their way through the labyrinth of questions which naturally come up as to the literary and other relationships between Matthew,

Mark and Luke. And any of us, who may inadvertantly enter upon that interesting and inviting field of investigation, will simply become, for the time being, a higher critic, though perchance he may not know it. It is the province of the higher critics to study the language of the Gospels, without being fettered by any preconceived notions about a sacred dialect; and when they find, as they have found, that the language used is simply the *κοινὴ*, the common language of the people, spoken not simply in Palestine, but in Egypt, in Asia Minor, and at Rome, it is their privilege to study it alongside of any other documents written in the same speech, to compare its words with the same words used elsewhere, and thus to get at their true meaning. They are likewise within the strict limits of their work, when they compare the Gospels with each other, with the view of pointing out their similarities and differences; when on the basis of these similarities and differences, they try to determine their literary and other interdependence; when they employ all the light given by the Fathers on the question of authorship and date; when they carefully weigh each peculiarity of style and diction, and employ it in assigning to each its proper place, its true purpose, and its intended readers; and when they study all the historical circumstances, which lie back of any of the Gospels, and which have shaped their forms of expression, their selection of material, and their manner of presentation. In a word, the higher critics are strictly within their rights so long as they confine themselves to the literary and historical study of the Gospels, without prejudices or prepossessions which may warp their conclusions.

And it may be well for us to pause here just long enough to note a few of the gains which have come to us from just this kind of Gospel criticism. Without going into detail, it may be enough to remind ourselves of the great gain which has come from the literary analysis of the Synoptic Gospels. While it has become clear that all three belong to a considerably earlier period than was once claimed by many critics, so



that there are very few scholars left who would assign any of them to the second century; it has also become evident that they rest upon sources, some of which at least belong to the first quarter of a century after the death of Jesus.<sup>2</sup> And not only have these sources been thus traced to within a comparatively short period after the events, but they have been traced to men who had a personal knowledge of the facts of which they testify. Thus it is now generally accepted that back of our present Matthew and Luke lie the Gospel according to Mark and the Logia of Matthew; and it is an equally well established fact that back of Mark's Gospel is the preaching of Peter, while the Logia are accepted as the records of that publican apostle whom Jesus called at the very beginning of the Galilean ministry. And this literary study has yielded also another result. Our critics have gone into the manner in which the gospel story was at first transmitted from mouth to mouth, how the "teaching" of which so much is said in the early chapters of the Acts resembled the synagogue instruction, in which it was the business of the teacher to repeat a portion of the sacred text over and over, again and again, until the pupils, who were seated around him, had committed it to memory. If the higher criticism of the Gospels had yielded no other results than this bringing of the narratives into almost immediate touch with the facts, there would be an inestimable gain; and we may hence well be jealous for the

<sup>2</sup>In speaking of the higher valuation, which is now being placed on our Gospel sources, Professor George Dewitt Castor, in the August number of the *Biblical World*, p. 116, says: "Such men as Wellhausen, Dahlman, and Nestle have definitely established that most of the material of the Synoptic Gospels comes directly from the Aramaic, the language of Palestine. This means, as Jülicher says, that 'the gospel was essentially completed in the home of Jesus before his generation had passed away, and believing Jews wrote it down then in their own language. This sentence has more weight than a hundred questions against gospel verses.'" This is a confirmation of Dr. A. Wright's contention that Mark's gospel is essentially the teaching of Peter at Jerusalem during the years immediately following the Ascension. But if this position can be maintained, as we believe it can, where is the room for the growth of legend in the gospel story?

rights of Gospel criticism. While it has been abused, and while the enemy has found in it weapons with which he has done and is still doing great harm, it has also furnished the weapons with which the attacks of the enemy have been and may be warded off. And our refuge from the dangers of the higher criticism, as applied especially to the Gospels, and which some have feared so much, is to be found, not in decrying the higher critics; for, as before said, the higher criticism is only a method of study; but in a more thorough and careful application of that method to the study of all the problems which it has raised. But to obtain these results the method must be rightfully and judiciously employed; and the method has its limitations, as well as its rights, which must be recognized.

What are these limitations? It is evident that these must be carefully observed, if we would obtain proper and reliable results.

It must be apparent that the higher criticism has its limitations in the very task which it seeks to accomplish. To command our respect and confidence, the higher critic must be content to be a critic and to use legitimate methods of literary and historical investigation. He must not attempt to play the rôle of the dogmatist; nor dare he come to his task with such dogmatic possessions as will make an unprejudiced investigation impossible. Of course, it will be impossible for him to free himself from all prepossessions; for we all have our conceptions of God and the universe. They are part of our intellectual life; and it is as impossible for us to free ourselves from them as it is to rid ourselves of our minds. But these preconceptions must not be held in such a way as to allow them to become prejudices. We must have the ability to hold ourselves open to the truth wherever that may lead. And in as far as we shall not be able to do that, the results of our investigations will depend on the validity of the judgments which we bring to our task.

What I mean may perhaps be best illustrated by several con-



crete examples; for we have an abundance of cases where men have come to the Gospels with such dogmatic and philosophical prepossessions that their conclusions have been totally different from what they would otherwise have been.

As is well known, there are many men who find it difficult to accept the miraculous. They point us to the fact that stories of miracles have been told of all the great heroes of history, of Buddha, of Mohamet, of Thomas Becket, of St. Francis of Assissi, and of many others. They likewise tell us that, in view of our modern conception of natural law, miracles are an impossibility. God is a God of law and order; he has accomplished his ends in the creation through the slow processes of evolution, where effect is so closely bound to antecedent cause that an irruption of new creative energy is impossible. Hence when such persons come to the Gospels they must find some expedient for disposing of these miraculous narratives. Miracles are incompatible with their philosophical view of the world; they have dogmatically determined beforehand that all such narratives can not be taken in the sense in which the evangelists intended them. They come to the narrative with the fixed opinion that they are historically incredible. Oscar Holtzmann is a good illustration. When he comes to the narrative of Jesus walking on the sea, he starts out by saying, "Geschichtlich kann diese Erzählung nicht sein"; and then he goes on to give an explanation of how such a story might have originated. Now, while Holtzmann is solely responsible for his view on the subject of miracles, the view modifies the validity of his critical conclusions; and his conclusions can have no more validity than his preconceptions. If his view of the miracle is wrong, then all that he has built upon it must fall. In estimating his results, it is important to keep in mind this distinction between his preconceived notion of the miracle and his critical processes. The latter may be genuine and correct so far as they go; but they rest upon a dogmatic assumption which I, at least, believe to be mistaken.

Probably the high water mark in this kind of criticism was reached by Professor Schmiedel in his article on the Gospels in the "*Encyclopædia Biblica*." As he afterwards explained in his preface to Neumann's "*Jesus*," he finds three distinct classes of passages in the Gospels. The one he calls "plainly incredible"; the second he characterizes as "plainly credible"; and to the third he assigns "an intermediate position as bearing on their face no certain mark either of incredibility or of credibility." And the mark of credibility or incredibility which he thinks he can find on the very face of many passages is their reflection of the worshipful regard of the followers of Jesus. All the Gospels were written by worshippers of Jesus. And passages which reflect their worshipful regard for Jesus he calls "plainly incredible"; while the few (he finds only nine such), which can not be conceived as proceeding from such regard, and which can not be conceived as invented by the worshippers of Jesus, he designates as "plainly credible." That is, all that the Gospels contain that betrays that their authors looked upon Jesus as divine and hence as worthy of worship is put down as incredible; and, unless I have greatly mistaken Professor Schmiedel's whole argument, he looks upon them as incredible, because for him Jesus was no more than a man, and can hence not have done or said the things on which such worshipful regard is based.<sup>3</sup> Now, Pro-

<sup>3</sup> We are not concerned here with the few passages, which Professor Schmiedel calls "plainly credible." As over against the denial of the historicity of Jesus, we freely grant that there is force and validity in the argument based on these "foundation pillars." Our concern is with those which he styles as "plainly incredible," and with his reasons for calling them incredible. What these reasons are he himself has told us, thus: "What are the portions of the Gospels which are so persistently objected to? We find that they are, to say all in a word, those in which Jesus appears as a Divine Being whether in virtue of what he says or in virtue of what he does. And the reason why exception is taken to these passages may be stated thus: the Gospels are, all of them, the work of worshippers of Jesus, and their contents have been handed down through the channel of tradition in like manner by his worshippers; the portions to which exception is taken are open to the suspicion that they are the outcome of these feelings of devotion, and not purely objective renderings of the facts as they actually occurred."



fessor Schmiedel has a perfect right to his own view as to the divinity of Christ, and he has a right to teach it to others; but when he brings that dogmatic preconception to his critical work on the Gospels, and then asks us to accept his conclusions as those of an impartial investigator, we have a right to demur. His critical conclusions are worth no more than his dogmatic preconceptions which he has undertaken to inject into his work.

We might cite other illustrations; but enough has been said on this point to bring out a principle. *The higher criticism of the Gospels is limited by the dogmatic and the philosophical*

An illustration of how this principle works out may be found in Neumann's "Jesus"; for he was a pupil of Schmiedel's and has avowedly used his method. Luke 2: 52 is freely used as a "foundation pillar"; and of the entire section, Luke 2: 41-52, Neumann says, "Its authenticity is guaranteed by this, that it contains no trace of the doctrine of a supernatural birth. It still speaks of both the parents of Jesus in quite a natural way (see vs. 41, 43, 48); and, moreover, they have no suspicion of his greatness. The story further supplies another of the foundation pillars on which to build the story of Jesus' life—the saying about his growth (see v. 52). Such sayings could never have been invented by the worshippers of Jesus, nurtured in a later dogma regarding his person. They must have been taken over from some source as an historical inheritance." But with reference to the words in v. 49, "Wist ye not that I must be in the things of my Father," his estimate is totally different. Of these he says, "We must simply concede that this answer was formulated by a later writer. Who was there who could have made permanent record of it in that first hour in Jerusalem?" It is one of the passages which show Jesus to have been something more than a man; and hence it is waved aside as "incredible," though there is not the slightest evidence in the text or elsewhere that it is not genuine.

Now, this, we maintain, is not criticism, either literary or historical, but dogmatism, pure and simple. The question at issue is not one of criticism at all, but of faith. If Jesus was simply a man, then of course all these statements of the Gospels, which represent him as more than a man, must be put down as incredible; and, like Neumann and Bousset, we may set aside whole passages as untrustworthy because incredible. But if Jesus was what the Gospels, and in fact the whole New Testament, represents him to have been, then we must follow a totally different method. And the question what he was must be decided on the basis of the entire record, as that has come down to us in the New Testament, and not on a preconceived notion, derived from our view of the world, nor on what may be left of the record after we have trimmed it down to suit our preconceived notions of what is credible or incredible.

*conceptions of the higher critics.* And inasmuch as a man's dogmatic and philosophical conceptions are dependent on his moral and spiritual insight, we may go a step further and say, *the higher criticism of the Gospels is limited by the moral and spiritual insight of the higher critics.* If a man's moral life is warped by prejudice or by pride of intellect, if for any reason he has refused to give to the truth as it is in Jesus that humble and heartfelt obedience which is the prerequisite to a knowledge of all truth (John 7: 17), he is to that extent unfitted to be a safe guide in the critical solution of the problems presented by our Gospels.

Another limitation of the higher criticism of the Gospels, as indeed of all higher criticism, is found in the intellectual equipment of the critic. Probably the chief reason why the higher criticism has become such an imperative discipline of modern times is found in the fact that we live in a practically new world. Our horizon has become very much enlarged over that of our fathers. We know more of the universe and of its laws than men of former times did. History and archæology have opened to us the whole past history of the race in a way that would have been wholly inconceivable to men several hundred years ago. This enlarged vision has given us the means of studying our sacred books in a way which was possible at no previous period. We can determine many things concerning them, which men of former times had to accept on the testimony of tradition. If, for example, a wholly unknown book should fall into our hands, of whose author we know absolutely nothing, of the time of whose composition we are absolutely ignorant; if we should find its author speaking of automobiles, of the telephone, and of aeroplanes; and if we should yet be told that the book had come down to us from the Middle Ages, we should at once detect the fraud. We have other information, which enables us to see through the deception. So with reference to any of our New Testament books. If any of them should claim to be from the hand of an apostle, and should yet contain unmistakable evidences of second century conditions, the higher critic who knows enough to detect



that evidence would be justified in rejecting the claim, and in placing it within the second century. But before he is justified in so doing, he must have sufficient knowledge both of the book in all its details, and of the history and life of the second century to enable him to pronounce a just verdict. No mere guess will do. The critic, who would pronounce the judgment, must have *full* and *adequate* knowledge. Hence we add that *the higher criticism of the Gospels is limited by the erudition, the knowledge and the general intellectual equipment of the higher critic.*

As a corollary flowing from this, we may mention still another limitation. *The critic must have undoubted facts on which to base his conclusions.* And facts are not always obtainable. As the critic goes on with his investigations, questions will arise, and difficulties will present themselves, which will challenge his best endeavor to find a solution. But the solution may be impossible, because the facts, on which it depends, have been lost. For example, there are evidences of disturbances in the seventh chapter of the Fourth Gospel. Taken as it stands, the reference to a sabbath cure in verse 23 is utterly vague. We do not know to what cure Jesus refers. But read in connection with the narrative in chapter five, the reference seems to become clear; and the inference lies near at hand that at some time in the history of the Gospel, there must have been a dislocation of some of its parts; and with it comes the temptation to readjust the order so as to bring the several sections into harmony. But the facts for such readjustment are lacking. The original order, granting that we do not possess it, has been lost; and any attempted restoration must be conjectural. Now, in such a case the validity of the conclusions must depend on the number and the character of the facts with which the critic starts. If his results are to command our respect, he must not substitute hypotheses for facts. At least, where he begins with a hypothesis, he owes it to his readers plainly to tell them that such is the case; and he must not expect us to accept his conclusions until his hypothesis has been verified by indubitable facts. So that we

add as a third limitation of the higher criticism of the Gospels this *that it is dependent on the number, the character, and the certainty of the facts on which the process is made to rest.*

Time allows me to mention only one more limitation. That is the ability of the critic to judge. Judgment, as we know, is a rare quality. Few men possess it in the highest degree. We may know many things; yet our knowledge may be disorganized. Unless we have the ability to link together our information by valid judgments, it will do us little good as a guide of life. So with the erudition of the critic. His very work is that of judging of the qualities and merits of a literary composition. But if his judgment is poor, so that he is constantly in danger of mistaking one thing for another, his work must be defective. He may have ever so much information, but if he lacks the judgment rightly to value the different items of the information, his work must be unreliable. So that we are justified in adding that *the higher criticism of the Gospels is limited by the judgment and the good sense of the higher critic.*

Our conclusion, therefore, is that in Biblical criticism, as in very many other things, the great desideratum is the man. As a method of study, it is invaluable; but its worth in any particular instance is dependent on the person who uses it. If he is devout, God-fearing, honest, with sufficient erudition, with sound judgment, and with a clear moral and spiritual insight, he is bound to give us results which are valuable. But it all depends on the man, on his character, his equipment, and his judgment. Give me an ideal critic, and I will give you critical results which all good and true men will accept. But unfortunately, persons engaged in the work of the higher criticism are no nearer ideal than men in other callings; and hence our results have been, and, at least for a long time, will continue to be, defective. With the good that is being accomplished, we must expect to meet much that is of a different character; and we should never make the mistake of ascribing to the higher critic the infallibility which was once ascribed to the sacred text.



### III.

## CHRISTIAN LIFE IN ITS RELATION TO CHRISTIAN CULTUS.

BY PROF. JOHN I. SWANDER, PH.D., D.D.

Christianity, in its concrete form, as the absolute and only true religion, is the organic union of the Divine and the human, the Infinite and the finite. Such union is possible because God and man are in mutual relation to each other. However much the latter is limited, inferior to and dependent upon the former, they belong together in the constitution of the moral universe, as answerable to the eternal and ontologic idea existing in the mind of the Creator, and projecting into creation under the category of time and space. Under this view, as related to each other in one essential and comprehensive whole, man needs God, and God needs man. They are bound together by the common yet distinct ligaments of life and love, "uniting all below to all above"; all are serving, all are served, nothing stands alone; the bond runs on and up, encircling the eternal throne.

In the foregoing and introductory paragraph it is stated that God needs man. The truth of the statement stands in its proper qualification. God is in Himself the Self-sufficient and Absolute One. Self-grounded, He needs nothing outside of Himself; yet he may so move in an act of self-determination as to call a necessity into being. In such action he moves in the freedom of eternal necessity and the necessity of absolute freedom. God does not need man as something foreign to Himself, but as included in that which he "purposed in Himself," and the most important factor in the plan of the ages.

As God is absolute and self sufficient, he is also in his very nature self-communicating. This he is of eternal and internal

necessity and freedom. He is free to communicate himself *ad intra*, as the object of which he is the subject, as well as the subject of which he is the object. He is also free *ad extra* to communicate himself to any receptive form of being which in the exercise of his creative freedom he may chose to bring into receptive and mutual relation with himself. Such receptive form of being must be like himself, *personal*. This personal being is man. God's communicative relation to man is one of *life, light and love*. Hence God needs man in order to such a free communication of these essential properties of his being.

These elements of life, light and love are not only essential properties of God's being; in a finite sense they belong to man as well. According to the Holy Scriptures, as well as the teachings of a sound psychology they are indispensably interwoven with all rational and ethical being whether infinite or finite—whether absolute or dependent—whether in the original archetype or in the image thereof. Though differing as much as God differs from man, and though the one order is as high above the other as heaven is above the earth, they belong in common to the creator and the personal creature. By virtue of these fundamental elements of being, God and man are interrelated for time and for eternity. "God is love and he that loveth is of God." Man sees light in God's light. Men arise and shine because their light is thus come. This can be only as their *phos* is the light of *life*. Such blessed fellowship is possible only in union with Him whom the Scriptures set forth as the "Living God." The living God is also love. In him life and love their mystic powers combine and in the realm of light forever shine.

It seems that the absolute or unlimited God, as prompted by the infinitude of his wisdom, goodness and power, had not room in Himself for a full display of his beneficence. The living God, who has everywhere and in every revelation which he has made and is making of himself as love, desired something other than himself with whom to communicate and



commune. That *ad extra* object of his love we repeat must be personal. This form of being is realized only in man and reaches its full realization in the Son of Man, the God-man who is the brightness of the Father's glory and the express image of his person. Through his mediation also it is made possible for all like human personalities to become partakers of his nature and thus become "like him." There is no evidence that any such possibility belongs to the angels. "Unto which of the angels said he at any time, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee." As the Father hath life in himself, so has he given to the Son to have life in himself. Indeed all men so stand reciprocally related to their Maker as to have potential life in themselves. "And man became a living soul." No human person, though he may plunge himself into an abnormal condition, can commit actual suicide as to the entirety of his being. Though alienated from the life of God in an ethical sense, he must endure forever. This destiny of everlasting endurance is the more inherent because of each human person's organic relation to the Lord from heaven—the Son of man—the second Adam.

Our type of orthodoxy takes but little stock in the theory of "the eternal humanity of Christ." Yet we do not regard it as heresy to hold that an eternal idea of humanity was eternally present in the mind of the Eternal God, and that that idea became realized in the "fullness of the times." Hence a creation culminating in man. Hence man as the organic head of the finite moral universe. As a personal being, he shares in his Maker's life, sees light in his Maker's light and is the only finite being able to reciprocate that infinite love, which, to be true to itself, was, under the freedom of necessity, to go beyond itself.

There does not seem to be any evidence in the Bible that God can love inanimate and irrational forms of being. If in the sense of John 3: 16 He loves the whole world, it is because the whole world has its culmination in man. Every thing which He had made He pronounced good, but there is no

proof at hand that he has real affection for the fishes of the sea, the beasts of the field, the birds of the air or the stars in the cerulean vaults of the sky. Why? Because love implies the possibility of love in return. God, doubtless, admires all his creatures, and looks upon them with divine complacency in the proportion that they answer to their true idea in the divine mind, but he can love only those which can reciprocate his love. No creature except man was made with power to reciprocate its Creator's affection. Man only was endowed with this possibility because he was made in the divine image.

What a tremendous meaning the divine impress therefore involves! When the Infinite One in three said "Let us make man in our own likeness" he was about to project a problem into the moral universe whose solution was to solve all other problems in time and space. That project was the union of man with his Maker through the incarnation of His Eternal Son. This doubtless is what the inspired apostle meant when in writing to the Ephesians he spoke of "the mystery of God's will which he purposed in himself" that in the dispensation of the fullness of times he might gather all things in Christ, both which are in heaven and which are on earth, even in him. Not the projection of "the eternal humanity of Christ" into the plan of the ages, but the realization of the eternal idea of humanity, as God's image and reciprocal, in his fundamental purpose in the cosmos. Time and space have no higher meaning and mission than to make room for such display of Jehovah's unlimited freedom of eternal necessity, to the intent that God the Creator and man the creature might exist in the mutual union and communion of life and love. For this the years of time roll by until time shall be swallowed up in eternity; for this the lines of terrestrial space extend from the rivers to the ends of the earth until there shall be new heavens and a new earth.

But how, if at all, has sin modified God's eternal purpose? God moves manward none the less since man's alienation from his Maker. Sin, and death by sin, having entered as a dis-



turbing element into God's working out of His purpose. His infinite affinity, while it remains essentially the same, becomes *compassionate yearning* for the erring creature of his power and love. God still desires that his tabernacle shall be with men and his abode with his people, even as a father with his family. To the extent that man is by sin alienated from the life of God, this divine movement is modified into a remedial revelation of life and love that in the full solution of the divine-human problem projected into time and space, the union and communion between the Infinite Father and the finite family may be so restored and established in ethical righteousness as to be placed upon the highest possible plane and beyond the range of all further contingency—an everlasting fellowship, not only between heaven and earth, but also between reciprocal personalities.

This consummation having been nominated in the bond of the eternal purpose, God longs for man, and man's heart yearns after God. Out of the depths of eternity God reaches toward the creature of his love, and wheresoever man is found, he, consciously or otherwise, seeks and sighs for that normal relation to his Maker which alone can redress the miseries of his abnormal state and give reality to his mystic dreams.

Hence, whether the unfolding of God's eternal purpose in time and space proceeds with or without involving abnormal facts and forces in the solution of the great problem of the ages, the key to its full solution is in the person of Immanuel—"God with us." The history of the human race when read in the light of Messianic truth shows nothing more clearly than the meaning of Christ's mission. "In the scroll of the Book it is written of me: Lo, I come to do Thy will, oh God!" And the same scroll of the Book teaches in conformity with the true interpretation of all historic records that it is the will of God not only that all things shall be gathered together in Christ, but also that it is the will of the Heavenly Father that not one of his children should perish by everlasting banishment from his presence. This implies also that only in

his presence and communion of his life and light and love is there fullness of joy.

For such fellowship, and the fruit of such fellowship with its Maker, as mediated through man's reconciliation and full communion with God, the whole creation, rising to a sub or semi-consciousness of its condition, because made "subject to vanity," groaneth and travaileth together in pain while looking for the redemption of the sons of God. Awaiting such restoration, the mountains and the hills already break forth into singing, and all the trees clap their hands. All cattle and beasts of the fields, creeping things and flying fowl speak from the depth of creation's sub-consciousness with a confused longing for nature's restoration to its normal relation with the divine source of its being. The untaught heathen have always waited to welcome the dawn of their deliverance from the bondage of human corruption. The more intelligent and gifted sons of mythology stood on the tiptoe of their partially developed desire to pierce the veil that dimmed their vision of the Hesperides. For this elysian state and abode Hæsioid harped and Sappho sang. For this dreamed-of consummation of redemption and bliss philosophers speculated, prophets predicted and patriarchs waited.

While the ancient world was general, if not universal, in its desires and dreams for union with God or the gods, it was nevertheless divided in its notions and methods of striving to attain to such religious fellowship. One form of mythology sought to bring the gods down to earth and incarnate them in human heroes; the other encouraged and acted upon the belief that men could and should elevate themselves to the dignity of deities. Some reckless poet represents Virgil as claiming that

The wealth of truth can never reach us  
Until the gods come down and teach us.

The more cultivated Greeks apotheosized their heroes and enrolled their names among their more excellent and immortal gods on Mount Olympus.



Notwithstanding the light of inspiration in Israel, the same confusion of ideas prevailed to some extent among the Old Testament prophets, who also saw through a glass darkly. David longed for the wings of a dove, and wondered who should ascend into the hill of the Lord. Jeremiah exclaimed "Oh that Thou wouldst rend the heavens and come down!" Only to the extent that the patriarchs and prophets either laid their philosophy and poetry aside or kept them in subordinate relation to the knowledge gendered in faith, and devoted themselves more to the cultivation of the consciousness of the ethical relation constitutionally existing between themselves and the living and loving and personal God were they able to rise above the confusion of uncertainty and fog of skepticism. It was only as David *thus* kept the "Lord always before his face" that he could find religious certitude in answer to his devout soul as his heart and his flesh cried out for the living God. It was in this faith, rather than in poetry, that "Jacob, when he was dying," not only blessed his sons, but also consigned his spirit: "I have waited for thy salvation, oh God." So also with Job the philosopher of Uz. It was because of his faith in God and his own consequent ethical righteousness, that this "perfect and upright one who feared God, and eschewed evil," was able to say "*I know that my Redeemer liveth.*"

Mark the depth and clearness of that conviction in the otherwise troubled breast of that illustrious monument of patience in affliction. Few if any of the prophets in the covenant had a clearer view than Job of the coming of Him who was to "stand at the latter day upon the earth," "a light to lighten the gentiles and the glory of his people Israel."

How remarkably Job and Jesus Christ complemented each other in the evolution of the one purpose of God and the completion of the one divine plan of the ages! Job, looking down the aisle of the future, exclaimed "My Redeemer liveth!" and Jesus looking back through fifteen centuries to Job, and forward through all the years of the future, responds to all the yearning

hearts in the family of man (John 14: 19) "*Because I live ye shall live also.*"

The above quoted language of Christ to his almost disconsolate disciples was not only the medium of communicating consolation to their sorrowing hearts, but may be regarded also as responsive to Job's confession of faith in his living Redeemer or vindicator, as well as to all the reasonable hopes and expectations of Adam's sons and daughters from the closing of the garden gates of Eden to the opening of the portals of the New Jerusalem. The language does not express the categorical imperative of a German philosopher, but the hearts desire, purpose and promise of Him who came to bring restoration and give completion to the human race. It means more than a promise of life in heaven. It is to be partially realized on earth. Ye shall live also—in his fellowship, in his church—in his cause, as coworkers together with him in the communion of a common life. It is equivalent to our Lord's enunciation elsewhere: "I am come that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly." St. John repeats the same in substance in his fine distinction between a cardinal fact and the record of its revelation. "This is the record that God hath given to us eternal life, and this life is in His Son," I. John 5: 11. Paul takes up the same fundamental truth and echoes it back from a more philosophic and soteriological standpoint: "*I live, yet not I but Christ liveth in me.*"

From the foregoing and essentially similar sayings of Christ and scriptural records, as well as from all right religious reasoning in the matter, the conclusion is logically reached that Christianity as to its essential substance in the concrete, is *the religion of life*. Of course there are other essential elements in its constitution. Light, love and law, *et cætera*, as inseparable and distinct from life, are as essential to Christianity as life itself. These should all be viewed, however, as grounding themselves in that primordial vital principle which by virtue of the incarnation became, and still becomes "that true light which lighteth every man that cometh



into the world," and manifests itself according to "the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus." Observe the divinely ordained order of Christological evolution. This order is from life to that which is involved therein and evolved therefrom. The light does not become the life of men, however important to the full manifestation of the latter. The Romish Church has laid undue stress upon law and ecclesiastical legislation. Hence the necessity for the Reformation. Religious sentimentalism accentuates the syllable of affection in the great word of salvation, and lays undue stress upon affected or perverted or disjointed love until it makes feeling the test of orthodoxy and activity the source of Christian character. Rationalism unduly emphasizes its own apprehension of truth as over against that life which is fontally in Christ, the Lord from heaven, the quickening spirit, who so imparts himself to recipient men as to produce their regeneration. Rationalism overlooks the fact that regeneration is deeper and more objective than mere conversion through the light of abstract truth, and without which there can be no real and genuine conversion in the sense of mortifying the old man and the quickening of the new, as taught in the Heidelberg Confession, question 88.

Christianity is a new creation distinct from and as real as that which includes the visible and material heavens and the earth. Its objective, concrete and entitive existence holds in the organic union of the substance of the Son of God with the essential substance of humanity, in the sense that the word was made (assumed) flesh. This new creation is therefore headed in Christ, "the last Adam," even as the old creation heads or rather culminates in the first Adam (I. Cor. 15). It is a kingdom in organic unity, as well as in expansive and progressive evolution. Christ, the true witness, "the beginning of the (new) creation of God" is the parent (Is. 9: 6) of the peculiar progeny or people born of Him, of whom the whole family in heaven and earth is named (Eph. 3: 15). Having such an objective existence, it is not dependent upon

subjective repentance, faith or experience, however important these conditions on the part of the individuals who would become citizens of this royal realm, and consequent recipients of its assimilative virtue and power. In a word, it may be repeated, that Christianity is life—not a mere attenuated human life, but a distinct effluence of the life of God which was not in the world in the same sense, and to the same extent before the incarnation.

It follows therefore that this absolute religion, the highest form of humanity, as to its essential elements, is not primarily molded from without, or made dependent upon its form, as materialism teaches concerning the dependence of the soul upon the body, and as some acousticians still affirm in the alleged dependence of “sound” upon the medium of its conduction and manner of its travel. Like all other orders of life, Christianity, in bending its energies toward externalization, is free under the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus, to take or change its own form, or rather to conform to the model or type involved in its constitution.

Of course Christian life, like all other orders of vital force, is susceptible of modification by its environments, or the conditions under which it may unfold itself. These conditions may be classified as follows: Those that belong to the world as constituted, and such as are produced by the evolution of the world’s life-force. Christianity as to its essential substance, while it remains, like its great Author, the same yesterday, to-day, forever and everywhere, subjects itself to ethnic, climatic and cultural influences. The Ethiopian, though brought with the Caucasian under the transforming power of the Gospel, is not expected to undergo an immediate change of his skin. Christian society in India is necessarily different from the social constitution of London. The Torrid and the Frigid Zones, though under the plastic power of the same Christian truth, do not produce types of Christian manhood equal to that in the Temperate Zones; neither is it reasonable for us to expect full strength and beauty of sym-



metrical character among the uncultured Christians in heathen lands, any more than we would look for tropic flowers and fruits on Greenland's frosty face. So, too, have the epochal movements of the world started influences that tend to differentiate the forms under which Christianity continues to unfold its power in leavening the whole lump of humanity. Among these epochs may be mentioned the birth of Magna Charta at Runnymede, the discovery of America, the invention of the printing press and the Reformation of the sixteenth century. These beginnings of new periods in history, though they have not changed the essential substance of the absolute religion, have, nevertheless, opened the way for the production of a higher type of Christian manhood, elevated Christian society to a higher plane of religious excellence and cleared the highway of Christian progress toward time's last stage for time's last play.

As Christian life is above all other orders of finite vital energy, and gives to all others their cosmic meaning and end in the wisely arranged economy of sublunary things, it is also capable of the highest form of manifestation. This higher life in its very nature, and according to its mission in the plan of the ages, is capable of manifesting itself in the conscious activity of Christian work, and that divine worship which is capable of culminating in the most lofty adoration of the Absolute One, as well as the most intimate fellowship of the finite human personality with the personal, Infinite Source of its being.

The most normal development of Christian life and the most healthy growth of organized Christianity in the form of the Church is made when the latter unfolds her heavenly power and fills her heaven-given mission with the least possible undue influence from without. While she is to admit and incorporate sincere proselytes from the outer court, she is to "beware of the leaven of the Pharisees." It is her mission to give birth to her own children—children which she has been commissioned to nurse in her own bosom, and bring up in

“the nurture and admonition” of her Lord—rather than to adopt foundlings already incubated in some questionable way by the bond-woman in the wilderness of Arabia. The tree of life in the midst of the paradise of God is *endogenous* rather than *exogenous*, and should be permitted to make its growth according to the law of its inner life.

Neglect of the aforementioned requirement and a gradual departure from this primary law of normal growth has caused the abomination of desolation to stand in the holy place of the Church’s past, and even in this day of better, broader things, is the most fruitful source of painful solicitude concerning her future, in the minds of discerning watchmen on the walls of Zion. What seems true of the Church as a whole is more or less true of each branch thereof. Perhaps the most alarming departure from the line of normal growth is in some of the more historic churches of our general Christendom. Let charity and self-examination begin at home. Of unkind criticism we have none. We would rather weep between the porch and the altar than to publicly blow the trumpet of alarm in Zion. Our tears might not be regarded at this time with proper charitable consideration, neither can we hope with the Psalmist that the Lord would put them into his bottle.

The danger of departure from the faith once delivered to the saints is not so much in false doctrine as in vain works and worship. The Church can counteract the evil influence of heresy much easier than she can guard against unconscious apostasy in cultus. According to our limited reading of church history, her work and worship have always been measurably exponential of her spiritual and sanitary condition. The records made before the Reformation may be called to the witness stand to testify as to the causes that greatly helped to mature the crisis which may yet be repeated in that great protestant hereafter seemingly near at hand.

Where is Martin Luther? Where is the Lord God of—rather where is the Elijah of the same Lord God, for a somewhat similar state of things in the New Testament and evan-



gelical Israel in the twentieth century of the Christian era? Sixty-five years ago certain or uncertain portions of Protestantism were threatened with what was known as the anxious bench or New Measure type of religion. Then, as now, there was a zeal for God, but not according to knowledge. The Heidelberg Catechism was denounced with the system of cultus in which it stands, and of which it had been for three hundred years the symbolical representative. Anxiety was written in the faces of the church's best men and women. There was a call for some one to sound the alarm and rise in defense of the old principles of the Gospel interwoven with the tried and true traditions of the Fathers. That man came from the Presbyterian church. The Rev. John Williamson Nevin wrote the "Anxious Bench" in merited exposure of pretentious innovations, and tore the false system into tatters, while he raised the old banner of educational religion in the advocacy of sound Christian cultus. The result was that in less than a score of years that foreign epidemic was driven out of the church. During that time Dr. Nevin was cannonaded. At the close of that period he was canonized. In 1876 he passed into the skies. Since then other new elements and influences have crept into our protestant faith, the combination and confusion of which now constitute a religious non-descript which no sane man would undertake to either analyze or denominate.

Ever since the occurrence of the seeming discrepancy between the teachings of two of the evangelists respecting the relative value of Christian works in the matter of justification before God, there has been no question more continuously under discussion than the relation of works and worship to the life which animates and gives character to everything of virtue and value in the Christian system. This question was very properly considered and fully discussed by the Reformers in their defence of the cause and promotion of the principles of Protestantism. During the last score of years protestant America has very properly emphasized the importance

of church-work. There seems, however, to be a general want of serious reflection, if not confusion as to whether such work is primarily the root or the fruit of Christian life and justification by faith. And what is true of church-work is equally true of so-called Christian worship. Is there not, to some extent at least, a reversal of God's ordained order in the logical process of human salvation? Is there not also an unconscious attempt to work salvation *into* the soul and *into* the congregation by boastful personal and organized powers and paroxisms rather than to work it "out" with "fear and trembling," from a supernatural life-principle, assumed to be implanted by the Holy Ghost in the body of Christ and the real members thereof? As endeavorers to *do* something *for* Christ, instead of submitting ourselves to *be* something more and better *in* Christ, we work to live rather than live to work. We worship almost exclusively to get nearer to God rather than because He has graciously taken us into covenant nearness with himself. The nineteenth century will pass into history for its great religious exhibitions of exceedingly small Christian potencies. Inconsiderate efforts on the part of the church to arouse herself from spiritual apathy too often lead her into false progress and paroxysmal enthusiasm. And are not these paroxisms of so-called evangelistic piety too frequently mixed with unconscious carnal ambition, dreams of self-sufficiency and indulgences in the way of gratifying either the mind, the humor or the appetite? Thus

We serve the Lord by fits and starts,  
And shout the Gospel to the nations,  
While warming our own frozen hearts  
With frequent ice-cream applications.

That the Reformed Church has been in need of some restorative remedy is evidenced by her past manifest apathy, especially in sections and among portions of her laity. This, however, is nothing unusual in the general history of Christianity. Zion has had her seasons of drouth and decadency in all the periods of her history and under all the various



forms of her development; upon the other hand the church has always been right in her self-resuscitative efforts when she sought and found and applied the required remedy in accordance with the law of her own peculiar life. Her mistake has always been her willing submission to and cooperation with foreign powers and adventitious influences. Such foreign invasion for the present may not seem grievous but joyous; nevertheless, afterward it yieldeth the unrighteous fruit of ecclesiastical mongrelism. If there be any astonishment in the case, it is in the fact that such foreign influences should be permitted to enter into and encroach upon the peculiar spirit and genius of the Reformed Church whose very birth was involved in a mighty protest against the incorporation of foreign elements into the kingdom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.

What is the condition and the consequent cultus in the Reformed Church to-day in many sections of the territory which she occupies and under the conflicting schools of thought which afford charity such good opportunities to exercise her most excellent gifts. Proceeding in this spirit of charity, no accusation is made of conscious infidelity to principle; no criticisms are offered; and therefore none are expected in answer to these inquiries into the cause, the nature and the modern trend of our church-life, work and cultus. Let brotherly love continue, and in love let us reason together. Why should our "mother's children" be angry with us? In our partially commendable zeal to Christianize Japan and to emancipate China from the chronic servitude of Confucianism, are we not in danger of a relapse into something that incorporates too much of our Western-world-element? "They made me the keeper of the vineyards, but mine own vineyard have I not kept." Songs of Sol. 1: 6.

Are we justified in admitting, tolerating and employing all of the many measures, methods and customs that now dominate much of our work and worship? Are we not, in so doing, in danger of a foolish departure from the old paths in which

our sainted fathers walked, and from the old principles for which they were willing to join the noble army of martyrs? Are we not indeed losing that true and apostolic conception of the church as a supernatural constitution of grace and truth in the world, extending with unbroken succession from the day of Pentecost onward to the end of time? Our true cultus grounds itself in that objective and sacramental life and power of the heavenly world at hand in the bosom of the Church as the very embodiment of God's kingdom which we so devoutly and earnestly pray may come with rising, spreading and prevailing glory. Are the sacraments, instituted and placed in her keeping and use by her Great Head, now generally held, administered and used as means of grace? Where used at all, are they not regarded by many as being under that category and conception of meritorious works which are supposed to give us right to the tree of life and a passport through the gate into the heavenly city? Are ordained men now, as formerly, accounted as ministers of Christ and stewards of the mysteries of God? Are they not too generally looked upon as mere authorized individuals, preachers, commissioned by other clergymen, instead of divinely authorized functionaries of that supernatural order of heavenly life and power proceeding from the great head of the church, and which by the Holy Ghost is to be of force always for the salvation of men? Are not ministerial acts too generally viewed, not as official, but as merely personal acts, actions and transactions, rather than administrations? Does not the minister become of value to the congregation according to his dignified appearance, magnetism and other elements of ability to attract a large audience, tickle their fancy and gratify their morbid tastes by rendering on each succeeding Sunday some new program of pulpit acrobatics?

Hence it is that the old catechetical system of educational religion, in many sections of the Reformed Church, is now being gradually placed, with the old preachers, upon the retired list or tolerated with a sort of a step-motherly affection.



Another Pharaoh, who knows not Joseph, is ascending the throne. Modern innovations call for modern methods. An effort is made to build the temple of God with untempered mud. The swelling multiplicity and multiformity of half-breed leagues, fraternities, orders and societies leave but little for some churches and some clergymen to do. Preachers, therefore, have plenty of time to study up new sensations for the coming Sunday. Mothers have plenty of time to prepare their children for dress-parade, while thoughtful and considerate Christians reflect upon the fact that no amount of religious zeal can reanimate a lifeless church with a churchless life.

TIFFIN, OHIO.

## IV.

### THE ETHICS OF THE GOSPELS.

BY REV. E. E. KRESGE.

In the treatment of this subject I shall limit myself to the ethics of the Synoptic Gospels, because it is here where we find the teachings of Jesus in their purest form.

And first of all what do we mean by ethics? and what are its peculiar problems? Ethics is defined as a study of what ought to be, or of what is right for human beings to do through voluntary action. The history of philosophic ethics reveals two types, which should be, though often are not, distinguished from each other. The one type is individualistic and the other is social. Ancient ethics was individualistic. It dealt with the individual as an isolated entity. The ancient Greeks, the first teachers of ethics, asked: what ought the individual to be or do? The followers of Zeno said: he ought to be virtuous, and the followers of Epicurus said: he ought to be happy. In modern history we also find two types of individualistic ethics; Intuitionism and Egoistic Hedonism. Each considers the individual as an end in himself. Intuitionism says: man ought to be morally perfect, moral perfection being defined as voluntary obedience to the moral law within, or conscience. Ends and consequences are not considered. Right must be done merely for right's sake. Egoistic Hedonism says: man ought to be happy, happiness being defined as the greatest amount of pleasure over pain for the individual. But the form of modern ethics is social rather than individualistic. The question is not what ought the individual to do as an end in himself, but rather what ought the individual to do for other individuals? Materialistic ethics says: we ought to aim at man's general well-being: improve his conditions: feed and



clothe him well. Idealistic ethics would set up some ideal human relationship or some ideal object such as justice or freedom. While Utilitarianism, another type of Hedonism, says we ought to make all men happy. The history of philosophic ethics reveals a tendency in individualistic ethics to pass over into socialistic ethics. Those who said the individual ought to be virtuous soon discovered that a man cannot be virtuous by himself, but only as he lives among men, and then only as he lives in the right kind of society. Hence they dream of an ideal society where virtue can be realized. Egoistic Hedonism, the most clear-cut, but also the most selfish system of ethics in history, saw clearly that the individual cannot be happy in the highest sense save as he lives in the right relationship with his fellow men, and in the right kind of society from the hedonistic standpoint. Hence the hedonistic schemes of society. But no matter what the method or form of philosophic ethics has been, its history, from the Greeks on down, shows that this science has busied itself with an inquiry into desirable human life, whether for the individual or for groups of individuals.

Now has the ethics of our Bible as it is summed up in the life and teachings of Jesus anything to say on these vital questions? Has it anything to offer for the solution of these problems with which philosophic ethics has wrestled? and if so, what? These, in my judgment, are the questions that must be met in a paper like this.

There are not a few men at the present time who would answer these questions in the negative. They say Christianity is an ascetic religion without an ethics. It withdraws itself from this real world and contemplates another world which is not real. It substitutes pious meditation for life and ethical activity. Its object is not to redeem human society, but rather to increase the census of heaven.

We all admit that Apostolic Christianity showed some dangerous ascetic symptoms. These grew out of a mistaken idea of Christ's speedy return to the earth when the present

order of things would pass away and the hoped-for Kingdom of Heaven would be set up. These mistaken ideas, drawn from certain veiled sayings of Jesus, made the early Christians for a time wholly indifferent to the things of this life. In certain quarters they quit work because of this delusion. The thought of Christ's speedy return effected even St. Paul's teaching on certain ethical and social questions such as marriage and slavery.

But whatever may be true of certain abnormal aspects of Apostolic Christianity, it is not true that the Gospels contain a religion without an ethics. Jesus was no ascetic like John the Baptist. He "came eating and drinking." He mingled freely with men in the city and in the country, and he wanted His disciples to do the same. In His last prayer for them He prayed: "Not that thou shouldest take them out of the world, but that thou shouldest keep them from the evil." They are to be "the salt of the earth," and "the light of the world." This they could not be in cloisters and in deserts. They are to be in the world though not of the world. The religion of Jesus is good for the life that now is as well as for the life that is to come. His teachings contain an ethics as well as a religion. The difficulty, however, is to cull the ethics of the Gospels from the religion of the Gospels, for Jesus did not teach ethics but religion. Christ's ethics we find in His doctrine of the Kingdom of Heaven.

#### THE ETHICS OF THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN.

Of this one thing we are certain to begin with: that the Kingdom of Heaven in the teaching of Jesus is not only future but also present. It is not only the future abode of that blessed company in whom the divine rule is perfectly realized, and where the blessings of the kingdom are enjoyed in their fullest degree; but it is also here on the solid earth, leavening human hearts and human society. In His opening ministry Jesus said: "The Kingdom of Heaven is at hand." It came to earth in the person of Jesus. It was present in the



fullest and most perfect form in Him. And it is here on the earth now to the extent and in the degree that human hearts and wills accept Jesus.

The most important term in Christ's doctrine of the Kingdom of Heaven is the word righteousness. It contains both a religion and an ethics. As it unfolds itself God-ward it is religion, and as it unfolds itself man-ward it is ethics. It is the latter phase of the term that we wish to follow in this paper. And first of all righteousness is primarily an individual matter. Jesus addressed Himself first to the individual: to his will and conscience. Jesus had no idea of redeeming the world by beginning with groups of individuals. We cannot have good society unless the individuals who compose it are good. Nor did He think any more of saving a man by first giving him bread and a coat. You cannot save a man by beginning on the surface. In both of these things Jesus differs from a great deal of our present day reform-agitation. We cannot save society by legislating for groups of men, nor can we save the individual by appealing to his stomach or his back. Jesus began by planting the Kingdom of Heaven in the form of a regenerative life-germ in the heart of the individual. Righteousness is an inner spirituality. It is a good disposition of the heart. In philosophic ethics we would say it has to do with the motive and the intention. The law said: "Thou shalt not kill," and "Thou shalt not commit adultery." But Jesus forbade the angry feeling and the lustful look. In the religion of the kingdom nothing counts but that which comes from the heart. The good deeds which the Father sees are those which are done in secret. The prayers which He hears are those which come from the inner chamber. And the fast that is acceptable to Him is that which men do not see. The left hand shall not know what the right hand doeth. Thus the ethics of Jesus is individualistic in its foundation, beginning with a right disposition of the heart whence issues righteous conduct. Jesus would first make good men, then He will have good society.

The righteous individual of the kingdom is humble, he is pure, he is just (*i. e.*, merciful), he is peaceful, he is tolerant, he is forgiving; St. John's Gospel adds that he is also truthful and sincere. These are qualifications for our every-day life: for Monday as well as Sunday. These things are good for the life that now is as well as for the life that is to come. The righteous individual of the kingdom stands armed with all the cardinal virtues that are recognized in any individualistic system of philosophic ethics. The ancient systems of ethics which made virtue the end of life laid great stress on wisdom. By some it was made the primal virtue; not wisdom as scientific knowledge of things, but wisdom as a regulative principle of human conduct. In the Synoptic Gospels nothing is said about knowledge. But in St. John's Gospel the thought is very prominent. Knowledge of the truth is essential to righteousness. In fact truth in the Fourth Gospel takes the place of righteousness in the Synoptics. And to do the truth means more than merely to have a right inclination; it also means to have a right sight for good and evil. This knowledge of the truth, this keen insight into good and evil is good not only for our life before God but also for our life with man. Between the knowledge of the truth in St. John, and the wisdom of the Greek ethicists (and the wisdom of the wisdom literature of the Old Testament) there is not as much difference as we may think. As to the ethical content of the term (the practical import for life) I see scarcely any difference at all.

But while there is a striking similarity between the individualistic ethics of the Gospels and individualistic philosophic ethics, there is still a great difference. Philosophic ethics never goes further back than the individual conscience or social custom in its inquiry into the moral ought. There is no other authority than the moral law within, or social custom without. The sanctions of philosophic ethics are twofold; internal or conscience, and external, either in the form of public opinion or civil law. Back of these sanctions philosophic ethics has never gone. But Christian ethics rests on



religion. Apart from religion it knows no ethics. The author of the moral ought is God. I just said that I can see little difference as to ethical content between the wisdom of the Greek ethics and the knowledge of the truth in the Fourth Gospel. But as to the supposed origin of this wisdom there is all the difference in the world. St. John's wisdom comes from above, while the other comes from within. This is no place to discuss the respective claims of authority for the ethical ought. It is enough to say that the finest specimens of ethical character have been produced in the religious school of Jesus. The moral ought that is supposed to have its origin in God comes with more binding motive power, at any rate for the average man, than the moral ought that comes only from within the individual himself or from public opinion. Belief in a Supreme Judge before whom all, the great and the small, must give an account of their stewardship, is still the strongest incentive to right living. Arraignment before the bar of conscience or public opinion cannot take its place.

Another difference that deserves notice is the fact that philosophic ethics takes little account of sin. It looks away from this night side of our life, while Christian ethics deals with it seriously. Philosophic ethics begins with the non-moral, while Christian ethics begins with the contra-moral. And this recognition of sin adds a further impetus to the bindingness of the moral ought. Jesus gives no theory of the origin of sin. He simply deals with it as a fact, endeavoring to bring light into the darkness.

And finally, in the individualistic ethics of Jesus we find a solution of the philosophic dilemma between the individual's perfection and his happiness. Few ethical systems, ancient or modern, have been able to dismiss the idea that happiness is an end in life: that we ought to be happy and that we ought to make other people happy. The Stoic idea that we ought to be insensible to all feelings of pleasure and pain has always seemed a horrid doctrine. The Epicurean idea that virtue

is valuable only as it produces happiness for the individual has always been obnoxious to the moral consciousness. While the Platonic and Aristotelian idea that happiness is a logical concomitant of virtue: that the more virtuous a man is the happier he will be is not true to fact. Ancient ethics therefore ended in a dilemma on this particular question. Nor can I see that modern ethics has fared any better. There seems to be a contradiction between the individual's moral perfection and his happiness. At any rate this question marks the point of cleavage between the leading ethical systems: between Zeno, Aristotle and Epicurus in ancient times, and between Intuitionism and Hedonism in modern times. I said Christian ethics offers a solution. The moral perfection of the individual is the aim of Christ's individualism; and in the growth in righteousness the cross rather than the crown is the prominent idea. The disciple must deny himself. He must be willing to sacrifice all things for the sake of his righteousness. In this life the disciple may be obliged to leave house, and father, and mother, and wife, and children for the sake of the Gospel. But that Christianity stoically courts the cross is false. That it makes much of happiness is certainly true. Even in this life happiness is promised. He who leaves house, and father, and mother and children, etc., for the sake of righteousness shall in this life receive an hundred fold: not in material houses, etc., but in blessedness, in happiness. Jesus was kind; and the virtue of kindness lies in its happiness-producing power. Jesus did many little things just to make people happy. I know of nothing that He said or did that would make any one unhappy. It is true, however, that in this life happiness is kept in the background, and righteousness in the foreground. But in the kingdom as future perfect happiness is promised as the end of righteousness. Blessedness! thrice blessedness! is the ultimate end of individual life in the kingdom as future. Christian ethics solves the philosophic difficulty with reference to perfection and happiness by transferring the full realization of both to



a future world. I said above that this is *a* solution. I refrained from saying *the* solution because I am well aware that this will not satisfy a scientific ethicist, especially not if he is of the hedonistic type. He will not be satisfied by the promise of happiness in a world that must be accepted on faith. He wants his happiness right here in this real world and right now as he is travelling along the rough stretches of life's road. But this promise of future perfect happiness in future perfect righteousness will satisfy the child of faith, who sees that life is a training-school rather than a playground, and who has foretaste, right here in this life, in rational sacrifice and loving service, of the future perfect happiness in perfect righteousness. There is no contradiction between the individual's moral perfection and his happiness when happiness is defined in terms of quality instead of in terms of quantity. The Benthamite hedonists define happiness in terms of quantity: "Push-pin is as good as poetry." Between mere quantitative happiness and moral perfection there is a rational contradiction, neither can the contradiction be bridged over by any dialectical subtlety.

Jesus then begins with the individual, with his will and conscience, and by a process of moral growth from within out aims at righteous perfection. A perfect individual is the end and aim of His individualism. But we may not stop here. Too many interpreters of Jesus have stopped with His individualism, and have thus failed to give us the whole truth. In my judgment no merely individualistic ethics is a complete ethics. There is something very essential lacking in modern Intuitionism which says: right must be done for right's sake: ends and consequences must not be considered. According to this way of thinking a man can be just as good in a great wilderness as in a great city. This is not true. Unconsciously feeling its weakness, Intuitionism constantly supplements itself by Utilitarian principles. Individual goodness apart from social relations is no longer conceivable. In the ethics of the Gospels we have individualism and socialism

woven together into one fabric. Righteousness begins in the individual will, but it becomes complete as the individual will is related to other wills. Christ's righteous man lives in society. He is the salt of the earth and the light of the world. All the individual virtues for which he is offered the blessings of the kingdom are ultimately possible only in his relation to other men. We cannot conceive of a humble, pure, just, peaceful, forgiving and truthful man by and for himself. If he were the only man in the world he could be none of these things. Surely a man can be just, peaceful and forgiving only in his dealings with other men. The same is true also of humility, purity and truthfulness. A man might be willing and able to be all these things in a cloister, but the proof lies in the test, and that is possible only in his relation to real flesh and blood men and women. After all to be righteous means to stand in a benevolent relation to other men.

That this is the scope of the ethics of the kingdom becomes clearer when we consider the two fundamental laws of the kingdom. These are love and service. Neither of these laws mean anything that can be made intelligible apart from man's relation to his fellow-man. We can think of a man loving God because we Christians think of Him as a person. A man may spend his time in solitary meditation and communion with God. He may even rise into ecstasy through such practises. But such a thing does not exhaust the idea of love as taught by Jesus. Love to God with all the heart, soul, mind, and strength is one half of the supreme law of the kingdom, but an equally intense love to man is the other half. And while we love men because we love God we also love God because we love men. In fact we love God most when we love men. This is what Christ taught. He asked Peter: "Simon, son of Jonas, lovest thou me?" and when Peter said: "Lord, Thou knowest that I love Thee," Christ said: "then feed my sheep." Feeding sheep, not confession, is the final test of love. St. John, the apostle of love, says a man cannot love God if he does not love man. Love to God without love to man may be good mysticism but it is poor ethics.



The social and benevolent aspects of Christ's ethics can be seen still more plainly in the other fundamental law of the kingdom. If the righteous man were alone in the world he could love God but I cannot see that he could serve Him. I cannot conceive of anything that he could do for God. Paul says you cannot serve God with your hands "as though He needed anything." The only way to serve God that I can think of is to help Him lift this poor, sinful, suffering world up into the blessedness of the kingdom. We can serve God only through His needy children. This is plainly the Christian idea of service. If you love me Simon feed my sheep. "In as much as ye did it unto the least of these my brethren ye did it unto me." Saying Lord, Lord, and doing wonderful works in Christ's name cannot take the place of humble service rendered unto the needy. No amount of ritualism can atone for a lack of service. Josiah Strong says: "The attempt to serve God without serving man is the explanation of ritualism, which serves neither, and which is hateful to the one, and hurtful to the other. Forgetting that service, if real, is social, we by a misnomer call divine worship divine service. Thus our services are held instead of being rendered." Worship is a matter between the righteous individual and God, but service is a matter between him and man.

In all non-Christian religions sacrifice has always been an element of worship; in fact it has been the most prominent element of worship. The blood of man and beast has been shed as a sacrifice to the gods. Countless numbers of poor beasts have been slain as a sacrifice to Jehovah. Men have tortured themselves, even in Christian lands, as a sacrifice to God. Jehovah told Israel long ago that He does not want the fat of rams because He does not need it. We must not fail to recognize the very significant fact that in the Kingdom of God as presented by Jesus sacrifice has ceased to be an element of worship and has become wholly a matter of life, of ethics. Sacrifice apart from service for man receives no recognition from Christ. Sacrifice is not a separate law of

the kingdom; it is only a part of the supreme laws of love and service. The only sacrifice that we can make to God is that which we make in a devoted effort to serve man. Even the sacrifice on the cross was made in behalf of man.

It is evident from all this that the righteous man's ethics does not become complete in any mere "other-world" goodness, in mere pious dispositions and good intentions, but in a benevolent relation between him and his brother-man. Now the question arises: who is my brother? Is the term a universal one, or does it describe a particular relation like the Jewish term neighbor? In the majority of cases where the term occurs Jesus identifies brotherhood and discipleship. The righteous man's brother is his fellow disciple. But this does not exhaust the Christian idea of brotherhood. There are other passages where the term brother does not mean the fellow disciple. The Christian idea of brotherhood is determined by the Christian idea of fatherhood. God is the Father of the whole human family, of Jews and Gentiles, of circumcised and uncircumcised. Every member of the human family is by virtue of his birth as a human being a child of God. Some are good children and some are bad children, but all are children. The righteous man is therefore a brother to every child of God. All the human beings whom he meets day by day in the street, in the field, in the shop, in the palace and in the hovel, are the children of his Father. To all of them the righteous man must be a brother even as God is their Father.

And as a brother, he owes the children of his Father love. He must love them like he loves himself. He must love them like Jesus loved them. He must be willing to sacrifice, to suffer, and even if occasion should demand it, to die for them; not necessarily for any particular one of them, but for the family of brothers. Those who will be born in the far distant future will be the children of his Father, and he must be willing to work for the future as well as for the present. As a righteous man he must love them all; not only the good,



but also the bad. The righteous man must love his enemy. He must bless them that curse him, and pray for those who treat him ill. Jesus said if an enemy smite thee on the one cheek turn him the other also; if he take your coat give him your cloak also; and if he force you to go with him a mile go with him two miles.

This extreme of forgiving love and meekness the world has not always understood. Christians have sometimes misunderstood this to mean that love dare not respect and defend itself, and consequently have sacrificed their rights and even their lives in a lack of rational self-defense. The world has said: this is the teaching of an extremist, a fanatic: such love can exist in precept only and never in practice. It is important that we should understand this. The trouble is that we have taken these sayings too literally. We must learn to distinguish between the spirit and the letter of Christ, between His plain speech that is to be understood literally, and His figures of speech which are to be understood in spirit only. There is a limit to the righteous man's tolerance and endurance. Righteousness will stand on its own feet. The righteous man loves himself as well as his neighbor, and he will maintain his rights and his self-respect. We must not allow swine to trample upon the pearls of righteousness. When the ruffian struck Jesus in the face on the night of His arrest He rebuked him instead of turning him the other cheek. When the disciples were refused entrance into a city they were to shake the dust of that city from their feet. If a man offend you, Jesus said, go to him personally and try to adjust matters. If he will not hear you, then take with you one or two witnesses, men who know you both and who can give you disinterested advice. If your enemy will not hear them, then bring the matter before the Ecclesia. If he will not hear the Ecclesia, then treat him like a publican and a sinner: *i. e.*, have nothing more to do with him. In the Kingdom of Heaven there is no contradiction between rational self-love and rational benevolence, and one is as necessary as the other. But while there

is a limit to the righteous man's tolerance, we must note very carefully that righteous love may never turn into unrighteous hate. The righteous man may never return curses for curses, nor meanness for meanness. In brief, the righteous man may never become unbrotherly.

And as the righteous man is to love his brothers as Jesus loved them, so also is he to serve them as Jesus served them. This means that we serve men, not things; that we serve men, not their conditions. Jesus paid little or no attention to things. Not that He despised things, but because there were greater things to serve. He never told men how to raise more sheep or better sheep. He healed a few sick bodies and fed a few hungry people, but otherwise He said nothing about man's physical, social, or political conditions. The chief thing in the Kingdom of Heaven is men. The basis of relationship is fraternal and moral, and the object of service is men.

In this respect the Kingdom of Heaven is diametrically different from the kingdom of the world. Some time ago I read an article which says that the foundation of society is economic. I think that is correct. The history of the evolution of society shows that men band themselves together primarily for economic and industrial reasons. Our chief interest is in things, not in men. Men form themselves into groups, into cities and towns, not in the interest of the mind and the heart, but primarily in the interest of their several pocket-books. Society is useful to a man in the degree that it enables him to get more of this world's goods. He gets moral and social benefits from society, but the chief interest is in things of commercial value. All this means that the foundation of society is not moral. This matter is treated in a masterful way by Maurice in his "Social Morality." Between a man and a thing there can be no moral relationship. A man can owe no duty to a loaf of bread, nor can a row of houses have any obligation to a man. Maurice says: "The relation between a man and the earth, or the things of the



earth, is dominion. He asserts his will over them; they are his property. He does what he pleases with them, and they are not able to call his right into question. The great first thing about a man is society then, according to this theory, is that he exercises dominion. He realizes himself when he asserts his will, when he brings his environment into subjection." Now the assumption of this principle in society will have its results. If a man's chief interest is in things, it is to be expected that his relation to things, which is that of ownership, will become his nature and he will live out his nature in society. He will try to have dominion over persons as he has over things. This is what they do in the Gentile world, says Jesus. "The princes of the Gentiles exercise dominion over them." Some are owners and others are only things. In our own society we see this principle asserting itself in many ways. We see it in the misunderstandings between capital and labor, where there is often no moral and fraternal relation at all; where the one sells his labor and the other buys it, and this ends the relationship. Brothers they are not. The only attachment between them is things. It is seen in every trust and monopoly, in every swollen fortune, and in every political and social ring that exists for selfish purposes. We see it wherever a few are lords and owners and the rest are slaves and things. In the Kingdom of Heaven, or the society of Jesus, this may not be. Here the association between man and man must be fraternal and moral; and the object of the righteous man's service must be men, not things. Jesus placed man, the individual man, upon a pedestal stripped bare of all that dazzles and glows, and served him. Whether the poverty of Jesus was a matter of voluntary choice or of circumstance I do not know, but I do know that through His poverty He enthroned His glorious personality above all the perishable things that the world hungers and thirsts after.

If now the object of our service is men, not things, the question still remains: What shall we do for men? What shall

our service consist of? And this is after all the crucial question of social ethics. This is the question which every social system of ethics has attempted to answer. The school of Hobbes and Spencer says: Help men to realize themselves. The school of Bentham and Sidgwick says: Make all men happy. And Christianity says: Make men righteous. This answer is just as clear and just as capable of realization as any that has been given. Hedonism objects that we cannot make men righteous against their wills. This is true, but neither can you make men happy if they will to be miserable. But this will not hinder us from trying to make men happy. Hedonism objects that righteousness is a complex thing; that no two men will agree as to what it means and that we can, therefore, not aim at it as the goal of our service for men. But the same is true of happiness. The Hedonists define it clearly for themselves, but if we will ask one hundred men to define what they mean by happiness we will get a diversity of answers. Especially will they disagree as to the means of happiness. Some will want "push-pin" and others will want "poetry." How then can we aim at the happiness of these one hundred men? We can no more do it than we can aim at the righteousness of one hundred men. Still we keep on trying to make men happy. And so likewise we keep on trying to make men righteous. We know what we mean by our *summum bonum*. By making men righteous we mean making men children of God and brothers of men. And when men become righteous better physical, social and political conditions will follow as a logical consequence. The righteous leaven will leaven the whole lump, soul and body.

Still a question remains in my own mind: in this service for men, are we to have no regard for man's conditions? Are we to save souls regardless of men's bodies? Are souls, as separate entities, the only objects of our service? It did well enough to say so in an individualistic and unscientific age, but it will not do to say so in our age. We have learned to know the close interrelation between soul and body, and



between man and his conditions. We know that we cannot save the one without regard for the other. And it is not Christian to say that we should. In the mature types of prophetism the Kingdom of God fully come to earth was that of an ideal world redeemed in soul and body. It was a kingdom of physical and spiritual well being. It included all that attaches to manhood. Jesus came not to destroy the law and the prophets but to fulfill them. His kingdom fully come surely does not mean less than it did for Isaiah and Micah. Christ's kingdom fully come to earth will mean a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness: an ideal world redeemed both in body and soul. Our service in this kingdom shall be for men, but not only for a part of man, but for the whole man, a service for body and soul. And since man cannot be redeemed apart from his conditions, our service for man must also include man's conditions. I feel very keenly, though I am slow to express it, that the Church is loosing her hold on our age because she has been neglectful of this fact. Our business is to preach righteousness, and righteousness in a man or in society will change external conditions, but we must not forget that the reception of righteousness and growth in righteousness can be helped or hindered by external conditions. A loaf of bread, soap and water, the physical ministry of genuine sympathy will prove a good preparatory service for a sermon on righteousness. This was the object of nearly all of Christ's miracles. They removed some external obstacle and opened the poor individual's heart to Christ. And note that there is all the difference in the world between a service that uses men for the sake of things, and the service that uses things for the sake of men. The one is industrial and the other is Christian.

This service for man must be rendered in the spirit of humility. Our only ambition shall be to become the best servants. We must not shrink from this service even if it becomes menial. Christ did not hesitate to wash His disciple's feet, thereby giving them an example of the spirit of a true

servant. It must be rendered in the spirit of tolerance. If the Samaritans will not admit us into their city we may not call fire from heaven to burn them up. If our enemies persecute us we must pray for their forgiveness and continue to serve them. The big brother must always be tolerant toward the little brother no matter how unappreciative or unreceptive the little brother may be.

Upon specific ethical and social questions Jesus spoke only incidentally. The state of Cæsar and the Kingdom of God may coexist and the righteous man owes a duty to both. The family rests upon a divine order which can be dissolved only for one grave moral reason. Jesus referred to the perplexing problem of wealth in the same incidental way. Wealth is no evil in and of itself. A man's attachment to his wealth may make it hard for him to enter the kingdom, as in the case of Zaccheus; or it may keep him out of the kingdom altogether, as in the case of the rich young ruler. It may make a man insensible to the claims of human suffering and misery, as in the case of Dives; or it may make selfish ease and pleasure the end of life as in the case of the rich fool. There is nothing connected with any of these institutions or problems that will not find its solution in any age and under any conditions in the spirit of the righteous man's filial relation to his Father God and in his fraternal relation to his brother man.

The abiding advantage of the method of Jesus is the fact that He gave us only general principles, leaving each age to apply them to their own peculiar problems. Local and particular problems, no matter how interesting and absorbing for the time, will pass away. The most burning question in the day of Jesus was the relation of the theocratic kingdom to the Roman state. The Jews would have been glad for a word of authority on the subject. All that Jesus said was: Do your duty to both. Both the Jewish and the Roman nation have passed away long since and have ceased to be of interest to all but the students of history. We would be glad for a word of authority to-day as to the rights between capital and labor.



But this question will likewise pass away soon and another one will take its place. All that Jesus said on the subject is: Be brothers, children of your Father in heaven. Particular problems will have their day and will cease to be, but Jesus says: "My words will not pass away." And they will not, for they are on principles as broad as life and as eternal as life. Love and the service of love men will need and want as long as they live. Men will need and want love just as much when they will fly from city to city as they did when they walked. In each age and among the different peoples of the earth these living principles of Jesus will adapt themselves to their environment, appropriating that which is essential to their growth and discarding that which is foreign and useless. The ethical teaching of Jesus will adapt itself to any form of government, and to any society above barbarism. Thus Christ's words will continue to leaven individual hearts until the whole of human society will be leavened, not only in soul but in body as well; until there will be a "New heaven and a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness."

ALLENTOWN, PA.

## V.

# THE SPIRITUAL SELF-CULTURE OF THE MINISTER.

BY C. B. SCHNEDER, D.D.

Hugh Black concludes his very excellent book, "Culture and Restraint," in the following beautiful language:

"When the sons of Greece are not against but for the sons of Zion: when all the ideals of culture find their inspiration and nourishment in the divine ideals of Jesus, and take their place in the great loving world purpose of the world's Saviour; when thought, and art and literature, and knowledge and life are brought into subjection to the obedience of Christ, that is the true victory."

These words place before our minds a beautifully comprehensive ideal. Only that which tends toward its realization is real progress. And its full realization implies the effacement of thought distinctions which it has been found convenient to make. Then secular and sacred will coincide because all of life will be sacred. Then all culture will be spiritual culture because the physical being, the mental faculties, and the moral character will unfold normally, rising "in a crescendo from sense to mind, from mind to the moral, from the moral to the spiritual," and thus each will find its fuller glory in glorifying that to which it rises, and all, their *chief* glory, in the perfection of the spiritual. This ideal is that of the perfect man and has been realized but once during all the ages. That realization is Jesus, the ideal man. Among all the rest of human kind, even the very best product of the ages of culture and civilization is but an approximation to the standard and true symmetry of the ideal man. So long as this is true we shall find it convenient to hold in mind the distinctions to



which we are accustomed, and to study the laws of physical culture, mental culture, moral culture and spiritual culture, remembering, however, that the culture of the body, mind and conscience have real significance only as they reach up to, and enter into something beyond themselves, and that is the realization of the perfect ideal, in other words, the realization of the life of God in the soul in ever increasing fulness.

From the foregoing the importance of spiritual culture becomes at once apparent. It reaches down into the all of life and utilizes its forces unto the highest possible ends and purposes. It presents to view the only worthy motive for culture and life and should therefore enlist and hold the attention of all who would make the best of the life which now is, as the proper preparation for that which is to be.

Culture implies life. The results of culture are found in terms of increase by development commonly called growth. Spiritual culture implies spiritual life. Spiritual culture cannot be applied to unspiritual life any more than animal culture can be applied to vegetable, or other forms of life, not animal. Life results from birth. Spiritual life results from spiritual birth—the birth of which Jesus spoke to Nicodemus. His “That which is born of the flesh is flesh” is a truth which is unfailing. His “That which is born of the Spirit is spirit” is likewise an unfailing truth. One of the laws of all life is that of growth. Given life, with proper supply of food, air and exercise, and growth follows providing the life is in a condition of health. This is true of all life so far as known and consequently true of spiritual life. Supply it with spiritual food for sustenance, with a spiritual atmosphere for breathing, and with exercise along spiritual lines of activity, and the result will be growth.

But life and growth imply health. Health in spiritual life is holiness. Holiness is a state of separation to, or of being set apart unto God. Rev. G. Campbell Morgan speaks of it as being, while the subject is in this life, perfection of condition as over against perfection of consummation in the life

which is to come. Therefore in order to spiritual growth, which is the object of spiritual culture, there must be spiritual life in a state of spiritual health. Here is the point where culture can begin.

How can he who is born again, who has the new life resulting from the new birth, hasten, encourage, increase the growth of a holy life unto the perfect imageship of the Lord Jesus? Is there anything that he can do to promote growth? If so, what is it, and where does it lie? Can growth be brought about by force of will, or by emotion, or through the affections? These are proper questions. But in seeking correct answers to them it must be borne in mind that growth is primarily dependent upon life and health and that it is possible to do that which is conducive to larger, better and fuller growth only as we know and obey the laws of life. In garden, field and orchard this is in evidence as everywhere else in life. The means of culture are well known because the laws of the life whose growth is to be accelerated are known—scientifically known. Is it not vastly more important that in relation to the spiritual life the laws of growth should be so thoroughly known and so diligently obeyed as to be conducive to the very fullest possible results?

To the work of acquiring a knowledge of these laws, the Christian minister stands sacredly pledged. Faithfully must he study and observe and investigate in order that he may know these laws not only in a general way, but also as applying to individual men and women. And he must begin with himself, applying in his own inner self that culture which he would prescribe for others. He must know the fountain before he can lead others to its living waters. He must know the possibilities of spiritual self-culture as actual experience before he can properly direct others. If those over whom God has placed the minister as under-shepherd, are to be spiritual, the under-shepherd himself must be spiritual.

The spiritual self-culture of the minister does not differ as to means from that of any child of God. It is the same life,



and growth is by the same law. But there is reason to believe that the minister is in danger of overlooking this fact and that there is a possibility of handling the means of grace and failing to profit by them; of urging others to become more spiritual without being spiritual himself; of warning others against neglect while he himself is guilty of it. St. Paul seems to have foreseen this possibility. His letters to Timothy abound in earnest, urgent warning and exhortation. "Neglect not the gift that is in thee, which was given thee by prophecy, with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery. Be diligent in these things: give thyself wholly to them: that thy progress may be manifest unto all. Take heed to thyself and thy teaching. Continue in these things; for in doing this thou shalt save both thyself and them that hear thee." It is the minister's great privilege to lead his flock. In this leadership precept alone is not sufficient. He dare not say to men, "Do as I tell you, and not as I do." Above all other men ministers are to be "living epistles" because they *are known and read* of all men.

If, therefore, the minister would lead his flock in green pastures and beside the still waters, he himself must know by actual experience where spiritual sustenance, atmosphere, and exercise are to be found. In other words, the minister must know and use for his own spiritual development the positive means of growth. What are these means of growth? Where shall the minister find sustenance for the life of God in his soul? Does it not lie in a constantly increasing knowledge of God by the power of a living faith? "This is life eternal, to know God." Is not the fuller, clearer knowledge of God a chief result to be attained in our daily living? How shall we come to that fuller knowledge of God? Spiritual things are spiritually discerned. God is spirit and he who would know Him must know Him spiritually. And such knowledge is by the written word which sets forth the living word—the revelation of God. This being so, the spiritual study of the word of God is a constant necessity. What is needed in the minis-

ter's life for his spiritual self-culture, therefore first of all, is daily, devotional study of the Bible. No other study of the Bible can take the place of such devotional study. Critical, homiletical, doctrinal, literary study of the sacred volume cannot be substituted for it. He must study the Bible in the preparation of sermons and addresses, and for teaching in the Sunday-school and in the catechetical class. He ought to study the Bible critically and exegetically at all times. But apart from all such study there must be study in which the minister can say, "I will now study the precious Word of God to meet my own spiritual needs. I will study it that I may grow stronger and richer spiritually; that I may have loftier ideals; and that I may enjoy the larger freedom of the higher life." The minister must study his Bible in such a way that in it God veritably communicates Himself to him; that the period devoted to this study is real fellowship with his heavenly Father. Of the importance of this there can be no doubt. All other forms of Bible study should culminate in this form. "If ye abide in My Word, then are ye my disciples." According to these words the real test of discipleship consists in abiding in God's word. To abide means to dwell—to stay, in a place. To abide in God's word means to live in it. Abiding in God's word implies such study of it as will cause the minister to be at home in the Word under all the circumstances of life. It is Bible study upon our knees, study whose sweet influence follows throughout the trials and toils of the day and accompanies us through the wakeful hours of the night. In his picture of the blessed man the Psalmist is careful to say that "His delight is in the law of the Lord, and in his law does he meditate day and night." Such a study of the Word awakens to a sense of spiritual need. It opens up to a consciousness of the depths of the hidden recesses of sin and misery. It helps a man to see himself as God sees him, and to see God as his loving, faithful Father.

Upon such a study of the Word every minister, if he would be true to himself, and true to his calling, must insist. There



must be time for it. The morning hours seem most generally approved as being best adapted for devotional study of the Bible. But the particular time of day is not a matter of great importance to the earnest soul with whom Bible study has come to be, not a duty, nor a privilege, but a passion. The importance lies in the doing of it regularly, consistently, deliberately, devotionally. We have reason to believe that Jesus studied the Scriptures after this manner. Spirit-filled men cannot be found anywhere apart from such devotional study of the Sacred Volume. That the minister may be spirit-filled, keep spirit-filled and attain constantly increasing capacity for the spirit's indwelling, he must become possessed of a passion for Bible study.

But sustenance, to be in the highest degree helpful must be taken while life is lived in a wholesome atmosphere. That spiritual food may be in the highest degree helpful the spiritual life must draw its breath in a wholesome spiritual atmosphere. Prayer is that atmosphere. No man will study the Bible long, and love it, who does not approach such study in the spirit of earnest prayer. Other books we can study and understand in the power of the intellect alone. But the Word must be spiritually discerned and spiritual discernment comes by prayer only. "Men catch its deep, real meaning only as they cast their helplessness on God's might, and as they sink their ignorance in God's wisdom." To grow spiritually the minister must live the life of fellowship with God which is the life of prayer. Time must be found morning, noon and night to "Lift up mine eyes unto the mountains," and to lift up the heart unto God who is our "Strength and our Redeemer." And through the day, in any need, the minister must be conscious of God's nearness, and he must trust implicitly in His power to help. Thus it comes to pass that his life is elevated to the plane of a holy fellowship with the divine Father, encouraging him to tell Him all his woes, to thank Him for all his joys, to breathe out to Him the deep agonies of the heart, and to realize that every place may serve as an altar and all

the world as a temple. Thus, cultivating the habit of prayer until it becomes one of the principal joys of life to tell Him everything just as a little child delights to tell its mother everything, there is created an atmosphere in which the spiritual life can freely breathe and grow stronger, fuller, richer and more fruitful. In such an atmosphere of prayer, Jesus lived. Just how much of his time he spent upon His knees we cannot know. But we do know that he spent whole nights on the mountain side in prayer and that frequently as he went about doing good He was in the spirit of prayer. Since Jesus found it helpful to live in a prayer atmosphere, and it is inconceivable that he could have lived in any other, how much more important that the minister's constant desire should be to live in a spirit of prayer.

Given spiritual life, health, sustenance of the Word, the atmosphere of prayer, the result is growth. Growth is increasing capacity for work. Work is not ordinarily regarded as having any spiritual significance. Hamilton Wright Mabie in his oration before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Franklin and Marshall College presented strong reasons for regarding work as having a large spiritual influence. The same idea is somewhat differently stated by Ruskin when he says, "Ascending from the lowest to highest, through every scale of human industry, that industry worthily followed, gives peace. Ask the laborer in the field, at the forge, or in the mine; ask the patient, delicate-fingered artisan, or the strong-armed, fiery-hearted worker in bronze, and in marble, and with the colors of light; and none of these, who are true workmen, will ever tell you that they have found the law of heaven an unkind one—that in the sweat of their face they should eat bread, till they return to the ground; nor that they ever found it an unrewarded obedience; if, indeed it was rendered faithfully to the command—'Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might.' " We believe this, though the day may be far distant when it will be generally accepted. But how true this general statement is when applied to the work of the



Christian ministry. Standing on the watch-tower of Zion, delivering his message, testifying for the Master, breaking the bread of life, commending holiness, exalting righteousness, rebuking sin, pleading with the sinner, wrestling in prayer for the triumph of good and the overthrow of evil, encouraging the dying, comforting the sorrowing, pointing all men continually to Christ, instructing youth, sustaining old age, cheering the sick, helping the helpless, caring for the orphan, magnifying the Christ as Lord and Saviour—this is the work of the minister and if this does not serve as a means to spiritual self-culture there is something very seriously wrong within. Either the spiritual life is not there or its growth is being sadly hindered in some way.

So we see that work has a large place in the minister's life and under God's grace and blessing it should stimulate mightily his spiritual growth. In all his work the minister is a "worker together with God." How sacred his work! How exalted his calling! How graciously influential this work must be upon his spiritual life if he is faithful and conscientious in all that he does! Preciousness is added to the thought when it is remembered that the work of the minister is unselfish, consecrated, service. That is the great Christian thought growing ever more brilliantly beautiful and effective as civilization advances toward the fuller freedom and glory of God.

Sustenance by the Word of God, the atmosphere of prayer, the activity of Christian service; these three are presented as the means of spiritual self-culture for the minister, the ultimate object of which must ever be to grow into the likeness of Jesus.

It may be asked, What of self-denial, what of cross-bearing, what of self-discipline? These have their proper place, according to the teaching of Jesus. They are not a negligible quantity by any means. But until a man possesses the divine life and nurtures it in the food of the Word, the atmosphere of prayer, and activity in Christian service, self-denial, cross-

bearing, and self-discipline, will not account for much, just as it does not account for much when a gardener is ever so diligent in destroying weeds and fails to plant and cultivate good seed. It is only in cultivating the good that the rooting up of evil attains significance. "When a heart is motivated by the love of God, and a life is inspired by the consciousness of God's presence, the necessary self-denial, self-sacrifice becomes easy."

That the minister should diligently and earnestly devote himself to his own spiritual culture, no one will deny. The importance of it is implied in all that has been said. Scripture emphasizes it in many passages. Reason and common sense demand it. Only thus can the minister hope to become Christ-like, and only as he grows in the Christ-likeness can he hope to grow stronger in influence and power with men for the glory of God.

SHAMOKIN, PA.



## VI.

### AUTHORITY IN RELIGION.

BY A. C. SHUMAN, D.D.

Our mental nature prompts us to ask many questions. And these questions usually affect all that we hold precious for this life and that to come. Even the non-scientific mind is impressed everywhere with the intention and benevolence and control and careful adjustment of the universe, but it is not satisfied until some practical account of how all things came to be, is furnished. In undertaking to account for the universe at least four great and fundamental questions or problems are faced. In the answer and attempted solutions the various sciences have been developed, and speculative philosophical systems constructed. These problems may be stated in their order: (1) What is the origin of matter. (2) What is the origin of force. (3) How account for the formation and orderly arrangement of the universe. (4) What is the origin of life. Evolution has tried to account for all these things but has failed. Only one satisfactory account has ever been found, and that is the Bible account. Without a Divine revelation we should not have any light upon the solution of the problem of the first great cause of the origin of the heavens and the earth, and life, because the origin of all creation lies beyond the sphere of reason and experience. Why is the Bible account satisfactory? Simply because the Bible narrative and doctrine deals with, and rests upon facts, and therefore speaks with authority. So the mental nature is not satisfied until it is supplied with the facts. The facts in any given case form the ultimate authority in matters of education.

Our moral nature also prompts us to ask many questions, and makes us impatient until they are answered. Certain facts

and truths constitute the moral and spiritual realm, man's most natural sphere. For man is a created spirit in vital union with a material organized body. He is a spirit and has a body. Man was created to hold communion with God and to devote his life and powers to His worship and service. Consciousness of God, then, is the basis of all religion. True religion, must, and does rest upon undisputed facts. From these facts doctrines are derived and from doctrines come experiences, which give rise to conduct and that ends in suitable prospects. All education is important, but religion is our chief concern. This is evident from the many questions that naturally arise and prompt a satisfactory answer. How does it come that sin is universal? What is the character of the being to whom we are responsible? May we trust him or must we be in terror? How are we to know what is right or what is wrong since judgments of men differ and frequently conflict? Are we immortal and is it a happy hereafter which awaits us? Does it depend on anything we do? If so what must we do? Where shall we go for a satisfactory answer to these and many more related inquiries, for we cannot rest till we find some standard of truth which we can regard as infallible. Where are we to find it? "In your reason" says one, "In the Church" says another, "In the Bible" says a third, and the decisions we reach determine whether we shall be rationalists, Romanists or Protestants.

But even back of all these there must be, and is an ultimate standard of right, and ultimate source of rights. The very use of the term authority implies the existence of a final ethical standard, either *original* or *delegated*, but both are nevertheless real. Christ says, "All Authority has been given unto me in heaven and earth." From these words and other similar passages of Scripture we can trace Authority, as delegated, back to its original source whence it is derived. We might expect our Lord to define religion, but he does not do so in so many words. From His teachings, however, we learn that religion is the bond of union which unites—reunites—God and



man: that man is the subject of religious feelings and experiences, and God the sole object of religious worship and adoration. Taking religion as a term of relation, God and man as the two chief factors, Christ shows what are the essentials of right relations between them. He came not to reveal anything new, but to fulfill all law defining man's duty and right relations with God.

In the consideration of the relations existing between God and man, our Lord duly recognises the unity of the soul: (1) *The Understanding*: "And this is life eternal, that they should *know* thee the only true God, and him whom thou didst send, even Jesus Christ" (John. 17: 3). (2) *The emotions*: "Thou shalt *love* the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy mind; thou shalt *love* one another even as I have *loved* you." (3) *The will*: "Not everyone that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that *doeth the will* of my Father who is in heaven." The will must control the conduct. Christ then finds the ultimate standard of right in God's nature as expressed through God's will. The will of God is the standard of right and authority to which everything is to be referred. So God's will is the fountain and source of all particular rights. Man may as a free creature be an original source of power, but never of rights. His rights are *derived*, but nevertheless real.

Authority is of three kinds, *legislative*, *judicial* and *executive*.

*Legislative authority* is concerned with *duty* either as required or forbidden. To know what is true shall we go to Church councils, creeds or catechisms? To know what is right shall we consult human reason, private opinions or public sentiment? If so, then what council, creed or catechism; whose reason or what private opinion; who is to define duty and rights and tell what is true? Who is best fitted to prescribe for the conscience? Certainly, He alone who is the author of it. God is in the absolute sense Lord of the

conscience. To him it belongs to say, "Thou shalt" and "Thou shalt not." He alone can determine the relations between himself and his creature. He must define duties. Hence the preceptive portions of the Old Testament. And "every Scripture inspired of God is also profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, for instruction, which is in righteousness that the man of God may be complete, furnished completely unto every good work. The Scriptures mediated by Moses and the prophets was the law and authority for Christ. Notice the reply of Christ when tempted by the devil. Quoting from Deuteronomy 8: 3, He says: "Man doth not live by bread only, but by everything that proceedeth out of the mouth of Jehovah doth man live." "If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded, if one rise from the dead" (Luke 16: 31). The Bible then is the book of duty and character for Christ and for every man. All questions both of creed and conduct are to be determined by it.

*The Bible is an Organism.*—It is a Divine-human book in which man does all and God does all. Forty different writers, sixty-six different books, sixteen hundred years of writing and yet the several books stand in designed relation to one body of truth, and the whole body is *animated by one Spirit*. The Old Testament is the record of the revelation of redemption in its earlier, typical form, or as the law, pointing toward a coming Redeemer. The New Testament opens with the realization of this hope in the person of Jesus, and continues as the Gospel setting forth Christ, the Redeemer, already come, in fulfillment of the law. The whole Bible is God's message. Through it there is one increasing progressive purpose. The Gospel could not have been without the law, which was a preparation for it, and law would have been a failure without the Gospel. The two Testaments make up one complete revelation of the divine religion of salvation through Christ, and are designed to be an official and authentic communication to make known the way of Salvation. The Bible is a uni-



versal book containing all and the only known legislative precepts in the moral world. As an offspring of the divine mind and an expression of the divine will the Bible has sole legislative authority, and is infallible.

*Judicial Authority.*—Judicial authority has to do with the truth, interpretation, or what one is to believe comes in here. Legislative authority has to do with the *conscience*. Judicial with the *understanding*. The authority Christ uses in the Gospels is judicial and not legislative, and yet He prescribes laws and commandments to the conscience. The exercise of authority by Jesus on earth was practical. He claimed other men for himself. They were, however, such as the Father had given him (Jno. 17: 9, 24). It was that authority then which only the morally right and the perfectly good have to exercise over all moral beings. The moral and practical authority of Jesus is never legal. We cannot take the letter in which it was expressed and regard it as a statute. In the case of the rich young man (Mark 10: 17, 22), Jesus said: "Go, sell whatsoever thou hast, and give to the poor: . . . and come, follow me." We know that this is not intended to be of general application. Jesus is our authority, but his words are not our statutes. We are not under law, but under grace. Conduct must be determined by no other motive than that of love.

Jesus Christ has authority as teacher, revealer, and life-giver. At this point some of the greatest controversies and keenest discussions have been involved. The controversy turns on the deity of Christ. Does he have authority as God? Recent writers claim to find four reasons for the alleged religious decline. They say that it is due to the same reason which brought on the financial panic: viz., a lack of confidence. (1) A lack of faith in the Bible as the inspired word of God. (2) A lack of faith in the Sabbath as a divinely appointed day of spiritual rest and communion with God. (3) A lack of faith in the Church as a divine institution. (4) A lack of faith in the deity and authority of Jesus Christ.

For a satisfactory answer to this last statement we must turn to Jesus himself as he is presented to us in the Gospel. The authority of Jesus is vested not in external credentials but in what he is in himself. In the first place the Bible unmistakably declares Christ to be the Son of God. And the Bible is true. (Luke 1: 35.) "And the Angel answered and said unto Mary. The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee; wherefore also the holy thing which is begotten shall be called the Son of God." In the next place Jesus fulfilled the prophecy and thus is the Messiah of the Old Testament. (Matt. 2: 15, Luke 4: 17, 2.) But the interesting thing for us to know is that Jesus claimed to be equal with God. And not only so but framed an argument to prove it and brought witnesses to substantiate it. All this found, for instance, in the fifth chapter of John. Again and again Jesus had been asked to show a sign from Heaven. He was also asked to tell "by what authority doest thou these things? or Who is he that gave thee this authority? In Matt. 11: 27, Jesus says, "All things have been delivered unto me of my Father. . . . Neither doth any know the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal him."

But Jesus "Called God his *own* Father, making himself equal with God." (1) *On the grounds of divine knowledge.* John 5: 19. Christ has the will to do nothing of himself but what he seeth the Father doing. Jesus and the Father are one indivisible essence, and their acts are absolutely inseparable. He that doeth the things that the Father doeth in like manner cannot himself be less than God. (2) *Jesus has divine power.* John 5: 21. "For as the Father raiseth the dead and giveth them life, even so the Son also giveth life to whom he will." Either Physical or Spiritual quickening is the prerogative of God alone. If the Son can give life to whom he will can he be less than God? (3) *Jesus proves his deity by divine authority.* John 5: 22. The Father hath given all judgment unto the Son. Judgment is the preroga-



gative of God alone and if all judgment hath been given unto the Son can he be less than God? The important inference and distinct application is there made in the twenty-third verse. "That all may honor the Son, even as they honor the Father. He that honoreth not the Son, honoreth not the Father that sent him." Now the world acknowledges that Christ's name is above every human name; that his life is the model life; his worth overshadows the world's wealth. The world together with the Unitarian, the Christian Scientist, the Theosophist, the educated Pagan and even the so-called New Theology will acknowledge Christ's divinity. But by his divinity they will mean only that which is meant when your divinity and mine is spoken of. But we are to honor the Son as God. "All authority has been given unto him in heaven and in earth. Not to honor the Son is to be an idolater since he is not worshipping the God who hath revealed himself in the Bible.

Apparently there are four Christs known to men, but there is only one living Christ, who has created Christianity, and who is the object of the faith of the Christian Church. (1) There is the man who was born at the beginning of this era in Palestine, and gathered a body of disciples, and produced a profound impression on the people, and was credited with the various miracles; and left behind him certain marvelous sayings and was at last crucified. It is necessary that an intelligent person should have these facts in his mind, for without an actual basis of facts the life and Christ dissolves into a dream. But the knowledge of this Christ has no more authority and spiritual effect upon the human race than a biography of Alexander, or of Socrates, or of Washington. This is the historical Christ.

(2) The second Christ has touched the imagination of the finest minds of the race and has floated before them as a very lovely and attractive ideal. He looks down upon us from the transfiguration of Raphael. He is the King Authur of Tennyson's Idylls. He lives in the beautiful deeds and

sacrifices of St. Francis. He has done more for the most insensible and unromantic of us than we are aware. But this Christ one knows only as he might admire a piece of art. This Christ has no authority over us. This is the poetical Christ.

(3) Another Christ came to fulfill the covenant of Grace, and render perfect obedience to the eternal law, and expiated the penalty of our sins, and rose again for our justification, and has entered into heaven to be the High Priest of God's House, and shall come again to judge the world. In the progress of time this Christ comes to be little less than a frame on which the embroidered garments of doctrine are laid while beneath their voluminous folds the Nazarene himself is obscured and forgotten. No one can love and honor this lay figure any more than an abstraction of the study. This is the Theological Christ.

(4) But thanks be unto God. There is still a fourth Christ who lies in no grave, who needs no picture or crucifix, who is secluded in no heaven, who revealed himself to the disciples on the way to Emmaus; who rose from his throne to receive the martyr Stephen; who calls upon him to leave all and follow him; who suffers with every Christian that overcomes; who still welcomes Magdalene, and teaches Thomas, and guides Peter and admonishes James and John, and is betrayed by Judas; who still divides human opinion; is adored or misunderstood; is still called Master, or sent to the cross afresh. This is the living, ever-present, effectual, eternal Authoritative Christ.

In this connection the place of the Church with reference to authority comes up for consideration. The authority vested in the Church and exercised by her is a purely judicial authority. The Lord is head and lawgiver. His laws bind the consciences of men. Her sole functions are to declare and to apply the teachings and commandments of Christ. To make new laws or any laws for her own members or for others is beyond her prerogative, which is declarative and unfolding:



declarative to those without. "Go and teach all nations." "Ye shall be my witnesses." Unfolding to those within; "Teach them to observe all things." "Ye are my friends, if ye do the things which I command you."

Here the extreme position and views of the Roman Church present themselves. Romanists regard the church as infallible, and her teachings as authoritative. This cannot be true. For proof of infallibility in any case must be made either to Scripture or tradition. Various sects spring up through different interpretations of Scripture, and claim to be authoritative. No protestant church has an infallible interpretation of Scripture and neither has the Church of Rome. An opinion is one thing. A fact is quite another. The Christian religion rests on facts and the facts are revealed to us in the Bible. We may assent to an opinion or not as we please. But if we neglect a fact we only advertise our stupidity. This difference may be illustrated.

The Bible teaches that only God can forgive sins. Rome says the priest can. The Bible says worship God only. Rome says worship the virgin Mary too. The Bible teaches there is one mediator. Rome says every priest is a mediator. The Bible says Christ offered himself once for all. Rome pretends to repeat the eucharist. The Bible says we are justified by faith. Rome says we are justified by baptism. If the Church is infallible and her teachings authoritative and the Bible is infallible and authoritative we have two contradictions. But the incarnate word sets his seal on the written word. The incarnate word is God. Therefore the Bible is authenticated by God himself. The Church and the individual does not always arrive at a knowledge of truth and right. Hence the final standard is the teachings of prophets, apostles, and Christ.

The supreme norm for every man is within himself. Christ gave the fullest recognition to the right of private judgment. He set up his claims before the bar of individual reason and conscience, so that every man might verify for himself the

truth of a proposition before assenting to it. Conclusions reached in the exercise of this prerogative cannot be dictated by any form of external compulsion. Men are left free with his claims. When Pilate asked, "Art thou the King of the Jews." Jesus answered, "My kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight." Christ's kingdom is not of this world. If it were then force would be used.

So Christ disapproved the compulsion of a tyrannical public or ecclesiastical opinion. A man may say he needs no other revelation than the light of his own intellect. In this case he makes reason the source of knowledge. Or he may say that conceding the Bible contains divine revelations he will receive nothing which he cannot comprehend or which conflicts with his sense of right. Thus reason again is made the criterion of truth. But in the case at his baptism Christ denies to human reason the prerogative to annul or declare or set aside or to pass judgment upon the propriety or expediency of divine prescriptions. Jesus came to fulfill law. The reason is not intended to sit in judgment on the contents of Scripture, but must be allowed to weigh the evidence and come to a conclusion. This takes into account that men may, and will arrive at correct judgments. One thing is sure a man must abide by the decisions he has reached. (John 8: 24.) "Except ye believe that I am he, ye shall die in your sins."

Finally, there is *executive authority* in Religion. As the exalted head of the Church Christ exercises executive authority in the Church. The Book of Acts is the record of the personal action of the ascended Savior. The action and authority of the Lord is manifest in each event and advance of the Church. His action appears in the scenes on the Day of Pentecost. "If I go away I will send the Comforter unto you." The only vicar of the Lord Jesus Christ on earth is the Holy Spirit. "For he shall take of mine and shall declare it unto you. He shall glorify me." He convicts of



sin, of righteousness, and of judgment, and guides into all truth. The Church, then, is commissioned with judicial and executive authority. And the one great executive of the Godhead is the Holy Spirit.

*The ultimate authority for every man is God's nature as expressed in his revealed will.* Men are not saved by bare intellectual assent to a creed, doctrine, or proposition. Faith must terminate on a person. "He that hath the Son hath the life." "Who is he that overcometh the world, but he that believeth that Jesus is the Son of God." The truth which has been lodged in our hearts is to become a living force. Each individual, being a repository of judicial authority, so also he is to be an executive agent of the Godhead. Men exist for the doing of the will of God whether as creatures or as Christians. The end of Christ's whole teaching function was to set men doing, and to guide them in doing, the will of God. The ultimate standard of right for every man is in God's nature as expressed in his revealed will. God's will is the most desirable thing in the universe. He wishes it done in himself. Not only in himself but everywhere and in every person and thing. God's best friend in the world is the man who will put his life in touch with God, and quietly, day by day claim in Jesus' name, that God's will shall be done. Yielding to, and doing the will of God is the end of life.

TIFFIN, OHIO.

## VII.

### A NEW DEFENSE OF THEISM.

BY S. S. HEBBERD.

#### I.

True theism has always had a hard struggle for existence. But just now certain well-known conditions are rendering that struggle unusually severe. In many churches a "new theology," plainly pantheistic, is preached. In most others any kind of theology is evidently an unwelcome visitor hovering timidly in the dim background. In common, everyday life, the thought of God seems to be slowly but surely passing into oblivion.

Such a state of affairs certainly suggests the need of new defenses for theistic belief. Hence I venture to offer such a defense, one not only new but impregnable. It must have, of course, a metaphysical basis; but one that I hope to make plain enough to be readily comprehended by any average mind. That basis is as follows:

The specific function of all thinking, as distinct from mere feeling is to discriminate between cause and effect.

*Substance and Attribute.*—I have to prove the above thesis concerning the nature of thought in all its three grand divisions, perception, conception and reason or inference. But first a word concerning those feelings of resemblance and its opposite—automatically associated by some mechanism within—which are given to man and brute alike. Indeed the brutes even surpass us in their power of detecting these similarities; witness for instance a dog tracking the footprints of his prey. Now the great stumbling-block of modern philosophy has been the tendency to fall back from the perplexities of the causal



problem upon these mere feelings of resemblance as a sure resting-place. We see that even in the case of Descartes; he founds his "problematic idealism" upon the fact that "often effects are not like their causes." And in Berkeley's system still more obtrusively everything hinges upon this fallacy of resemblance. Again and again he pleads that "an idea can be like nothing but an idea."<sup>1</sup> Once indeed he has a glimpse of the real truth that qualities are related to the things as effects to their cause or partial cause. But he rejects that curtly, on the ground that things are inert and therefore cannot be causes.

Then Hume came with his famous problem of causality, one which, according to Höffding, "Kant was unable to solve and which indeed is insoluble." Hence Kant was forced to altogether discard causation in any proper sense of the term. Instead thereof he substitutes a series of mere effects—motions, events, qualities and other appearances—conjoined only by an illusory and subjective necessity of thinking them conjoined. This Kantian substitution of a series of effects for true causation must be remembered; for it ever since has formed the basis and essence of all anti-theistic argument.

Kant's successors, equally unable to answer Hume, also discarded causation; with Hegel it is naught but one of those self-contradictory categories through which thought is doomed to pass on its way upward to "the Idea." The causal conviction thus paralyzed, free play was given to the fallacy of resemblance, the feeling of likeness and unlikeness. Especially among the Hegelians, new or old, the formula of identity and difference is the key to all the mysteries of the universe. Now it is the very essence of these pseudo-relations that they should be vague, incoherent and self-contradictory; it is equally true that anything is *like* everything else and that it is *not like it*. No real thinking emerges until we specify upon what the likeness or unlikeness *depends*; in other words until you convert the mere feeling of resemblance into a causal relation. But confine yourself to the vague formula of identity

<sup>1</sup> "Principles of Human Knowledge," § 8, also 9, 18, 33, etc.

and difference, then it is easy enough to reduce the universe to a mirage of phantoms and self-contradictions.

Apply this now to the relation of the thing and its attributes. The two terms of this relation are given by sense, together, undiscriminated; thought separates and re-unites them as cause and effect. Is it objected that the thing is not the complete cause of any attribute? That is granted; no finite thing is a complete and sufficient cause; but it is a permanent factor in each and all the various causal processes by which its attributes are severally produced. Do you object, with Berkeley and the rest, that when the attributes are taken away nothing remains? The answer is that likewise when you take away the thing the attributes perish; either a cause without effects or an effect without a cause is but a half-thought, a snare and a delusion. Do you still insist that isolated attributes, a patch of color for instance, are given by sense? The answer must be a flat denial. The patch of color is never given except as automatically associated with a colored object by that mechanism of sense which belongs to man and brute alike.

My view then seems to fully satisfy all the conditions of the problem. It is further confirmed by the glare of light which it throws upon those theories which conceive the thing as naught but the sum of its attributes. Idealists are prone to regard themselves as having risen above the "naïve realism" of common minds. But in fact they have *descended* from thought to feeling. Having discarded causality they have had no resource but to fall back upon mere feelings of resemblance—pseudo-relations of "identity and difference," the very essence of which is vagueness, incoherence and self-contradiction.

*Concepts.*—Here we are at once confronted by that futile dispute between the Nominalists and the Conceptualists, the one insisting that a universal means only an imaginary collection of resembling things, the other of resembling attributes. Here again we have only that old fallacy of resemb-



lance which makes philosophic progress impossible. Thrusting it aside we turn to that most splendid triumph of Greek thought—Plato's insight that the essence of a concept consists in its being at once *invariable* and a *cause*. In those pre-scientific times he could not fully unify his thought; but that task is made for us an easy one by the revelations of modern science concerning the causal processes of nature. We can see that a concept means something more than a heap of vague similarities, that its deepest meaning points straight to *the invariable process of causation* whereby these similarities are produced.

Take, for example, one of the most universal of concepts, weight. The fall of a stone, although an infinitely varying motion changing its velocity and its real direction in every infinitesimal instant of time, is yet the product of an absolutely invariable process of causation. So with the infinite variety of color; so everywhere.

Bare inspection, then, proves that a concept is essentially the indication of a causal process and its products. Many subsidiary proofs not to be detailed here are given in my "*Philosophy of History*." For example scientific classification: as Darwin says: "Naturalists in their search for a true or natural system of classification have always been unconsciously-guided *not by mere resemblance*, but by the principle of inheritance"<sup>2</sup>—that is, by the process of production. So in the history of language: linguistic roots almost always signify familiar processes of causation attended with visible results.<sup>3</sup>

Now contrast this theory with others. In one place, indeed Hegel has a glimpse of the truth; he says that the true universal is not merely some common element in all of a kind; it is their ground, their substance. But he soon sails away on the wings of his metaphor about the organism; the concept proves finally to be but the "totality" or the "articulated whole" of

<sup>2</sup> "Origin of Species," Chap. XIV.

<sup>3</sup> M. Muller, "Science of Thought," 30, 31.

self-contradictory parts. But my view is not a metaphor; it does not oblige us to regard the universe as an animal or a vegetable; it is plain, solid, scientific fact.

Or turn to Lotze who finally decides that the universal cannot claim to be called an idea "in any ordinary sense of that term." Concepts are "only short expressions of logical problems whose solution cannot be compressed into the form of an idea."<sup>4</sup> And so to save himself from the pit of the crudest Nominalism, he seeks the frail support of "intuition," of "æsthetic values" and "faith."<sup>5</sup>

*Cause and Reason.*—Here, it will be urged, your thesis certainly fails; cause and reason cannot be identified. Bradley devotes a chapter of his *Logic* to proving their essential difference, but the gist of his whole argument is given in a single illustration he uses. "Two coins," he says, "are proved to have similar conceptions because they each are like to a third. But the cause is not found in this interrelation. The cause is their origin from a common die." But surely that is foolishness. Here are two very different facts, one physical and one psychical, two coins and our belief in their similarity. How could any one in his senses expect that two such different results could have the same causes?

A less absurd argument, however, is this: cause refers to changes or events, but reason to eternal and immutable truths. But that overlooks the fact that these immutable truths are universal judgments and therefore refer to a matter infinitely *variable*. The geometer's theorem, for instance, does not refer solely to the one triangle shown in the diagram but to an infinite host of all possible triangles varying in length of sides, size of angles and position. So that argument fails.

Another argument, much emphasized by Bosanquet, is that reason and consequent, unlike cause and effect, are interconvertible; the equilaterality of a triangle, for instance, is a reason for inferring its equiangularity, and conversely. But

<sup>4</sup> "Logic," p. 24.

<sup>5</sup> Jones, "Philosophy of Lotze."



here we have again that great error—already described as the tap-root of modern agnosticism—the failure to distinguish the necessary co-existence or sequence of two *effects* from the *cause* of their co-existence or sequence. The equiangularity and the equilaterality are necessarily co-existent, hence either one may be inferred from the other. But as even Bosanquet concedes “the nature of space is not only the ground but the cause” of that co-existence.

There does not seem then to be the slightest proof of any contrariety between reason and cause. Reason is simply one kind or rather one variety of cause—the cause of normal belief.

*The Solution of Hume's Problem.*—We have proved then that the essence of all thinking—in its three forms of perception, conception and reason—is a relating of cause and effect. But does not that still leave it possible to regard causation as only, in Hume's phrase—“a feigning of the mind”? I answer emphatically: No! For mark, if the essence of thought is what I have proved it to be, then the cancelling of causality logically involves not merely the extinction of all knowledge, but of all *thinking*. One may perchance be content, as Hume seems to have been, with the former, the denial of all knowledge, or absolute skepticism. But sane thought cannot cancel that the cancelling of which logically involves the collapse and extinction of all thinking—all questions of true or false, even of existence or non-existence. That would be suicide indeed; something like a man's cutting off his own head in order to inspect the brains within.

## II.

*The Ontological Proof of God's Existence.*—By such a proof I understand an argument derived from the very nature of all existence as being either cause or effect. Kant's alleged “refutation” of this ontological proof has been a mighty power for evil in that he did succeed in casting such a cloud of suspicion around it that many good theists—such as Flint, for example—seem disposed to forsake it and put their trust in

stead in Hegel's "organic" metaphor which logically leads only to pantheism. But Kant was wise enough to see that the ontological argument was the basis of all other proofs: if that went down, they went with it.

The gist of Kant's refutation is presented in these words (wherein he follows Hume very closely): "I find myself unable to form the slightest conception of a thing which when annihilated in thought with all its predicates leaves behind it a contradiction."<sup>6</sup> Possibly that assertion may be true concerning all other objects of thought, it is certainly not true of a Sufficient Cause. For I have proved in the first part of this essay that to annihilate the conception of causality would involve the contradiction of all other conceptions, the complete collapse and extinction of all thinking. Kant goes on to argue that the proof of any objective reality must be based upon principles of possible experience and not upon the principle of analysis or contradiction. But to cancel any sufficient cause is of course to cancel all effects; and therefore, as I have shown, to invalidate not merely some special bit of experience but all possible experience whatsoever.

In fine, Kant's easy triumph over the schoolmen and Descartes was due to their unhappy mode of stating the ontological argument. To prove the existence of their *ens realissimum* would virtually amount to proving the existence of the most existent existence. That was not only preposterous in itself, but it also buried out of sight the real point at issue. That point to be proved was that when man began to think there necessarily rose within him some dim consciousness that for all this vast complex of changes, motions and other effects before him there must be a complete and sufficient *cause*.

Leaving thus Kant and his refutation behind us, we go on to ask: What else concerning this sufficient cause can be determined from the very nature of being and thought? I answer first, that it must be Infinite: for, whatever is finite or limited demands another to account for its limitation and therefore could be only an insufficient or partial cause. Secondly, it

<sup>6</sup> "Critique of Pure Reason," 446.



must be One. That indeed is implied in its infinitude; furthermore, if there were many causes, something else would be required for their co-ordination and so each would come short of being an altogether complete and sufficient cause. The necessity of here stating these proofs so compactly, of course, gives an easy opening for cavils. But, trusting myself to the sagacity and fair-mindedness of the reader, I pass on to the most supremely important phase of the ontological argument.

Third, a sufficient cause must be a *self-sacrificing* one. For only thus can an adequate motive be assigned for the creation of the universe. The Infinite has need of nothing: if it did have needs, then its activity in supplying them would spring from something lacking and alien to itself, and so it would no longer be in itself a complete and sufficient cause. Therefore creative activity on the part of the Infinite can be rationally conceived only as a self-sacrificing effort for the sake of others.

I claim no originality for this last insight. On the contrary some more or less dim idea of creation as necessarily an act of self-sacrifice, is one of the oldest treasures of human thought. Traces of it are to be found in the Vedas, and in the Scandinavian Edda; in fact it is the gold in all the dross of primitive sacrifice. Even the skeptical Sankhya philosophy of India declares, "Every intelligent being acts either from self-interest or beneficence. . . ."<sup>7</sup> A creator who has all that he can desire has no interest in creating anything. The demiurge would be unjust and cruel." Here the principle is taken for granted, but creation is denied on the pessimistic ground that it would not be a beneficent act. Indian poetry, however, took a more optimistic view. Thus Krishna is made to say: "Look at me Arjuna! If I stop from work for one moment the whole universe will die. Yet I have nothing to gain from the universe. I am one Lord."<sup>8</sup> But why do I work? Because I love the world."

<sup>7</sup> "Rig-Veda," X., 90, 16. Also, "Brhaddevata," Harvard Or. Series, II., 369.

I have then but restored a conception which has always been recognized—although in dim, imperfect forms—by the human consciousness. If that conception now seems strange or even incredible, it is because modern philosophy—unable to answer Hume—has robbed the conviction of causality of its real meaning and power. The word cause is glibly used, but nothing is meant but a sequence or coexistence of effects. And so modern life has been taught to worship not the cause, but the effects—not the Creator but the created universe.

*The Cosmological Argument.*—The ontological proof stands by itself, needing the support of no other. The chief value of the cosmological proof is, therefore, I think, to ward off misconceptions that imperil theistic belief. But the most of these seem to spring from that primal fallacy which confounds a mere sequence of effects with their cause; and as we have already dwelt upon that enough we need not reconsider it here. But if any reader is not satisfied let him turn, for instance, to the long and labored argument in Professor Taylor's "*Metaphysics*," that all causation is a delusion, on the ground of its continuity and the indefinite regress.<sup>9</sup> The answer to it is, of course, that a sufficient cause is something different from the mere sequence of its effects.

Of late, indeed, this antipathy to causation is assuming the most fantastic forms. Professor Royce, for example, declares that "the unhappy slavery of metaphysicians of the past to the conception of causation has been responsible for some of the most fatal of the misfortunes of religion and humanity."<sup>10</sup> Freed from such bondage himself, he finds the world to be a dream and deifies man as a "part" of God.

But Hegel himself, I think, was much nearer the truth than these recent disciples are. His dialectic which they seem generally inclined to thrust aside, really needs but a slight modifying to make it very useful. For its principle simply

<sup>8</sup> Ragozin, "Vedic India," 382, and Menzies, "Hist. Religions," 68.

<sup>9</sup> "Metaphysics," 271 seq.

<sup>10</sup> "The World and the Individual," I., 444.



is that every truth is a synthesis of two elements each of which taken apart from the other is illusive and self-contradictory. Now this principle when restricted to relations of cause and effect is entirely correct. For, as I have proved, every form of thinking is, in its essence a relating of cause and effect: and yet each of these elements when taken apart from the other is unthinkable and absurd; a cause without any effects or an effect without any cause, either of these is nonsense. Let us note now some of the errors which Hegel might have avoided, if he had fully understood his own method.

First, the pantheistic identifying of God and the world. "Without the world God is no God."<sup>11</sup> But in saying that, Hegel overlooks the distinction between the two terms of a synthesis—God is the cause of the world. For always cause and effect differ as follows: If the cause is annihilated the predicates vanish; but the cause endures even when its predicates disappear provided that others take their place. Precisely that is the relation between God and the world. The latter might be blotted out and still God would exist; other activities would be possible—self-consciousness and what else, we may not know.

Second, God's personality. The real proof of that lies in the ontological argument already given; for the proved existence of an Infinite Cause acting self-sacrificing for the sake of others, gives the very highest type of personality that can be conceived. And the difficulty due to identifying God and the world has just been considered and cancelled. But in making God the cause of all, do we not deny the activity of finite things, and so their very existence? By no means: they still exist, have their special activities in the causal processes maintained by the Infinite. Hence we are not driven—like Professor Bowne and others—to absurdly ascribe to the finite only a sort of "non-existent existence."<sup>12</sup>

Third, the Problem of Evil. I am not so foolish as to pretend to solve off-hand, in a few lines, an enigma that has

<sup>11</sup> Hegel, "Philosophy of Religion," I., 200.

<sup>12</sup> Bowne, "Metaphysics," 101.

baffled all human genius. Still, my method does seem to me to throw a great deal of light upon this darkness. For one of the first principles of scientific method is that it is always hazardous to reason from effects to causes; and yet almost all reasoning upon the problem of evil has been of that character. Thinkers looking out on the entangled, immeasurable complex of existence, have tried to strike a balance between its good and evil, its joy and sorrow; and from these effects to decipher the character of the cause. But that is an impossible task. Always our estimates will vary according to our temperaments and even our moods. But reverse this procedure; from our demonstration of what is involved in the very thought of a sufficient cause, pass to the effects—to a survey of the world even in its deepest gloom. Then the mystery of pain slowly yields to the conviction that Infinite Love is behind it all, and midnight turns into some faint dawn, at least, of day.

*The Teleological Proof.*—Kant long ago showed that the ordinary argument from design does not fully sustain the theistic conviction. I believe that to make that argument really effective there must be a vast widening out of its scope and tenor. I have prepared the way for this expansion by proving that every concept, every word known to human speech is, in its true and deepest meaning, the assertion of some causal process; and that these processes must be conceived as originated and sustained by an infinite self-sacrificing Cause of all. To deny that, logically involves the extinction of thought.

This understood, the argument from design widens wonderfully. We shall no longer be content to grope about for some few stray indications of utility or contrivance in Nature; we shall find in all the countless causal processes going on everywhere around us the constant revelation of Infinite wisdom and love. It is a sad spectacle, this long wrangle between the scientist and the theologian, one contending for “mechanism,” the other for “teleology.” Neither remembers that Aristotle, the very man who invented these causal distinctions, emphatically taught that there was no essential difference



between them—that the mechanical or efficient cause and the final cause or end were really but two aspects of the same thing seen from different points of view.<sup>13</sup>

Let me adduce still higher authority for this identifying of mechanism and teleology. Hosts of thinkers have regarded the absolute uniformity of physical processes as a proof that Nature is unmoral, indifferent to right or wrong. But Jesus did not think so. On the contrary he takes this unswerving uniformity of Nature as his chosen symbol and proof of God's love. "He maketh his sun to rise on the evil and the good and sendeth rain on the just and the unjust."

Human freedom is another conception indispensable to genuine theism. Recent philosophy seems to hold "teleology" in very high favor, and yet it generally obliterates all real purposes by describing them not as freely chosen but as fatalistically forced upon us by environment, heredity or character. This determinism, however, is too subtle and sinuous a theme to be discussed as the fag-end of an essay already, perhaps, covering too wide a field. To this extent, then, our defense of theism is left incomplete. I am certain however that the true proof of human freedom must start from the fundamental principle here established. Man by showing himself capable of conscious, premeditated self-sacrifice, proves that he is indeed made in the image of God—is, in the limited sphere of his own little life, a sufficient although very finite cause.

In closing let me repeat that what has been demonstrated in these pages has always been dimly discerned by faith. But now there is everywhere a more urgent demand for strict proof, a growing distrust of sentimentalism and empty phrases, of frantic appeals to "intuitions," "consciousness," "the will to believe" and other forms of obscurantism. These new conditions must be met, if theism is to survive. Furthermore, in all ages the noblest faith has ever claimed to rest upon a solid basis of knowledge. To *know* God—"this is life" eternal.

MASPETH, L. I.

<sup>13</sup> Ritter, "Hist. Ancient Philosophy," III., 141.

## VIII.

# CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS AND THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT IN GREAT BRITAIN AND AMERICA.

BY REV. A. S. WEBER, D.D.

### ALTERED RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS AND ATTITUDES.

In connection with the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Rev. Dr. George A. Gordon's pastorate in the Old South Church, Boston,<sup>1</sup> there were delivered several months ago, a number of important addresses dealing with varied aspects of religious thought and life. These addresses have been brought together and published recently in a form that should commend most of them to the attention of the Christian public. The most notable of them is perhaps that on "Changes in Thought in Twenty-five Years" by the Rev. Williston Walker, D.D., professor of church history in the Yale Divinity School. He brings to the discussion of his subject the scholarly mind which is acquainted with what has been taking place in the world of thought during the last quarter of a century, and the discriminating judgment of a trained and impartial historian—an equipment by which he has furnished us in these pages a most illuminating and satisfactory summary of the progress religious thought has meanwhile made under the stimulating impulse and guidance of modern "forces of change."

Whilst writing sympathetically of this progress, Professor Walker is by no means unmindful of the fact that the period in which it was achieved, has been one full of anxiety, per-

<sup>1</sup> Twenty-fifth Anniversary Record of Dr. George A. Gordon's Pastorate over the Old South Church, Boston. The Pilgrim Press.



plexity and pain for many Christians. Periods of transition and theological reconstruction are always painful. "For many," he observes, "it has been one of much more than pain." The removal of what they regarded as belonging to the very foundations, sorely tried their faith and hope, even though they trusted "that the removing of those things that are shaken" was divinely intended "that those things which cannot be shaken may remain." Like other devout scholars of to-day, Dr. Walker finds it impossible not to cherish tenderest sympathies for those passing through such experiences. And what stirs his feelings even more is his consciousness that we have as yet come to no completion of the process of sifting and reconstruction. "We are still in the midst of the onward flow, even if the main characteristics of the newer-theological structure may now be regarded as approaching fixity."

At the same time, however, he regards the process of doctrinal reconstruction necessary on the one hand, and helpful to the faith on the other hand. "Amid all the perplexing changes," he reminds us, "the mighty essentials of Christian discipleship—loyalty to Christ our Lord, filial love toward God our Father, brotherly helpfulness toward our fellowmen, the achievement of Christian character, the blessedness of Christian service—all stand forth in a clearness never before surpassed. And in his opinion this is due in no small measure to the bold and courageous work of those who, feeling the old slipping away, have dared to formulate our faith in altered intellectual statements, and in constructive expression suited to our age. Often suspected and disparaged, sometimes maligned and persecuted, these present-day prophets of the truth have known how to restate the verities of the Gospel which are abiding and eternal, in terms to which the conscience can now assent, and in thought-forms adapted to the requirements of this new age. However widely sundered in doctrinal interpretation from the advocates of traditional conceptions of Christian doctrine, these heralds of the truth as seen in the new light and set forth in new forms, are them-

selves linked, and are linking their followers, in Christian experience with that of the Christian discipleship of all the ages. In this lies the significance of their ministry, in this they find their joy and their reward.

Instead of allowing ourselves the use of more space for general remarks on Dr. Walker's address, let us mention several of the particular points instanced by him to show the contrasts between present and former conceptions and attitudes in regard to matters of faith. "One momentous change," he says, "that has come into the apprehension of the churches in this recent period is the practical obliteration of that line once so sharply drawn between the natural and the supernatural." In connection with this change has come the recognition of God as in and of his world, immanent in all its on-goings and development; not simply as one sovereignly efficient over it, as the creator over the creation he has made. Fostered as this great transformation in thought has been, by the growth of an idealistic philosophy, it is unquestionably attended by perils. Just as the old divine transcendence was in danger of passing into Deism, so Pantheism sometimes lurks near the divine immanence. "But no great point of view," our author correctly declares, "can be free from the possibility of perversion. And be the peril of Pantheism real or no, a wholly new view of the relation of God to his world has silently won its way." This to his mind is the most fundamental alteration that has come into present-day thought. In place of being exalted high above a world separate from him, whose every act he yet arbitrarily controls, revealed in miracle and theophany to ages long past, the new conception regards God as One who is in and of his world, in a true sense its life, manifesting himself in uniform law in what we call nature, revealing his moral purpose through man, who is the best expression of his character, and above all in the holiest of men, our Lord Jesus Christ.

This tendency to a new interpretation of the nature of God and of his relation to the universe, together with the empha-



sis of his immanent self-expression through humanity and the obliteration of the line between the natural and the supernatural, has resulted in profoundly modifying traditional conceptions of the person of Christ. "In traditional orthodoxy," our author notes, "his divinity was practically exalted at the expense of his humanity, however fully his oneness with men was theoretically asserted." In the altered view, wrought by the thought of the last quarter of a century, "Christ is seen to be not the perfect God mysteriously joined with perfect man, but the perfect revelation of God in all those divine attributes which are capable of expression in a human life, because the highest manifestation of a humanity through which God has been forever revealing himself." In seeing Christ we perceive both what God is and what man may be. We see that his office is no less unique, his character no less exalted, the reverence we pay him no less profound, because we have in him humanity's crowning manifestation, which is, just because it is such, our most majestic revelation of the character of God.

Accompanying this changed view of Christ's person, we have as its corollary, a new conception of the nature and place of man. "The older Calvinistic view of man," Professor Walker writes, "as wholly depraved and alienated from God by nature, powerful a century ago, had indeed become attenuated by the beginning of the period which we now consider. None among us would then have asserted, as Jonathan Edwards did, that 'wicked men are useful in their destruction only,' or as was declared in the early days of the American Missionary Board, 'that the heathen were dropping hopelessly into hell.'" Bushnell by his book on Christian Nurture, Channing by his assertion of the dignity of human nature, Robertson and Maurice by declaring that all men are the sons of the Father, have made their several contributions for effecting the significant transformation with regard to our view of man. But most of all in this matter we owe, according to Dr. Walker, "to our changed conception of God himself, who

hateth nothing that he hath made, who must reach forth with fatherly pity to all his children, not to a chosen people or an elect few, but to all to whom he has given life and made in his image." This new conception does not oblige us to regard men as needing the grace of God less than the old view, but it believes that it comprehends the divine attitude toward and estimate of men better, and so commends God to a deeper love and sincerer trust.

Quite as significant as this altered conception of the nature of man and of his relation to God, is the change that has been wrought in the view of that salvation which is the purpose of the Gospel. On this point Dr. Walker's observations seem particularly luminous and forceful, and strictly in line with the best and most effective preaching of our day. He is glad to acknowledge that the development of individual character, the cultivation of personal allegiance and loyalty to Christ, must always be a main purpose of the Christian ministry and of the Church, but, as he says, "it is no longer, as it was, the exclusive purpose." The view that it is the sole business of the ministry and the Church to rescue a select few, one here and another there, from our lost humanity and fit them for the bliss of a future heaven, has been enlarged, and now embraces the world as the object of redemption. "The prayer of the Christian is not that he may escape from it as speedily as God wills, but that God's kingdom may come and his will be done 'in earth as it is in heaven.'" The salvation which is the purpose of the glorious Gospel, it is coming to be seen with increasing clearness, must be great enough not merely to fit some men for bliss in heaven; it must effect a transfiguration of man in all of his relations in this life. "It must make this world, what it is not now, a reign of righteousness, peace and joy in the Holy Spirit. The duty of the Church to right ancient wrongs, to foster principles of justice in the relations of man with man and class with class, to further endeavors for social betterment, is now recognized as never before."



RIGHTFUL DEMANDS OF THE CHURCH IN DOCTRINAL  
RECONSTRUCTION.

Thus far in its history, the process of theological reconstruction above noticed has been carried forward by individual theologians. Neither in their quest after the truth, nor in their attempt to give literary expression to the conclusions reached, have they had ecclesiastical authority back of them. Like many divinely appointed leaders in other ages, they have been "plowing a lonely furrow," and sowing the seed for a harvest in which only they seemed to have confidence. In the nature of things this is as should have been expected. The attitude of the Church, Roman and Protestant alike, has always been one of unchanging doctrinal conservatism. Unless constrained by the findings of individuals of "light and leading," the Church has not deliberately changed any of its earlier doctrinal formulas. In an interesting article published in the *American Journal of Theology*,<sup>2</sup> on the question—What has the Church a right to demand in theological reconstruction?—Professor Allan Hoben, of the University of Chicago, suggests that such conservatism of the Church is largely necessary and to that extent unblameworthy. "She holds a trusteeship for humanity, which by every law of justice and every prompting of wisdom, forbids whatever seems a doubtful investment. Hence every important change in her cultus must be made by the self-sacrificial leadership of the few. And so it happens that the Church is often found bravely holding positions, which, being no longer strategic or even necessary, unfortunately withhold her forces from participation in the vast and confident advance of modern thought." The present situation of the Church reminds him of the "squatter whom twenty years of western city growth has surrounded with urban conditions making the water from the well in his yard even dangerous and his flickering lantern quite unnecessary. Water from the Great Lakes and light from the great dynamos are to be received even at some cost to laudable sentiment."

<sup>2</sup> See Vol. XIII., No. 3, July, 1909, page 414.

There are, at the same time, however, certain rights the Church may demand of theological leaders in the reconstruction of doctrinal statements. "Because of the difficulty of his task the theologian is tempted to one or the other of two opposite and equally unfortunate extremes: that of weak concession, on the one hand, or of scholastic unconcern, on the other. An empirical theology must reckon with the Church as being neither a tyrant nor yet an idiot, but as a mighty factor, past and present, in man's religion. Life is incomplete without religion, and religion in its organized forms. It is less than human not to need sanctuary."

Among the demands the Church can rightly make upon any proposed new theological system, or section of a system, according to the writer of the article under notice, the first is that it shall possess religious vitality. "Any proffered re-statement which lacks ground for propagandism, enthusiasm, loyalty, and heroic service," he confidently and justly affirms, "is to be suspected." The Yale theologian, whose views have been above referred to, and other supporters of progressive thought whom he may be taken to represent, would readily accede to the validity of the demand for a reconstruction that shall be vital and inspiring, imperial and irresistibly dynamic. And simply because they see these qualities in the new conceptions of Christian truth, do they desire the Church to take cognizance of them, believing that in so doing increased effectiveness will be brought to its task of promoting the interests of the kingdom of God among men.

Another demand, closely akin to the first, that deserves the most cordial recognition, as specified by Mr. Hoben, is that which asks for "a series of theological symbols consonant with modern culture." Here we are brought face to face with one of the principal difficulties of contemporary Christianity. Not a little of the lamentable religious indifference, the unyielding lethargy so generally deplored by the churches, is unquestionably due to the fact that for large masses of men the old thought-symbols, whether found in sermon, hymn, or



prayer, have not only lost their power of appeal, but have become meaningless and unsatisfying, if not absolutely dead and disgusting. And meanwhile the proposed reconstructed theology has not provided the doctrinal maxims, the liturgical aids for prayer and praise, which are needed to make it properly efficacious. "Catchwords, mental passports, tokens, are needed, whereby the average man, who deeply believes in his theological powers, shall be assured that he is hearing the truth. The reconstructed theology must quicken the intellect, the heart, and the imagination. It must invade the emotional life so as to get itself symbolized in good hymns and tunes. These always mark the high tide of conviction and devotion. And the new theology must by some just means create an emotional high tide that will bring in a flood of new religious poetry and at the same time bear away much of what is now stranded riffraff from the former springtides of Christianity." If it must be confessed, as the writer quoted does, that "here the Lord delays his coming," may we not at the same time look with confidence for the appearance of the inspired religious poets that age needs?

The additional demand, insisted upon as right for the Church to make upon reconstructed thought, is that it shall have an adequate social message. This is in precise correspondence with what we found accentuated under the concluding point of Dr. Walker's description of the transformed conceptions of our faith. We heartily believe with Professor Hoben that the Church must be given a religious sanction or imperative which shall compel her to take a more intentional and significant part in the now conscious struggle of the masses for more just conditions of life. The new thought has no greater service to render the Church than to cause her to cry out and spare not, and as God's appointed umpire to pronounce judgment upon social unrighteousness. It will glorify the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ by inspiring and controlling the profound demand for justice and the humanitarian sentiments of the great middle and sub-middle classes of

society. For want of theological leadership speaking with the accent of conviction, the Church's efforts in these social directions are often judiciously postponed. "But just as the Puritan movement was the Church interpreting religious convictions in the field of politics, so that movement which is trembling at the heart of our half-disappointed democracy, that over-due reaction against a preposterous individualism, that finer realization of brotherhood in all the economic and cultural values of life—that is waiting for the leadership of the Church, when with a ringing social message and self-sacrificing love she emerges from her present humiliating probation. The social movement will be the making of the Church, and the Church will be the making of the social movement. She will illumine, temper, correct, sanction, and exalt; it will create the very issues for which the Church is now sinking into indolent obscurity."

#### JESUS AND THE GOSPEL.

One of the names to which the lingering hopes of British theological conservatism have been attaching much importance, is that of the learned author of a recent book with the above title, the Rev. James Denney, D.D., of Scotland. Reference to his treatise<sup>3</sup> on this important subject may not be inappropriately made in the present notes, because of the unexpected recognition and support its pages bring to the fact and legitimacy of such changes in thought as have been above noticed. "Amid the vast unsettlement of opinion, which has been produced by the emancipation of the mind and its exercise on the general tradition of Christianity," one finds him saying in his preface, the attitude to Jesus characteristic of the New Testament "is all that is vital to Christianity"—an attitude which "is not bound up as it is often supposed to be, with this or that intellectual construction of it, or with this or that definition of what it supposes or implies." This con-

<sup>3</sup> An excellent and extended notice of the book, from the pen of the Rev. Professor William C. Schaeffer, D.D., may be found in the last issue of this REVIEW, pp. 473-475.



tention leaves all the room that could be desired for such a reinterpretation of the person of Christ as we have already found a Church historian of our own country recording as having taken place during the last generation. Equally gratifying and satisfactory, even to more radical champions of progressive theology than Dr. Walker, is the view which Professor Denney expresses, as to what the Church may and may not exact of its members. "The Church must bind its members," he argues, "to the Christian attitude to Christ, but it has no right to bind them to anything besides. It can never overcome its own divisions, it can never appeal with the power of a unanimous testimony to the world, till both these truths are recognized."

Upwards of three hundred pages of our author's book are devoted to an examination of what is the New Testament attitude to Christ, and to the vindication of his claim that the Church must bind its members' faith to that attitude. It is a lengthy and somewhat wearying journey on which his readers are invited to accompany him, in order that he may prove what even before beginning but few thoughtful Christians, however liberal-minded, can have had any disposition to question or deny, namely, that from the beginning of Christianity a supreme place was given to Jesus in men's faith. Christ determined for the religious lives they lived all their relations to both God and men. To him they owed their knowledge of God as Father, the forgiveness of their sins, the new life in the Spirit, the assurance of a blissful immortality. A corresponding faith, a like attitude of soul, determines now a valid Christianity—a conclusion from which but few would feel it necessary to dissent.

To the significant concessions, made to modern claims of intellectual freedom in giving new literary construction to the doctrinal content of such a faith, Dr. Denney returns in the concluding chapter covering about thirty pages, which constitute by far the most valuable portion of the volume. His authorship of the concessions referred to, and the firm empha-

sis with which he states them, gives them added and refreshing impressiveness. After insisting upon it that the Christian is bound to Christ by faith, he goes on to affirm that "we are not bound to any man's or to any church's rendering of what he is or has done. We are not bound to any Christology, or to any doctrine of the work of Christ. No intellectual construction of what Christ's presence and work in the world mean is to be imposed beforehand as the law of faith, or a condition of membership in the Church. It is faith which makes a Christian; and when the Christian attitude of the soul is found, it must be free to raise its own problems and to work out its own solutions. This is the point at which 'broad' churchism is in the right against an evangelical Christianity which has not learned to distinguish between its faith—in which it is unassailable—and inherited forms of doctrine which have been unreflectingly identified with it. Natural as such identification may be, and painful as it may be to separate in thought things which have coalesced in strong and sacred feelings, there is nothing more certain than that the distinction must be recognized if evangelical Christians are to maintain their intellectual integrity, and preach the Gospel in a world which is intellectually free."

One fails to recall any words written by most "advanced theologians," so-called, that go farther in the direction of maintaining intellectual liberty, than do these of our conservative author. A wise teacher of an earlier age gave this counsel to his disciples: "Do not believe in traditions simply because they have been handed down for many generations; nor in anything which is rumored and spoken of by many; or because the written statement of some old sage is produced. Do not believe in that as truth simply because you have been attached to it by habit, on the authority merely of your teachers or elders. But after observation and analysis, and when the thing agrees with reason, and is conducing to the good and benefit of all, then accept it and live up to it." Dr. Denney might have been a faithful disciple of that teacher, since in matters of doctrinal construction he is willing to rely upon no



authority save that of personal consciousness, divinely guided in its upward way, ever learning and ever growing, discovering its mistakes and correcting them, in the new light to which the soul is held open. He recognizes, it is evident, that theology has at last entered, with the other sciences, into the realm of observation and experience; that its authority henceforth will be founded not in the *ipse dixit* of popes or councils, schools or synods, but on the verdicts of competent research; and that the spirit which to-day animates the highest characters in their quest after truth merits men's regard and esteem, not their censure and scorn. "Soundness in *faith*"—which according to the Heidelberg Catechism means a hearty trust in the Lord Jesus Christ—"is that on which Christianity and the Church depend for their very being; but the construction of Christian doctrine is one of the tasks at which the Christian intelligence must freely labor, respecting, no doubt, but never bound by, the efforts or attainments of the past."

The position thus described, Dr. Denney believes, is that practically occupied by the vast majority of the members of the evangelical churches. "They are loyal to Christ, but to a large extent they have lost interest in the traditional theology," simply because it is not their own, not the product of their personal intelligence energized by faith in Christ, nothing than which has either interest or value for them. With Christian organizations, however, whose responsibilities are other than those of individuals, the case is somewhat different. Here the Scotch theologian's views are in agreement with those met with above on the same point in Professor Hoben's paper. "The Church is inevitably more conservative than the individual. It has to guard in some sense what the labors of the past have won, and not allow the historical inheritance to be repudiated or cast away by the juvenile petulance of those who know neither what it is nor what it has cost." But in spite of this necessary and important guardianship, in spite of the duty incumbent on the Church to conserve its intellectual as well as its moral attainments, it is frankly acknowledged by our author, "the pressure put upon the Churches, both from

without and from within, is rapidly becoming irresistible. And if the conclusions we have reached are sound, the principle on which they should act is to bind men to the Christian attitude to Christ, but leave them, thus bound, free to assume and discharge their intellectual and moral responsibilities with a conscience acknowledging no authority but that of the God in whom they believe through him." The words, which Dr. Denney ventures to suggest as embodying the religious truth about Jesus together with his significance for the Christian faith, and as furnishing a symbol expressive of the unity of all believers, are put into a single sentence: "I believe in God through Jesus Christ His only Son, our Lord and Saviour."

#### THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF GOD.

Amid the vast changes of thought to which we have been giving attention, one of the most insistent demands of contemporary thinkers has been for a new statement of the doctrine of God—one cast in the light of modern knowledge, capable of answering the requirements of the conscience and culture of to-day, and adapted to the religious conditions and needs of the time in which we live. Several years ago announcement was made that one of the leading theologians of our country, whose earlier contributions to religious and theological literature had furnished guidance and inspiration to multitudes of his readers, had undertaken the task of restating the traditional form of the supreme theme of theology. The result of the undertaking, to the gratification of an expectant religious public, has at last made its appearance as the latest volume in the "International Theological Library" series.<sup>4</sup> The author's definite aim, as stated in his own words, has been to present that "view of God for which Christianity stands responsible in the presence of such life and knowledge as surround us now," and it is this aim and the results the pursuit of

<sup>4</sup> "The Christian Doctrine of God," by the Rev. William Newton Clarke, D.D. Pp. 500, price \$2.50 net. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.



it has accomplished, that gives appropriateness to the notice of this timely and serviceable volume in the present discussion.

The impression made upon one's mind by many a page of Dr. Clarke's previous writings was that the author stood in close personal touch with divine realities and had authentic tidings to convey from unseen worlds. In the present treatise, pervaded as it is throughout by the spirit of devout piety and adoring reverence, one may say at once, the earlier impression of the man is not only justified, but vastly deepened. He has given the Christian world not simply a work on theology that is great from a literary and academic point of view, but one that is greater and immeasurably more important from the view-point of its practically vital religious character and inspirational power. It is a book which laymen can take up and read with almost as much interest and profit as can be gotten from it by trained scholars and theologians. Attempting to set forth the great doctrine anew, the writer happily avoids from the start of his discussion both the order and method of traditional theological systems. He is thoroughly acquainted with the literature on the subject with which he deals, but there is a striking absence throughout the volume of quotations and cited authorities, his purpose being to allow his contentions to make their appeal and win their way to acceptance, on the single basis of their inherent truthfulness, a truthfulness whose authoritativeness is recognized because one's own religious experience responds to it.

Were the space available it would be interesting to institute a detailed comparison between the points mentioned by Dr. Walker as indicative of progress in recent thought, and the illustration of them as found in Professor Clarke's chapters. The contents and the character of the entire volume could in that way be forcibly brought under notice, but our page limitations forbid the attempt. We can only remark, in a general way, that the secret of Dr. Clarke's commanding strength lies in the constructive ability and the modern outlook he possesses. His conception of the character of God, with the discussion of which rather than his existence he begins, of his redemptive

relation to the world, of his revelation in man, and particularly in our Lord Jesus Christ, of the person of Christ, of the nature of man and his salvation, and of the evidence on which belief in God to-day rests—his conception of all these is fairly well represented by the transformed views we have dwelt upon in the earlier paragraphs of this article. But these views, and the doctrines logically inferred from them, of course, do not lay stress upon what traditional orthodoxy once thought fundamental and essential. We shall presently hear mutterings of protest, no doubt, against the inadequacy of some of Dr. Clarke's conclusions, and of the danger there lies in accepting certain others. In his discussion of the Saviourhood of God, such critics will probably discover that he does not make sufficient account of the ancient theories of the atonement. In his discussion of the unity of God, into which he claims the ancient idea of the divine personality of the Father and the Son and the Spirit is to-day being taken up and absorbed, they will discover an unsatisfactory view of the Holy Trinity, and of the Deity of Christ. And in his statements concerning miracles, that whether they have occurred or not, is not a vital question in religion, because "the certainties that are the food of eternal life, which alone are essential to religion, are certainties in themselves, of which a man can become sure for himself through fellowship with God"—in this likewise some minds will discern a serious and perhaps unpardonable departure from the truth. Meanwhile, however, the sympathetic reader of Dr. Clarke's book will find in it really great thinking consistently and courageously, humbly and reverently pursued, whilst at the same time the vital religious conviction or experience, which must be the starting point and governing principle of all theology that is worth while, is never lost sight of or given up. The book is probably the most important contribution to theological science and religion of the first decade of the twentieth century, and it is bound to render important service to Christian thought and life for many years to come.

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## IX.

### CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY.

BY PROF. A. V. HIESTER.

While Plato's "Republic" belongs chronologically to antiquity, and reflects in many ways its Hellenic environment, it is peculiarly cosmopolitan in spirit. It rises above the accidents of time and place and appeals to the common experience of the race. Many of its problems are also modern problems. Some of these problems, too, are solved along lines approved by modern experience. It is because of this cosmopolitan spirit, this prophetic insight, this power of comprehensive vision, that the "Republic" has been the parent and model of so many utopias, medieval and modern.

Medieval utopianism is either a grafting of Christian ideas and sentiments on the social and political speculations of Plato, or it is exclusively concerned with religious interests. Its most important representatives, St. Augustine's "De Civitate Dei" of the fifth century and Sir Thomas More's "Utopia" of the sixteenth, are both of the first class. But neither of these works is distinctively medieval in tone and spirit. Not even chronologically do they fall altogether within the middle age. They rather mark the limits of that period. The one stands at the dividing line between the ancient and medieval periods; the other marks the transition from the middle age to the modern world. The one forms the connecting link between Greek thought and scholastic speculation; the other is the fruit of the Renaissance which emancipated the human mind from scholastic modes of thought and inaugurated the era of modern intellectual freedom and progress. The one still retains much of the spirit of antiquity; the other has already caught something of the vision of the modern world.

St. Augustine possessed the speculative talent of the ancient Greeks though a Latin himself. The natural bent of his mind toward idealism was materially strengthened by the speculative character of Neoplatonism which strongly attracted him. He confesses that the Platonic writings "enkindled in his mind an incredible ardor." At first he studied the Bible from a purely Platonic point of view; and Neoplatonism ultimately became for him the bridge by which he passed from paganism to Christianity. After his conversion he clung for a time to his Platonic Christianity and shaped the doctrines of the Bible in accordance with its principles. He was the only western theologian of his age to be directly and strongly influenced by Neoplatonism; and while he clearly recognized the various points of antagonism between it and Christianity, on such cardinal points of Christian doctrine as God, matter, the relation of God to the word, personal freedom and the nature of evil, he exhibited to the last the unmistakable impress of Neoplatonism.

Neoplatonism stands for two main things: first, the complete dominance and all-pervading character of the religious interest; and, secondly, the principle of the supra-rational which it introduced into philosophy, the principle that there is something beyond reason and beyond reality which is the final goal of all effort and the ultimate ground of all being. The necessary accompaniment of this dominant and all-pervading religious interest, and this denial of the reality of sensible existence, was the conviction of the utter vanity of all earthly things. But Neoplatonism found itself quite unable to describe this supreme good lying beyond experience; and the inevitable consequence was that it gave itself to the undisputed reign of the imagination. It would be hard, indeed, to find a better background for a Christian utopian philosophy than Neoplatonism.

While the "City of God" bears a general resemblance to Plato's "Republic," there are also certain marked differences. Both were suggested by manifestations of social decline, the one



by the degeneracy of Greek politics, the other by the decay of the Roman Empire. On the other hand, St. Augustine has no sympathy with the old Roman life as Plato has with Greek life. He does not lament its going and manifests no desire to call it back. Then again, St. Augustine lacks Plato's power to conceive of a different state of the world from that in which he lives, and which is still in harmony with the universal principles of human nature; and the consequence is that his views are even more idealistic than those of Plato in the sense that they are further removed from the existing social order. The fact that the "City of God" is deeply penetrated with Christian ethics, and the presence of controversial features, are additional differences between it and the "Republic."

The "City of God" occupied thirteen years in writing, that is, from 413 A. D. to 426 A. D. It is divided into twenty-two books and has a three-fold character. It is first of all a Christian apology. Then it is also a philosophy of history. And in the third place it is an utopia. The taking and sacking of Rome by Alaric in 410 A. D. profoundly shocked the whole civilized world. It was believed not only by the heathen but also by a large part of Christendom that the disaster portended the destruction of the world. By heathen writers the catastrophe was attributed to the rise of Christianity and the decay of faith in the old heathen divinities. To meet this attack on Christianity the "City of God" was primarily written. It was easily the foremost apologetic treatise of its age. Its main thesis is that the repeated successes of the barbarians were due, not to the rise of Christianity, but to the corruption of paganism. It shows that the Roman Empire contained within itself, in the moral decay of its citizens, the seeds of its own destruction; and that to arrest this decay the pagan philosophies and religions were hopelessly inadequate. In its efforts to search out and set forth the true causes of Rome's decline the "City of God" was the first comprehensive attempt at a philosophy of history.

From this contemplation of the decline of the Roman Em-

pire and its causes, St. Augustine turns to the splendid vision of a new social order which is destined to arise out of the ruins of the old. In this vision he sees that human history is not identified with the history of any particular earthly power, but that from the first there has existed alongside of the kingdoms of this world another kingdom, the city of God, which because of its superior morality, true doctrine and heavenly origin, is imperishable. With this imperishable kingdom, whose history is recounted from its beginning before the world was, is constantly contrasted that perishable earthly kingdom whose history runs parallel to that of the imperishable city of God from the fall of man to the final judgment, when they are fully and forever separated into heaven and hell. These two kingdoms are mutually antagonistic, their antagonism having its root in the distinction between good and evil angels. But in the present order of the world they touch each other at innumerable points. St. Augustine's philosophy of history is therefore dualistic in character, exhibiting as it does the history of the race under the view of two antagonistic organized forces, whose diverse foundations, different motive forces, parallel histories, and ultimate disposal and separation in the last judgment, are considered at length.

The utopian philosophies which fall within the medieval period proper are unimportant. They belong to an age which had lost all connection with classical civilization and are purely religious in character. There is one other, however, which stands by itself. Dante's "*De Monarchia*," 1314, resembles the other purely medieval utopias in that it shows no acquaintance with Plato. But its prevailing character is not religious, as theirs is, but political. Dante was deeply impressed with the idea that a universal monarchy was indispensable to the well-being of the world, and in the "*De Monarchia*" he dreams of another Roman empire existing alongside of the Church. Neither of these organizations, as he regards them, is superior to the other. Rather are they two parallel, equal, coördinate powers, each of which owes to the other only res-



pect. Both are divine, and what is more, each derives its authority immediately from God.

This conception of the Church and the State as two coördinate, divinely-established powers is a distinct contribution to the history of political thought and practice. It became the ruling principle of the later medieval and early modern periods; and within recent years it has been revived by Bismarck in his theory of the Christian state. It displaced the earlier theory of the supremacy of the Church over the State, which had ruled the world for centuries, and which the Papacy had laid down when, with the growing power and importance of the Roman See, it had laid claim to various temporal powers until it arrogated, and was able to maintain, the right to preserve the peace of nations, decide quarrels between temporal princes, defend the oppressed and enforced its decisions and commands by anathema, and excommunication, and even by force of arms when necessary. One of the stoutest champions of this theory was Thomas Aquinas, who argued that while both the Pope and the Emperor derived their powers from God, the Pope alone derived his directly, the Emperor obtaining his only indirectly, that is, through the Pope's hands. This theory had in turn displaced the principle, which had prevailed in the early history of the Church, and according to which the Church claimed dominion over only the spiritual interests of mankind, leaving to the State—not a divine institution, however, as was later asserted—complete supremacy in temporal affairs.

With the Renaissance, and the return to classical ideals which accompanied it, the social and political speculations of Plato were revived, and with them were mixed Christian ideas and sentiments. The result of this mixture was something akin to the work of Augustine at the other extremity of the middle age, something between the philosophical utopianism of antiquity and the purely religious utopianism of the medieval period.

The "Utopia" of Sir Thomas More, standing at the border

line between medievalism and modernism, is the best example of this coalescence of Hellenism and Christianity. It breathes the same cosmopolitan spirit, and exhibits the same intellectual reach and the same wonderful power to see beyond the limitations and prejudices of its environment, as the "Republic." But again, as in the case of the "City of God," there are also striking differences.

The "Utopia" has been pronounced the only work of literary genius of the age in England. Its author is known to have been a philosopher and scholar, an ornament of the new learning, a statesman of spotless integrity, a man of rare wit and piety, a cultured and accomplished gentleman. The work is written in the form of a romance, and contains many extravagances of thought and sentiment. But mingled with its extravagances are numerous profound and sensible criticisms of the political and industrial conditions of the time. The apparently chimerical character of the work is part of the author's purpose. For under such a despotic regime as that of Henry VIII, whose chancellor More was for a time, and at whose command he eventually lost his head because his rectitude did not permit him either to sanction the divorce of Queen Catharine or to acknowledge Henry as the "Supreme Head of the Church," criticisms of the established order of things, however mild and just, had to be veiled behind the caprices of the imagination. It was doubtless through fear of the royal displeasure that the "Utopia," though written in 1514, was not published until two years later, and then only in Louvain, a city of Belgium, and under the editorship of More's friend Erasmus. A revised edition appeared in 1513 at Basle. Both editions were in Latin. Then in 1524 the work was translated into German, into Italian in 1548, into French in 1550, and into English in 1551.

While the "Utopia" was the fruit of the Renaissance it represents, for the most part, only a particular aspect of that movement. At first the new learning took an exclusively intellectual and religious direction, and its influence was con-



finer mainly to scholars and divines. The "Utopia" was the first piece of literature to apply the same freedom of thought to the old forms of society and politics as to matters of education and faith. In his dream of a new social order, based on equality, brotherhood and freedom, More anticipated many important social problems of modern times. This alone would prove his prophetic gifts and keenness of intellect. But he did more than this. He not only anticipated modern problems, but he also proposed solutions for them. Here again he anticipated important social and political discoveries of later times; and in several instances he so far anticipated the future that the practice of the modern world has not yet caught up to him. Whether More expected that his ideas would ever be realized, or whether his object was merely to call attention to certain political and industrial evils, is an open question. But so much is certain, that he saw no immediate prospect of their being realized, for they were hopelessly at variance with the temper of the age. This he recognizes in the closing words of the "Utopia." "There are many things," he says, "in the Commonwealth of Nowhere that I rather wish than hope to see embodied in our own." At the very moment, indeed, that he was pleading for the poor, new exactions and sterner laws were making their lot constantly harder. He advocated religious toleration just as the nations of Europe were entering upon an unparalleled series of religious wars. While he was advocating the principle of popular sovereignty the rule of the Tudors was fast becoming more and more despotic.

Besides the Renaissance the "Utopia" clearly reflects the influence of another movement. Contemporaneously with the revival of classical art and letters, the discoveries and explorations of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries had quickened the slumbering intelligence of Europe by bringing it into sudden contact with new lands, new faiths and new races of men. A strange curiosity was aroused everywhere; books relating to the New World, like the travels of Amerigo Vespucci, found a ready market; and gradually the old nar-

rownness of life gave way to a certain cosmopolitanism of thought and sentiment. This widening of the intellectual horizon of men is seen in the "Utopia" in its wide range of speculation on almost every subject of human thought and action.

The immediate setting of the "Utopia" is as follows: While traveling on the Continent More met at Antwerp a traveler and philosopher who had just returned from an extensive journey in strange lands. He had accompanied Vespucci on his last voyage, but leaving that enterprising navigator at the farthest point reached he had pushed on to other strange lands and had finally arrived at the island of Utopia. The laws and customs of this strange island had greatly impressed him and he proceeds to describe them at length to More, in whom he finds an eager and sympathetic listener.

According to the account of this traveler, Hythloday by name, the government of Utopia is a representative democracy consisting of a senate, a general assembly of the people, and a president. The president holds his office for life but is removable on suspicion of a desire to enslave the people. The senate is composed of three representatives from each city of which there are twenty-four of equal size. Both the president and the senators, as well as all other officials, political and ecclesiastical, are chosen by popular election. All this clearly foreshadows the democratic institutions of the nineteenth century, and indicates political thinking of the most advanced sort, the more so when it is remembered that the writing of the "Utopia" antedated the American and French revolutions, and the inauguration of the first experiments in popular representative government, by more than two and a half centuries.

More was a keen observer of the political conditions of his time. He clearly recognized the absolutist tendencies of the Tudor monarchy and their attendant evils. Most naturally, therefore, there is in "Utopia" no room for either an absolute sovereign or a privileged class. The provision that the president is removable from office for malfeasance is a biting



criticism of the doctrine so dear to the hearts of the Tudor monarchs that the king can do no wrong.

In this absence of a privileged class the "Utopia" differs fundamentally from the "Republic." Plato's state was the Greek city-state with which he was so familiar, and was based on the principle of caste. There was first a warrior class from which the philosophers and statesmen came. War and philosophy were its only occupations. Below this leisure class were the "hewers of wood and drawers of water," to whom all industry and trade were relegated, and who could not, except in rare instances, rise to the first class. Plato's state was, therefore, an aristocratic republic founded on science and force. In Utopia, on the other hand, there are no castes. With the exception of the slaves all are equal in political power and privilege. To labor and defend the state are the duty of all alike. Instead of labor being regarded as a badge of inferiority it is the highest title of honor.

Closely connected with the twin principles of popular government and civil liberty is the idea of religious toleration. In nothing perhaps does More depart so completely from the accepted notions of his time as in his views respecting religion. In the first place, he unqualifiedly condemns the whole medieval system of asceticism, maintaining that God designed man to be happy and that the ascetic rejection of human comforts and pleasures, except for the common good, is ingratitude to him. Then More also makes the family rather than the church the center of religion. Hence there are in Utopia few priests and little public worship. There are, however, two religious orders similar to that of St. Francis of Assisi whose members endeavor to purify their souls by engaging in the humblest and least attractive labors. And in the third place, More lays down the principle of religious toleration in accordance with which any one in Utopia is free to hold, as well as to propagate, so long as he confines himself to argument, any religious opinions whatsoever. He maintains that religious belief is largely a matter of environment

and birth, and that a uniformity of belief is not essential to the peace and well-being of a state. Revolutionary as the doctrine of religious toleration must have appeared to his contemporaries, it was logically required by the principles of liberty and equality upon which the government of Utopia was based. Not only was More the first to enunciate the principle of religious toleration, but he did so more than a century before William of Orange proclaimed it, and more than a century and a half before William Penn launched his "holy experiment" in the wilds of Pennsylvania.

In presenting the industrial side of his ideal state More condemns the prevailing economic conditions of his day with unsparing hand. His language at times might easily be mistaken for an extract from the program of modern socialism. The entire social system he regards as "nothing but a conspiracy of the rich against the poor," veiled, indeed, behind the forms of law. "The rich," he says, "devise every means by which they may in the first place secure to themselves what they have amassed by wrong, and then take to their own use and profit, at the lowest possible price, the work and labor of the poor. And as soon as the rich decide on adopting these devices in the name of the public they become law." He exhibits a keen sympathy with the poor. The life of the English laboring classes, as he sees it, is so wretched that "even a beast's life seems enviable." He pleads for larger opportunities for the laboring classes, declaring that the supreme aim of legislation should be to secure their welfare as the true basis of a well-ordered commonwealth. And with the hope of effecting some immediate amelioration of the miseries of the English masses, by arresting the attention of thinking men and quickening their sympathies, he draws a harrowing picture of the luxurious idleness and grinding poverty, the crime and vagabondage, the physical and moral degradation, of his day; which evil he ascribes to the abrogation of peasant proprietorship, the secularization of church property, the conversion of arable lands into pasture, royal monopolies and unjust system



of taxation. No such cry of pity, it has been said, had been heard in England since the days of Piers Ploughman.

Like Plato's state, Utopia is a communistic commonwealth. All industry is under the supervision and direction of the magistrates who distribute the instruments and materials of production to the inhabitants. With the exception of a small class of very learned persons all are required to labor according to their ability, women as well as men. Mental and physical labor are combined in pleasing variety. Variety of occupation is also secured by the requirement that each one must alternate between agriculture and some form of mechanical industry. The machinery of production is rendered amazingly simple by the assumption of a perfect and unchanging simplicity of taste in the consumer. What is produced by the labor of all is shared by all. But there are no luxuries. All show of wealth is forbidden. Only children are permitted to wear precious stones. Gold and silver are regarded as the basest of metals fit only to fetter criminals with or to be fashioned into domestic utensils. Money is unknown. There is no need of it for domestic purposes, and of foreign trade there is none. The houses, which are the common possession of all, are redistributed among the citizens every ten years. All meals are eaten in common in large dining halls, and are accompanied by music to render them attractive. During meal hours, too, the air is scented with the most delicate perfumes. As none are idle so none are overworked. Only six hours of labor a day are required of the able-bodied, which is sufficient to secure to all the necessities and comforts of life. Abundant room is thus afforded for leisure, study, recreation and the enjoyment of the fine arts. This together with a variety of occupation avoids fatigue and adds greatly to the interest and relish of life.

Slavery is a fixed institution in Utopia because it is required by economic considerations. More clearly recognizes that there are some trades so rude and repulsive that they are carried on only from necessity, and that where all are equal

and at the same time freely supplied with the means of subsistence it will be difficult, if not impossible, to get disagreeable tasks done. This is a practical difficulty that must be reckoned with in all communistic systems. More meets it by establishing slavery, and in order to secure a proper supply of slave labor in a country where equality is the ruling principle he makes two suggestions: first, that slaves be purchased by the state from foreign countries; and, secondly, that slavery be made a punishment for crime. The latter is the better way and in accordance with it, as well as from humanitarian considerations, More abolishes capital punishment and substitutes for it a life slavery.

Like Plato, More adopted the communistic principle. But he justified it on different grounds. While Plato in accordance with his philosophical point of view maintained that the renunciation of private property was required by the principle of the moral perfection of society, More bases it on the more practical consideration of the common happiness of men. A further distinction between the two is that More does not, like Plato, extend the communistic principle to wives and children. In this he exhibits a far greater independence of the accepted opinions of his day than the Athenian philosopher does. For Plato could not divest himself of the idea that the wife is the property of the husband; and being property, his communistic principle logically required that she should be treated like any form of property, that is, be enjoyed in common. He had no consciousness of the modern notion that marriage is a contract; and for him monogamy meant nothing more than the exclusive possession on the part of one man of a piece of property which ought to be for the use of all. That More recognized the sanctity of marriage and the fundamental importance of the family in the social economy, is doubtless to be ascribed, at least in large part, to the influence of Christianity.

In the matter of education More is well abreast of the most advanced sentiment of our own day. Every child in Utopia



is given a thorough education at public expense. The significance of this can be understood only when it is remembered that fully one half of the population of England in the time of More was illiterate.

Again in discussing the physical basis of society More writes like one of the twentieth century. He recognizes the close connection between public and private morality and the health which springs from light, air, cleanliness, and a certain degree of economic well-being. Hence in Utopia the streets are broad and clean, and the houses well built, well lighted, and surrounded by spacious gardens.

More was the first to recognize the importance of preventing crime, through better social, political and economic conditions, and making the reformation of the offender the supreme end in punishment. He also advocated the use of more humane penalties and of penalties proportioned to the nature of the crime. If a thief and a murderer are sure of the same penalty, he argues, the law is simply tempting the thief to accomplish his theft by murder. In these suggestions More anticipates practically every important improvement in penal science and practice which has been accomplished within the past century. Here again it is necessary to remember, in order to a proper appreciation of More's intellectual reach and prophetic insight, that at the time the "Utopia" was written probably more than two hundred criminal offences were subject to the death penalty in England, while minor offenses were punished with the utmost cruelty. Apparently the sole end of punishment was to inflict on the offender the greatest possible amount of suffering.

In all this More exhibits a truly modern spirit despite his medieval environment. Notwithstanding his recognition of slavery, he believed in democracy when other men still believed in the "divine right of kings." In his advocacy of political equality, religious toleration, the reduction of the hours of labor to a degree consistent with leisure, recreation and opportunities for mental improvement, compulsory educa-

tion for both sexes, better sanitary conditions, and improved criminal legislation and administration, he made Utopia a model for the most advanced nations of our own day, for he advocated principles and programs that are of the very essence of modern democracy.

If exception be taken to the strict and minute manner in which the daily life of every individual is regulated, to the fact that all must wear a prescribed dress, the fact that all are required to labor the same number of hours or to the same degree of fatigue, the fact that the inhabitants are apportioned between city and country and changed from one to the other according to need, the fact that the population is kept at a prescribed limit by means of emigration and colonization, it must be remembered that all this is required by a communistic organization of society, and does not, therefore, impugn the quality of More's democracy.

Although its originality, prophetic insight and reach of thought stamp it as a work of genius, the Utopia made little impression when first published. One reason for this is that it was written in Latin and for the learned; and even when it was translated into English, about the middle of the sixteenth century, it was still read only by the few, who refused to regard it as a piece of serious literature or as something to be realized even in the remote future. It was universally regarded as nothing more than a more or less ingenious exercise of the fancy. Another reason is that the temper of the time, owing to the religious wars and the spirit of political absolutism which ruled the civilized world, was not favorable to the discussion of political and economic questions. Within the past century, however, after a long period of suspended vitality, the "Utopia" has experienced a remarkable rejuvenescence. For this the new interest which has been awakened in everything pertaining to human society is primarily responsible. It is now widely read, particularly by socialists and other exponents of radical social reforms, who have found in it many arguments and practical suggestions.

LANCASTER, PA.



## X.

### NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

SCHWENKFELDER HYMNOLOGY AND THE SOURCES OF THE FIRST SCHWENKFELDER HYMN-BOOK PRINTED IN AMERICA. Allen Anders Seipt, A.M., Ph.D., Member of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania and formerly Instructor in German, Ohio Wesleyan University. Philadelphia, Americana Germanica Press, 1909.

The Schwenkfelders—a small religious denomination of eastern Pennsylvania—have recently manifested considerable literary activity. Not only have they begun the publication of the great *Corpus Schwenkfeldianorum*, which will probably extend through many volumes; but individual members have prepared and published important monographs on historical and doctrinal subjects. That one of our smallest religious communities should undertake such work is at least surprising; for it is evident that more numerous denominations might well shrink from the labor and expense which these enterprises involve. Such work, however, is not without peculiar fascinations for the author and student. It affords the author an opportunity for minute research which would hardly be possible in a more extended field; while the interested reader is gratified by observing that the work is thoroughly done, and that for information on its theme he need seek no further.

It is, of course, understood that the works of this character rarely discuss the religious and civil questions in which the modern world is most directly interested; but we can understand that a community should be convinced that it has inherited a treasure of truth which it must preserve undiminished, and that it has a special testimony to offer to succeeding generations. It is from this point of view that the work is peculiarly valuable, and the toil of the laborers becomes deserving of universal appreciation.

We have long been aware that Dr. Seipt was preparing a monograph on Schwenkfelder hymnology; and now that the book has appeared, it affords us pleasure to bear witness to the thoroughness with which his work has been performed. Hitherto the subject has been greatly neglected, even by the foremost hymnologists of Europe; and it is therefore pleasant to be admitted to a field which has practically remained uncultivated.

Schwenkfeld himself does not appear to have been a poet; and the few specimens of his versification, which have been preserved, do not increase his fame. Among his successors during the European period our author enumerates no less than eighteen

writers of hymns, but gives the palm to Daniel Sudermann who was evidently a sacred poet of no common order. It is interesting to observe that these poetic compositions remained practically untouched by the mysticism that became so characteristic of the German sects of the eighteenth century. The Schwenkfelder hymns are generally churchly, and in their arrangement they follow the order of the Christian year. In tone and spirit they most closely resemble the compositions of the Bohemian Brethren, whose work the Schwenkfelders collected and preserved; and they may, therefore, be said to derive much of their inspiration from a period earlier than the great burst of song that accompanied the Reformation of the sixteenth century.

When the Schwenkfelders emigrated to America, in 1734, they brought with them the faith and cultus of their forefathers. Many of their hymn-books, and other books of devotion, were in manuscript, principally because in Europe tyrannical governments had frequently denied them the privilege of publication. In America they continued for some time to prepare such manuscripts, adding occasionally a few of their original compositions; but in 1762 they proceeded to publish a hymn-book which is justly regarded as one of the finest issues of the press of Christopher Saur, the celebrated Germantown printer. The introduction to this book, which was written by Christopher Schultz, senior, is an excellent essay on hymnology, and is still worthy of study. Schultz was evidently a man of considerable learning and great natural ability; and among his coadjutors as sacred poets were such men as George Weiss, Balthasar Hoffman, and others, who deserve an honorable place in the history of hymnology.

In treating of these themes Dr. Seipt's work is practically exhaustive. He has examined original sources in Europe and America, and has collated them with the utmost care. The external appearance of the book is attractive, and the illustrations are abundant. It is evidently a labor of love, and as such deserves to be highly esteemed. We congratulate the author on the completion of his excellent monograph.

JOS. H. DUBBS.

**TESTIMONIUM ANIMÆ**, or Greek and Roman before Jesus Christ. A Series of Essays and Sketches dealing with the Spiritual Elements in Classical Civilization. By E. G. Sihler, Ph.D., Professor of the Latin Language and Literature in the New York University. New York, G. E. Stechert & Co. Pages x + 453. Price \$2.25 net.

This book is from the pen of a teacher and scholar who has spent the working years of his life in studying the remains of classical antiquity and in following the classical movement down to modern times. "At the end of it all," he says in his preface, "there has come over my soul a profound melancholy." This



is because so much of the industry of modern professional classicists seems "to be spent in the fond belief (hallowed by long academic tradition) that Classic Literature was something absolute, something precious and transcendent in itself, that the addition of a monograph no matter on how infinitesimal a detail of classic tradition (though destined to be read by two or three specialists alone, perhaps) was an adequate object of life and labor." The archaeologists especially excite his indignation. He is also dissatisfied with the classicism that has issued in an intellectual and æsthetic culture which ignores the transcendent value and deepest needs of the human soul, and which attempts to reduce Christianity to a position of inferiority. Likewise the classicism dominant in European culture during the period of the early Humanists is condemned, the conclusion being that the immorality and generally contemptible character of the Humanists (who, knowing the ancient world but ill, circle about what was debased in classic literature and art) demonstrate the essential interdependence between the Renaissance and the decadence of the Church, and that to the craving for radical betterment which finally led to the Reformation the Humanists contributed less than nothing.

These distressing forms of classicism, the author claims, are due to the stupendous error of ignoring the broad basis of sin and corruption which lie at the base of the history of the classic world. It is utterly wrong, he says, to separate the progress of understanding and art, literature and material civilization, from the moral decadence of that ancient world. Therefore with the "vile and sordid paganism which underlies most of classical civilization" always before his mind, and yet maintaining that Greek and Roman letters abundantly reveal to us the course and range of man's powers and aspirations in our concern for the highest things, he essays a revaluation, entirely on the moral and religious side, of the thought and conduct of the Greeks and Romans before Christ.

His position is that of one who holds to the absolute and divine worth of revealed religion, to belief in a personal God, to the dignity of the immortal soul and to a divine law of conduct. Religion, faith, theology, in connection with pagans are "monstrosities of designation." Religion is not defined, but is apparently nothing less than Christianity, the essence of which "is a reception of transcendental boons coming at a definite point in history." The Christian ideal is accepted as absolute. With it as a standard the author examines the views of the Greeks and Romans concerning the soul, life and death, God and the world, as well as the character of their religion and worship, morality and conduct.

There is no lack of emphasis upon the darker side of classical antiquity. The repulsive features of Greek and Roman life, from



the time of Homer to the time of Seneca, and the impotence of Greek and Roman polytheism to cure these evils are treated in great detail, with a mass of quotations from classic writers, in versions made by the author himself. The Greeks receive especially hard treatment. They pass before the reader immersed in the bliss of the mere surface and steeped in unnatural vice. No theory of morals, no call to goodness for all men. Art embellished but did not elevate Greek worship. Greek men craved no righteousness deeper or higher than that of their own anthropomorphic gods, in whom "the *good* has no share, is no element." The Greek character, it would seem, was rotten at the core.

On the other hand the intrinsic soundness of the Roman character is recognized. Yet the conquests of the Romans were only exploitation on a gigantic scale, a career of force and fraud. The covetousness engendered by growing wealth and power, and the corruption introduced by the Greeks caused the old severity of morals to decline until the climax of wickedness came in the cruelties and bestiality of Nero's reign. Religion, though free from the vicious legends of the Greeks, was concerned chiefly with the outward faring of the state and with conformity to ancestral observances. It had almost no relation to soul and spirit; in acts of worship the mental or moral state was hardly concerned at all.

Yet the author does find spiritual elements in the classic literature, and this *testimonium animæ* he aims to present. For valuations of poets, historians, philosophers and moralists, the book must be read. Some will arouse dissent, as, for instance, the short and contemptuous reference to Virgil. There were thinkers who had profound spirituality, but all were infected to a greater or less degree with the current practical paganism and their higher teachings made no impression upon the spirit of their world. Not only was there no progress in morality towards Christian ideals, but the spiritual pride of the Stoic system forbids the view that in the noblest utterances of Seneca there was a historical point where Stoicism and Christianity met.

With some of the author's judgments the Christian scholar will agree. For instance, he will not dispute the insufficiency of mere intellectual or æsthetic culture, or of mere technical scholarship or antiquarian research, to satisfy the soul and purify the life. He will not deny that there were repulsive features in classic civilization, or the failure of classic paganism to regenerate the world. Yet to most of the implications which the author discovers in these admissions the well informed and fair minded reader will not consent. Likewise he will regret the narrow range of sympathy and the meager conception of the Christian ideal which condemn as "utter futilities" everything which is not of eternal import. Evolution is "the current simian mythology"; admira-



tion of Greek art is "mandatory ecstasy"; to view a matter through Greek eyes is "absurd and mendacious ecstasy." This bent of mind incapacitates the author from recognizing the full measure of worth in anything that can not bear the test of his highest standards. If, tried by the absolute Christian ideal, the religions of Greece and Rome were a failure, yet for a time they worked well, considering the age. This relative success, however, does not appear in a book from which are excluded comparisons with contemporaneous peoples and all the happier features of classic civilization. In consequence it is not illuminating and fails to delineate clearly the essential qualities of two great and gifted nations. This is perhaps not as the author intended, but it is the necessary result of the bias with which the testimony of Greek and Roman life is selected and interpreted. At the same time the author's zeal for righteousness claims the respect even of the reader who can adopt few of his positions and conclusions.

C. N. HELLER.

THE LAWS OF FRIENDSHIP, HUMAN AND DIVINE. By Henry Churchill King, President of Oberlin College. New York, The Macmillan Company. Pages 159. Price \$1.25.

The contents of this volume are the lectures delivered by the author before the students of Haverford College. The author regards religion as friendship. The end of life is to cultivate friendship with God and man. He shows what are the laws of friendship in our human relations, the laws that must be observed in human friendships must guide us in the formation of that friendship with God which is the essence of religion.

In cultivating human friendships there must be integrity, depth and breadth of personality, there must be deep community of interests, mutual self-manifestation and answering trust and mutual self-giving. All these things of course are found in God and in forming friendship with him which is the sum of religion we must cultivate these qualities in ourselves.

As the first part of the book treats of establishing friendship, so the second part treats of deepening it. This part opens with a description of ideal friendships as pictured by Christ in the beatitudes and by Paul in 1 Cor. 13. The final chapter is on "Friendships' Ways," and emphasizes the importance of expressing more fully our friendships, human and divine. In making friendship the essence of religion the author is building upon the foundation laid by the Master in making love the sum of moral obligation, love to God and love to man. No matter what our theological system may be, we can all agree in making love or friendship the end of life. The author writes simply. The book will therefore find readers among people generally as well as



among the more scholarly. The subject is presented briefly and in a winning manner.

W. D. HAPPEL.

DANIEL BOONE, BACKWOODSMAN. By C. H. Forbes Lindsay. Philadelphia and London, J. B. Lippincott, 1908. Pages 320. Price \$1.50.

Being a descendant of the same stock on his maternal side and having been born and brought up in the community in which Daniel Boone grew to manhood, the reviewer's mind from his earliest childhood was filled with traditions concerning the "Kentucky Pioneer." It is with a great deal of satisfaction therefore that he read so graphic a life of Daniel Boone as the one by C. H. Forbes-Lindsay.

At the very beginning of the work the reader is made to feel that he is upon solid ground historically. It is one of a few biographies that are true to fact in regard to the place and time of his birth. Daniel Boone was born in Exeter Township, Berks County, about eight miles southeast of Reading. A portion of the wall of the house in which he was born is preserved in the house erected on the site of the old dwelling. This was recognized by Boone during one of his visits to his native state. The time of his birth, 1734, as given by Mr. Forbes-Lindsay, is at least approximately correct.

The author traces his life from Pennsylvania to North Carolina. He gives an account of his first hunting trip into the wilds of Kentucky. He shows how this led Daniel Boone to become the leader in forming a settlement there which resulted in the founding of Boonesborough which was the center of his activities for a decade, from 1773-1783, the period of the Revolutionary War. He was the leading spirit during this period in the conflicts with the Indians who contested bitterly the possession by the whites of their hunting grounds. At the end of ten years, however, the Indians as armies at least ceased to molest the whites, and Kentucky began to be filled with settlements. Many and thrilling were the adventures of the hero of this book and many times he narrowly escaped with his life. Mr. Forbes-Lindsay tells his story simply and naturally and without any labored effort presents to our view an interesting and attractive character. Daniel Boone was a great man physically. "Five feet ten inches in height, his erect carriage gave him an appearance of great stature. His body encased in deerskin dress of the backwoodsman was splendidly formed, the extraordinarily broad and deep chest giving evidence of great strength. A sculptor might have taken the head with its noble brow and fine features for a model. The long hair was plaited and rolled into a knot. The clear, keen, blue eye had a mild expression, but force was written in the large



aquiline nose and square chin, while the thin compressed lips denoted resolution. It was a face on which courage and composure were strongly stamped. As he swung along with easy stride, his rifle over his shoulder, the movement of the sinewy limbs betrayed strength and agility." He is pictured to us here as being greater still in character. In addition to the qualities mentioned above we find him to be a man of sound judgment, of integrity, of patience and sympathy. He was not a warrior out of love for warfare as the defensive character of the engagements in which he played a part shows.

Strange to say that as an old man he finds himself deprived of his farm by shrewd settlers and is thus without any claim to the country which he settled. He makes his way across the "father of waters" and receives a large grant of land from the Spanish authorities. Here he spends his latter years peacefully and contentedly. This before his death in 1820, at the age of eighty-six, had become a part of the Union.

The significance of a life like that of Daniel Boone is well expressed by Kipling in the following verses on the "Foreloper."

The gull shall whistle in his wake, the blind wave break in fire,  
And he shall see old planets pass and alien stars arise,  
And give the gale his reckless sail in shadow of new skies,  
Strong lust of gear shall drive him out and hunger arm his hand  
To wring his food from a desert nude, his foothold from the sand.  
His neighbors' smoke shall vex his eyes, their voices break his rest.  
He shall go forth till South is North, sullen and dispossessed;  
He shall desire loneliness and his desire shall bring  
Hard on his heels a thousand wheels, a people and a king.  
He shall come back on his own track and by his scarce cool camp,  
There shall he meet the roaring street, the derrick and the stamp;  
For he must blaze a nation's ways, with hatchet and with brand,  
Till on his last-won wilderness an empire's bulwarks stand.

W. D. HAPPEL.

THE FAITH AND WORKS OF CHRISTIAN SCIENCE. By the author of "Confessio Medici." New York, The Macmillan Company. Pages 232. Price \$1.25 net.

This is a serious examination of the theory and practice of Christian Science by a competent critic. The writer makes no haphazard statements, but quotes abundantly with full references as to volumes and pages from Mrs. Eddy and other Christian Science writers, and records both the claims made by Christian Scientists of cures effected, and the failures in treatment and the harmful results of neglect to administer medical and surgical treatment where they were plainly needed.

There is more than a little humor in the chapters which treat of the Philosophy of Christian Science, the relation between Christian Faith and Christian Science, Life and Christian Science, the Reality of Pain, etc. The author tries to get at the sense and



purport of the statements and definitions which are put forward with such an air of profundity by Mrs. Eddy, and shows very effectively how destitute of meaning the metaphysical jargon of Christian Science really is, and how utterly at variance is its religious aspect and modes of worship with genuine Christian faith and the reverent worship of God. Beginning with the historical development of Eddyism out of Quimbyism he traces the establishment of the first schools for Healers and the first churches of the new cult, and accounts for its rapid growth, first, because it is an exceedingly comfortable frame of mind into which men work themselves when they look away from sin and suffering, and persuade themselves that pain and death have no real existence, and, secondly, because this frame of mind is really helpful in curing certain functional disorders, nervous diseases, and forms of hysteria in which the mimicry of organic disease plays a prominent part. Cures of this kind are heralded abroad, as the author shows, *ad nauseam*, and the strength of the cult lies in whatever truth there is in the influence of the mind over the body. On the other hand there is a terrible arraignment of the system in the record given by the author of failures to cure cases where judicious medical and surgical treatment, applied in time, would undoubtedly have availed to afford relief and save valuable lives. The fact that mothers can, with an easy conscience, allow their children to suffer and to die, on the plea that sickness and pain are not real, and that the plainest requirements for the treatment of patients and the safeguarding of others in cases of malignant contagious or infectious diseases have been disregarded so that Mrs. Eddy herself found it necessary to advise compliance with the law where sanitary laws are in force, is adduced with striking effect as in itself sufficient to condemn the whole system.

JOHN S. STAHR.

CHRIST AND THE EASTERN SOUL, THE WITNESS OF THE ORIENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS TO JESUS CHRIST. By Charles Cuthbert Hall, D.D., LL.D., late President of Union Theological Seminary. The University of Chicago Press. Pages 208. Price, postpaid, \$1.37.

This work consists of the Barrows Lectures delivered in India and elsewhere by Dr. Hall in 1906-1907. It will be remembered that the Barrows Lectureship Foundation was established by Mrs. Caroline E. Haskell in 1894, under the permanent control of a designated committee of the University of Chicago. Dr. Hall had the distinguished honor of being twice appointed as Barrows lecturer, first in 1902-1903, and then again in 1906-1907. No doubt the second appointment was made because of the profound impression made by the first course of lectures in India, Ceylon, and Japan, and of the peculiar fitness of Dr. Hall to deal sympathetically with the relation of Christianity to the life and consciousness of the Orient.



In the first lecture the author puts himself *en rapport* with his audience, men of the highest learning and culture in India by speaking most appreciatingly of the characteristics of the Oriental mind. He finds especially four elements which impress upon his mind the sublimity of the Oriental Consciousness. These are: The Contemplative Life; The Presence of the Unseen; Aspiration toward Ultimate Being; The Sanctions of the Past, all of which are discussed in their proper order. In the second chapter the Mystical Element in the Christian Religion is set forth with great power and persuasiveness, and the fact is emphasized that Christian mysticism is more than a vague outgoing of the soul toward the Infinite in that it offers as its outcome something definite and positive, both in faith and morals. Here, as is shown especially in the third lecture, the author points out the difference between the pantheism of the East, to which he makes large concessions, and the system of Christian faith and doctrine. He finds in the former the "Witness of God in the Soul"; but Christianity especially testifies to this presence, first through the still, small Voice, secondly through the Sure Word of Prophecy, and finally through the Christ of God or the Personal Incarnation. He deprecates the fact that Christian theological systems have often been narrow, partisan, and prejudicial; but he insists that "Yet it remains true that he who undertakes to interpret Christianity in the sense in which it was understood by the authors of the New Testament, in the sense in which it became the delight and passion of the Eastern and Western Fathers, in the sense in which it took and held possession of the West, in the sense in which it controls to-day the most religiously effective thinking of the Christian world, both Eastern and Western, must not only take note of the Divinity of Christ, but must exalt that Divinity to the highest place of thought; until it shall stand not for the apotheosis of humanity, not for the deification of a man, but for the projection of the Divine Word out of unfathomable depths of Godhead, into the region of human consciousness, to speak, in the life of a Man, unto the lives of all men."

In the next chapter the author speaks of the Witness of the Soul to God, and shows that materialism, atheism, and doubt can never render permanent satisfaction or peace. It is the mission of pantheism to assert the *being* of God, and it is the mission of Christianity to assert the *moral character* of God, and human life cannot find its true value without the recognition of the infinite and ultimate worth of the personality of the individual. For this reason he thinks that Oriental pantheism requires a supplementation which Christianity alone can offer. Then, after the discussion of the Moral Grandeur of Christianity the author makes an eloquent appeal to the Orient to furnish out of the riches of its heritage the elements which are needed to make the Christianity

of the future. This Christianity, he thinks, will be less ecclesiastical and less institutional than that of the West, but even richer in spiritual contents and soul-satisfying power.

This book is rich in thought and diction and gives abundant evidence of the author's thorough scholarship, breadth of view, and charming personality.

JOHN S. STAHR.

THE SEEMING UNREALITY OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE. By Henry Churchill King, President of Oberlin College. New York, The Macmillan Company. Pages 256. Price \$1.50 net.

To the natural man it is exceedingly easy to regard the present life with its manifold secular interests as embodying the whole significance of human existence. The things we can see and handle are for many men the real things, and the deeper things of the spirit seem remote and unreal, and it would seem that the tendency to take such a view of life increased in proportion as industry prospers and secular duties become more exacting in their demands upon men's time and attention. It is not without reason, therefore, that Dr. King, in the volume before us, undertakes to show first why the spiritual life seems so remote from men's minds, and then to point out how the way into reality may be found.

"The deepest need of man is faith in the reality of the spiritual, faith in a God who can save us from being at constant war with ourselves." And yet: "Though, by hypothesis, God is the one realest of all facts and the most loving of all beings, he does not seem to be thrust upon us as such at all." These two statements are not necessarily contradictory; but the second frequently works out in such a way that the first is lost sight of, and when the unsatisfied heart gropes in the dark, seeking if haply it may find God, it finds a sharp contrast between things corporeal and things spiritual. This, Dr. King thinks, is mainly due to the fact that men fail to understand the real connection between bodily conditions and spiritual life, and forget the unity of life in the midst of its complexity. Knowledge, he says, is never merely passive. To know means to be conversant with, to realize in the form of experience. Now men have constant experience of things in their natural environment, but they frequently ignore spiritual things altogether, or, at least, they do not enter into concrete relation with the deeper things of life. Ignored elements practically drop out of our life; they have for us no real existence; and thus a habit is cultivated which makes the apprehension of spiritual realities exceedingly difficult.

The author next discusses some of the traditional objections urged against the reality of spiritual interests, the difficulty in-



volved in the conception of God, the difference between the scientific and religious problems, and the limitations and fluctuations of our natures, as well as the limitations and fluctuations of the spiritual life, and comes to the conclusion that it is only our consciously best hours that bear witness to the reality of the things of the spirit.

In pointing the way into reality, Dr. King discusses the presumptive evidence. This he finds in the trend of psychological thought, and man's essential need of religion. Next he discusses the theistic argument, and man's personal relation to God. Finally he points out the method of the spiritual life, and shows how the cardinal doctrines of Christianity harmonize with and satisfy every phase of human need and experience.

This volume, as might be expected from its author, gives evidence of careful thought in its preparation, and it will prove helpful to all who seriously grapple with the difficult spiritual problems of contemporary life and experience.

JOHN S. STAHR.

CALVINISM AND AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE. By Thomas Balch, 1876. Reprinted 1909. Philadelphia, Allen, Lane, and Scott.

This pamphlet of eighteen pages, written by a distinguished member of the Philadelphia bar, is very properly reprinted this fourth centenary year of the birth of John Calvin. The author makes a valuable contribution, not so much to religious history as to political science, and shows "that to the social mechanism, instituted by the great reformer, developed and modified by time and the experience of succeeding generations, we owe that form of political organization under which we live, commonly called Constitutional Republicanism." He points out the difference between the political effects of the Lutheran reformation in Germany, and those of Calvin's labors in Geneva, and follows the latter into France, Holland, Scotland, and the United States, tracing in this way the evolution of the civil and religious liberty which is the precious heritage of every American citizen.

JOHN S. STAHR.

Rev. ELLIS N. KREMER,  
Harrisburg Pa.

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YE SHALL KNOW THE TRUTH, AND THE TRUTH SHALL MAKE YOU FREE.

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## CONTENTS OF JANUARY NUMBER

---

ARTICLE I.—The Contribution of the Hebrews to Civilization . . . . .	I
By The REV. CALVIN K. STAUDT, Ph.D.	
" II.—Scientific Study of Religious Revivals . . . . .	16
By The REV. H. M. J. KLEIN, Ph.D.	
" III.—Evangelism in the Reformed Churches . . . . .	43
By The REV. HENRY COLLIN MINTON, D.D., LL.D.	
" IV.—The Preacher's Greatest Problem . . . . .	52
By The REV. SCOTT R. WAGNER	
" V.—The Greatness of <i>Hamlet</i> as a Work of Dramatic Art . . . . .	65
By PROFESSOR C. ERNEST WAGNER, A.M.	
" VI.—Punishment . . . . .	85
By The REV. A. G. GEKELER.	
" VII.—Contemporary Religious and Theological Thought in Great Britain and America . . . . .	91
By The REV. A. S. WEBER, D.D.	
" VIII.—Editorial Department.	
The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America . . . . .	107
" IX.—Notices of New Books . . . . .	114
<i>Hinke</i> : A New Boundary Stone of Nebuchadrezzar I. from Nippur; <i>Sternberg</i> : Die Ethik des Deuteronomiums; <i>Sheldon</i> : Unbelief in the Nineteenth Century; <i>Richard</i> : Christian Worship: Its Principles and Forms; <i>Mott</i> : The Future Leadership of the Church; <i>Maclaren</i> : Exposition of Holy Scripture; <i>Nösgen</i> : Das Wirken des Heiligen Geistes an den einzelnen Gläubigen und in der Kirche; <i>Goodspeed</i> : The Epistle to the Hebrews; <i>Robertson</i> : A Short Grammar of the Greek New Testament; <i>Adam</i> : The Religious Teachers of Greece; <i>Dykes</i> : The Christian Minister and His Duties; <i>Gilbert</i> : Interpretation of the Bible; <i>Tyrrell</i> : The Programme of Modernism; <i>Matheson</i> : The Representative Women of the Bible; <i>Bloomfield</i> : The Religion of the Veda; <i>Campbell</i> : Paul the Mystic; <i>Braun</i> : Die Bedeutung der Concupiscenz in Luthers Leben und Lehre.	





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The REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW is the lineal successor of the REFORMED QUARTERLY REVIEW, as that was of the MERCERSBURG REVIEW. And, true to its antecedents, it will continue to be an organ for Christological, historical and positive theology, as this has come to be generally understood in the Reformed Church in the United States. Taking its position in the confessional system of the Heidelberg Catechism, it will endeavor to be true to the historical genius of the Reformed Church; but believing in the principle of historical development, it will not shut itself up to the horizon of any particular place or time in theology, but will have an open vision and a cordial welcome for all truth, new as well as old, from whatever quarter it may come.

The REVIEW will strive to be truly catholic and liberal in spirit. It proposes to serve the cause of pure truth and of pure religion. It will, therefore, not be bound by any party lines. But seeking to serve and promote the truth as it is in Christ, it will endeavor to keep itself free from all forms of theological bondage. Freedom of thought within the limits of Christian truth will ever be its watchword. Hence it retains the old motto, only in a more complete form: "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free."

But while the REVIEW will serve chiefly as an organ for the advancement of theological learning, it will by no means exclude from its pages articles on other and more general subjects. It recognizes the truth that to Christianity, and, therefore, also to theology, nothing that is human is foreign. Natural science, philosophy, literature, ethics, sociology and kindred branches of knowledge, are at present engaging wide and earnest attention; and articles along these lines, written in the spirit of this REVIEW, are, accordingly, invited for its pages.

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